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INTRODUCTION
There is no such thing as 'the' problem of expression in art. It would be truer to say
that there are as many problems of expression in art as one cares to define.
In the past, talk of expression in art has provided philosophers with a convenient
launching point for discussing any one of three clusters of questions which crystalise
around the notions of 'expression' and 'art'. The first cluster of questions focuses upon
the notion of expression itself, the logic of the word 'express' and its cognates. General
philosophical studies devoted to the concept of expression are relatively rare.1 The
concept of expression is defined against the backdrop of three types of activity: the
activity of naturally expressing oneself by revealing or evincing emotional states in
behaviour; the activity of expressing or asserting thoughts in language; and the activity of
creating artifacts such as works of art. One philosophical question to ask here concerns
the relationship between the different areas of activity thought to be examples of
expression. Can we discover anything in common to all those activities that count as
'expressive'? Is the notion of expression a unified concept in our thinking? That is to say,
is there a 'primary' sense of the word 'express' around which we tend to organize a
cluster of derivative or secondary uses of the word? In his book Mind and Art, Guy
Sircello purports to find just such a primary use. Sircello asserts that all uses of 'express'
are derivative upon the notion of an expressive 'act'. Sircello conceives an expressive act
to be either a manner of acting or a product of acting deemed to be characteristic of a
human being who is in a particular emotional or intentional state. Sircello offers the
suggestion that works of art, history, philosophy and science, and any activity requiring
the use of language, share an important feature with ordinary sorts of expressions like
gestures, grimaces, and inarticulate cries. For all of these are construable as 'acts'
characteristic of persons who have certain emotions, feelings, and attitudes; who are in
particular moods or states of mind, or who possess certain personality-, character-,
1 Alan Tormey, The Concept ofExpression: A Study in Philosophical Psychology and Aesthetics
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971), provides the best general analysis of the
concept in recent decades.
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temperamental- or mental- traits.2 Although one might wonder whether the concept of
expression is as unified in our thinking as Sircello's analysis would suggest, Sirccllo's
book offers some food for thought.
Philosophers thinking upon the concept of expression might pose the question,
which of these three activities - asserting, evincing, creating artifacts - forms the
paradigm for our understanding of expression in general. Richard Wollheim describes
what he calls the 'conventional' account of expression, which attempts to define
expression by contrast with what is indifferently referred to as communication,
description or assertion. The conventional account comes up against the hard fact that the
dichotomy between expression and assertion does not correspond in any neat way with
the distinction between behaviour and language. For we recognize the existence of an
expressive use of language, a use displaying the characteristics of behaviour, as when we
make interjections. And at the same time, we recognize a form of ritualized or ceremonial
behaviour displaying characteristics appropriate to the assertive function of language.
These realizations lead to the circular conclusion that
we assert our feelings in language unless we express them, and we express our
feelings in behaviour unless we assert them. And to assert our feelings is to
reveal them as we do in language unless we happen to express them: and to
express our feelings is to reveal them as we do in behaviour unless we happen
to assert them.3
Clearly an intellectual cul-de-sac the philosopher will wish to extricate himself from!
One issue of particular interest to the philosopher of aesthetics concerns the nature of
the concept of aesthetic expression. How is this concept related to the other expressive
activities of asserting and evincing? Roger Scruton points at some of the difficulties faced
by those seeking a nonaesthetic paradigm upon which to model an understanding of
aesthetic expression. Scruton notes that the analogy between expression in art and
expression in language remains no more than an analogy. For whilst language is
2Guy Sircello, Mind and Art: An Essay on the Varieties of Expression (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 130.
3Richard Wollheim, "Expression", in On Art and the Mind (London: Allen Lane, 1973), pp.80-100,
pp.85-87.
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expressive through the conventions that give it reference, and expressive because it
expresses thoughts, a work of art is expressive in neither of these senses. Scruton further
notes an important dissimilarity between the expression that takes place in art and the
expression or evincing of emotion through behaviour. For the aesthetic use of the term
'express' is generally replaceable by the term 'expressive'. In art there is no expression
without expressiveness, and expression becomes expressiveness only when it is in some
sense successful. By contrast, a gesture is a natural expression of some feeling if it is a
symptom of that feeling, and a symptom need not be expressive.4 In response to these
observations, it might be argued that the fact there is no expression in art without
expressiveness probably reveals more concerning the notion of expression in general
than it reveals concerning the nature of aesthetic expression in particular. For as Guy
Sircello points out, 'express' functions as a 'success' or 'achievement' verb.5 That is to
say, the use of the word 'express' indicates a somehing captured. Either we have
expressed something or we have not; and if we have not, we look to use another verb.
Thus, the fact that the action evincing my emotional state is never expressive qua
symptom, might be used to indicate that there exists a genuine logical or conceptual gap
between the concept of expressing oneself and the concept of betraying oneself through
ones's emotions.
The second set of questions concerning the issue of expression in art focuses upon
the issue of expressive attribution in art. Human beings have a natural inclination to
anthropomorphise works of art and parts of nature, describing these with a vocabulary
borrowed from the realm of human affective and emotional life. Some philosophers
would define the problem of expression in art as one of accounting for this practice of
expressive attribution. The last half-century has seen the rise of what I shall call the New
Theory of expression.6 The New Theorists recommended doing away with the excesses
4Roger Scruton, Art and Imagination (London: Methuen and Co., 1974), pp.215, 214.
5Guy Sircello, Mind and Art: An Essay on the Varieties of Expression (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1973), pp.144, 138.
6The 'New Theorists' include Monroe C.Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of
Criticism, 2nd ed. (Indiannapolis, Cambridge: Hackctt, 1981), pp.331-332; O.K.Bouswma, "The
Expression Theory of Art", in Philosophical Analysis, ed. Max Black (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1950), pp.75-101; John Ilospers, "Art as Expression", in Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy,
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associated with the traditional theory of expression, "that hopeless theory that works of
art are exudates of the soul,"7 by redefining the problem of expression in art as one of
expressiveness in art, the problem of explaining the expressive features belonging to
works of art. To say that a work of music is sad is not to say that the work expresses or
is an expression of sadness. Rather, it is to say that the work is a sad-expression, in
much the same way that the features of a dog may carry a sad expression. The New
Theory conceives the expressive character of a work of art to be a "human quality" or
"feeling quality" of a work of art internally related to the physical and formal properties
belonging to the work, so that the relationship between a work of art and its sadness
more closely resembles the relationship between a rose and its redness than it resembles
the relationship between John and his sadness. In much the same way that the
anthropomorphic properties of nature can be explained away by appealing to the physical
properties of the situation, so too the expressive character of a work of art might be
explained away by appealing to the formal and representational properties belonging to
the work.
That the New Theory has tended to set the agenda for contemporary discussions of
expression in art may be gauged from the fact that two of the most important theories of
musical expression in recent decades tackle the problem of expression in music in the
terms laid out by the New Theory.8 That is to say, both theories assume that, in the
words of Peter Kivy, the problem of expression in music is "the 'special' metaphysical
difficulty (if I may so call it) of how a certain kind of object, musical sound, can possess
a certain kind of property, the garden-variety emotion, that can belong only to a very
different kind of object, namely a sentient being."9 However, despite the undoubted
contemporary influence of the New Theory, the view has not been without its critics.
ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1967), Vol.1, 46-48; Alan Tormey, The Concept of
Expression.
7Arthur C.Danto, "Introduction" to Alan Tormey, The Concept ofExpression: A Study in Philosophical
Psychology and Aesthetics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971), p.xii.
8Peter Kivy, The Corded Shell (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980). Reprinted in
Sound Sentiment: an Essay on the Musical Emotions, Including the Complete Text of The Corded Shell
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989); and S. Davies, "The Expression of Emotion in Music",
Mind, 87 (1980), 67-86. The view is reprised in a slightly expanded form in Stephen Davies, Musical
Meaning and Expression (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp.221-240.
9Sound Sentiment, p. 180.
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Those objecting to the New Theory typically do so because they believe that at least some
descriptions attributing anthropomorphic characteristics to works of art bear greater
logical similarities to the expression "John is sad" than they do to the forumla "The rose
is red".
Guy Sircello challenges the New Theory by discovering expressive descriptions of
works of art that resist the New Theorist's analyses.10 When we say "Poussin's The
Rape of the Sabine Women is calm and aloof' or that "Breughel's Wedding Dance in the
Open Air is an ironic work", the aloofness and irony described cannot be attributed to
these works as features of the subject matter or of the visual design of the respective
compositions. The only way to make sense of these statements is to interpret them as
descriptions of 'acts' performed by the artist in the work. Thus, "Poussin's Rape is calm
and aloof' amounts to the claim that "Poussin depicts his subject in a calm and aloof
manner"; and "Breughel's Wedding Dance is an ironic picture" becomes "Breughel
depicts his scene ironically". Statements such as "Poussin's Rape is calm and aloof' and
"Breughel's Wedding Dance is an ironic work" represent ways of describing works of art
that refer in the same breath both to the work of art and to the artist.11 It is important to
realize that the 'artistic acts' which Sircello describes do not correspond with a set of facts
concerning the historical artist and his methods of production, facts which might be
confirmed or denied by appealing to the biography of artist. Instead, in pointing to the
existence of 'artistic acts' in works of art, Sircello is relying upon a fact which Richard
Wollheim draws to our attention, the circumstance that, once we know what the outcome
of an activity might be, we can refer to the activity itself in a transparent way that allows
us to see straight through the action and focus on its trace. Thus, once we know there is a
grey mark on the canvas, we can refer to the artist's action of placing a grey mark on the
canvas, secure in the knowledge that there is no fact of the matter which could emerge
refuting the existence of this action.12 Once an artifact has been produced through human
1 °Guy Sircello, "Perceptual Acts and Pictorial Art: A Defence of the Expression Theory", .IP, 62
(1965), 669-677; Mind and Art, pp. 19-23.
11Mind and Art, 27,
1 2Richard Wollheim, "On Expression and Expressionism", Revue Internationale de Philosophie, XVIII,
67-60(1964), 270-289; p.282.
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intentional activity, it is possible to see the resulting artifact as the product of a particular
type of activity: specifically, the activity of producing an artifact of that type. Like the
action of placing a grey mark upon a canvas, Sircello's artistic acts are actions that can
only be specified in terms of the products of such actions. The act of depicting a scene
aloofly is the act of producing a painting that is calm and aloof. Sircello's point in
introducing the concept of artistic acts is to make us aware of the fact that human beings
have a natural tendency to see intentionally produced artifacts as something more than
mere things, for we see these as products of intentional action. Sircello sees a precedent
in the realm of human gesture for our tendency, in looking at works of art, to see the
trace left behind by an activity as the product of a manner of acting. In much the same
way that an 'aloof' picture points to an aloof manner of depicting, so too the fact that
Sally has a shy smile upon her face points to the fact that Sally is smiling shyly. A human
gesture, like a work of art, may be described both as activity ("Sally smiles shyly") and
as product of that activity ("Sally has a shy smile on her face"). This analogy invites for
Sircello the thought that the spectator views the work of art as something analogous to a
human expressive action. The work of art is, if you like, the artist's 'grimace'.
In introducing the concept of 'artistic acts', Sircello has a much more important point
to make than to show that there are ways of describing works of art which resist the
analysis of the New Theory. For it is Sircello's contention that the New Theorist shows
an inadequate metaphysical understanding when she treats the expressiveness of works
of art as of the same order as the expressiveness of natural objects. Works of art are not
brute physical objects which happen to possess anthropomorphic characteristics. Works
of art are brute physical objects which also happen to be artifacts, the products of human
activity. Viewed as the products of that activity, they carry the expressive traces of that
activity. The mistake of supposing that we might adequately describe a work of art as
nothing more than a brute physical object possessing expressive features, is equivalent to
the mistake of supposing that we might adequately describe a human gesture or facial
expression as nothing more than a bodily configuration or a lie of the face.
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Like Sircello, Virgil C.Aldrich has also expressed dissatisfaction with the New
Theory.13 Like Sircello, Aldrich expresses his dissatisfaction by querying the meta¬
physical sensitivity of the New Theorist. As the quotation from Kivy indicates, the New
Theorist believes that the problem of expression in art is the "special metaphysical
difficulty" of explaining how a work of art qua insentient thing comes to be the possessor
of properties which belong to sentient beings. The New Theorist believes that there is a
problem of explaining the expressiveness of works of art because she thinks that works
of art are metaphysically queer entities to function as the subject of expressive
attributions. Like Sircello, Aldrich diagnoses the New Theorist's mistake as one of
treating works of art, metaphysically speaking, as on a par with natural objects. The New
Theorist considers the work of art to be a queer subject for expressive attributions
because she accepts a materialist-reductionist analysis of a work of art, one which
reduces the work of art to a brute physical thing. Aldrich suggests that, were the New
Theorist entirely consistent in her metaphysical instincts, she would subject the concept
of a person to the same reductionist analysis and thereby come to realize that the person
qua brute physical object is also a peculiar subject for expressive attributions. This
realization would lead her to seek a more sensitive metaphysical analysis of the nature of
persons and of works of art, an analysis explaining how both the person and the work of
art may function as the subject of expressive predications.14 Aldrich suggests that the key
to a correct analysis of expressiveness in art and in persons lies in realizing that
expressive attributions do not designate properties, and that the notion of expression is
necessarily tied up with the notion of a body functioning in a certain way.15 In particular,
Aldrich suggests that it is only after the brute physical thing (human body, work of art)
has been subjected to a certain perceptual organisation that it becomes the proper subject
of expressive predication. It is a consequence of Aldrich's theory that, contrary to what
the New Theorist supposes, the question of expression in art cannot be conducted in
isolation from the question of expression in persons. Aldrich's critique of the New
13See for instance '"Expresses' and 'Expressive'", JAAC, 37 (1978), 203-217.
14Virgil C.Aldrich, Philosophy ofArt (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p.45-46.
1-^"Expresses' and 'Expressive'", p.208.
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Theory is hidden away within, and presupposes the truth of, a theory of aesthetic
perception that is both metaphysically packed and difficult to digest.16 For this reason,
Aldrich's thought-provoking criticisms never achieved the attention they perhaps
deserved. In an attempt to partially correct this oversight, Chapter Three below is devoted
to explicating some of the dense suppositions contained in Aldrich's theory of aesthetic
perception, whilst Chapter Four draws upon this exposition to describe the nature of
Aldrich's criticisms of the New Theory.
The third set of issues typically addressed under the heading of expression in art
focus upon the relationship between emotion and art, and in particular, the relationship
between a perceiver's emotional response and the work of art. In the area of musical
aesthetics in particular, the question of expression has in recent years shaped into a debate
concerning the relationship between emotion and music. There are two reasons why this
should have happened. In the first place, whilst many philosophers believe that felt
emotion does not form an essential component in a properly aesthetic experience of a
work of art, they also believe that not all ways of emotionally responding to a work of art
are aesthetically irrelevant. In particular, an emotional response is deemed to be a
properly aesthetic response in the event that the emotion takes the work of art for its
object as well as its cause.17 Many philosophers take it as fact that emotional responses
are more frequently felt in the experience of music than they are felt in experiencing other
artforms; and that not all of these emotional responses are aesthetically irrelevant
responses. In the second place, the tendency to treat the problem of expression in music
as one concerning the relationship between emotion and music reflects the hand of the
New Theory in shaping the recent debate. For the New Theorists replace talk of
expression in music with talk of the expressiveness of music; that is to say, talk of the
expressive properties music possesses. Thus, the question of the expressivenes of music
becomes a question of the emotion characteristics belonging to works of music and our
ways of identifying these; with some philosophers suggesting that we recognize emotion
1 6Aldrich lays out his metaphysical position in '"Expresses' and 'Expressive'", but also in Philosophy of
Art (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963); and "Pictures and Persons - An Analogy",
Review of Metaphysics, 28 (1975), 599-610.
17See for instance Stephen Davies, "The Rationality of Aesthetic Responses", BJA, 23, (1983), 38-47.
8
characteristics in much the same way we happen to notice the expressive character of a
person's face or carriage,18 and others suggesting that our experience of the emotional
qualities in music more closely resembles the experience of recognizing emotional
qualities in ourselves than it resembles the experience of inferring the emotions of others
based upon their behaviour and demeanour.19
These two factors have combined to produce a debate between on the one hand, a
group of 'emotivists' who believe they experience the emotions they ascribe to works of
music; and on the other hand, a group of 'cognitivists' who deny that they experience the
emotions they ascribe to musical works.20 Many emotivists are also arousalists, those
claiming that music's expressiveness consists in its power to arouse emotions in auditors.
However, not all emotivists are arousalists, for some emotivists would believe that we
experience some of the emotions attributed to the musical work whilst not believing that
this fact provides an analysis of music's expressiveness.21 Cognitivists, by contrast,
claim that music is sad in virtue of possessing sadness as a quality that we can hear in the
music. Many of those contributing to the topic of musical expressiveness in recent years
have felt moved, either to argue for an Arousalist position,22 or else to take exception to a
particular Arousalist theory,23 or to suggest some point of reconciliation between musical
cognitivism and emotivism.24
1 8Kivy, Peter, The Corded Shell; Music Alone: Reflections On the Purely Musical Experience (Ithaca
and London: Cornell University Press, 1990), clip.9, pp. 173-198; S.Davies, "The Expression
of Emotion in Music."
1 ^he view of Harold Osborne, "Expressiveness in the Arts", JAAC, 41 (1982), 19-29, p.20; and
"Expressiveness: Where is the Feeling Found?", BJA, 13 (1983), 112-123, p. 118.
20For the distinction between musical 'emotivism' and 'cognitivism', see Peter Kivy, Sound Sentiment:
An Essay on the Musical Emotions, p. 154. See also Peter Kivy, Music Alone, clip.8, pp. 146-172.
2 J-A point made by Stephen Davies, Review of Peter Kivy's Sound Sentiment, JAAC, 49 (1991), 83-
85, p.83. Jerrold Levinson, "Music and Negative Emotion", in Music, Art and Metaphysics (Ithaca and
London: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp.306-335, p.308, takes the emotivist-but-not-arousalist line
when he suggests that "something very much like the arousal of negative emotions is accomplished by
some music."
22See for example John Nolt, "Expression and Emotion", BJA, 21 (1981), 139-150; Donald Callen,
"The Sentiment in Musical Sensibility", JAAC, 40 (1982), 381-393; Peter Mew, "The Expression of
Emotion in Music", BJA, 25 (1985), 33-42, and "The Musical Arousal of Emotions", BJA, 25 (1985),
357-361; Stanley Speck, '"Arousal Theory' Reconsidered", BJA , 28 (1988), 40-47; Colin Radford,
"Emotions and Music: A Reply to the Cognitivists", JAAC, 47, (1989), 69-76; and "Muddy Waters:,
JAAC, 49 (1991) 247-252; Derek Matravers, "Art and the Feelings and Emotions", BJA, 31 (1991),
322-331.
23Robert Stecker, "Nolt on Expression and Emotion", BJA, 23 (1983), 234-239; Peter Kivy, "Sound
Sentiment: A Reply to Donald Callen", JAAC, 41 (1983), 332-334 and Sound Sentiment, pp. 153-176;
Aaron Ridley, "Mr Mew on Music", BJA, 26 (1986), 69-70; and "Pitiful Responses to Music", BJA,
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This thesis accepts the key assumption underlying the New Theory, that the problem
of expression in art is most adequately handled as a problem of expressive attribution.
However, this thesis departs from the New Theorist's assumption that the problem of
expressive attribution is a free-standing philosophical problem. Viewed in the proper
context, the problem of expressive attribution forms part of a far wider problem of
aesthetic attribution in general. To see why the problem of expressive attribution might be
treated as part of a wider problem of aesthetic attribution, consider the following gushing
description:
Titian's Bacchus and Ariadne is a young person's work, a work which
exhausts even as it carries the viewer along in the tide of its own momentum.
What optimistism, what joie de vivre does Titian express in this exuberant
work! The colours, if they do not exactly shout, certainly speak out in a firm
and loud voice. Like the members of the entourage of the young god in the
foreground, they jostle one another for the viewer's attention until the viewer
doesn't know where to look. At the same time that these mythic beings
compete for the viewer's attention in Titian's fantastical landscape, the picture
motifs corresponding with each of these beings compete for space in the picture
plane. Adding to the sense of competition at both levels is the impression that
each of these figures occupies a self-contained world, an impression no doubt
accidentally heightened by the fact that the figure in the middle foreground
wrestling with snakes represents an overpainting, a late addition to the work.
With so much lushness and visual lavishness on offer, the viewer may be
forgiven for feeling exhausted by all this vitality.
The New Theorist sets himself the task of explaining the expressive attributions
contained in the first two lines of this statement, by appealing to the various
nonexpressive properties belonging to the work. Those properties he uses in particular
33, (1993), 72-74; John E. MacKinnon, "Artistic Expression and the Claims of Arousal Theory", BJA,
36 (1996), 278-289.
24R.T.Allen, "The Arousal and Expression of Emotion by Music", BJA, 30 (1990), 55-61; Jencfer
Robinson, 'The Expression and Arousal of Emotion in Music", JAAC, 52 (1994), 13-22; Alan
Goldman, "Emotions in Music (A Postscript)", JAAC, 53 (1995), 59-69. Even Peter Kivy, first among
cognitivists, has felt moved to make some slight concession to the emotivists. See "Auditor's
Emotions: Contention, Concession and Compromise", JAAC, 51 (1993), 1-12. Kendall L. Walton's
suggestion that music involves the arousal of imaginary emotions, constitutes an interesting attempt at a
reconciliationist position. See "What is Abstract About the Art of Music?", JAAC, 46 (1988), 351-364.
Aaron Ridley's "Musical Sympathies: The Experience of Expressive Music", JAAC, 53 (1995), 49-57,
is less an attempt at reconciling the claims of the two views than it is a theory purportedly integrating
elements of both positions.
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will be of two kinds: properties attributable to the representational content or the subject-
matter of the work, and certain elements of the visual design. Immediately he faces the
problem that the claim "Titian's Bacchus and Ariadne is an exuberant work" constitutes
one of Sircello's artistic acts, translated in the ensuing description into the claim that
"Titian depicts his subject-matter exuberantly'. Yet even supposing the New Theorist did
find a way of rearticulating this claim without mentioning such metaphysically dubious
entities as artistic acts, the New Theorist finds that his philosophical work is not yet at an
end. As he works his way through the passage, he finds himself confronted by a host of
what look to be philosophically baffling descriptions. What does it mean to say that a
brute physical thing, a canvas having had paint applied to it, possesses 'momentum'?
Does it make sense to say that colours may 'shout' or 'speak in a loud and firm voice'?
This passage demonstrates that we will fail to make adequate progress in understanding
the nature of expressive characterizations of works of art unless or until we understand
the nature of aesthetic predications in general.
II
To lend some order to the ensuing discussion of aesthetic attributions, Chapter One
begins with Frank Sibley's classic distinction between aesthetic and nonaesthetic
concepts. According to Sibley, the class of aesthetic concepts serves to describe a set of
properties which can only be detected through the exercise of a certain perceptivity which
Sibley calls 'taste'. Although careful consideration of Sibley's account of aesthetic
concepts demonstrates that Sibley does not manage to offer a particularly enlightening
account of aesthetic perception or aesthetic experience, Sibley's account does deserve a
more sympathetic and attentive reading than many commentators have seen fit to give it.
For this reason, I use Chapter One to search for an interpretation of Sibley's project
1 1
yielding a philosophically defensible position which remains true to Sibley's original
intentions. Here I argue that Sibley's proposal was far more modest in scope than many
of Sibley's critics have supposed, and that in particular, it would be a mistake to suppose
that Sibley was using his distinction between aesthetic and nonaesthetic concepts to mark
out the entire subject-matter of philosophical aesthetics. I also describe the challenge to
Sibley's brand of aesthetic realism laid out in an argument given by Roger Scruton,25 and
demonstrate some of the ways in which Sibley might meet Scruton's challenge.
Having made the most sympathetic case possible for Sibley's theory, Chapters Two
through Five treat Sibley's views as a launching pad into a wider enquiry into the nature
of aesthetic perception and aesthetic judgement. In Chapter Two the suggestion is made
that those aesthetic judgements which employ Sibley's taste concepts constitute strongly
perceptual judgements: judgements made in the course of acts of perception as opposed
to acts of reflective judgement taking the data of perception for their raw materials. This
observation provides some circumstantial evidence in favour of Sibley's claim that
aesthetic judgement relies upon an ability to notice or detect things. It also represents the
final concession made here to Sibley's theory. At the end of Chapter Two, I suggest how
a simple perceptual model of aesthetic judgement of the type Sibley offers, one which
treats aesthetic sensitivity as an ability to detect a certain species of quality, might be
thought to offer an inadequate understanding of aesthetic experience. This is because
aesthetic sensitivity might have less to do with the properties detected than it has to do
with the way in which the perceiver perceptually organizes the object as she perceives.
The notion that aesthetic perception amounts to a form of perceptual organization
raises the possibility that the act of perceiving aesthetically excludes a more ordinary
perceptual awareness of the object perceived. With this in mind, Chapter Three examines
in some detail Virgil Aldrich's intriguing proposal that aesthetic awareness by its very
nature excludes a nonaesthetic awareness of the character of things. Aldrich creates a
distinction between a nonaesthetic and aesthetic mode of perception, identified
respectively as observation and prehension, and claims that I cannot simultaneously
25Roger Scruton, Art and Imagination: A Study in the Philosophy ofMind (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1974), pp.38-44.
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observe and prehend the same object. As well as laying out the metaphysical assumptions
which underlie Aldrich's distinction, I compare and contrast Aldrich's views on
representational perception with the more familiar views of Richard Wollheim. This
comparison suggests that there is no obvious implausibility in the use Aldrich makes of
his distinction to describe the phenomenon of representational perception. However, as
applied outside of the example of looking at a picture, the view runs foul of
commonsense. Since no evidence can be discovered in Aldrich's writings to support his
claim that aesthetic and nonaesthetie perception represent mutually exclusive modes of
perception, I conclude in favour of the commonsense view that perceiving the aesthetic
character of things is compatible with what we think of as ordinary acts of perception.
That is to say, a sensitivity to the aesthetic character of the object perceived can enter the
content of any perceptual act.
Chapter Four previews the account of aesthetic judgement developed in Chapter
Five, exploring the nature of physiognomic perception as part of a wider discussion of
expression in art. The theories of Aldrich and of Wollheim feature large in this
discussion. Because Wollheim draws certain parallels between his theory of pictorial
representation and his theory of artistic expression, the discussion, conducted in the
previous chapter, of Wollheim's views on the representational perception forms the
backdrop to his discussion of expression in art. The reader is doubly rewarded for
bearing with the complexities of discussion in the previous chapter, when I draw upon
the metaphysical machinery underpinning Aldrich's account of aesthetic perception to
explicate his views on the nature of expressive attribution.
In Chapter Five, I suggest how the concepts of aesthetic perception and
physiognomic perception may be juxtaposed to provide mutual illumination. The notion
that aesthetic perception goes hand in hand with ordinary perception is used to show that
aesthetic sensitivity amounts to an assessment of the perceptual character an object
possesses for the act of perception, where the perceptual character of an object can be
understood as the 'physiognomy' or face the object presents to the act of perception
itself. Aesthetic judgements are judgements telling us what it is like to perceive things.
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The notion that aesthetic perception constitutes a form of 'physiognomic' perception in
some extended understanding of the term coheres with the suggestion that aesthetic
qualities constitute 'tertiary' qualities, qualities of affect which rely upon secondary
qualities in much the same way that secondary qualities depend upon primary qualities. I
briefly re-examine the question of aesthetic realism as a question concerning the objective
status of tertiary qualities, and throw some doubt upon the notion that the doctrine of
aesthetic supervenience sometimes used in describing the relationship between aesthetic
and nonaesthetic qualities, has any serious theoretical contribution to make in aesthetics.
The model of aesthetic judgement developed here has certain implications for our
understanding of the relative distribution of aesthetic taste, or sensitivity. Sibley adopts
the traditional understanding of the distribution of aesthetic sensitivity when he confines
taste to a small group of gifted individuals. According to the model of aesthetic judgement
developed in Chapter Five, perceivers form aesthetic judgements when they determine
what it is like to perceive things. This suggests that, in principle, aesthetic judgements
can be made by anyone, and may take place in the course of any act of perception. The
thesis ends by suggesting that the traditional distinction between those possessing and
those lacking taste does not reflect a difference in ability to enjoy aesthetic experiences,
but becomes instead a distinction between those possessing and those lacking the ability
to articulate the nature of their aesthetic experiences. That is to say, the main difference
between these two groups of individuals consists, not in the nature of their experiences,




Before we can decide which aspects of the language of art appreciation pose special
philosophical puzzles, we will require some grasp of what is meant by an aesthetic
attribution or an aesthetic description. The notion of an aesthetic attribution is both prima
facie obvious yet difficult to make theoretically precise. On the one hand, we might
expect to discover some significant connection between aesthetic attributions, aesthetic
judgements and aesthetic experiences. On the other hand, we accept that not everything
uttered in the context of art appreciation serves to report an aesthetic experience. The man
who informs his companions in the art gallery that a picture weighs five pounds,
occupies six square foot of space and was painted in 1936, is not making aesthetic
attributions. Frank Sibley's famous distinction between aesthetic and nonaesthetic
concepts1 articulates the commonsense intuition that not everything uttered in the context
of art appreciation constitutes a properly aesthetic remark.
Because Sibley's discussion of aesthetic concepts has achieved the status of a
modern classic in the area, I shall use Sibley's insights as a convenient starting point for
the theory of aesthetic attribution to be developed in Chapters One through Five. To
preview the development of that theory, Chapters Two and Three examine the link
between perception and aesthetic judgement. For Sibley, an aesthetic judgement serves to
describe a perceptual experience rather than functioning as the conclusion to a piece of
reflective reasoning. In Chapter Two I examine and reject two arguments commonly
raised against the proposal that aesthetic descriptions serve to designate objective aesthetic
properties. The examination of the relationship between perception and aesthetic
judgement continues in Chapter Three, where I address the claim sometimes made that an
aesthetic awareness of things is incompatible with the performance of more mundane
perceptual tasks. Chapter Four focuses upon a special category of aesthetic attributions:
1 Sibley, "Aesthetic Concepts", PR, 68 (1959), 421-450; "Aesthetic and Nonaesthetic", PR, 74 (1965),
135-159; Frank Sibley and Michael Tanner, "Objectivity and Aesthetics", PAS, Supp. Vol.42 (1968),
31 -72; pp.31-54. See also some short rebuttal pieces: "Aesthetic Concepts: a Rejoinder", PR, 72
(1963), 79-83; and "Symposium on Taste", BJA, 6 (1966), 68-69.
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expressive attributions, or those descriptions of aspects of works of art employing
emotion-terms, terms borrowed from the domain of human affective and emotional life.
Although expressive attributions form a proper subset of aesthetic attributions, I shall use
the theory of expressive attribution offered in Chapter Four as a starting point for the
account of aesthetic attribution developed in Chapter Five.
Here in Chapter One, I offer a more attentive and sympathetic reading of Sibley's
discussion of aesthetic qualities than that offered by many of Sibley's commentators.
Section I introduces Sibley's distinction, and Section II offers a tentative classification of
Sibley's aesthetic attributions. Sufficient time has elapsed since Sibley first introduced the
notion of an aesthetic concept to render it both desirable and necessary to say something
about the philosophical climate in which Sibley's paper was first received. With this in
mind, the remaining sections of this chapter describe the tenor of those criticisms which
Sibley's view attracted in the 'sixties and early 'seventies. Here I indicate where I believe
the true interest of Sibley's distinction lies, and suggest a plausible reading of Sibley's
distinction which counters or avoids the main objections put forward by Ted Cohen and
Roger Scruton. In particular, I shall argue that to assume that Sibley was proposing his
distinction in an attempt to isolate the subject-matter of aesthetics is not the only, or the
best, possible interpretation of Sibley's intentions. What Sibley says is more modest,
and therefore more plausible, than many of his critics have chosen to suppose.
I
Sibley launches his discussion of aesthetic concepts by drawing attention to two
different classes of remark we might make. According to Sibley, any ordinarily
perceptive person would be qualified to say that something is "large, circular, green,
slow, or monosyllabic". However, pronouncing something to be "graceful, dainty, or
garish", or claiming that a work of art is "balanced, moving, or powerful" requires
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"aesthetic sensitivity, perceptiveness or taste", something beyond ordinary perceptual
sensitivity. The first group of judgements involve nonaesthetic concepts, whilst those
judgements requiring something beyond ordinary perceptiveness for their formation
employ what Sibley calls aesthetic concepts.2 That something beyond ordinary
perceptiveness Sibley identifies as 'taste', in the sense of an ability to notice or discern
things.3
Sibley appears to believe that aesthetic terms such as 'balanced' or 'moving' or
'graceful' designate dependent, emergent qualities very similar to perceptual gestalts. In
the same way that there could not be a grin without a face, aesthetic qualities owe their
existence to nonaesthetic qualities, and emerge for us only if we are able to see or
otherwise experience those nonaesthetic qualities which are responsible for their
existence.4 Sibley believes that aesthetic attributes have occurrence conditions, in the
form of those nonaesthetic attributes upon which they causally depend, but that aesthetic
terms lack application conditions. No set of nonaesthetic attributions is logically sufficient
for a particular aesthetic term to apply. To put the same point in a slightly different way,
no finite description specifying the occurrence conditions for an aesthetic feature ever
puts it beyond doubt that the corresponding aesthetic attribution must apply. Whereas
certain features of an object may be causally sufficient to bring about a particular aesthetic
feature, reference to these nonaesthetic features will never belogically sufficient to ground
a particular aesthetic description.5 This leads Sibley to say that aesthetic terms are not
condition-governed, or that they are at best only negatively governed by conditions.
While no nonaesthetic quality can count for the presence of an aesthetic quality, the
knowledge that a particular nonaesthetic quality is present might lead us to reject a
particular aesthetic description.6 For instance, if I know that the colours of an object are
all pale pastels, then it is quite likely the object would not count as garish. Because
2 "Aesthetic and Nonaesthetic", p. 135; "Aesthetic Concepts", p.421.
3 "Aesthetic Concepts", p.423; "Symposium on Taste", p.68.
4 "Aesthetic and Nonaesthetic", pp. 137-138; "Objectivity and Aesthetics", pp.35-36, 39; "Aesthetic
Concepts", p.424.
5 "Aesthetic and Nonaesthetic", pp. 152-153; "Aesthetic Concepts", p.426. For more on the tenninology
of occurrence conditions and application conditionss, see Monroe C.Beardsley, "The Descriptivist
Account of Aesthetic Attributes", Revue International de Philosopliie, 28 (1974), 336-352; p.337. See
also Jerrold Levinson, "Aesthetic Uniqueness", JAAC, 38 (1980), 435-449; p.436.
6 "Aesthetic and Nonaesthetic", p. 152; "Aesthetic Concepts", pp.426-427.
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aesthetic terms lack governing conditions, the role of the critic is not one of providing
'reasons' for aesthetic judgements, by specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for
the application of an aesthetic term. Instead, the role of the critic consists in providing
what we might call a 'perceptual proof, pointing out those nonaesthetic features in a
work of art most notably responsible for the effect she wants us to see.7 If you like, the
critic's comments serve as a form of verbal gesticulation, an effort to focus our attention
in such a way that we come to see the relevant emergent aesthetic qualities for ourselves.
The following represents a master list of the various aesthetic terms Sibley mentions
in his discussion, alphabetized as adjectives, nouns and qualifying phrases:
Adjectival aesthetic terms: anaemic, athletic, balanced, blatant, chaotic, comely,
dainty, delicate, dynamic, elegant, exciting, flaccid, forceful, garish, gaudy,
gay, graceful, handsome, hideous, insipid, integrated, lanky, lifeless, lovely,
majestic, * monotonous, moving, naive, nostalgic, pathetic, pensive, * pretty,
powerful, sentimental, serene,* silken, solemn,* somber, strident, taut,
tragic, trite, turbulent, ugly, unbalanced, unified, vertiginous, vivid, wan.
Nouns functioning as aesthetic terms: elegance, energy, excitement,
flamboyance, frenzy, garishness, grandeur, majesty, plaintiveness, power,
sadness, solemnity, * splendour, stability, strength, unity, vitality.
Qualifying phrases employed by Sibley in aesthetic descriptions: conveys a
sense of, deeply moving, sets up an exciting tension (said of a grouping of
figures), exquisite balance, firm line, holds it together, merely touching,
never really come to life (said of characters in a novel), nobly austere, plaintive
tone, powerfidly moving-, has a certain serenity and repose, (an episode)
strikes a false note, subtley varied, telling contrast, tightly knit (poem),
uncertainty of tone (in a novel).8
In claiming that the person exercising taste notices qualities that others may
overlook, Sibley apparently commits himself to a form of realism concerning aesthetic
qualities. Precisely what form Sibley's brand of aesthetic realism might take I will be
discussing in Section IV below. What is certain is that most persons, Sibley included,
would baulk at embracing a simple-minded aesthetic realism which claims that each and
7 "Aesthetic and Nonaesthetic", pp. 142-143.
8 The list has been compiled from "Aesthetic Concepts", passim, especially pp.421-422, 427-428, 448-
449; "Aesthetic and Nonaesthetic", pp. 135, 137, 141, 151, 156; "Objectivity and Aesthetics", pp.31-
32, 35, 40, 47, 53. The * denotes those terms and phrases Sibley attributes to musical works.
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every aesthetic description uniquely designates a particular aesthetic property. An
examination of Sibley's master list reveals why this is so. Although many of those
adjectives Sibley lists ('beautiful', 'comely', 'dainty', 'delicate', 'garish', 'graceful',
'handsome', 'lovely', 'pretty') constitute what I shall call dedicated aesthetic words,
words whose only or whose primary use is in aesthetic contexts,9 most of Sibley's
aesthetic predicates employ words whose primary use is nonaesthetic. Sibley
acknowledges this fact by pointing out that words used in aesthetic descriptions may
display varying degrees of metaphoricalness.10 For instance, Sibley treats the use of
some aesthetic terms ('balanced', 'dynamic', 'melancholy', 'tightly-knit') as instances of
dead metaphors: terms with nonaesthetic uses which have become a standard vocabulary
of criticism following a metaphorical transference. A critic would be employing live
metaphor if she were to describe "a passage of music as chattering, carbonated, or gritty,
a painter's colouring as vitreous, farinaceous, or effervescent, or a writer's style as
glutinous, or abrasive". Sibley suggests that some aesthetic terms ('athletic',
'vertiginous', 'silken'), fall somewhere between live and dead metaphors, and notes
words which would seldom if ever be used as aesthetic terms ('brackish', 'clammy',
'curved', 'derelict', 'docile', 'evanescent', 'faithful', 'freakish', 'intelligent', 'noisy',
'red', 'tardy'). The existence of metaphorical aesthetic descriptions serves to undermine
the notion that there is, corresponding with each aesthetic quality or aesthetic concept, an
aesthetic predicate or aesthetic term uniquely designating that quality or concept.
Occasionally, a critic may reach for a metaphorical expression to designate a perceived
quality for which she finds no literal expression ready to hand. Flowever, there is no
reason to suppose that metaphorical aesthetic descriptions will never be redundant to
requirements, in the sense that there will never be occasions when a critic utilizes a
metaphorical description where there exists an established literal description to hand.
Before proceeding further with Sibley's views, it will be helpful to clarify some
terminology. For most of the time that he speaks of an aesthetic term, Sibley has in mind
an aesthetic word, or a word used to designate either an aesthetic concept or an aesthetic
9 Sibley designates these 'characteristically' aesthetic terms. See "Aesthetic and Nonaesthetic", p.315.
10 "Aesthetic Concepts", pp.422, 423 and footnote.
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quality. This terminology is unfortunate, since most of Sibley's aesthetic terms really
constitute aesthetic uses of words. It is also unfortunate because as the list above
suggests, many of those descriptions employed by Sibley - such as 'the characters never
really come to life' - descriptions whose use requires a degree of perceptiveness, neither
employ a dedicated aesthetic term, nor do these designate readily identifiable aesthetic
qualities. To avert potential problems, I shall follow Ted Cohen in treating an aesthetic
term as any open sentence of the form Fx which serves to ascribe an aesthetic quality.11
Many of Sibley's critics would subject Sibley's aesthetic attributions to a Kantian
analysis, treating Sibley's aesthetic judgements as instances of Kant's so-called
'judgement of taste'. For these critics, an aesthetic judgement does not only or not
primarily designate some property in the object perceived, but instead serves to express
or report the pcrceiver's experience of the object. Thus according to Ruby Meager, "in
saying of a perceptual object or literary work that it is graceful (or ungainly) we are
treating the object as the focus of a certain pleasure (or pain) in our imaginative
experience of it".12 To avoid begging any important issues which may be at stake
between the Kantian view of aesthetic judgement and Sibley's perceptual account, in
what follows an 'aesthetic attribution' will be interchangeable with what Roger Scruton
calls an 'aesthetic feature', designating whatever is, or seems to be, attributed by an
aesthetic predicate.13 The notion of an aesthetic attribution or an aesthetic feature
constitutes a grammatical rather than an epistemological notion. To say that certain
aesthetic predicates ascribe or attribute features or characteristics does not commit us to
the claim that each or any of these predicates describes or designates an aesthetic
property.
11 Ted Cohen, "Aesthetic/Non-aesthetic and the Concept of Taste: a Critique of Sibley's Position",
Theoria, 39 (1973), 113-115; p.l 17.
12 Ruby Meager, "Aesthetic Concepts", BJA, 10 (1970), 303-322; pp.315-316. A similar view is
proposed by Derek Matravers, "Aesthetic Concepts and Aesthetic Experiences", BJA, 36 (1996), 265-277;
and articulated by Roger Scruton, Art and Imagination: A Study in the Philosophy ofMind (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), pp.48-56.
13 Roger Scruton, Art and Imagination, p. 29.
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Another crucial point of terminology concerns Sibley's use of the term 'aesthetic
quality'. In the widest meaning of the term, an aesthetic feature would be anything which
can be mentioned as part of the reason for an aesthetic assessment. Speaking in this wide
sense, anything of a perceptible or imperceptible nature affecting the aesthetic value we
place upon a particular object, or else contributing to the discovery of an aesthetic
difference between two objects, constitutes an aesthetic feature. It is important to note that
when Sibley speaks of an aesthetic quality, he is not describing any and every potentially
aesthetic feature. This is because Sibley identifies an aesthetic quality as something
which can only be detected through acts of perception. In particular, Sibley invites us to
think of his aesthetic qualities as emergent qualities: phenomenal features which emerge
from the phenomenal nonaesthetic features of objects and in this respect, contrast with
those perceptible properties, such as colours, which emerge from the nonperceptible
qualities of things. Thus, Sibley points out the contrast between aesthetic qualities and
other phenomenal qualities by noting that, while there is nothing about the way a thing
looks that makes it look blue, it is the visible features of an object which are responsible
for its looking graceful.14 Because he treats an aesthetic quality as a species of emergent
quality, it follows that for Sibley, not everything constituting as an aesthetic feature in the
wide sense of the term, everything contributing to the discovery of an aesthetic difference
between two objects, would count as an aesthetic quality. To illustrate how Sibley would
be obliged to omit some would-be aesthetic features from his list of aesthetic qualities,
suppose that we are confronted with two paintings whose providence identifies them as
being, respectively, an original Raphael and a copy by the school of Raphael. In the case
under consideration, we are to suppose that the original and the school copy are visually
indistinguishable in every way, so much so that, were the paintings to be switched in our
absence, it would require nothing short of elaborate scientific tests to verify the identify
of each painting on re-entering the room. Because the knowledge that only one of the
pictures was painted by Raphael would lead us to value the pictures differently, it follows
that 'by the hand of Raphael' would count as an aesthetic attribution in the wide meaning
14 "Objecitivity and Aesthetics", p.35.
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of the term.15 However, in the event that visual inspection alone could not allow us to
detect which of two paintings was by Raphael, Sibley would be forced to exclude 'by the
hand of Raphael' from his list of aesthetic qualities. Thus, whether intentionally or not,
Sibley's discussion of aesthetic qualities serves to replace a more generous notion of
'aesthetic attribute' with the relatively precise notion that an aesthetic attribution ascribes
some phenomenal quality. In what follows, I shall mark Sibley's relatively precise,
quasi-technical use of 'aesthetic qualitiy', 'aesthetic concept', and so on, by adopting the
abbreviated formulae 'a-terms', 'a-concepts', 'a-attributions', 'a-qualities' etc. in place
of the more cumbersome 'aesthetic concepts', 'aesthetic attributions', and 'aesthetic
qualities'; and 'na-terms', 'na-concepts', 'na-attributions', 'na-qualities', in place of
'nonaesthetic terms', 'nonaesthetic concepts', 'nonaesthetic attributions', and 'non-
aesthetic qualities'. I shall revert to the unabbreviated 'aesthetic qualities', 'aesthetic
terms', and so on, when discussing the views of writers who may not share Sibley
assumption that an aesthetic quality constitutes a perceivable or otherwise experientially
available feature.
II
Whilst emphasizing the importance of Sibley's contribution to the debate on aesthetic
attribution, I would not wish to imply that Sibley provides the final word on the matter.
The most notable shortcoming of Sibley's discussion of aesthetic concepts lies in a failure
to discriminate between the different forms of taste judgement we make. Roger Scruton
begins to hint at the varied nature of aesthetic attributions when he provides a
15 Nelson Goodman adopts this wide notion of an aesthetic attribution when he claims that the difference
between an original and a forgery currently detectable only through elaborate scientific examination
constitutes an aesthetic difference that in time may become apparent to visual inspection. Goodman
makes the case for treating such a difference as an aesthetic difference by contending that my knowing
which picture is the original and which the fake would bring me to search for differences and thereby
shape my perceptions; and makes the further point that there is no way of proving that I shall never
perceive a difference between the pictures. See Languages ofArt (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1976), pp. 104-
107; OfMind and Other Matters (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 134.
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categorization of aesthetic descriptions in Art and Imagination. According to Scruton,
aesthetic descriptions include:
(a) Predicates used primarily in aesthetic judgements, especially judgements of
aesthetic value. Included among these would be such terms as beautiful,
gracefid, elegant, ugly.
(b) Descriptions referring to the formal or technical accomplishment of a work
of art, as when we say that a work is balanced, well-made, economical, rough,
or undisciplined.
(c) Descriptions employing predicates that are normally used to describe the
mental and emotional life of human beings. Thus, works of art may be sad,
joyfid, melancholy, agitated, erotic, sincere, vulgar, intelligent, and mature.
Scruton notes that almost any mental predicate may be applied to a work of art,
and that a proper subset of these predicates may apply to aesthetic objects
generally (e.g. sad).
(d) Descriptions designating expressive features of works of art. Works of art
may be said to express emotion, thought, attitude or character.
(e) Descriptions employing affective terms: terms that are used to express or
project particular human responses which they also indicate by name (moving,
exciting, evocative, nauseous, tedious, enjoyable, adorable).
(f) Statements of comparison using terms in a purely figurative or metaphorical
way, as when we speak of a writer's style as bloated or masculine, a colour as
warm or cool, or a piece of music as being architectural.
Realizing that even these categories might fail to exhaust the variety of aesthetic
attributions extant, Scruton is moved to observe that we may also describe a work of art
in terms of what it represents, its truthfulness, its overall character or genre. Scruton
ultimately widens the scope of aesthetic attribution to include anything which can be
mentioned as part of the reason for an aesthetic assessment.16 For this reason, it would
be safe to say that Scruton uses the notion of an aesthetic attribute or aesthetic feature in a
wider sense than Sibley.
What Scruton offers by way of a classification of aesthetic attributions may be
viewed as a rough preliminary sketch of the territory, albeit a mapping with some
prominent topological features, in the form of classes of aesthetic attributions, barely
indicated or left out altogether. One obvious shortcoming of Scruton's schema lies in the
fact that Scruton's category (f) is both too narrow and too broad. Category (f) includes
16 Scruton, Art and Imagination, pp.30-31.
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too little, if (c) and (f) function as mutually exclusive categories. Any serious inquiry
into the nature of aesthetic attributions should not legislate from the start that (c) category
statements are not metaphorical, since whether or not 'sad painting' constitutes a
metaphorical utterance is precisely the sort of matter to be decided in the course of such
an investigation. As it happens, many philosophers are not willing to leave open the
possibility that 'sad painting' amounts to a metaphorical description. For these
philosophers assume that metaphorical language is somehow redundant to theoretical
requirements, that metaphorical statements reflect the structure of human thought less
well than do literal statements. That which is said metaphorically could be stated more
directly and more lucidly in literal terms. According to this view, a metaphorical statement
will always be eliminable in favour of a literal paraphrase, and any statement resisting
paraphrase will for this reason fail to qualify as metaphorical. It is a point often argued
that (c) category statements are ineliminable, to the extent that any attempt to eliminate
emotion terms from our aesthetic descriptions would lead to the loss of important truths
concerning our aesthetic experience. Those who hold the view that metaphorical
statements are eliminable and who accept the fact that category (c) statements are
ineliminable would tend to use this fact to demonstrate that (c) category statements are not
metaphorical.17
As it happens, it is almost certain that Scruton himself would not accept the view that
any description which proves to be ineliminable is thereby disqualified from being a
metaphor. This is because Scruton believes that a complex system of metaphor underlies
our most basic apprehension of music. Sruton points out that our experience of music is
structured by metaphors of space, and of objects moving through musical space. These
metaphors are ineliminable from our musical understanding to the extent that any attempt
to eliminate reference to these metaphors in our descriptions of music would at the same
time eliminate the object of musical understanding.18 In material fact, when we listen to
17 Proponents of this view include Malcolm Budd, "Understanding Music", The Aristotelian Society,
Supp.Vol.59 (1985), 233-248, pp.241-242, and "Music and the Communication of Emotion", JAAC, 47
(1989), 129-138, p. 132; Stephen Davies, Musical Meaning and Expression (Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 1994), pp. 150-151, 162. For more on this proposal, see Chapter Six below.
18 Roger Scruton, "Understanding Music", in The Aesthetic Understanding (Manchester: Carcanet Press,
1983), pp.77-100, esp.p.85.
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music, what we experience is a succession of sounds of different pitches that we move
between in our understanding. However, the intentional object of our understanding is
not this succession of sounds but a melody that we experience as though it were a single
object moving through space. Talk of melodies 'rising' and 'falling', 'advancing' and
'retreating', is more than a convenient way of describing that which we understand when
we listen to a piece of music, for any attempt to eliminate these metaphors from our
descriptions of music would remove the intentional object of musical understanding,
would reduce our experience of music to the experience of mere sounds.
Whilst it is important to leave open the possibility that a variety of aesthetic
descriptions may prove to be metaphorical, it is also important to note that the simple act
of designating a range of aesthetic descriptions as 'metaphorical' provides little
illumination. To call the use of a term 'metaphorical' is not to provide an analysis of that
use but to make the historical observation that the term once had a very different use. This
suggests that Scruton's category (0, which treats a wide variety of aesthetic descriptions
as metaphorical, is almost certainly too inclusive to prove informative. One of the
problems here is that Scruton includes within his category (0 synaesthetic descriptions
such as 'warm colour' and 'cool colour' as well as the more recognizably metaphorical
'masculine style' and 'bloated style'. Whereas an orthodox metaphor such as 'bloated
style' involves a transfer of vocabulary between very different areas of human
experience, synaesthetic descriptions such as 'warm colour' and 'bright sound' involve a
transfer of vocabulary within the relatively confined area of sensory experience. The
experience of sight and sound is so closely related in our minds that for most of the time
we fail to realize that calling a sound 'bright' involves a transfer of vocabulary from the
realm of visual experience and light to the realm of aural experience. It is only in our
more philosophical moments that we would think to question whether what we have here
is a transfer of vocabulary, and potentially a metaphorical description.19 Once again, we
19 Perhaps not even in our philosophical moments. Philosophers have been slow to recognize the
phenomenon of synaesthetic metaphor. The only two philosophical discussions of synaesthetic metaphor
of which I am aware are Glemi O'Malley, "Literary Synaesthesia", JAAC, 15 (1957), 391-411; and
A.G.Egstrom, "In Defence of Synaesthesia in Literature", Philosophical Quarterly, 25 (1946), 1-19.
Those looking for insight into the nature of synaesthetic metaphor would be best advised to look to the
work of psychologists rather than philosophers. The American psychologist Lawrence E. Marks has made
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enter the realm of that which should be determined in the course of, rather than at the start
of, all enquiry into the nature of aesthetic attribution.
The existence of synaesthetic descriptions points to the presence of some potentially
interesting relationships between aesthetic description in general and our vocabulary of
purely sensible description in particular. As J.O.Urmson has observed,20 we may ascribe
characteristics across the boundaries of the sense modalities, and across the boundaries
between sensible and non-sensible characteristics. Urmson's observations suggest the
existence of two further categories of aesthetic attributions meriting close philosophical
attention:
(g) Descriptions of sensations in one sense modality employing terms
appropriate to sensations of another sense modality. Thus, warmth and
coolness, properties of sensation, may also be attributed to colours. We
attribute dullness to pains, but also to colours or sounds. We talk of a sweet
sound or sweet taste; a sour taste or sour note\ and a mellow taste or mellow
sound.
(h) Descriptions employing terms most characteristically occurring outside the
realm of appearance as terms of purely sensible description. In "the woman has
a fragile look", a dispositional term {fragile) comes to characterize the look of a
person. Similarly, we speak of a majestic mountain (mountain with a majestic
look); or an opulent man (man with an affluent look).
Urmson also notes the existence of the converse case, where terms of sensible
description do duty in non-sensible descriptions, as when we speak of a sweet girl, a
bright pupil, or a bitterquarrel. Categories (g) and (h) represent subsets of Scruton's
category (f). Some might dispute whether the synaesthetic descriptions listed in category
(g), statements ascribing characteristics across the sensory boundaries, constitute
aesthetic attributions. Provisionally, I would assert that such descriptions become
aesthetic attributions whenever they function as descriptions of timbre. When the music
critic describes the whiteness of a singer's tone, she makes an aesthetic attribution. I
would agree with Monroe C.Beardsley's stipulation that a comprehensive theory of
an extensive study of subjects' reactions to literary metaphor. Sec for instance, "Synaesthesia:
Perception and Metaphor," in Aesthetic Illusion: Theoretical and Historical Approaches (Berlin: Walter
de Gniyter, 1990), pp.28-40; and other works listed in the bibliography.
20 J.O.Urmson, "Representation in Music", in Philosophy of the Arts, ed. G.Vesey (Royal Institute of
Philosophy, 1973), pp. 132-146. See in particular pp. 142-145.
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aesthetic attributions must decide whether timbre terms constitute aesthetic attributions.21
The theory of aesthetic judgement developed in Chapter Five happily accommodates
descriptions of timbre amongst our aesthetic judgements.
Those offering a Kantian analysis of aesthetic attributions typically operate with
category (a) cases in mind. Quite how a Kantian would analyse aesthetic descriptions
falling into the other categories listed here is difficult to say. Part of the difficulty arises
from the fact that the distinction between categories (a) through (h) will often prove easier
to fix in theory than in practice. Although undoubtedly there exists a class of dedicated
aesthetic words, words whose only or whose primary use occurs in aesthetic contexts,
we may experience considerable difficulty when it comes to determining the precise
boundaries of that class. For instance, would delicate, Sibley's favoured example of an
aesthetic attribution, count as an example of a category (a) or category (h) term? When we
speak of a person of delicate constitution, 'delicate' describes a dispositional tendency of
a non-sensible nature. The question arises whether the dispositional, non-sensible use of
'delicate' constitutes the primary use of the term, with aesthetic uses constituting
transferred uses; or whether the primary use of 'delicate' occurs in the realm of sensible,
or even aesthetic, description; so that talk of a 'delicate constitution' represents an
extension of the primary, sensible or aesthetic use of the term. That is to say, do I learn to
call a constitution 'delicate' only after I have learned to recognize delicacy in vases; or is
it true to say that my ability to describe a vase as 'delicate' presupposes an ability to
recognize Sally's delicate constitution? Something like an answer to this question will
emerge in Chapters Four and Five below.
Regardless of how we choose ultimately to carve up the domain of aesthetic
attributions, this much is certain: there is an enormous variety to be found in the language
of art appreciation. In assessing Sibley's account of aesthetic concepts, it is important to
keep in mind the variety of forms an aesthetic attribution might take.
21 Monroe C.Beardsley, "What is ail Aesthetic Quality?", Theoria, 39 (1973), 50-70; pp.51-52.
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Ill
The most obvious questions raised by Sibley's distinction between aesthetic and
nonaesthetic qualities are, 'what is the distinction for?\ and 'does it work?' Any genuine
philosophical distinction must meet two criteria: it must create a real separation between
two classes of items, and we must possess some motivation for creating this separation
in the first place. In the decades immediately following Sibley's original paper, critics
have tried to show either that the criterion underpinning Sibley's distinction could never
create the precise separation between terms which Sibley was after; or else they have
suggested that we could have no motive for wishing to make such a distinction in the first
place. Ted Cohen manages to combine these lines of criticism in a manner which
misconstrues entirely Sibley's original intentions. In fact, Cohen's criticisms fall so wide
of their mark that his paper becomes an object lesson in how not to interpret Sibley. I will
spend some time on Cohen's interpretation of Sibley in this and subsequent sections,
partly because doing so will serve to dispel some common misperceptions concerning
Sibley's views; but also because Cohen displays an extreme hostility to Sibley's
proposals, and it is important to account for the extremity of that response. In particular, I
would suggest that Cohen's interpretation of Sibley serves to reveal an attitude pervading
the discipline of aesthetics at the time that Cohen was writing his paper.
Cohen organizes his discussion of Sibley around the following set of claims:
There is, it seems to me, no need to defend the distinction. Once examples have
been given to illustrate it, I believe almost anyone could continue to place
further examples - barring of course the expected debatable, ambiguous, or
borderline cases - in one category or the other. To deny such a distinction is to
be precluded from discussing most questions of aesthetics at all, just as one
could hardly begin ethics without prior recognition that some judgments and
notions do, while others do not, concern morality. One must be able to
recognize examples of one's subject matter. Those who in their theoretical
moments deny any such distinction usually show in their practice that they can
make it quite adequately.22
22 "Aesthetic and Nonaesthetic", p. 135.
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That is to say, Sibley believes that we make an intuitive distinction between two classes
of concepts; and that it is both our ability to make this distinction on an informal basis,
and our ability to give form to this distinction in our more theoretical moments, which
underpins the discipline of philosophical aesthetics. Cohen disagrees with each point
Sibley makes here. According to Cohen, the distinction is neither intuitive nor rooted in
our practice. If the distinction were intuitive or rooted in our practice, then people would
tend to converge in their attempts to identify aesthetic concepts and nonaesthetic concepts.
To show that no such convergence of intuitions exists, Cohen provides a list of terms
employed in art criticism which he believes will resist classification under Sibley's
distinction. Cohen believes that we wouldn't know how to follow the instruction to
divide this list into aesthetic terms and nonaesthetic terms. In the unlikely event that
people could perform this task, we would find that individuals complying with this
instruction would inevitably generate different lists.23
Cohen supposes that if the distinction serves any theoretical function, it must do so
at the level of meta-aesthetics. That is to say, the distinction is not itself part of aesthetics
but something we make before embarking on aesthetics. As Cohen sees it, Sibley's
notion of taste functions as a practical device allowing us to mark out the subject matter of
aesthetics, much as someone might employ a tape measure to set out a plot of land. Any
terms found to require the exercise of taste for their application will be aesthetic terms.
Any judgement employing an aesthetic term constitutes an aesthetic judgement. The
mechanical task of gathering together the class of aesthetic terms and aesthetic judgements
gives us the subject matter of aesthetics. However, the notion of taste proves at best an
inconsistent tool when it comes to sorting the aesthetic from the nonaesthetic. According
to Cohen, we don't know how to use Sibley's distinction because we don't know what
it means to say we have exercised taste in using a concept. In illustration of this point,
Cohen nominates gracefulness as an example of an aesthetic attribute that does not require
taste for its detection. Cohen points out that whilst taste implies "more than normal ability
23 Cohen, pp. 137-140. Marcia Muelder Eaton also complains that she does not know how to go on
adding to diose exemplary lists of aesthetic and nonaesthetic tenns which writers on the topic of aesthetic
attributions tend to produce. See 'The Intrinsic, Non-Supervenient Nature of Aesthetic Properties",
JAAC, 52 (1994), 383-397; p.387.
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to notice or detect things", it requires no special degree of perceptiveness to see that one
line is more graceful than another. Far from it being the case that Sibley's distinction
informs our notion of the subject-matter of aesthetics, Cohen wishes to suggest that we
can muddle along in aesthetics without making anything like this distinction. Cohen
makes the further point that the distinction does not apparently inform the way we apply
the term 'aesthetic', since we successfully employ the word in a variety of ways which
don't draw upon the distinction, as when we object to a mathematical proof 'on aesthetic
grounds'.24
Cohen is not the only critic who treats the following passage as a would-be argument
for Sibley's position. In this passage, Sibley describes an 'aesthetic clod', someone
lacking in taste who would not be able to make any a-judgements:
The point I have argued may be reinforced in the following way. A man who
failed to realize the nature of taste concepts, or someone who, knowing he
lacked sensitivity in aesthetic matters, did not want to reveal this lack might by
assiduous application and shrewd observation provide himself with some rules
and generalizations; and by inductive procedures and intelligent guessing, he
might frequently say the right things. But he could have no great confidence or
certainty; a slight change in an object might at any time unpredictably ruin his
calculations, and he might as easily have been wrong as right. No matter how
careful he has been about working out a set of consistent principles and
conditions, he is only in a position to think that the object is very possibly
delicate.... Though he sometimes says the right thing, he has not seen, but
guessed, that the object is delicate.... He could not be praised for exercising
taste; at best his ingenuity and intelligence might come in for mention.25
According to his critics, what Sibley offers here is an argument from the existence of
aesthetic clods to the conclusion that a-concepts lack governing conditions.26 If a-
concepts were governed by conditions, then an aesthetic clod would have confidence in
his a-judgements, and we would praise him when he gets things right. The fact that
neither condition obtains supports the conclusion that a-concepts lack governing
conditions. However, viewed as an argument for the claim that a-concepts lack governing
conditions, this assumes what it sets out to prove. How do we know that the clod's
inductions will lead him astray? Only by assuming that no set of na-conditions will entail
24 Cohen, pp. 124-125; 135.
25 "Aesthetic Concepts", p.532. The term 'aesthetic clod' originates with Allan Casebier, "The Alleged
Special Logic for Aesthetic Terms", JAAC, 31 (1973), 357-364.
26 Allan Casebier, p.359ff.; Cohen, pp. 120-123.
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an a-ascription. Why do we fail to praise the clod? Because it is a matter of luck rather
than skill that he manages to arrive at a correct judgement whilst treating a concept which
lacks governing conditions as though it were condition-governed. Since we cannot
understand what it means to designate someone an aesthetic clod unless we already accept
the view that a-concepts lack governing conditions, it follows that we cannot use the
existence of persons who treat a-concepts as though they were condition-governed to
demonstrate that a-concepts lack governing conditions. Cohen concludes that what Sibley
provides here is not an argument, but a form of running on the spot. And since Sibley
offers no alternative arguments in support of his view, Cohen suggests that making the
distinction is all the philosophy Sibley has.27
The ineptitude of this alleged 'argument' should alert us to the fact that here Sibley is
not offering anything like an argument, but as he says a 'reinforcement' or illustration of
his claim that a-concepts lack governing conditions. Why then does Cohen treat this as an
argument? Because if, like Cohen, you believe that Sibley is using the notion of taste to
demarcate the class of a-judgements, which is co-extensive with the subject matter of
aesthetics, then you will believe that Sibley must try to provide evidence for the existence
of taste which doesn't rely on the fact that some people consistently make correct a-
judgements. Sibley cannot introduce the notion of taste to explain how we correctly apply
a-terms as long as attributing taste to someone amounts to nothing more than the claim
that that person has a capacity for forming correct a-judgements.28 However, as one of
Sibley's more sympathetic commentators has pointed out,29 this line of reasoning
reverses the direction of Sibley's discussion. Sibley does not introduce the notion of taste
in order to explain how we know when we have applied a-terms correctly. Instead,
Sibley discusses the way we apply a-terms in order to illustrate what is involved in the
exercise of taste. That is to say, Sibley's distinction does not pretend to carve out the
whole subject matter of aesthetics ab initio. Rather, Sibley is relying upon our prior
understanding of this subject matter while directing our attention to one very important set
27 Cohen, pp.120, 123.
28 R.David Broiles, "Frank Sibley's 'Aesthetic Concepts'", JAAC, 23 (1964), 219-225; p.222.
29 J.F. Logan, "More on Aesthetic Concepts", JAAC, 25 (1967), 401-406; p.403.
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of judgements which arise in the course of aesthetic appreciation; and he asks us to
realize that the ability to make such judgements is what we comprehend under the notion
of taste.
To help comprehend the nature of Cohen's attack on Sibley, it will be useful to recall
the philosophical climate in which Cohen was writing his paper. It would be true to say
that Cohen's hostility to Sibley's proposals is just one example of a widespread distrust
of the word 'aesthetic' displayed by philosophers writing in the 'seventies. In particular,
these philosophers distrusted what they perceived to be the hidden agenda pursued in
philosophical aesthetics in the first half of the twentieth century. As George Dickie
characterized this agenda, whenever philosophers in the first half of the century spoke of
the 'aesthetic attitude' or else the 'aesthetic object' or 'aesthetic perception', the
underlying intention was the same - to distinguish the "proper object of appreciation and
criticism," or those features of art objects that critics should be attending to, from those
qualities in objects and those ways of attending to objects that were irrelevant to the aims
of the critic.30 The Proper Object of Criticism was to be identified with the 'aesthetic
object', or that set of 'aesthetic qualities' revealed when attending to objects in a properly
aesthetic way. Attending in a properly aesthetic way might involve exercising a special
mode of 'aesthetic perception' or it might involve adopting a special mind-set or mode of
attention known as the 'aesthetic attitude'.
Those reacting to this perceived agenda argued for the 'vacuousness' of the term
'aesthetic',31 and sought to replace talk of the work of art as an 'aesthetic object' with
talk of the work of art as an artifact embedded in and arising out of certain cultural
practices. George Dickie's Art and the Aesthetic represents perhaps the best-known
example of an attempt to replace a traditional notion of the 'aesthetic' with a more up-to-
date philosophy of contemporary art practices. But Dickie was not alone in proposing to
replace the notion that the work of art constitutes an 'aesthetic object' with the notion that
the work of art constitutes a culturally embedded artifact. Timothy Binkley was arguing
3 0 George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis (Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 1974), pp.86-87, 135-136.
31 See for instance George Dickie, 'The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude", APQ, 1 (1964), 56-65, p.64;
Timothy Binkley, "Piece: Contra Aesdietics", JAAC, 35 (1977), 265-277, especially p.269.
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in a similar vein when he suggested that, viewed as an aesthetic object, the work of art is
a 'fragile' entity with changeable qualities. That is to say, the aesthetic qualities belonging
to a work of art will change if there are any changes in its nonaesthetic qualities. In
addition to the inevitable alteration in aesthetic qualities that would occur as a work of art
ages, reports of aesthetic qualities might vary relative to perceivers, and relative to the
differing conditions under which the object was perceived. By contrast, viewing the
work of art as a cultural artifact turns the work of art into a robust entity with a relatively
fixed identity, and serves to explain contemporary art practices not obviously connected
with the production of aesthetically pleasing objects.
Cohen's attack upon Sibley's distinction reflects this prevailing climate of opinion in
two separate ways. In the first place, when Cohen claims that he can find no use for
Sibley's distinction, he is agreeing with the more radical voices in that movement in
twentieth century Aesthetics which has sought to replace the traditional Philosophy of the
Beautiful with the Philosophy of Art. Cohen apparently agrees with those proposing to
eliminate the use of the word 'aesthetic' by replacing talk of aesthetic qualities and
aesthetic objects with talk of contemporary art practices and the artifacts issuing from
those practices. Interpreting the work of art as a cultural artifact does not involve
formulating aesthetic judgements, nor does it require the exercise of taste. We only
require a distinction such as Sibley's if we wish to catch ourselves in the act of forming
a-judgements, and according to the new agenda being set in philosophical Aesthetics, we
would never have a reason to catch ourselves forming aesthetic judgements either in
theory or in practice. Yet even as he expresses impatience with Sibley's use of the term,
Cohen does not propose to eliminate the word 'aesthetic' from everyday or philosophical
discourse. To this end, Cohen points out that the person who objects to a mathematical
proof on 'aesthetic grounds' manages to say something intelligible, perhaps something
which could not be conveyed in a statement eliminating all reference to the 'aesthetic';
and he manages to do so without committing himself to anything like Sibley's use of the
term.32 In making this latter claim, Cohen apparently sides with those who continue to
32 Cohen, pp. 135-136.
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find a use for talk of aesthetic qualities in the new Philosophy of Art, because they
redefine an 'aesthetic quality' to include any feature singled out for attention within the art
practices of a culture. On this definition, the class of aesthetic qualities includes many
qualities which Sibley describes as nonaesthetic. Marcia Muelder Eaton displays this
temper of mind when she suggests that, in the right circumstances, "how wonderfully
loud' is as much an aesthetic description as "how wonderfully balanced". This is because
"if loudness or yellowness .... is a property of an object and if it is considered worthy of
attention or reflection in a culture and if a viewer shares the traditions of that culture and if
the viewer assents to 'That object is loud (or yellow, etc.),' then that viewer appreciates
the object aesthetically (to some degree)."33
It would appear that at the end of the day, the dispute between Cohen and Sibley
becomes a dispute between those adopting a wide, and those adopting a narrow, use of
the term 'aesthetic'. This dispute is more apparent than real. Those adopting the wide
notion of an aesthetic quality believe that we risk overlooking genuine sources of
aesthetic value if we identify aesthetic qualities with all and only Sibley's taste qualities, a
fear which would be justified only if Sibley had introduced the notion of an aesthetic
quality with a view to capturing the total domain of aesthetic value. I would suggest that,
regardless of Sibley's original intentions, it is not necessary to read Sibley's project in
this way. That is to say, rather than treating Sibley's distinction as an attempt to isolate
the Proper Object of Criticism or the subject-matter of aesthetics, Sibley's distinction may
be usefully regarded as a distinction within the wider subject-matter of Aesthetics. This
remains true whether we identify Aesthetics with the Philosophy of the Beautiful or with
the Philosophy of Art. I would suggest that Sibley's discussion of a-concepts has the
relatively modest aim of bringing to our attention that part of our ordinary perceptual
competence which poses some interesting questions from the point of view of
philosophical aesthetics: our capacity for apprehending a certain species of emergent
quality. Pace Cohen and others, there are occasions when we do wish to catch ourselves
in the act of forming a-judgements, if only for the theoretical purpose of isolating that part
33 "The Intrinsic, Non-Supervenient Nature of Aesthetic Properties", p.390.
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of perception which raises special philosophical challenges. Whereas there is no obvious
puzzlement of a philosophical nature in the fact that an object appears yellow or that a
piece of music strikes the listener as loud, there is much philosophical puzzlement in the
idea that a painting is balanced or has a 'sad' character. It is this latter source of
puzzlement which Sibley brings to our attention in making his distinction. It is important
to realize that, in designating some qualities as worthy of the attention of philosophical
aesthetics, Sibley is not thereby committed to saying that those qualities he calls
nonaesthetic, qualities such as yellowness or loudness, which do not pose particular
problems from a philosophical perspective, could never constitute sources of aesthetic
value. Once we realize that there is a difference between saying that a feature is aesthetic
(a source of philosophical interest), and saying that a feature is aesthetic (a source of
aesthetic value), much of Cohen's criticism of Sibley loses its point.
IV
Cohen's paper represents an exaggerated response to Sibley's proposals. In
accounting for the extremity of that response, I have rejected the notion that Sibley's
distinction was intended as a practical tool serving to locate the subject-matter of
aesthetics; and have suggested that Sibley's discussion of a-qualities should be regarded
as an attempt to create a distinction within a subject-matter already familiar to us. In
suggesting this reading of Sibley's intentions, I am aware that Cohen is not the only critic
who has treated Sibley's distinction as a formal attempt to identify the subject-matter of
aesthetics. In particular, it has sometimes been suggested that Sibley's observation that a-
concepts lack governing conditions constitutes an attempt to isolate a special logic for
aesthetic concepts, resembling in this respect Kant's attempt, in the Third Critique, to
characterize thejudgement of taste as a logically distinctive class of judgement.34 Roger
34 This is how Ruby Meager presents the matter, opus cited, especially pp.303, 306-307. For a brief
introduction to the view that Kant sets out the logical rather than the epistemological conditions of
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Scruton has developed this line of interpretation at some length,35 and in doing so, has
repeated some common misconceptions of Sibley's aims and purposes. For this reason,
I shall examine Scruton's arguments in some detail, with a view to refining and focusing
my own interpretation of Sibley.
Scruton incorporates his discussion of Sibley within a wider discussion of what
Scruton chooses to call the theory of aesthetic perception, a form of aesthetic empiricism
tracing its genealogy to Frances Hutcheson. The theory of aesthetic perception amounts
to the theory that to appreciate an object aesthetically is to perceive its aesthetic features,
aesthetic features being precisely those features it requires aesthetic perception (or 'taste')
to discern.36 Thus, the theory of aesthetic perception distinguishes aesthetic interest from
other forms of interest, not in terms of features distinctive of aesthetic experience qua
experience, but in terms of the characteristic objects that interest takes. That is to say,
aesthetic experience is not experience of a phenomenologically distinctive kind, but
experience of a distinctive type of object. Because the theory of aesthetic perception
distinguishes aesthetic attention from moral or practical attention in terms of the special
nature of the objects of that attention, Scruton places a requirement upon the theory of
aesthetic perception to provide a unitary logic characterizing the aesthetic use of terms.
For "without this unitary logic the concept of aesthetic appreciation, defined merely in
terms of an open and indefinite class of features, will be an arbitrary and uninteresting
notion, with no ultimate ground, and with no special place in the philosophy of mind."37
Scruton regards Sibley's assertion that a-concepts lack governing conditions as an
attempt to provide such a unitary logic for aesthetic terms.
Scruton believes he can demonstrate that the theory of aesthetic perception cannot
work by introducing what I will call the ambiguity argument. Scruton points out that if
the absence of governing conditions acts as a criterion for the aesthetic use of a term, it
aesthetic judgement, see Eva Schaper, 'The Pleasures of Taste", in Pleasure, PreferenceandValue:
Studies in Philosophical Aesthetics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp.39-56;
especially p.47. Stanley Cavell, "Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy", in Must We Mean What
We Say? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp.73-96, pp.88ff, explores the question
whether Kant's treatment of the judgement of taste constitutes a logical or a psychological enquiry.
3 5 Art and Imagination, pp.32-44.
36 Art and Imagination, p. 29.
3 7 Art and Imagination, p.32.
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follows that terms such as those belonging to categories (c) and (f) above, terms having
both aesthetic and nonaesthetic uses, will be ambiguous between their aesthetic and non-
aesthetic uses. Applied to persons, 'sad' is a condition-governed term, and I can specify
criteria for its use in terms of the gestures, expressions and utterances characteristic of
sad persons. In its aesthetic use, 'sad' denotes an emergent perceptual property,
dependent upon other properties but in no particular way.38 The notion that 'sad' could
be ambiguous between its aesthetic and nonaesthetic uses contradicts the commonplace
understanding both that there exists a significant connection between the use of 'sad' in
'sad painting' and the use of 'sad' in 'sad person', but also that the point and meaning of
our aesthetic judgements arises from the fact that the former use depends in some way
upon the latter. That is to say, 'sad painting' involves something like a secondary or
paronymous use of 'sad'.39 Just as, in Aristotle's example of a paronymous use of
terms, talk of a 'healthy body' or 'healthy complexion' is dependent upon a primary
nuclear meaning of 'healthy'; so too my ability to call paintings 'sad' relies upon my prior
understanding of what constitutes sadness in persons. One who understands the meaning
of 'sad painting' displays that understanding by referring at some point to the notion of
sadness in persons. It would never be enough to go on referring to parallels with other
works of art in order to explain what it means to call paintings sad.40
It is important to understand how Scruton deploys the notion of ambiguity in his
attack against the theory of aesthetic perception. In his gloss of p.39 of Art and
Imagination, Derek Matravers apparently reduces the ambiguity argument to a simple
reductio, whereby Scruton uses the claim, that (c) category terms refer to aesthetic
properties in their aesthetic uses to derive the patently false claim, that (c) category terms
are ambiguous between their aesthetic and nonaesthetic uses.41 Whilst it is true that the
38 Art and Imagination, p.38.
3 91 say 'something like' a paronymous use because although Scruton asserts in chapter three that there
must be a significant connection between 'sad painting' and 'sad person', he rejects the claim that 'sad
painting' represents a paronymous use of 'sad' in chapter four. See Art and Imagination, pp.44-57.
40 Art and Imagination, p.40. At this point, Scruton apparently echoes Philosophical Investigations, II,
p.216, where Wittgenstein describes a language-game applying the words 'fat' and 'lean' to days of the
week. "Asked 'What do you really mean here by 'fat' and 'lean'?" -1 could only explain the meanings in
the usual way. I could not point to the examples of Tuesday and Wednesday".
41 "Aesthetic Concepts and Aesthetic Experiences", p.266.
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ambiguity argument operates as a reductio, this gloss upon the argument fails to indicate
where the true interest of Scruton's argument lies. Matravers' gloss also wrongly
suggests that the point of Scruton's argumentation at pp.38-41 is to demonstrate, in a
way which any opponent would be forced to concede, that it is patently obvious that (c)
category terms are not ambiguous between their aesthetic and nonaesthetic uses. What
Scruton actually demonstrates here is that the ambiguity of (c) category terms is offensive
to the commonsense view of the relationship between the aesthetic and nonaesthetic uses
of category (c) terms, a fact which the proponent of the theory of aesthetic perception
may or may not find surprising, but may be happy to live with once it was pointed out to
him.42 In this respect, those pressing for the existence of aesthetic properties might
follow the lead of Richard Wollheim, who expresses a general uneasiness with the
strategy of appealing to the notion of ambiguity to help us out of a philosophical tight-
spot, yet who nevertheless embraces the ambiguity of (c) category terms as a viable
option to committing some form of the pathetic fallacy.43 The real point of Scruton's
argument is to bring his opponent to see that he should not be happy to accept the fact that
'sad' is ambiguous between its aesthetic and nonaesthetic uses. Scruton does this by
presenting his opponent with a dilemma:44
The principal objection to the idea of an aesthetic property [is] this: either terms
denoting aesthetic properties have the same meaning as they have when used in
their normal contexts, in which case, how can we distinguish aesthetic
properties as a separate class? Or else they have a different meaning, in which
case, what is the point of naming aesthetic properties as we do?
If Sibley asserts that 'sad' in 'sad painting' does not possess its ordinary meaning, then
the point of the judgement "This painting is sad" cannot be to make some connection
between what we think of as sadness in the personal case, and the emergent property of
42 On the question, whether Sibley would be surprised to learn that he had made (c) category term
ambiugous between their aesthetic and nonaesthetic uses, see p.61 below.
43 Richard Wollheim, "Correspondence, Projective Properties, and Expression in the Arts", in The
Language ofArt History, ed. Salim Kemal and Ivan Gaskell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991), pp.51-66; p.54. It is important to note that Wollheim would not count as a proponent of the
theory of aesthetic perception. For more on Wollheim's own analysis of 'sad painting', see Chapter Four
below.
44 Art and Imagination, p.44.
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sadness in works of art. Sibley must accept the consequence that in this case we possess
no motivation for using the word 'sad', that we might have chosen instead to call the
painting 'happy' or used some other word to designate whatever emergent property is
found to be present in all and only those paintings we presently call 'sad'. That is to say,
Sibley must give up all pretense that he can explain the point or meaning of aesthetic
judgements,45 that he has an explanation for the connections that exist between the
aesthetic and nonaesthetic uses of (c) category words. Alternatively, Sibley may retain the
claim that the use of 'sad' in this case was motivated, but only if he accepts that 'sad' in
'sad painting' retains its ordinary meaning. However, he then will be forced to concede
that 'sad' is condition-governed in its aesthetic uses, and that he has failed to provide a
distinguishing logic for aesthetic terms. Having been brought to admit that aesthetic terms
do not serve to designate a distinctive class of property, Sibley must give up the project
of defining aesthetic interest by appealing to the distinctive nature of the objects of that
interest.
In a recent paper, Nick Zangwill offers an interpretation of the ambiguity argument
apparently differing in some respects from the interpretation given here.46 According to
Zangwill, pages 38 through 44 of Art and Imagination provide a "novel metaphysical
argument" demonstrating that the metaphorical nature of much aesthetic description
makes it impossible to maintain a realist stance concerning aesthetic properties and
aesthetic judgements. The argument begins by observing that (i) much aesthetic
description is metaphorical in nature; then introduces Donald Davidson's general doctrine
concerning metaphor,47 which states that (ii) words used in metaphorical contexts have
only the literal meaning that they have when used non-metaphorically. The argument
concludes that (iii) aesthetic realism cannot be maintained vis-a-vis those aesthetic
descriptions which are metaphorical.48 This is because anyone wishing to claim that (c)
category terms serve to designate real aesthetic properties in their aesthetic uses is thereby
45 Art and Imagination, pp.40-41.
46 Nick Zangwill, "Metaphor and Realism in Aesthetics", JAAC, 49 (1991), 57-62.
47 Donald Davidson, "What Metaphors Mean", in On Metaphor, ed. Sheldon Sacks (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp.29-45. Davidson's paper was first published in Critical
Inquiry, 5 (1978), 31-47.
48 "Metaphor and Realism in Aesthetics", p.57.
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committed to the claim that (c) category terms are ambiguous between their aesthetic and
nonaesthetic uses, in contradiction of (ii). As Scruton's dilemma demonstrates, the
would-be aesthetic realist who accepts the truth of (ii) will find it impossible to reconcile
(ii) with his aesthetic realism. The realist faces a choice between rejecting a realist stance
concerning aesthetic properties and accepting (ii), as per the first horn of Scruton's
dilemma. Alternatively, he might maintain his aesthetic realism at the expense of denying
(ii) and thereby run the risk of not being able to explain what motivates us to call
paintings 'sad'.
The first thing to note concerning Zangwill's interpretation of the ambiguity
argument is that Zangwill articulates the second premise of the argument using a theory of
metaphor first published some four years after Art and Imagination. I see two risks in this
procedure. As well as constituting something of an anachronism, the introduction of
Davidson's thoughts on the nature of metaphor makes the success of Scruton's argument
contingent upon the acceptance of a particular, and some might argue peculiar, account of
metaphor. That is to say, the appeal to Davidson's general thesis concerning metaphor
makes it all too easy for any opponent of Scruton who remains unimpressed with the
general thrust of Davidson's discussion of metaphor to refuse to become entangled upon
the horns of Scruton's dilemma. This would be a pity, since it could be argued that the
strength of Scruton's original argument lies in an appeal to commonsense that transcends
the bounds of whatever theory of metaphor one happens to accept. The anachronism
would be justifiable in the event it could be shown, either that Scruton happens to agree
with the overriding themes of Davidson's account of metaphor; or, if that should not
prove to be the case, if it could be demonstrated that Zangwill's use of Davidson's
thoughts on metaphor was limited, judicious, and served to illuminate the nature of
Scruton's argument. Unfortunately, neither of these proves to be the case.
I have already hinted at one reason why Scruton might be unwilling to embrace
Davidson's theory of metaphor in all of its consequences when I alluded to Scruton's
views concerning the nature of musical understanding.49 To recap: Davidson wrote his
49 See above, pp.25-26.
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paper on metaphor as a corrective to the commonplace opinion that a metaphorical
statement possess a special, secondary or metaphorical meaning over and above the
meaning attaching to that statement under a literal interpretation. Hence his general thesis
that statements used metaphorically possess only their literal meanings. Davidson insisted
that, in a majority of cases, a metaphorical sentence taken literally is either false or
trivially true. For Davidson, the point of a metaphor consists not in the surface meaning
of the statement, but in what the speaker brings us to notice in using the metaphor.
However, Davidson resisted the notion this might be thought to imply, that a metaphor
possesses a special coded cognitive content that is systematically related to the literal
meanings of the words used. According to Davidson, the things a metaphor brings us to
notice are neither finite in scope nor propositional in nature.50 In view of the
meaningless, false or trivial nature of most metaphorical statements taken literally, those
following the Davidson agenda on metaphor have suggested that we show our
understanding of a metaphor not by explaining the meanings of the words used in the
metaphor, but by giving a paraphrase that explains the speaker's point in making the
utterance. These writers regard it as a corollary of Davidson's view that the literal
meaning of a metaphor can and should be bypassed en route to such a paraphrase, and
have treated the availability of paraphrase as a defining mark of the metaphorical.
According to this view, any statement failing the eliminability test, any statement where
the literal meaning cannot be bypassed in favour of a description of its use, ipso facto
cannot be a metaphor.51 Now as described above, Scruton would not accept the
eliminability test for at least some of the metaphors we use in describing our musical
understanding. Taking the material point of view, what we hear as music consitutes
constitutes nothing more than a succession of pitched sounds. We hear these sounds as
music only when we hear them as tones possessing melodic, harmonic and rhythmic
implications. We hear melody in a succession of sounds because we hear those sounds as
50 "What Metaphors Mean", pp.30, 44, 45.
51 Malcolm Budd, "Understanding Music", The Aristotelian Society, Supp.Vol.59 (1985), 233-248,
pp.241-242, and "Music and the Communication of Emotion", JAAC, 47 (1989), 129-138, p. 132;
Stephen Davies, Musical Meaning and Expression (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994),
pp. 150-151, 162.
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if they comprised an object moving through space. We hear harmony in a set of tones
when we hear qualities of tension and relaxation in those sounds, and we hear rhythm in
a series of sounds because we hear those sounds as if they were moving about in a
particular manner, specifically dancing.52 Scruton contends that it is impossible to
eliminate any of these metaphors from our descriptions of music without reducing the
experience of tone to the experience of mere sound. The fact that Scruton is willing to
tolerate the existence of ineliminably metaphorical descriptions of our musical
understanding suggests that Scruton would not accept Davidson's approach to metaphor
as that theory has been developed by some of Davidson's warmest admirers. I conclude
that the case for saying that Scruton would embrace the fundamentals of Davidson's
theory of metaphor is at best unproven.
Zangwill might object that all of this is beside the point, since the only part of
Davidson's theory of metaphor that Zangwill utilizes in his argument is Davidson's
general thesis concerning metaphor, which states that words used metaphorically possess
only the meanings they possess when used literally: an observation universally
acceptable, regardless of the particular position one adopts concerning metaphor. If so, it
is worth pointing out to Zangwill that, far from illuminating the nature of the ambiguity
argument, treating (ii) as a gloss of Scruton's argument at pp.38-41 only serves to reduce
the ambiguity argument to the reductio described by Matravers. To reiterate: it
misrepresents the nature of Scruton's argument to suggest that Scruton assumes that (c)
category words do not undergo a meaning change in their aesthetic uses. Scruton's
argument is intended to point out that when we as human beings use the word 'sad' to
describe an aspect of a particular work of art, the most natural and obvious explanation
for our doing so is because we wish to make some connection between an aspect of
human emotional life and the experience of that work of art. Anyone who claims that the
word 'sad' designates an emergent aesthetic quality in its aesthetic use rejects the
possibility that the word functions in the same way across its aesthetic and nonaesthetic
uses, and thereby rejects what is the most natural and obvious explanation for the
52 Scruton, "Understanding Music", pp.84-85,
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connection that exists between the aesthetic and nonaesthetic uses of (c) category terms.
The onus therefore falls upon that person to provide some alternative explanation for this
connection.
I would suggest that, far from illuminating the nature of the ambiguity argument,
introducing Davidson's general thesis concerning metaphor into the argument serves to
distract Zangwill from the task of assessing Scruton's original argument and onto the
very different task of demonstrating how the aesthetic realist might use the details of
Davidson's account of metaphor in order to square a belief in aesthetic realism with
Davidson's general thesis. To this end, Zangwill notes that the best hope for the aesthetic
realist who accepts (ii) lies in the first instance in retreating to another claim Davidson
makes concerning the nature of metaphor. The aesthetic realist might point out that, while
'sad' carries the same linguistic meaning whether it is attributed to a person or to a work
of art, what the word makes us think about, the thought-content accompanying the use
of the word, will vary between 'sad person' and 'sad painting'. Thus, whilst there may
be a meaning-difference at the level of language between the two uses of 'sad', this does
not preclude the existence of a meaning-equivalence at the level of thought.53 This
strategy permits the realist to evade the first horn of Scruton's dilemma whilst neatly
impaling him on the second. Zangwill suggests that the realist may then extricate himself
from the second horn by providing some suitable causal account of the relationship
between the two uses of 'sad', an account demonstrating how the use of 'sad' in 'sad
painting' causally depends upon the prior use of 'sad person'.54 Zangwill concludes that
contra Scruton's argument, "the essentially metaphorical nature of much aesthetic
description does not endanger a realist interpretation of aesthetic judgement and
experience."55 In effect, Zangwill purports to discuss one type of problem and ends by
discussing another problem altogether. Rather than addressing the problem identified in
Scruton's argument, the problem of reconciling the existence of metaphorical aesthetic
descriptions with a particular brand of aesthetic empiricism , Zangwill addresses the very
53 "Metaphor and Realism in Aesthetics", p.58, 61.
54 "Metaphor and Realism in Aesthetics", p.59.
55 "Metaphor and Realism in Aesthetics", p.61.
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different problem of squaring the belief that metaphorical aesthetic descriptions possess
genuine content with the prejudice, implicit in the views of Davidson and his followers,
that regarded as a piece of language, a metaphor is a thing of sound and fury, signifying
nothing.
The suspicion that the argument Zangwill discusses differs somewhat from the
argument offered by Scruton receives some prima facie confirmation from the fact that
Zangwill and Scruton apparently disagree when it comes to identifying the target of
Scruton's argument. For whereas Scruton identifies the target of the argument as the
theory of aesthetic perception, Zangwill identifies the target as the aesthetic realist,
someone who holds that aesthetic judgements represent a range of 'distinctively' aesthetic
facts or states of affairs; an aesthetic state of affairs being a structured entity consisting of
an object or event which possesses a genuine aesthetic property. For the aesthetic realist,
an aesthetic judgement will be true in the event that the object or event described in the
judgement possesses the genuine aesthetic property which that judgement represents it as
possessing.56 A close examination of Zangwill's discussion suggests that the difference
in target between the two interpretations may be more apparent than real. According to
Zangwill, the aesthetic realist is committed to the existence of a distinctive range of
aesthetic concepts devoted to picking out real aesthetic properties. It is not surprising that
Zangwill should assert this, since it is only the aesthetic realist committed to the existence
of 'distinctive' aesthetic concepts who could succeed in impaling himself upon the first
horn of Scruton's dilemma. That is to say, it is only the aesthetic realist who commits
himself to the existence of a set of distinctively aesthetic concepts who strays into
thinking that (c) category terms must be ambiguous beween their aesthetic and non-
aesthetic uses; serving to pick out genuine aesthetic properties in one set of cases but not
in the other. Now clearly, to say that the aesthetic realist committs himself to the existence
of a 'distinctive' range of aesthetic concepts is to say that the aesthetic realist treats those
properties his judgements pick out as the defining characteristic of the aesthetic. In short,
what Zangwill encompasses under the heading of aesthetic realism amounts to nothing
56 "Metaphor and Realism in Aesthetics", p.57.
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more or less than that brand of aesthetic empiricism Scruton chooses to designate the
theory of aesthetic perception. If Zangwill does believe that the argument targets the
theory of aesthetic perception, then it is unhelpful to identify this target under the general
label of aesthetic realism. For it might be argued that not every person who counts herself
an aesthetic realist, not every person believing that that aesthetic descriptions serve to pick
out genuine properties, thereby commits herself to the belief that such properties serve to
define the realm of aesthetic interest.
On the other hand, if what I have suggested is true, that Zangwill conceives the
ambiguity argument as a challenge to defend the contentful nature of metaphorical
aesthetic descriptions in the face of Davidson's prejudices concerning the meaningfulness
of aesthetic statements, then it is no accident that Zangwill conceives the argument as a
challenge to aesthetic realism in general. For it is not just Sibley's brand of aesthetic
empiricism, but any form of aesthetic realism which must defend the contentful nature of
aesthetic judgements in the face of Davidson's attack upon the meaningfulness of
metaphorical statements. In formulating the ambiguity argument as an argument
concerning the contentful nature of metaphorical aesthetic descriptions, Zangwill draws
attention to something all loo easily lost sight of in assessing Scruton's argument.
Scruton apparently places Sibley on the spot when he suggests that Sibley formulates an
account of aesthetic descriptions which overlooks the special case of metaphorical
aesthetic descriptions. Yet clearly, if philosophers in general feel a need to give a
philosophical account of the nature of metaphor, a philosophical justification of our
practice of using statements that are prima facie false or meaningless, then Sibley is not
the only theorist purporting to givie an account of aesthetic descriptions who owes us an
account of the content of metaphorical aesthetic descriptions. Realizing this fact serves to
remove some of the sting from the tail of Scruton's argument.
In summary, I would suggest that Zangwill's paper does nothing to improve our
understanding of Scruton's ambiguity argument. This is partly because what Zangwill
offers is less an historically accurate reconstruction of the argument Scruton presents in
Art and Imagination, than it is a variant argument taking Scruton's text as an opening
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theme. The differences between Scruton's original argument, and the argument Zangwill
discusses may be summarized as follows. Scruton presents the ambiguity argument as an
argument targeting a particular brand of aesthetic realism. The argument requires those
asserting that aesthetic descriptions serve to pick out an identifiably aesthetic set of
characteristics to reconcile this claim with the commonsense belief that the aesthetic use of
a category (c) term is in some way dependent upon the prior, nonaesthetic use of the
term. That argument which Zangwill presents in Scruton's name highlights the problem
of accounting for the contentful nature of aesthetic judgements in the face of a particular
doctrine concerning the nature of metaphor. Each argument highlights a different problem
requiring a different solution. Since ZangwilTs paper does not succeed in improving the
clarity of Scruton's argument, 1 shall take the liberty of assessing Scruton's argument
against Sibley using discussing my own formulation of the argument. The next two
sections of this chapter address the problems raised by that argument, and demonstrate
how Sibley might go about extricating himself from each of the horns of Scruton's
dilemma. In section V, I show why the ambiguity argument needn't trouble that particular
brand of aesthetic realism that Scruton attributes to Sibley. In section VI, I go on to
suggest that it is perhaps inaccurate to claim, as Scruton does, that Sibley's reflections on
the nature of aesthetic experience and taste amount to an attempt to provide a unifying
logic for aesthetic terms.
V
Regarded as an interpretation of Sibley's views, the ambiguity argument is
unsatisfactory on two separate counts. In the first place, the manner in which Scruton
constructs his dilemma serves to artificially restrict the options available to Sibley. It is
incorrect to suggest, as Scruton does, that Sibley faces a stark choice between claiming
that our use of 'sad painting' is motivated and claiming that sadness describes a genuine
emergent quality found in paintings. Since Sibley is not as limited in his options as
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Scruton's dilemma suggests, the ambiguity argument is a failure. In the second place, I
believe that Scruton manages to misrepresent Sibley's philosophical intentions when he
uses Sibley to illustrate that brand of aesthetic empiricism which Scruton labels the theory
of aesthetic perception.
To see why Scruton's dilemma restricts the options open to Sibley, consider the
following set of claims:
(i) some significant connection exists between the aesthetic and nonaesthetic
use of 'sad'
(ii) the aesthetic use of 'sad' is motivated by the nonaesthetic use of 'sad'
(iii) the aesthetic use of 'sad' is conditioned by the nonaesthetic use of 'sad'
(iv) the aesthetic use of sad is condition-governed
(v) 'sad' has the same meaning in both its aesthetic and nonaesthetic uses
Clearly, (i) through (v) describe distinct possibilities. Whereas (v) claims that 'sad' is
governed by the same set of conditions in its aesthetic and nonaesthetic uses, (iv) would
fit both this scenario but also the scenario where one set of conditions served to govern
the use of 'sad' in 'sad painting', and another set of conditions governed its use in 'sad
person'. Statement (iii) claims that my knowing how 'sad' is applied in the nonaesthetic
cases provides me with some rule of thumb for its application in the aesthetic cases;
whereas (ii) amounts to the claim that there are reasons why we use the word 'sad' to
designate this particular emergent property, rather than using another emotion term, or
rather than using a term which makes no connection between the emotional life and an
emergent quality. Such reasons could be advanced at the level of psychological, rather
than logical, explanation. Finally, (i) could be interpreted as equivalent in meaning to any
one of (ii) through (v), or it might be synonymous with some weaker claim.
The manner in which Scruton poses his dilemma for the theory of aesthetic
perception apparently makes little or no distinction between (i) through (v). This is
because Scruton assumes that he has only to bring Sibley to admit that there exists some
significant connection between the aesthetic and nonaesthetic uses of 'sad', a connection
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providing some motivation for using 'sad' rather than some other term to describe the
emergent quality discovered in a painting; and either Sibley has introduced governing
conditions for a-terms via the back door, or else Sibley has admitted that 'sad' possesses
the same meaning in its aesthetic and nonaesthetic uses, or both. That is to say, Scruton
believes that he has only to bring Sibley to admit the truth of either (ii) or (iii), and Sibley
will be forced to affirm some version of (iv) and (v) as well. Scruton allows no room for
the possibility that our use of 'sad' in 'sad painting' may be motivated in some way by
the nonaesthetic uses of 'sad' even in the event that the primary use of 'sad' does not
furnish anything like a set of governing conditions for the secondary use of the word.
That is to say, Scruton overlooks the possibility that Sibley might be willing to accept (ii)
whilst rejecting (iv).57 In assuming that anyone assenting to (ii) thereby commits himself
to (v) as well, Scruton manages to conflate the question, "what is the meaning of 'sad
painting'?" with the very different question, "what is our motivation for calling this
painting 'sad'?" The difference between these two questions may be brought out by
considering the different types of explanation which would satisfy each. Whereas a
request for the meaning of 'sad painting' amounts to a purely logical question, a request
for the criteria governing this particular use of 'sad', a request for the reason why we use
'sad' rather than some other label to designate a particular emergent quality is a question
which would receive a perfectly satisfactory explanation in psychological rather than
logical terms. To say that the aesthetic use of 'sad' is tnotivated is not to say that
knowledge of how 'sad person' is applied furnishes the type of rule that would allow us
to predict with confidence which paintings will count as 'sad'. However, it is to say that
when we observe those sortings persons contrive to make between 'sad' and 'not-sad'
paintings, the practice of making such sortings will be explicable in terms of the fact that
the creatures doing the sorting are creatures who enjoy emotional experiences of a certain
degree of richness and a certain range of types. Our understanding of human nature may
57 It would also be possible for Sibley to accept the somewhat stronger claim (iii), whilst rejecting (iv).
In other words, Sibley could accept that knowledge of the nonaesthetic uses of 'sad' could generate rules
which help guide the practice of matching certain emotion-terms with certain emergent qualities; whilst
insisting that the rules thus generated would not allow us actively to predict which paintings will count
as sad.
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not equip us to predict which paintings will count as sad, nor perhaps will such
understanding allow us to anticipate precisely which words will be used to designate
particular emergent qualities. However, this is not to say that our understanding will not
allow us to make sense of whatever sortings we happen to encounter. The aesthetic uses
of (c) category terms will not be entirely predictable, but given some understanding of
human nature these will not seem to be totally arbitrary.
That Sibley does accept something like (ii) whilst rejecting (iv) is, I believe,
demonstrated by the fact that Sibley leaves open the possibility that certain a-terms may
be negatively governed by conditions,58 even once he has ruled out the possibility that
any a-term could be positively condition-governed. Some commentators have found
Sibley's claim that a-terms may possess negative governing conditions, may be ruled out
by certain na-descriptions, to be inconsistent with the claim that no a-term could be
logically entailed by some na-description. For once Sibley admits that some set of na-
attributions could rule out the a-attribution A, we can use the set of na-attributions
entailing -A to entail any a-term B which means -A.59 That is to say, it would be possible
to bring in governing conditions for A via the back door. However, the inconsistency
vanishes if the relationship between a-terms and na-terms discovered in cases of negative
condition-governing amounts to something weaker than logical entailment. As I interpret
the matter, when Sibley introduces the concept of negative condition-governing he is
suggesting that, whilst no set of na-descriptions could logically suffice for a particular a-
description, occasionally we might treat a given na-description as operationally or
practically sufficient to rule out certain a-descriptions. Sibley here draws attention to a
curious feature concerning our aesthetic competence, the fact that often we feel more
confidence in witholding an aesthetic description than we do in applying it. If so, then the
claim that a-terms may be negatively governed by conditions would amount to nothing
more than the claim that those competent in the use of the term feel some confidence in
predicting those cases where the term might not apply, but rather less confidence when it
58 "Aesthetic Concepts", pp.46-47; "Aesthetic and Nonaesthetic", p. 152.
59 Derek Matravers, "Aesthetic Concepts and Aesthetic Experiences", footnote pp.276-277. Allan
Casebier made substantially the same point in "The Alleged Special Logic for Aesthetic Terms", p.363.
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comes to predicting positive applications of the term. To use Sibley's preferred example
here, knowing that all the colours in an object are pale pastels allows us to rule out the
possibility that the object is garish. The same knowledge could never suffice to logically
establish the conclusion that the object is delicate.601 propose that this, or something like
it, is what we might understand by negative condition-governing in the case of category
(a) terms. Since (c) describes a category of a-terms that have been borrowed from the
domain of nonaesthetic emotional experience, we should reasonably expect the negative
conditioning of these terms in the aesthetic domain to reflect some aspects of their use in
the nonaesthetic home domain. The conditions governing the use of 'sad person' might
not determine the meaning of 'sad painting', but these might provide us with some rule of
thumb when deciding whether to withold the epithet 'sad' from certain paintings in the
aesthetic case. The aesthetic use of 'sad' is motivated by, or guided by, the practice of
designating persons as 'sad' in some way which falls short of the laying down of
necessary and sufficient conditions. All of which amounts to a long-winded way of
saying that the would-be Sibleyite who accepts the existence of negative condition-
governing for (c) category terms accepts (ii) or (iii) whilst rejecting (iv).
I believe Scruton overlooks the possibility that Sibley might accept (ii) or (iii) whilst
rejecting (iv) because Scruton attributes to Sibley a peculiar and unsustainable notion of
'taste'. Scruton takes it to be a requirement of the theory of aesthetic perception that taste
operates as a special and narrowly perceptual capacity, the aesthetic equivalent of
G.E.Moore's moral intuition.61 The notion that taste is akin to a form of intuition allows
the theory of aesthetic perception to reconcile two otherwise incompatible claims: the
claim that a-concepts lack governing conditions, and the claim that a-descriptions
constitute objectively verifiable true-or-false statements. Joseph Margolis makes just this
alignment of concepts when he argues that, unless Sibley is willing to say that a-qualities
are detected via some form of intuition, then either Sibley will be forced to admit that a-
concepts are condition-governed but enter into judgements that are straightforwardly true
or false; or else Sibley must admit that a-concepts lack governing conditions and enter
60 "Aesthetic Concepts", pp.426-427.
61 Art and Imagination, p.35.
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into judgements that are at most apt or inapt, but never true or false.62 Scruton assumes
that, for those adopting the theory of aesthetic perception, this special faculty of taste is a
capacity which may upon occasion operate independently of our ordinary perceptual and
judgemental capacities. It is this assumption which leads Scruton to describe an unusual
and puzzling scenario offensive to commonsense which he believes represents a genuine
possibility under the theory of aesthetic perception:63
Suppose that there is some agreement among adults trained in the appreciation
of art as to which works of art are sad Suppose then, that I classify all
works of art as sad or not sad: I classify them into two groups, with perhaps a
third group in between where the question whether or not they are sad is
undecidable. Now suppose also that someone else carries out the same
classification, without consulting me, and groups works of art together in
exactly the same way as I do myself. And suppose, finally, that both he and I
agree in our application of the term 'sad' to people (its use to denote an
emotional state). That is, we agree about the normal sense of the term and use it
according to the same criteria. Imagine, then, that while I call the two categories
'sad' and 'not sad', he refuses to apply these terms. He says .... he does not
know what to call the property in virtue of which he has made the classification
that he has made, but certainly it would be wrong to call it sadness - works of
art cannot have states of mind.
According to the theory of aesthetic perception, the fact that this man's sorting coincided
with our own, coupled with the fact that the aesthetic feature in virtue of which the
sorting was made was an observable emergent quality, should incline us to say that the
man has seen the sadness of these works. According to Scruton, the fact that this man's
capacity to recognize sadness in a work of art has not been coordinated with his ability to
recognize sadness in persons would make us reluctant to say that he has seen the sadness
of these works. For unless or until he has seen the vital connection that exists between
these works and the emotional state of sadness, he has not seen that the quality these
works have in common is sadness.
In constructing this scenario, Scruton assumes that the man whose sorting of works
of art corresponds with our own shares our understanding of the nonaesthetic use of
'sad'. Scruton's reasons for making this assumption are obvious given the wider context
62 Joseph Margolis, "Robust Relativism", JAAC, 35 (1976), 37-46; p.40.
63 Art and Imagination, pp.38-39.
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of the ambiguity argument. If however taste constitutes an autonomous faculty,
uncoordinated with other judgemental capacities in its operations, then it might be
possible to take Scruton's scenario a stage further and assume that the person doing this
sorting has no experience of the nonaesthetic use of 'sad'. For if this man's only reason
for classifying works of art in the way that we do is because he has detected the presence
of an emergent quality in some works of art and failed to detect it in others, then he
should be able to affect the same sorting in the event that he had no understanding of the
nonaesthetic use of 'sad'. Now if Scruton were to regard the first but not the second of
these scenarios as a possibility under Sibley's account, this can only be because Scruton
accepts the very thing that I have been arguing for here: that our practice of using a term
in one experiential domain may serve to motivate, shape, or guide the classifications we
make in other areas of experience, even in the event that the original use of the term does
not strictly govern the new use.
The notion that taste could operate in the absence of ordinary perceptual and
judgemental competence apparently accommodates a feature of aesthetic characterizations
noted by Philip Petit: the fact that these are "perceptually elusive", to the extent that
thorough acts of perception may fail to reveal the aesthetic qualities of an object.64 The
realization that thorough acts of perception may fail to reveal aesthetic character might
tempt the careless thinker to conclude that such thorough acts of perception are not a
necessary component in aesthetic sensitivity: a false conclusion, since it does not follow
from the fact that ordinary perceptual and judgemental competence are not sufficient for
aesthetic judgement that these will not prove necessary, either. It is not a conclusion that
Sibley's own discussion of taste would invite. For whilst some of Sibley's passing
comments might give the impression that Sibley treats taste as a special, intuition-like
capacity, something operating in addition to, or beyond, ordinary perceptual competence;
his more extended pronouncements on the topic quickly dispel this impression.
According to Sibley, taste involves elements of both perceptual and linguistic
competence, "the sophistication that consists in making finer distinctions and employing a
64 Philip Petit, "The Possibility of Aesthetic Realism", in Pleasure,PreferenceandValue, pp. 17-38;
p.26.
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more precise vocabulary" than the majority of men. Taste involves a capacity for fine
perceptual discrimination that is perfected through experience and coupled with the ability
to articulate the variety and texture of one's experiences. The difference between a person
with taste and someone lacking this discriminative capacity resembles the difference
between the refined perceived who employs a rich vocabulary differentiating fine shades
of red ('vermilion', 'crimson', 'carmine'), and the perceiver who indifferently describes
the same shades of colour using the generic term 'red'. Whereas the young child
beginning to master an aesthetic vocabulary or any unsophisticated aesthetic perceiver
will lump together many things under a generic term ('pretty', 'lovely'), the
discriminating few who display a real mastery over a-terms employ a more subtle and
specific vocabulary of taste, managing to differentiate between the beautiful, the dainty,
the elegant, the gracefid and the charming.65 In addition to this component of perceptual
and linguistic competence, Sibley assumes that an ability to make correct a-judgements
requires training in the form of an extensive life's experience, an understanding of human
nature and a degree of familiarity with the world. It takes all sorts of knowledge of
human nature and customs, and often nothing short of the experience of a lifetime, to get
the point of certain jokes or to realize the particularly moving nature of passages in
Othello and King Lear 66 That is to say, I will come to see the difference between those
things which are sentimental or bathetic on the one hand, and those judged to be
genuinely pathetic, moving or tragic on the other, only when I have a sufficiently wide
experience of the variety and shades of human emotion, and sufficient knowledge of the
ways in which emotions may be evoked and sustained to distinguish between, on the one
hand, those occasions where I am being manipulated to react in an emotionally trivial
way, and on the other hand, those occasions where the object of my experience deserves
a sustained emotional response.
This brief summary of Sibley's position suggests that Sibley believes that ordinary
perceptual and judgemental competence form essential components in the capacity known
as taste. For Sibley, taste does not represent an isolated faculty which we may possess in
65 "Objectivity and Aesthetics", p.47; "Aesthetic Concepts", pp.448-449.
66 "Objectivity and Aesthetics", pp.39-41.
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lieu of more ordinary capacities. Nor could this capability fail to be coordinated in its
operations with other capacities. If taste represents something in addition to ordinary
capacities, it is still very much grounded upon those ordinary capabilities. This means
that Sibley would not believe that the scenario Scruton describes, or my proposed
extension of that scenario, represent serious possibilities. Sibley would be surprised to
happen upon someone lacking the concept of sadness in persons who could manage to
sort works of art in a way that corresponds with our own sorting of works between the
'sad' and 'not-sad'. This is not, however, because Sibley believes that the meaning of
'sad person' provides a set of conditions governing the use of 'sad painting'; but because
Sibley would not believe that a person lacking the fundamental ability to apply the notion
of sadness to persons could be thought to possess taste. Sibley does not believe that our
aesthetic judgements occur in a vacuum, that we somehow leave the rest of the person
behind when perceiving aesthetically. The man of taste is someone who seeks out and is
sensitive to the connections that exist between different domains of human experience.
Since the man described in Scruton's scenario refuses, or is unable, to connect that
quality he has detected in works of art with his experience of using 'sad' in relation to
persons, Sibley would not regard this individual as someone with taste. It is precisely
because aesthetic taste presupposes and operates in tandem with other capacities that I
believe that Sibley would affirm some version of (ii) or (iii), by stating that talk of sad
paintings is motivated by the practice of talking about sad persons, and that our use of (c)
category terms is not totally arbitrary or unrelated to our wider linguistic competence.
VI
The previous section demonstrated why the ambiguity argument should not trouble
that version of the theory of aesthetic perception which Scruton attributes to Sibley. For
the purposes of that demonstration, I have assumed that Scruton's interpretation of
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Sibley's intentions is fundamentally correct; that Sibley set about creating his distinction
and noting that a-terms lack governing conditions with a view to establishing some form
of the theory of aesthetic perception. However, I would now like to suggest the
possibility that Scruton seriously misrepresents Sibley's intentions when he suggests that
Sibley was consciously arguing for the theory of aesthetic perception. The Sibley I read
is not the Sibley presented by Scruton in the context of the ambiguity argument. As a
first step to seeing why this might be so, consider some examples of aesthetic and
nonaesthetic uses of (c) category terms:
(Al) Autumn rain has been falling throughout the early afternoon. It stops
abruptly, and the sun breaks through. Drops of water sparkle on the leaves and
on the grey slates, and they drip down onto the pavement, which glistens with a
hard sheen. The sky is blue, but streaked with black, suggesting distant rain.
This is a melancholy scene.
(A2) The narrow road rises and falls. Along the verge on either side there are
apple-trees in blossom. The fields as they slope away from the road are a
brilliant green, dotted with the blue, yellow, and white of wild flowers. A few
miles away the mountains rise up sharply from the rolling landscape. They are
grey rising to blue, cut by the silver lines of mountain torrents. Patches of
snow persist on the rock face. The air is fresh, and there is the sound of
cowbells. At the foot of the mountains, beyond the rich orchards, there are
large half-timbered farmhouses forming villages. It is a happy countryside.67
(Nl) Sally's whole demeanour is listless and lethargic. She sits slumped in the
chair, and doesn't appear to hear the questions that are put to her. She stares
blankly at the wall, or else down at her feet, and there is a misty look in her eye.
Sally is feeling sad.
(N2) Sally cannot sit still in her chair. She occasionally stands up, only to sit
down again, fidgeting, and wringing her hand. She refuses to look at Arnold,
and stammers as she answers questions put to her by other people in the group.
A reddish tinge suffuses her face and neck. Sally is embarrassed.
The ambiguity argument exploits the idea that whereas 'sad' in (Nl) and
'embarrassed' in (N2) are being used in a condition-governed fashion, 'melancholy' in
'melancholy scene' and 'happy' in 'happy countryside' lack governing conditions. If
so, then it is possible that people will react differently to the (A) and (N) cases, perhaps
accepting the concluding statements in (Nl) and (N2) where they might feel that the
67 Richard Wollheim, "Correspondence, Projective Properties, and Expression in the Arts", p.51.
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conclusion in either (Al) or (A2) represents something of a non sequitur. This is because
to say that the use of 'embarrassed' in 'Sally is embarrassed' is condition-governed
whilst the use of 'melancholy' in 'melancholy scene' lacks governing conditions, is to
say that no extension of the description contained in (Al), however complete, will be
logically sufficient for the claim that (Al) describes a melancholy scene; whereas some
way of characterizing the situation described in (N2) will put it beyond doubt that Sally is
embarrassed. Articulating the difference in this manner sidesteps an objection which
might be made, that since (N2) represents a purely behavioural description of Sally's
emotional state, and since two or more emotions may issue in similar patterns of
behaviour, the situation described in (N2) could be consistent with the fact that Sally is
feeling ashamed rather than embarrassed. Undoubtedly, behaviour represents only one of
a set of criteria useful in differentiating the emotions. Where patterns of behaviour are
common to more than one emotional state, extending the description by appealing to other
elements of the case - the thoughts or beliefs of the subject, or the situation in which she
finds herself - allows a greater degree of differentiation between the emotions. Thus,
where (N2) does not place it beyond doubt that Sally is feeling embarrassed rather than
ashamed, (N2') might:
(N21) Sally cannot sit still in her chair. She occasionally stands up, only to sit
down again, fidgeting, and wringing her hands. She refuses to look at Arnold,
and stammers as she answers questions put to her by other people in the group.
She believes that the others are questioning her with a view to discovering
whether she harbours any tender feelings for Arnold. A reddish tinge suffuses
her face and neck. Sally is embarrassed.
There is no doubt that, as the ambiguity argument predicts, people typically react in
different ways to the (A) and (N) cases. Almost invariably, it has been my experience that
groups of students introduced to Wollheim's examples object that the description given in
(Al) could be consistent with a cheerful scene, whilst (A2) could be taken to suggest a
scene of melancholy character. Thus, (Al) and (A2) lend some circumstantial support to
Sibley's claim that no set of na-descriptions could be logically sufficient for a particular a-
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description.68 Furthermore, I would suggest that in those pre-philosophical moments
when we are not testing our statements for governing conditions, most people would
accept the concluding statement in (N2), and the reason for this acceptance is
psychological rather than logical. To say that I infer Sally's embarrassment from the
preceding statements in (N2) serves to misdescribe the nature of the language-game we
are playing. This is because, as Errol Bedford has astutely noted in his seminal paper on
the emotions, statements about emotions act as interpretations, rather than descriptions,
of behaviour.69 From a purely logical point of view, the statement that Sally is
embarrassed manages to go beyond anything that has come before it in (N2).
Nonetheless, we would tend to accept the claim that Sally is embarrassed based on
nothing more than the behavioural evidence offered in the preceding description, because
bringing the behaviour of persons under emotion concepts is our way of interpreting and
making sense of that behaviour. This suggests that the reason why we accept the
conclusion of (N2) but resist the conclusion of (Al) is not, as the ambiguity argument
assumes, because emotion-terms possess and aesthetic uses of emotion-terms lack,
governing conditions. The same facts can be explained more simply by noting that we
have a natural desire to make sense of the behaviour of persons, a desire which leads us
to assent to certain emotional characterizations of their behaviour even in the absence of
evidence concerning the thoughts and feelings of the persons concerned. And since
applying emotional terms to landscapes does not serve to fulfil some latent desire we
possess to understand scenery, we are less inclined to agree to the closing statement in
(Al).
Let us be clear what these examples are not intended to show. In the first place, I am
not denying that emotion-terms are condition-governed in their nonaesthetic uses; or not
quite. Nor am I denying that Sibley thought that they were. The foregoing analysis
suggests that emotion-concepts are examples of what Sibley, following H.L.A.Hart,
would call 'defeasible' concepts,70 concepts which lack sufficient conditions but which
68 It is perhaps significant that when Wollheim introduces similar descriptions in Painting as an Art
(London: Thanes aid Hudson, 1987), pp.80-81, he accompanies these with illustrations.
69 Errol Bedford, "Emotions", Aristotelian Society Proceedings, (1956-57), 281-304; p.288.
70 Sibley, "Aesthetic Concepts", p.430.
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nevertheless are loosely condition-governed to the extent that some description may be
deemed sufficient given the absence of voiding conditions. Introducing non-behavioural
criteria into a behavioural description of an emotional state might be sufficient for an
emotion-predicate to apply because extending the description in this way rules out
potential voiding conditions. For instance, knowing that Sally believes she has done
something for which she can be criticized would serve as both a necessary condition for
the claim that Sally is feeling ashamed,71 and a voiding condition for the claim that she is
embarrassed. Statement (N2'), which apparently removes a voiding condition for the
claim that Sally is embarrassed, by making it seem unlikely that Sally believes her actions
are open to criticism, thereby inclines us to agree that Sally is feeling embarrassed rather
than ashamed.
There is no doubt, then, that Scruton's ambiguity argument correctly attributes these
two views to Sibley: the view that a-terms lack governing conditions, and the view that
terms lending themselves to both aesthetic and nonaesthetic uses are subject to governing
conditions in their nonaesthetic uses. Nor is there any doubt that Sibley would have
accepted some version of the theory of aesthetic perception, or rather, that his comments
on the nature of taste can be construed as consistent with some weak form of the theory
of aesthetic perception. For instance, Sibley subscribes to some form of aesthetic
empiricism when he states that anyone who persistently failed to detect instances of
delicate brushwork in paintings could not be said to possess the concept of delicacy, that
such a person would be lacking the equivalent of a basic perceptual or experiential
capacity and in this respect, would resemble someone who was blind to the colour red.
The aesthetic clod example is intended to demonstrate that aesthetic enjoyment,
appreciation and judgement are beyond those who cannot perceive aesthetic qualities for
themselves.72 In short, I am not objecting to the bits and pieces which Scruton extracts
from Sibley's account. However, I am suggesting that Scruton reassembles the pieces in
a manner which seriously misrepresents Sibley's methods and intentions. In particular,
Scruton misrepresents Sibley's methods and intentions when he supposes that Sibley
71 This example may be found in Bedford, p.290.
72 "Aesthetic and Nonaesthetic", p. 137.
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noted that a-concepts lack governing conditions with a view to providing a simple logical
criterion separating the aesthetic from the moral and the practical.73 As I read him, Sibley
never set himself the task of providing a unifying logic for aesthetic terms. When, in his
original paper, Sibley set about contrasting a-concepts with a range of familiar condition-
governed concepts, this was not done with a view to demarcating the realm of the
aesthetic; but with a view to demonstrating the different types of condition-governing he
was denying for a-terms. Far from using the fact that a-concepts lack governing
conditions as a method of distinguishing the class of a-terms from all other classes of
concepts, Sibley leaves it an open question whether there are categories of terms besides
a-terms which lack governing conditions.74
What the analysis of the (N) examples above is intended to show is that emotion
concepts are themselves only loosely governed by conditions. Emotion concepts are
defeasible concepts, concepts for which we choose to treat a definition as operationally
sufficient in the absence of voiding conditions. I have tried to show that our desire to treat
a description such as (N2) or (N2') as sufficient for the claim "Sally is embarrassed" is
tied up with our desire to make human behaviour appear comprehensible. In the previous
section, I argued that if the claim that a-terms may be negatively governed by conditions
amounts to something other than a denial of the claim that a-terms lack governing
conditions, it amounts to the claim that occasionally, we treat some description as
operationally sufficient for withholding an aesthetic predicate. Now if it is true that Sibley
treat emotion-terms as defeasible concepts, and if my analysis of negative condition-
governing is correct, this would mean that for Sibley, emotion concepts and a-concepts
both constitute examples of concepts that are loosely governed by conditions. In short,
what my introduction of the (N) examples is intended to show is that, in Sibley's
thinking, there may be no great distance in point of logic between emotion-concepts and
a-terms. And if for Sibley there is not that logical distance between category (c) aesthetic-
terms and non-aesthetic uses of emotion-terms which Scruton's discussion of the
73 Art and Imagination, p.42.
74 Cf. "Aesthetic and Nonaesthetic", p. 152: 'There are no doubt other concepts that lack sufficient or
positive conditions (of some specified sort); hence I am not claiming that aesthetic concepts differ from
all others in this respect".
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ambiguity argument would appear to suggest, this fact should give pause to anyone
trying to argue that Sibley was attempting to create logical space between a-concepts and
all other categories or concepts.
When Scruton suggests that Sibley made the claim that a-terms lack governing
conditions with a view to providing a unifying logic for aesthetic terms that would
underpin the theory of aesthetic perception, Scruton manages to create a Sibley who is
both naive and clever in all the wrong places. Scruton asks us to imagine a Sibley
sufficiently sophisticated in his methodology to provide a simple logical criterion
allowing us to separate the aesthetic from the practical and the moral; yet at the same time
sufficiently naive in his thinking to overlook the fact that many, perhaps a majority of all
a-descriptions, employ a vocabulary borrowed from other contexts. The Sibley I read
possessed greater intelligence and less sophistication than this assessment would imply.
For the Sibley I read was sufficiently wise to realize that taste cannot operate in isolation
of our other faculties; and he lacked the ambition to provide a special logic isolating a
unique set of terms. Scruton altogether misrepresents the type of enquiry Sibley was
engaging when he uses Sibley's views to discuss the theory of aesthetic perception. What
Sibley offers is not a formal attempt to characterize the special logic of aesthetic terms,
but an informal piece of smoking room philosophy, comprising a set of commonsense
claims - that aesthetic terms lack governing conditions, that aesthetic descriptions
characterize qualities available to the sensitive perceiver - which are not necessarily
interconnected in any systematic way. These commonsense observations are rooted in the
commonsense intuition that not every utterance made in the context of art appreciation
constitutes a properly aesthetic remark. The connections that Scruton creates between
these claims are connections which Sibley himself never explicitly makes. This is not
entirely surprising, given the fact that Scruton's primary aim in presenting the ambiguity
argument was less to provide sensitive interpretation of Sibley's position, than it was to
use Sibley as a summary illustration of the theory of aesthetic perception, a theory which
Scruton himself was keen to reject.
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In arguing that Sibley did not create his distinction nor did he make the observation
that a-concepts lack governing-conditions with a view to establishing the theory of
aesthetic perception, I am aware of the fact that perhaps a majority of Sibley's
commentators have shared Scruton's assumption that Sibley was attempting to provide a
unifying logic for aesthetic terms; or else they have concurred with Cohen in believing
that Sibley set about the task of demarcating the subject-matter of aesthetics. All I can do
here is to offer my own reading of Sibley, a reading which, whether or not it remains
historically true to Sibley's intentions, I believe manages to cohere with the substance of
Sibley's text.
VII
We are now in a position to examine in some detail that list of terms which Cohen
culls from the pages of art criticism in an attempt to demonstrate, firstly, that Sibley's
distinction is anything but intuitive or rooted in our practice; but also, that the concept of
taste proves at best a clumsy tool for sorting through the judgements we make in aesthetic
contexts.75 As I now plan to show, Sibley has nothing to fear from Cohen's list. Far
from undermining the intuitiveness of Sibley's claims, Cohen's list manages to talk right
past Sibley's distinction.
To facilitate discussion, and to reveal the challenge which Cohen places before
Sibley, I propose dividing the terms in Cohen's list between the following three
categories: (1) terms belonging to the vocabulary of art criticism which are 'aesthetic' in
some popular understanding of the word, but which do not appear to require for their
application any perceptual sensitivity ('colourful', 'dissonant', 'poetic', 'rhythmic'); (2)
terms which do not carry an aesthetic flavour in most contexts in which they are used,
yet seem to require for their application some nonaesthetic analogue of (aesthetic)
75 Cohen, p. 139.
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perceptiveness or taste ('funny', 'ideological', 'introspective', 'metaphysical',
'moralistic', 'obscene', 'pompous', 'pretentious', 'sad', 'sentimental', 'serious',
'sincere', 'suspenseful'); and (3) style or genre terms ('baroque', 'in the style of
Beethoven', 'classical', 'Gothic', 'impressionist', 'Kafkaesque', 'modernist', 'national¬
istic', 'realist', 'Romanesque', 'surrealist', 'symbolist', and Wolfflin's familiar
distinction between the 'linear' and 'painterly' pictorial styles). These categories will not
account for every term on Cohen's list and some terms (e.g. 'metaphysical') will find a
place in more than one category. Nor perhaps do these categories exhaust every problem
which Cohen would like to create for Sibley. Nonetheless, it would be true to say that a
majority of the terms on Cohen's list fall into at least one of these three categories.
Dividing Cohen's list in this way exposes the fact that Cohen regards Sibley's taste test to
be both too narrow and too broad. By incorporating the terms in category (1) into his list,
Cohen suggests that the taste test is too narrow, excluding from the class of a-terms many
terms popularly conceived to be aesthetic in nature. The terms in category (2) raise the
possibility that the taste test is too broad, since many more terms than Sibley would wish
to count among the a-terms require for their application something resembling taste.
Cohen includes the style concepts in category (3) for good measure as instances of
'aesthetic' concepts which rely upon something more than perceptual sensitivity. That is
to say, the style concepts in category (3) are intended to challenge the primarily perceptual
status that Sibley accords his a-judgements. Our concern here is with the concepts listed
in categories (1) and (2). I shall defer a discussion of category (3) until we come to
discuss the relationship between perception and aesthetic judgements in Chapter Two.
There is little point in demonstrating that Sibley's taste test includes or excludes too
many aesthetic terms unless you agree with Scruton that Sibley was setting about
providing a special logic for aesthetic terms; or unless you share Cohen's belief that
Sibley introduced his distinction with a view to demarcating the subject-matter of
aesthetics from the realm of practical or moral concern. As I have argued at length,
Sibley was attempting neither of the above. Far from using his distinction to isolate the
subject-matter of aesthetics, the distinction presupposes our prior acquaintance with that
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subject-matter. I have described at some length the basis of Sibley's decision to use the
term 'aesthetic' in a somewhat narrower sense than Cohen does. To recap: any term
characteristically used in the classification and description of the arts might count as
'aesthetic' in some broad meaning of the word. However, not all such terms are
'aesthetic' in the narrow sense that their use poses interesting questions for a form of
philosophical enquiry. Sibley operates with this narrower notion of the aesthetic when he
distinguishes those terms occurring in art criticism which stimulate our philosophical
curiosity because they lack governing conditions and designate emergent qualities
requiring some sensitivity to detect, from those terms (large, circular, green, slow,
monosyllabic) which seem to provide no new philosophical challenges whether they are
used in specifically nonaesthetic contexts, or used to qualify works of art. This is where
the intuitiveness of the distinction lies. It is Cohen, not Sibley, who goes against intuition
when he denies that we make any such distinction.
If Cohen produces his list of terms with the intention of illustrating the three
categories I have described, then it seems reasonable to suppose Cohen shares the
common misconception that the taste which Sibley describes constitutes an autonomously
operating, intuition-like faculty owing little or nothing to the activity of the ordinary
faculties, a capability to be juxtaposed with ordinary perceptual competence. Why else
would Cohen wonder whether that training or informed experience required to judge that
various works of Lizst and Brahms are 'in the style of Beethoven' involves "the
development of taste or [only] the directed training of one's normal faculties"?76 As I
have argued at length, to understand 'taste' in these terms is to misconstrue Sibley's use
of the term. Sibley does not believe we face a choice between saying that a judgement
relies upon taste and saying that a judgement requires the directed training of one's
ordinary faculties. Any accurate summary of Sibley's discussion of taste demonstrates
that Sibley believes that taste constitutes nothing more or less than the directed training of
one's ordinary faculties, or else that it represents a special deployment of the ordinary
76 Cohen, p. 140.
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faculties.77 To suppose otherwise is to misinterpret Sibley's pronouncements on the
matter.
In introducing category (2) terms into his master list, Cohen raises the interesting
question of mixed judgements: judgements which are neither purely aesthetic nor purely
moral, but draw upon both sets of considerations. Marcia Muelder Eaton adduces the
example of judging a novel to be sentimental to illustrate the notion of a mixed
judgement.78 Eaton points out that, in the paradigmatic case, we think of aesthetic interest
as an interest in certain 'intrinsic' features of an object or situation, formal and expressive
features we can directly perceive. Moral interest, by contrast, amounts to an interest in
'extrinsic' features; consequences or principles of action, features which typically cannot
be perceived in the performer or in the action she performs. This tidy distinction between
the intrinsic and the extrinsic comes apart when we come to determine the sentimentality
of a novel; a case where we have a supposedly 'aesthetic'judgement where both aesthetic
and moral aspects intertwine. We must go beyond the intrinsic features of the novel,
applying knowledge of how people react to death or unrequited love, in order to decide
whether these topics are being treated sentimentally. Similarly, a 'moral'judgement of
sentimentality must look not simply at what is done, but at how it is done - an intrinsic
feature of the action. The question arises whether the existence of mixed judgements
should prove an embarrassment for Sibley's distinction. Clearly, the existence of mixed
judgements would prove deeply embarrassing for Sibley in the event that he was aiming
to distinguish the realm of aesthetic interest from the realms of practical and moral
interest. Since he was doing nothing of the kind, Sibley can happily acknowledge the
existence of mixed judgements without surrendering his distinction. Nevertheless, the
thought may persist that mixed aesthetic judgements must prove at least mildly
embarrassing to Sibley, that these will sit uneasily with the notion that aesthetic
judgement involves a form of perceptivity. For this reason, Sibley will be obliged to treat
mixed aesthetic judgements as less than central cases of aesthetic judgement.
77 A point noted by J.F.Logan, "More on Aesthetic Concepts", p.405.
78 Marcia Muelder Eaton, "Integrating the Aesthetic and die Moral", Philosophical Studies, 67 (1992),
219-240; pp.228-229.
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To see why Sibley might happily incorporate mixed judgements among his a-
judgements, consider once more the notion of taste. Sibley's discussion of taste invites
the thought that the person who acquires taste acquires something more than a narrowly
discriminative or narrowly perceptual capacity. Now whether we choose to think of taste
as a broadly based capability of which the capacity for making fine perceptual
discrimination forms a part, or whether we choose to treat a capacity for fine perceptual
discrimination as one of a group of capabilities which jointly constitute taste, there seems
little reason to suppose that taste will be confined to that intelligence we bring to bear
when perceiving works of art. If I exercise taste in seeing that a vase is graceful, I
exercise 'taste' or an analogue of this capacity in deciding that a face has a 'sad' rather
than a thoughtful or introspective look; in distinguishing between those jokes that are
very funny and those that are at best mildly amusing; and in describing a would-be
gesture of generosity as both pompous and pretentious. On this view of the matter, the
making of aesthetic discriminations reflects a single application of a capability which may
be exercised in all walks of life. The same broad capability that is put to service in the
making of narrowly aesthetic discriminations will be called upon in the making of mixed
judgements or in the making of what are conceived to be narrowly moral judgements. It
follows that, whilst mixed judgements may not represent narrowly aesthetic judgements,
these constitute taste judgements nonetheless.
If we focus upon the important role which Sibley assigns to life experience in the
formation of taste, we derive a further understanding of this capacity that is congenial to
our understanding of mixed judgements. The fact that the development of taste requires
considerable life experience invites the thought that (aesthetic) taste is just one of a
number of capacities that are nurtured together and acquired throughout the course of a
lifetime. That is to say, the experience of a lifetime offers opportunities to hone and
refine, not just a capacity for aesthetic judgement, but a whole host of other
discriminative capacities not directly called upon in most aesthetic situations. We can
think of the person with taste as someone who displays a certain 'talent for living',
someone who is at ease with the world and who displays her ease both in the number and
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in the variety of aesthetic and nonaesthetic discriminations that she makes. What is more,
the person with taste becomes the unusually complete perceiver, someone who brings to
her aesthetic judgement-making a whole host of discriminative capacities that were forged
inside and outside the narrow sphere of aesthetic activity. The aesthetically adept
perceiver becomes the emotionally and morally adept perceiver. On this view of the
matter, not only would mixed judgements become paradigmatic rather than marginal
cases of aesthetic judgement, but it follows that a capacity for forming mixed judgements
becomes central to our understanding of the nature of aesthetic perceptivity. For it is the
presence or absence of the ability to form mixed judgements that allows us to sort the
sheep from the goats, distinguishing those who are aesthetically adept from the
aesthetically naive or inexperienced perceivers.
The discussion of Cohen's list may be summarized in the following way. Cohen
apparently believes that there are no less than three distinct notions of intuitiveness which
Sibley's distinction fails to meet. In the first place, Sibley's division of concepts between
the aesthetic and the nonaesthetic is not intuitive in the sense that this is not a distinction
we automatically or pretheoretically make. In the second place, Cohen denies the
distinction is intuitive to the extent that it relies upon the operation of a special faculty
analogous to the faculty of moral intuition. Since introspection reveals no such faculty
operating in us, the distinction cannot be 'intuitive' in this sense. And thirdly, Sibley's
distinction is not intuitive to the extent it is not one rooted in our practice. I have endorsed
the second of Cohen's claims whilst disagreeing with the first and the third. It is indeed
true to say that Sibley's distinction does not presume the existence of a special, intuition¬
like faculty. Nonetheless, the distinction is both intuitive and rooted in our practice.
What is more, I would suggest that there is a further sense in which Sibley's distinction
might be thought to be intuitive, one which Cohen overlooks. For the fact that 'taste'
represents a wide-ranging capacity which feeds upon, incorporates and complements so
many of our ordinary capacities demonstrates how intuitive, i.e. deeply rooted in our
nature, both the capacity and the judgements based upon this capacity must be.
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Throughout this chapter, I have attempted to demonstrate the relatively modest
ambitions which underlie Sibley's 'theory' of aesthetic concepts. To designate the
observations contained in Sibley's discussion of aesthetic concepts a 'theory' of aesthetic
attribution perhaps overstates the rigour of those observations. I have attempted to show
here that it is the very modesty of Sibley's ambitions which protects Sibley's account
from many of the criticisms traditionally raised against it. For the purposes of this
discussion, I have accepted without question Sibley's reflections on the nature of
aesthetic judgement and the nature of aesthetic perceptivity or 'taste'. It is now time to
subject Sibley's opinions to more critical scrutiny.
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CHAPTER TWO
Sibley distinguishes his a-judgements from what he calls verdicts, the latter being
those purely normative judgements we form when we say that things are aesthetically
good or bad, excellent or mediocre, and so on.1 In contrasting a-judgements with
verdicts, Sibley is rejecting two different possibilities: the possibility that an a-judgement
constitutes an evaluative claim, and the possibility that an a-judgement forms the
conclusion to a piece of reflective reasoning. When Sibley speaks of an a-judgement,
what he has in mind is not an evaluation or the concluding statement of an aesthetic
argument, but either a sensitive perception, or the report of a sensitive perception. This is
not to say that reports of aesthetic perceptions will never carry at least some element of
evaluation. As an examination of the list on page 19 above suggests, many of the phrases
Sibley uses in his discussion appear to carry some element of evaluation ('holds it
together', 'never really come to life', 'strikes a false note', 'telling contrast', 'tightly
knit', 'uncertainty of tone'). However, in creating a distinction between his a-judgments
and what he calls verdicts, Sibley suggests that, as well as providing evaluations, phrases
such as "the characters never really come to life" serve to describe qualities we have
perceived or otherwise recognized to be present in a work of art. That is to say, aesthetic
judgements act as phenomenally objective reports of experienced emergent qualities.
This chapter explores the nature of the links which might exist between aesthetic
judgement and acts of perception. Section I gives some support to Sibley's claim that a-
judgements constitute perceptual determinations, for here I argue that aesthetic judge¬
ments are strongly perceptual judgements: judgements formed in the course of acts of
perception rather than pieces of reflective reasoning taking the data of perception for their
materials. Section II examines what overlap exists between aesthetic judgements in the
wider meaning of the word, and Sibley's a-judgements. Here I provide an analysis of
1 Frank Sibley, "Aesthetic and Nonasthetic", PR, 74 (1965), 135-159; p. 136.
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style concepts in order to demonstrate that the class of a-judgements potentially
incorporates a greater number of aesthetic judgements in the wide sense than we
intuitively might suppose.
Many of Sibley's critics have quarrelled with the distinction Sibley wishes to create
between verdicts and a-judgements. In particular, the notion that a-judgements serve to
report perceptual experiences comes up against two claims sometimes made on behalf of
a-qualitites and a-judgements. The first of these is the proposal that a-terms serve
primarily to evaluate and only secondarily to describe. According to this proposal, since
all aesthetic judgements carry an element of evaluation, Sibley is mistaken in supposing
that there is a real distinction to be made between aesthetic evaluations and a-judgements.
The second proposal would deny the objective status of a-judgements by treating a-terms
as affective terms; terms which, while purporting to qualify the object perceived, succeed
only in describing the affective state of the perceiver. In the terminology of Beardsley,
this view claims that a-attributions describe the 'phenomenally subjective' rather than the
'phenomenally objective' components of my perceptual field.2 In Sections III and IV, I
demonstrate that neither of these proposals undermines Sibley's contention that a-
attributions constitute phenomenally objective perceptual reports. Section IV further
suggests an analysis of the content of perceptual acts which would allow us to take on
board both of these proposals whilst resisting a Kantian analysis of aesthetic judgements.
Sibley's understanding of the nature of a-judgement leads to a perceptual model of
aesthetic sensitivity, identifying aesthetic sensitivity as a form of perceptivity. Section V
describes how this perceptual model predicts the distribution of aesthetic sensitivity
across the population as a whole, and identifies ways in which a perceptual account of
aesthetic sensitivity might fail to capture our understanding of the nature of aesthetic
sensitivity.




Sibley is not the only writer who chooses to highlight the strong connection that
exists between acts of perception and the formation of aesthetic judgements. Marcia
Muelder Eaton identifies aesthetic qualities as 'intrinsic' features of objects, where an
intrinsic feature F of an object O is such that direct inspection of O is a necessary and a
sufficient condition for verifying the claim that O is F.3 Philip Petit contrasts aesthetic
characterizations with colour descriptions in order to illustrate the 'essentially perceptual'
nature of the former. In the case of colour descriptions, there are two separate ways in
which I may acquire the knowledge that O is red: I may visually inspect O for myself, or
I may rely instead upon the testimony of someone I trust. But whereas I may be said to
know that an object is red based upon nothing more than the testimony of others,
"perception is the only title to the sort of knowledge which perception yields" of the
truths which aesthetic characterizations express.4 Alan Tormey develops the same idea
by suggesting that we tend to place a direct perceptual acquaintance requirement upon
critical judgements, which he treats as co-extensive with aesthetic judgements.
According to Tormey, we react to critical judgements as though these were judgements
rooted in eyewitness accounts. That is to say, we expect anyone offering a critical
judgement to be acquainted perceptually with the object of their judgement, or in the case
of a picture, acquainted with a suitable reproduction or surrogate.5 Tormey suggests that
this direct perceptual acquaintance condition explains a further feature of a-judgements -
the fact that these cannot be transmitted between persons. From the fact that a knows that
b makes an aesthetic judgement (judgesa) that p, it does not follow that a also judgesa that
3 Marcia Muelder Eaton, "The Intrinsic, Non-Supervenient Nature of Aesthetic Properties", JAAC, 52
(1994), 383-397; p.391.
4 Philip Petit, "The Possibility of Aesthetic Realism:, in Pleasure,Preference,andValue, ed. Eva
Schaper (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 17-38; p.25.
5 Alan Tormey, "Critical Judgments:, Tlieoria, 39 (1973), 35-49. Because he places a direct perceptual
acquaintance condition upon aesthetic judgements, Tormey's conception of aesthetic judgement coincides
with Sibley's narrow use of the term. For this reason, I shall continue to adopt the abbreviated
terminology of a-terms, a-judgements, etc. in discussing Tormey's proposal.
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p. In this respect, 'judgesa' contrasts with 'knows'. If a knows that b knows that p, it
follows that a also knows that p. That is to say, the inference goes through in (1) but not
in (2):
(1) KaKbp -> Kap
(2) KaJabp -> Jaap
In the terminology which Tormey borrows from Hintikka, (1) is 'self-sustaining',
an epistemic analogue of a logically valid sentence form; (2) is not.
Tormey adopts the strategy of juxtaposing two separate facts - that judgesa is not
Iransmittable, that aesthetic judgements are rooted in eye-witness accounts - in the hope
that these will prove mutually illuminating. Since the facts which Tormey chooses to
bring into juxtaposition are not equally rich and interesting, little illumination results.
When Tormey suggests that a-judgements are rooted in eye-witness accounts, he is
making a highly particular claim concerning the nature of aesthetic judgement. This is
because the direct acquaintance condition is a feature particular to a-judgements and not a
condition binding upon judgements in general.6 Outside of the aesthetic case, I can form
judgements concerning a variety of objects with which I am not personally acquainted.
In order to judge that Darwin experiences a monsoonal climate, it is sufficient to consult
the annual climatic graph for the region. I am not required to visit that city before daring
to form my opinion. By contrast, the fact that judgesa is not transmittable in (2) is not a
rich and interesting thesis concerning the nature of a-judgements, but a rather thin fact
concerning the logical behaviour of cognitive verbs. Non-transmittability is a feature
common to all forms of judgement.7 That is to say, (2) represents a single substitution
instance of
(3) KaJbp -> Jap
6 This is not to deny that some na-judgements will take the form of eye-witness accounts.
7 Peter Kivy makes this point in "Aesthetic Concepts: Some Fresh Considerations", JAAC, 37 (1979),
423-432; p.425.
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which is not self-sustaining. What is more, the logical behaviour of (3) is consistent with
the logical behaviour of most cognitive verbs. Like (3), none of the following sentence




Contrary to Tormey's intentions, demonstrating the non-transmittable nature of judgesa in
(2) does nothing to prepare us for the more interesting claim that a-judgements constitute
eye-witness accounts. At most, Tormey's juxtaposition demonstrates that the eye-witness
nature of a-judgements is consistent with a piece of logical behaviour shared by many,
perhaps most cognitive verbs. And since this piece of logical behaviour is also compatible
with the fact that we do not automatically impose a direct acquaintance requirement upon
na-judgements, the observation does little to illuminate our understanding of a-
judgements in particular.
The problem is that the two facts which Tormey places before us are of a different
order, requiring different types of explanation. If indeed it is the case that we impose a
direct perceptual acquaintance condition upon aesthetic judgements whilst not placing one
upon judgements in general, then this is a fact which cries out for explanation. Clearly,
this explanation will not consist in pointing out a piece of logical behaviour which judgesa
shares with most cognitive verbs. On the other hand, if most cognitive verbs are not
transmittable after the fashion of 'knows' in (1), then unlike Tormey, we will not feel
compelled to reach for a special explanation of the failure of transmission in the aesthetic
case. If there is anything concerning the logical behaviour of cognitive verbs that cries out
for explanation, it is the fact that (1) is one of the very few sentence forms of its type
which is self-sustaining. What is at issue here is a logical point concerning the formal
acceptability of (1) as opposed to (2) or (5). It is impossible to secure the condition
expressed in the antecedent of (1) without simultaneously satisfying the consequent. I am
not in a position to know that p constitutes a piece of knowledge for b unless p also
constitutes a piece of knowledge for me. This is why the consequent follows from the
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antecedent in (1). By contrast, judging that p involves assessing some evidence for p.
'Judges that p' describes a more demanding cognitive operation than whatever cognitive
operation is involved in ascertaining that b judges that p. In most ordinary cases, merely
ascertaining that b judges that p will not satisfy the cognitive operation of judging for
myself that p, and so the inference fails to go through in (3).
In short, Tormey's juxtaposition proves uninformative, in part because noting the
logical behaviour of judgesa in (2) does nothing to prepare us for the claim that a-
judgments constitute eye-witness accounts; but also because the direct perceptual
acquaintance condition possesses little explanatory power when it comes to illuminating
the logical behaviour of 'judges' and 'believes' in (3) through (6). The real explanatory
power of the direct acquaintance condition lies in accounting for whatever informal
differences we may detect between individual examples of judgesa and judgesna. Thus, in
considering instances of schema (3), we discover that there are cases where, on an
informal basis, we would accept that the inference goes through. For instance, in highly
specialized areas of speculative science where a piece of information is abstruse and
difficult to acquire, perhaps requiring a lifetime's work to verify a single result, the
judgements of the experts provide the only relevant evidence I could assess. It therefore
follows that there is no gap to be bridged between ascertaining what others have judged
and assessing the evidence for myself, and that the very act of ascertaining what the
experts have judged itself would constitute an act of judgement on my part. It might even
be suggested that in cases of this kind, knowing what the acknowledged experts have
judged places me under pressure to judge in the same way myself. The direct
acquaintance condition helps to explain why no equivalent to this sort of case occurs in
the realm of aesthetic judgement. Aesthetic knowledge is information concerning the
perceptual appearances of things. Far from being difficult to acquire, aesthetic knowledge
constitutes a form of information in principle available to anyone willing to use their eyes
and ears. The 'experts' or critics enjoy no particular advantage over Everyman in this
respect. Unlike the cognitive activity of ascertaining what the expert critics think,
judginga involves assessing evidence of a perceptual nature, and the most efficient
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method of accumulating and assessing the relevant perceptual information involves
making oneself acquainted with the object concerned, looking and listening for oneself.
Thus, to insist upon a direct acquaintance condition for aesthetic judgements serves to
emphasize the perceptual nature of aesthetic judgements.
The direct-acquaintance condition serves to identify a-judgements as perceptual
judgements in a very strong sense. That is to say, not only are a-judgements perceptual in
the weak sense that they rely upon evidence of a perceptual nature; but a-judgements are
perceptual in the strong sense that these are judgements formed in the course of
perceiving. In an ontology which sharply separates human intellectual activity between
acts of perception and acts of pure cognition, the act of judginga that p involves a
perceptual rather than a cognitive operation. This is how Sibley and Tormey understand
the nature of a-judgement. However, others have not shared this understanding. Peter
Kivy for one appears to believe that at least some aesthetic judgements are perceptual only
in the weak sense. Kivy wishes to reject the direct-acquaintance condition, and to this end
argues that reading Tovey may be enough to equip me to make some aesthetic judgements
concerning Haydn's London Symphonies.8 Whilst Joseph Margolis does not explicitly
reject the direct perceptual acquaintance condition, he apparently believes that aesthetic
judgement is perceptual in the weak rather than the strong sense. This is because
Margolis acknowledges that perception provides the raw materials for aesthetic judgment,
but does not believe this entails that the act of judginga in itself must constitute a further
perceptual act. As Margolis puts it, whilst I must perceive an object in order to say that it
is graceful, I do not perceive that it is graceful.9 Margolis' understanding of the nature
of aesthetic judgment arises from his understanding of the nature of aesthetic dispute.
Margolis believes that in cases of aesthetic dispute, two individuals might form differing
opinions as to the aesthetic character of an object basing their judgements upon the same
nonaesthetic description. Margolis accounts for the existence of such disagreements by
suggesting that judginga involves an element of reflection as well as perception. My
judgement that a certain aesthetic quality is present partially reflects a theoretical decision
8 "Aesthetic Concepts: Some Fresh Considerations", p.426.
9 Joseph Margolis, "Sibley on Aesthetic Perception", JAAC, 25 (1966), 155-158; p. 157.
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upon my part as to what I shall allow to count for a given aesthetic quality. Thus, the
reason why two persons may agree in describing all the nonaesthetic qualities present in a
dance, yet fail to agree that the dance is graceful, is because they are operating with
different notions of what constitutes gracefulness in a dance. For Margolis, aesthetic
'reasons' are not offered like scientific reasons, something binding upon all rational
creatures, but instead form bases for judgement binding only upon the speaker himself.
It follows from Margolis' position that I can never be pressed to accept the aesthetic
judgements of another person in the way in which I may sometimes be under pressure to
accept the judgements of scientific experts. I can always protest that I agree with the
critic's na-descriptions and even agree that I understand why the critic judges as he does,
whilst insisting that I appreciate things differently.
Do the considerations raised by Kivy and Margolis throw any doubt upon the direct
acquaintance condition? A brief reply to Kivy would agree that reading Tovey may
provide me with some real knowledge of an aesthetic nature, might agree to call whatever
judgements I base upon my reading of Tovey 'aesthetic judgements' in the wide sense of
the word, whilst denying that the resulting judgements would be examples of Sibley's a-
judgements. A brief answer to the position adopted by Margolis would show that at least
some a-judgements are perceptual in the strong sense, by providing an example of a
commonly occurring aesthetic judgement which can only be formed in the course of an
act of perception. I here offer the notion of the balance we attribute to a painting as an
example of such a judgement. This is because the balance of a painting is its visual
balance. Judging the visual balance of a picture amounts to a perceptual operation, a
matter of seeing that the visual design 'looks right to the eye'. Whereas a balanced picture
has a settled character that is somehow satisfying to the eye, an unbalanced composition
has the appearance of something accidental, transitory. A composition which lacks visual
balance is the visual equivalent of an incoherent statement and for this reason, has an
unsettling effect upon the perceiver.10 Judging the visual balance of a picture is not a
1 0 Rudolf Arnlieim, Art and Visual Perception: A Psychology of the Creative Eye (London: Faber and
Faber, 1967), p. 12. The following account of visual balance owes much to Arnheim's first chapter, esp.
pp. 14-17.
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matter of determining the symmetrical disposition of visual motifs on the canvas. For
instance, where a picture consists of white polka dots superimposed on a black
background, I do not determine the visual balance of the picture by dividing the picture
along an imaginary vertical axis and verifying that each half of the picture contains the
same number of dots occupying the same positions. A picture displaying a random
distribution of dots from left to right may look balanced, whilst a picture displaying
perfect left-right symmetry may look too static to present a convincing experience of
visual balance. Nor is judging visual balance a function of the representational content of
a picture, so that judging balance becomes a matter of determining whether the picture
represents an object about to topple. We may decide that a picture is an implausible
representation but a highly satisfying visual statement. For instance, in Raphael's
GranducaMadonna, the child is seated on the Madonna's cupped left hand, her right
hand barely enclosing the child's torso. Neither hand apparently supplies sufficient force
to support the weight of the child, a fact which, once observed, does nothing to unsettle
the overriding impression of serenity and of total visual balance found in the
composition. Nor does judging the visual balance of a composition rely upon the
representational importance we assign to the various elements of a composition. The way
in which a figure is clothed, the sway of a curtain in the background, may carry no
representational significance in an annunciation scene. Nevertheless, these same visual
elements may serve to deflect the attention of the eye from the main figures in a way that
preserves the overall visual balance of a composition.
Rudolf Arnheim has documented various factors influencing the visual balance of
pictorial compositions. Arnhcim describes the visual 'weight' of a pictorial element,
where assigning a relative 'weight' to an element describes the extent to which that
element captures my attention within the visual field corresponding with the picture.
Given the anisotropy of visual space, shifting the same element to different positions
within the picture space may alter its visual weight. Thus the same element looks
'heavier' placed at the top of the picture than it would do if it were placed in the bottom
half. This means that in order to retain visual balance, a circle located in the top half of the
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picture must be counterbalanced by a larger visual object in the bottom half. Because the
same visual motif carries greater visual weight in the right as opposed to the left half of
the picture space, reversing a picture around its vertical axis may impair the overall visual
balance.11 Arnheim notes that bright colours look 'heavier' than dark colours, and that
the colour red looks 'heavier' than the colour blue. Arnheim also notes the operation of
certain 'lever' effects whereby the weight of a pictorial element increases in proportion to
its distance from the visual centre of the picture.12 The lever effect dictates that an object
appears 'heavier' as it retreats from the observer in the third dimension. Applied to the
pictorial case, the lever effect dictates that a picture motif takes on more visual weight as it
disappears into the depth dimension, attracting more visual attention than its size alone
would justify relative to the size of other motifs appearing in the frame.
To demonstrate that a judgement of visual balance constitutes a strongly perceptual
judgement, consider the following example. Suppose for the sake of argument that I have
become friendly with an eccentric millionaire who possesses an important private art
collection largely acquired upon the black market. Having gained his trust over a period
of time, I am offered a chance to view his most treasured painting - a lost work by a well-
known artist. However, to ensure that I will not be able to identify his acquistion to the
proper authorities, he proposes to expose only a small section of the painting at any one
time, whilst keeping the remainder of the painting hidden from view. I may spend as
much time as I like examining each section, and my friend helpfully offers to indicate on
a numbered diagram the position each section occupies within the painting overall.
Although there is no doubt that I could gain some information of a perceptual nature by
following this procedure, it is difficult to say precisely which perceptual judgements I
would be in a position to make. For one thing, it is doubtful that my knowledge of the
prevailing colour tonalities of the individual parts would enable me to determine the
11 It follows that where a picture contains the same amount of visual material on both sides, the right
side may look heavier than the left. This fact explains why a polka-dot picture possessing perfect left-
right symmetry might lack visual balance.
12 The visual centre of a picture should not be confused with the geometrical centre of the picture plane,
since the centre of visual interest in a picture is determined by the disposition of visual elements upon the
plane. For more on this, see Rudolf Arnheim, The Power of the Centre: A Study of Composition in the
Visual Arts (Bereley; University of California Press, 1982), esp. ch. 1 and p.93.
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overall tonality of the colour scheme of the painting, a fact familiar to anyone who has
tried matching the shades of colour belonging to individual pieces of a jigsaw puzzle
against the shades of colour see in a larger tonal context within the picture on the box.
What is beyond dispute is that I would never put myself in a position to judge the visual
balance of the picture by taking up my friend's singular offer. The balance of a pictorial
composition describes a relationship between the parts of the picture which is seen rather
than inferred. In the terminology adopted by Margolis, not only must I perceive in order
to judge that a picture is balanced, I perceive that the picture is balanced. It follows that,
as long as I lacked some overall visual impression of the picture, or had failed to visually
experience the interrelationship between its parts, I would not have perceived the painting
in a way that would allow me to judge its visual balance. The fact that I could never judge
the visual balance of the picture by applying the principles enumerated by Arnheim to the
sort of visual information gained in this pictorial game of 'peek-a-boo' demonstrates that
at least some a-judgements, notably judgements of visual balance, are perceptual
judgements in the strong sense that these are judgements formed during acts of
perception.
At this point, an opponent hostile to the notion that a-judgements constitute purely
perceptual determinations might object that I have chosen a rather poor example to
illustrate the strongly perceptual nature of a-judgements. This opponent might point out
that the very feature being used to demonstrate the strongly perceptual nature of a-
judgements, the fact that the judgement of visual balance can be made instantaneously in
an act of perception, only serves to show that the judgement of visual balance is an
atypical aesthetic judgement. For whereas the unity or balance of a painting is something
we take in at a glance, judging the unity or balance of most other artforms requires at a
minimum extended acts of perception, and perhaps in addition an element of rumination
upon that which we perceive. To illustrate his point, my opponent might rely upon a
distinction which Arnheim creates between the 'synoptic' and 'sequential' arts.13 The
synoptic arts encompass those artforms such as painting, sculpture and architecture,
13 Rudolf Arnheim, "Unity and Diversity of the Arts", in New Essays on the Psychology ofArt
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), pp.65-77, esp. p.70.
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where a work of art exists in its entirety at a single moment in time. The synoptic arts
contrast with those 'sequential' arts, such as music, drama and literature, where the entire
work of art is never available for perusal at a single instant but unfolds for the viewer
through time. The fact that the balance of a painting can be determined in an instant
demonstrates less concerning the nature of aesthetic judgement than it demonstrates the
highly unusual nature of our perceptual engagement with the so-called synoptic artforms.
Changing the original example from the judgement of visual balance to the judgement of
musical balance would not support my conclusion that a-judgements constitute strongly
perceptual judgements.
As it stands, the objection overlooks the fact that the distinction which Arnheim
creates between the synoptic and the sequential arts is a distinction more ontological than
epistemological in nature. This is because the distinction between the synoptic and
sequential arts concerns that which is available to perception at a moment in time.
Theoretically speaking, a work in the synoptic arts does, and a work in the sequential arts
does not, exist in its entirety at a single instant in time. However, this is not to say that in
practice, we won't require relatively extensive acts of perception to appreciate in detail the
features belonging to a painting or to any other work belonging to one of the synoptic
artforms. In much the same way that it takes a certain amount of time to hear a
symphony, so too appreciating a work of architecture involves a considerable investment
in time, walking around a building and viewing it from a variety of vantage points.
Likewise, although the optimal viewing distance for a painting allows the painting to
appear in its entirely within the perceptual field of the viewer, only the simplest pictures
can be taken in at a glance. Most pictures must be scanned, articulate perception being
confined to a small area at any given moment. My opponent might concede all of this, yet
persist with his original objection, pointing out that the act of scanning a painting differs
from the act of listening to a work of music in one crucial respect. Since the parts of a
painting are not presented in a linear sequence in time, it follows that there is no 'correct'
sequence in which the parts of the painting should be scanned. For whereas changing the
order of the movements would make a great difference when it comes to judging the unity
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of a symphonic work, the order in which my eccentric friend chooses to expose sections
of his painting could not influence my ability to judge its visual balance. Thus, if my
friend imposed the conventions for reading manuscripts upon my viewing of his picture,
by revealing the square in the top left-hand corner of the picture, working from left to
right across and down the painting until he arrived at the square at the lower right-hand
corner, he would succeed in giving some sort of order to what was seen. However, the
resulting sequence would lack any pictorial logic. As Arnheim points out, the
compositional or spatial characteristics in a painting, piece of sculpture or work of
architecture, such qualities as symmetry or balance, may be perceived "only when the
crisscross of relations between the elements is apprehended synoptically."14 That is to
say, the only sequence that could make pictorial sense is one which allows me to perceive
for myself the connections between the parts of the picture. My opponent would use this
point to show that judging the compositional characteristics of a painting disresembles the
act of judging the compositional characteristics of a musical work, the former requiring
momentary visual acts, the latter involving acts of memory, reasoning and reflection in
addition to brute perceptual input. Who is to say which of these judgements is more
typical of aestheticjudgements in general?
The challenge contained in my opponent's objection is clear: to produce a musical
analogue to the judgement of visual balance. Taking up the challenge, I here offer the
judgement of musical unity as an instance of a strongly perceptual judgement in the
musical case. In claiming that the judgement of musical unity constitutes a strongly
perceptual judgement, I am not claiming that the musical listener comes to an
instantaneous recognition of the unity of a musical work. Thus, I reject altogether Rudolf
Arnheim's suggestion that the listener judging the unity of a musical work creates in his
mind a visual image of the structure of the piece, thereby turning what is presented as a
sequence into simultaneity.15 Arnheim's claim is misleading on two separate counts. In
the first place, the response that Arnheim describes is not the response appropriate to the
average musical listener, but the response of a gifted visual thinker such as Arnheim
14 "Unity and Diversity of the Arts", p.70.
15 "Unity and Diversity of the Arts", p.69.
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himself. That large majority of persons versed in the art of musical listening who happen
to lack a vivid visual imagination would not utilize such visual props in conceptualizing
the unity of a musical work. Arnheim's suggestion is also mistaken for treating the unity
of a musical work on analogy with the transcendental self that evaded Hume's empiricist
eye, something available to perception only if it is the sort of thing of which we can
entertain a Humean impression. Peter Kivy tackles this Humean view when he
pronounces that he stands before the emergent quality of unity in a musical work like
Hume before his transcendental self. According to Kivy, "we are experiencing the unity
[of a musical work] just when we are perceiving the themes, their permutations and
combinations in which we say the unity resides."16 Kivy's comments here target a view
which Kivy attributes to Beardsley, the view that the relationship between na-qualities
and a-qualities is contingent and causal, with the na-qualities of an object working behind
the scenes to produce an emergent a-quality greater than the sum of its parts.17 Whereas
Beardsley conceptualizes the unity of a work of music as something resembling the
flavour of pea soup, a quality over and above and greater than the sum of its parts, Kivy
treats the unity of a musical work as more akin to the happiness in a happy face, the latter
consisting in nothing over and above the features belonging to that face. Kivy's argument
here is beside the point, since anyone taking the view that the unity of a musical work
constitutes an emergent quality greater than the sum of the parts of the work is not
thereby committed to saying that this emergent quality of unity is something only
available to an instantaneous act of recognition. Yet whatever the wrongheadedness of his
argument, Kivy's comments are interesting for the fact that, despite his professed opinion
that there are aesthetic judgements that we can make at second-hand, Kivy here manages
to identify one aesthetic judgement of a strongly perceptual nature. The unity of a musical
work is no more inferred from what we perceive than is the balance of a pictorial
composition. A statement regarding the unity of a musical work serves to report an
16 "Aesthetic Concepts: Some Fresh Considerations", p.427.
17 Vide Beardsley's suggestion that, in order to draw a funny face, it is not necessary to draw the lines of
the face, then draw in its funny quality. When we have drawn a set of lines of the right sorts, we will
unavoidably draw a funny face, "for the funniness will supervene". See Monroe C.Beardsley, 'The
Descriptivist Account of Aesthetic Attributions", Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 28 (1974), 336-
352; pp.338-339.
82
extended experience of the relationship of its parts, or else it serves to describe the music
as the source of such an experience. The act of judging the unity of a musical work may
involve a relatively extended perceptual operation when compared with the act of
determining the visual balance of a pictorial composition. What we have here is an act of
perception nonetheless.
It is important to remember that Arnheim's observations on the factors contributing
to visual balance do not function as a set of 'rules' enabling me to infer the presence of
visual balance given my knowledge of the various perceptible na-qualities of paintings.
Instead, Arnheim offers observations of visual effects, a series of generalizations based
upon the judgements which people actually make. Because those generalizations Arnheim
draws from our practice of judging visual balance are precisely the sort of generalizations
the aesthetic clod might employ in making his inferences, Arnheim's principles serve to
illustrate Sibley's claim that no set of na-qualities ever entails a particular a-judgement.
In this regard, consider an example devised by Jerrold Levinson:18
Imagine two paintings of the same size, produced on the same type of canvas,
with the same paints, and in the manner of Jackson Pollock, but laterally
symmetrical about the centre vertical. Now add that they are indistinguishable to
careful normal viewing except for one thing - the first painting has a medium-
sized round blue patch somewhere in its left half that is missing from the second
painting, whereas the second painting has an exactly similar patch at the
corresponding position in its right half that is missing from the first painting. In
short, they are mirror images of each other; one has the extra patch on the left,
the other has it on the right....it is hard to envision any grounds on which one
could maintain that this difference generated an aesthetic one.
Strictly speaking, painting A and painting B could not differ only with respect to the
placement of a single blue colour patch since, as I understand Levinson's description of
the case, the right half of painting A must present something other than a blue colour
patch in the position where we find a blue patch in painting B; whereas the left half of
painting B must present something other than a blue colour patch in the position occupied
by the blue patch in painting A. Let us therefore suppose a further fact compatible with
Levinson's hypothetical example: that the mirror reversal between picture A and picture B
18 Jerrold Levinson, "Aesthetic Uniqueness", JAAC, 38 (1980), 435-449; p.442.
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means that at the position where picture A has a blue patch in its left half, picture B has a
red patch, and that at the location where picture B displays a blue patch on its right half,
we find a red patch in picture A. If we assume that picture B displays a high degree of
visual balance, there is some reason to assume that picture A might not display the same
visual balance, in view of the principles of visual balance suggested by Arnheim - in
particular the nature of left-right visual asymmetry and the relative visual weight of the
colours red and blue. For whereas B places the visually less heavy blue spot in a visually
more prominent position, where it may 'balance out' the relatively heavy-looking red spot
in the left half, A places the heavier red spot in the visually prominent right half in a way
which might not allow the blue spot in the other half to counterbalance. A perceiver who
was sensitive to the way that the visual weight of different colours pull against one
another could quite possibly find that A was less well balanced than B, whether or not he
could articulate the reason why one picture looked more satisfying to him than the other.
So contrary to what Levinson wishes to suggest, we can imagine grounds for finding a
real aesthetic difference between the two pictures.19
When I say that picture A may look less balanced, or appear to have a different sort
of balance to picture B, I offer this only as a possibility. The case may be as Levinson
suggests, that there are no significant aesthetic differences between the pictures.
Arnheim's principles of visual balance are not a tool allowing us to infer that picture A is
less balanced than picture B. On the contrary, the sheer number and variety of principles
which Arnheim invokes in describing the phenomenon of visual balance indicate that
visual balance is sensitive to too many factors to allow any easy predictions. Which
factors count most in determining the visual balance in the individual case is something
only the eye can decide. As long as we place our faith in general principles, we find that
even where we believe we have discovered reasons why a picture might lack balance,
19 In the reprinted version of "Aesthetic Uniqueness", Levinson acknowledges that his original paper
underestimated "sources of aesthetic differentiation that right/left reversal might provide", and alters his
original example to one involving paintings with black and grey dots rather than coloured dots. The new
example is invulnerable to the objections I have raised here. See Music, Art and Metaphysics: Essays in
Philosophical Aesthetics (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp.132, 125-126.
Although I challenge Levinson's original example, I would endorse the thesis that example was intended
to support, that not every perceptible difference between two works of art constitutes an aesthetic
difference.
84
other reasons and principles may direct us to the opposite conclusion. Thus, in
contradiction of everything I have said thus far concerning paintings A and B, it could
prove to be the case that some lever effect was operating in painting A, so that the
distance of the red patch from the central vertical combining with the overall distributions
of shapes and colours on the canvas, acted to increase or decrease the visual 'weight' of
the red patch in a way that could not be predicted. Alternatively, we might find that
because the colour spots being reversed between the two pictures occupy such a tiny
amount of space in the overall scheme of each picture; or else, that because the red
pigment being used is a bluish red whilst the blue is a reddish blue, no difference of
effect can be detected when the spots are reversed between the two canvases. In short,
those generalizations which Arnheim provides may serve to indicate the salient
characteristics influencing judgements of visual balance, but these provide nothing like a
decision procedure allowing us to determine the visual balance of a composition. Once
again, we see a graphic illustration of Sibley's claim that a-terms lack governing
conditions.
II
As noted in Chapter One, Sibley uses the terms 'aesthetic quality', 'aesthetic
concept' and 'aesthetic judgement' in a narrow, quasi-technical sense. In the previous
section, I suggested that an aesthetic judgement in the narrow sense constitutes a strongly
perceptual judgement, to the extent that the act of judgement constitutes an act of
perception rather than reflection. The question naturally arises, what degree of overlap
might we expect to find between the set of aesthetic judgements in the wide and the
narrow meaning of the word? Does Sibley's restricted use of the term 'aesthetic' serve to
exclude from his list of a-concepts many concepts thought to be 'aesthetic' in the ordinary
understanding of the word? Cohen assumed as much when he devised his list of terms as
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a potential embarrassment to Sibley's distinction. Not only is it difficult to imagine what
form a satisfactory answer to this question might take, but providing such an answer
would certainly take us well beyond the scope of this enquiry. So rather than attempting
to provide a definitive answer here, I shall tentatively suggest that the area of overlap
between the class of aesthetic qualities in the wide and the narrow sense may be more
extensive than we suppose. I shall do this by demonstrating how some of those aesthetic
concepts which prima facie look to be based upon criteria of a non-perceptible nature
might, upon closer inspection, qualify as examples of a-concepts. For the purposes of
this exercise, we need look no further than the class of style concepts contained in
Cohen's list.
Cohen included style concepts in his list in order to challenge Sibley's claim that a-
judgements constitute perceptual judgements, no doubt because he was operating under
the opinion that the style of a work of art is not something we can identify by simple
inspection. It was Cohen's belief, in other words, that in the majority of cases, the
judgement that a work of art is in a certain style relies upon historical or contextual
knowledge as well as sensory perceptivity. In support of Cohen's contention that many
style concepts prove intractable to the taste test, we may note that the term 'style'
designates not a single concept but a whole cluster of concepts which may not be related
to one another. What we think of as the style of an individual painter may prove to have
little in common with what might be identified as the style of an historical period or a
school of painting. It is also the case that many of these operational definitions of the
notion treat style as something other than a perceptual determination. For instance, if we
treat the style of a work as the artist's way of presenting his subject-matter,20 or
alternatively, as something the writer does in the work that is expressive of the writer's
personality,21 it follows that attention to style will involve attention to more than the so-
called 'intrinsic' features of works of art. In general, and given the fact that literary works
constitute objects of conception rather than perception, it is difficult to imagine any
20 For a discussion of this notion of style, see Nelson Goodman, Ways ofWorldtnaking (Indiannapolis:
Hackett, 1978), pp.23-27.
21 The proposal of Jennifer Robinson in "Style and Personality in the Literary Work", PR, 94 (1985),
227-247.
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operational definition which could turn the detection of a literary style into a perceptual
affair. Likewise, in cases where the notion of style is identified with the notion of an
artist's 'repertoire', the set of alternative means of expression with which the artist
worked, identifying style will involve attention to more than the intrinsic features of the
work.22 The style concepts listed here would almost certainly qualify as aesthetic
concepts in the wide rather than the narrow sense.
However, whilst I would readily concede to Cohen the fact that many style concepts
assume non-perceptible criteria, I would suggest that there are cases where a judgement
of style amounts to a perceptual determination. To discover some cases where style might
be as apparent as the so-called intrinsic features of a work of art, consider a useful
distinction which Richard Wollheim creates within the topic of pictorial style.23
According to Wollheim, some but not all painters possess their own individual style; and
talk of the individual style of the painter who possesses one reflects a very different
conception of style to the concept we utilize under the heading of general style. Talk of a
general style - be it a universal style (e.g. classicism, painterly, linear), a period or
historical style (e.g. neo-classicism, art nouveau), or the style of a school (e.g.
Giottesque, Norwich School) - acts as a shorthand for those characteristics which art-
historians writing at a particular point in time judge to be particularly interesting,
arresting, innovatory, in a stretch of painting. The group of characteristics associated
with each general style are not fixed for all time, but vary relative to the changing
perspectives and interests of those who are doing the looking. By contrast, an individual
style is not identical with whatever characteristics happen to be associated with it. This is
because individual style designates something stored in the mind of the artist which is
causally responsible for certain characteristics regularly found in his work. Individual
styles have psychological reality, and the characteristics belonging to individual styles are
fixed immutably. The fact that individual style is something possessing psychological
reality is sometimes obscured by a tendency amongst art-historians to disagree amongst
22 Richard Wollheim gives a brief discussion of the problems involved in identifying style with
repertoire in Art and Its Objects, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), sec.30, pp.63-
66.
23 Richard Wollheim, Painting as an Art (London: Thames, 1987), pp.26-27.
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themselves as they struggle to find the ideal formulation of those characteristics. It goes
without saying that, where art-historians offer conflicting descriptions of an individual
style, at most one of these descriptions will be proven to be correct.
Wollheim summarizes the difference between the two conceptions of style by
suggesting that general style lacks the explanatory power of individual style. To subsume
an artist's work under a general style is to employ a classificatory tool which explains
nothing, although the exercise may draw attention to characteristics we should otherwise
overlook. Individual style has explanatory power because it has both psychological and
psycho-motor reality. Having an individual style, like knowing a language, is a form of
competence that manifests itself in the artist's output. To subsume a work under an
individual style serves both to explain those effects we discover, and to describe a
psychological fact concerning the artist.
Although Wollheim's definition of individual style concentrates upon the artist rather
than the spectator, it is clear that the explanatory power of the concept derives in part
from the fact that individual style has psychological reality for the spectator as well as the
artist. Whereas general style is a theoretical construct, something the spectator might
struggle to find evidence for in a given work, individual style is something that as it were
confronts the unwitting spectator. The spectator who hears the style of Beethoven in the
piano works of Brahms and Lizst is not making a detailed comparison of the oeuvres of
the respective composers, she enjoys an instant perceptual recognition of something
previously encountered. Here then are two facts concerning individual style requiring
explanation: the fact that individual style possesses reality for the perceiver, and the fact
that occasionally, the individual style of one artist may be detectable in the works of
another. One simple explanation for these facts would specify that, from the point of
view of the spectator, individual style manifests itself as a structural gestalt quality
perceptible in some or all of an artist's works. It is the existence of a repeated gestalt
pattern in the works of some artists which leads us to say that the artist in question
possesses his own individual style. To understand what this structural gestalt quality
might be like, consider the striking physiognomic character we encounter in some but not
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all human faces; a character which, once it has been found and associated with a
particular individual, allows us to recognize and track the individual through the facial
permutations of a lifetime.24 It may not be possible to discover a definite physiognomic
character in every human face, and not every artist's works will display an individual
style. But for those artists who possess an individual style, that style will announce its
presence to the sensitive perceiver as a perceptual gestalt discoverable in many or all of
his works. And this gestalt quality, being a perceptual characteristic, may be evident in
some works not by the artist's own hand.
I anticipate two lines of objection to this proposal which can be quickly dealt with.
The first objection points out that if style were nothing more than a gestalt or perceptible
pattern of organization in an artist's works, then the ability to detect individual style could
be manipulated as a tool in helping to determine the artist's oeuvre. Since the artist's
oeuvre would be identical with whatever class of works happened to display the relevant
gestalt or pattern, a knowledge of style could determine a knowledge of the artist's
oeuvre. In point of fact, the relationship of dependency most often runs in the other
direction. Not only do art historians require some prior acquaintance with the attributed
works of the artist to guide their understanding of his style, but changes in the
constitution of that oeuvre tend to bring about changes in their understanding of
individual style. For instance, once one or two Van Meegerens had been incorporated
into the class of known Vermeers, it became easier for subsequent Van Meegerens to be
taken for Vermeers. It was only once an attributed class of Van Meegerens was in place
that people were alerted to the existence of a Van Meegeren style, and began to
distinguish this from the style of Vermeer.25 Furthermore, it might be argued that if our
understanding of an artist's style reflects the state of knowledge of his oeuvre, it follows
that whatever gestalt quality becomes associated with his style must change as the
constitution of his oeuvre changes. A public familiar only with the early works of Titian
24 In an essay titled 'The Mask and the Face", Ernest Gombrich nicely illustrates our capacity for
physiognomic recognition of a person through time using photographs of Bertrand Russell aged four and
ninety. See The Image and the Eye: Further Studies in the Psychology ofPictorial Representation
(Oxford: Phaidon, 1982), pp. 105-136; pp. 108-109.
25 Cf. Nelson Goodman's discussion of the matter in The languages ofArt, p. 111.
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would derive their understanding of the Titianesque gestalt by looking at his early works.
This means that, should any late works of Titian come to light, these would be excluded
from the artist's oeuvre for failing to display the relevant gestalt character. By contast, a
public familiar with a collection of the mature and less mature works of Titian would
adopt a somewhat different notion of the Titianesque gestalt, one which would
accommodate further instances of the artist's mature works as these came to light. What
these reflections show is that the style of an artist cannot be identified as the gestalt
pattern read off his works.
The problem with this line of objection is that it mistakenly supposes that we can
manufacture at will gestalt patterns to correspond with the styles of artists. The
suggestion that the style of an artist may be present in his works as some sort of gestalt
quality is the suggestion that firstly, where an artist possesses an individual style, we can
look at one of his works and see the parts in that work as forming a whole that is greater
than the sum of those parts; and secondly, that other works by that artist will tend to
demonstrate the same principle of organization. Looking at the Titian example, there is no
reason to suppose that the works of an artist may not display more than one gestalt or
pattern of organization, and that therefore the artist might be thought to possess both an
early and a late style. Discovering such a gestalt quality is not a matter of looking for
similarities across a group of works, and this is why the gestalt corresponding with his
style is not vulnerable to changes in the artist's attributed oeuvre. Furthermore, to
suppose that we do manufacture stylistic gestalts by looking for properties held in
common between the works in the artist's oeuvre is to confuse the notion of individual
style with what Wollheim calls signature.26 Signature is something like the notion of
general style applied in the individual case, and indicates those features of an artist's
work singled out as sure guides to establishing the authorship of individual works.
Where an artist possesses an individual style, the artist's style will form his signature.
For those artists who lack an individual style, style and signature cannot coincide.
26 Painting as an Art, p.36.
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However, it would still be possible to compile a notion of the artist's signature out of
superficial mannerisms repeating themselves across a wide variety of works.27
The second line of objection to my proposal suggests that if the style of an artist
were something immediately apparent in his work, we would never, or almost never,
experience difficulty in assigning works to particular artists. In the very few cases where
an attribution was in doubt the dispute would line up, on the one side, a group of experts
possessing the sensitivity to detect the relevant perceptual gestalts; and on the other side,
those who lack the relevant recognitional capacity or expertise; with those who were
conscious of belonging to the latter group agreeing to defer to the superior knowledge of
the former. In fact, it is the experts, the art critics and art historians, who differ among
themselves; a sure sign that style judgements depend upon background information,
inference and reasoning, in addition to the capacity to recognize gestalt patterns. An
answer to this objection would point out that the existence of differences in expert
opinion does not demonstrate that experts never treat style as a perceptually obvious
characteristic in a work. At most, these differences in opinion demonstrate that experts
may apply different criteria when attributing works to artists. For example, where a
disputed attribution concerns the work of an artist who happens to lack an individual
style, art historians will look to characteristics other than style to discover the artist's
signature in the work. Precisely which properties a given connoisseur identifies with the
artist's signature will reflect the methods and instruments he has at his disposal. It
therefore follows that experts adopting different methods and instruments may well
disagree over what constitutes the signature of that artist. In cases where the artist whose
work is in question displays an individual style, we may find a dispute unfolding
between a group of experts who refuse to attribute The Polish Rider to Rembrandt using
purely perceptual criteria, because they fail to recognize therein the gestalt of a Rembrandt
painting; and those who would attribute the painting to Rembrandt basing their opinion
27 Nelson Goodman shows no sensitivity to the distinction between the general and the individual style,
or the distinction between style and signature, when he identifies style with "those features of the
symbolic functioning of a work that are characteristic of author, period, place or school." For Goodman,
"a style is a complex characteristic that serves somewhat as an individual or group signature....in general
stylistic properties help answer the questions: who? when? where?" See Ways of Worldmaking, pp.35,
34; OfMind and Other Matters, p. 131.
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upon nonperceptual criteria such as questions of provenance or the known history of
ownership of the painting. Far from undermining the notion that style may operate as a
perceptual concept, the existence of such disputes serves to suggest that at least some of
the experts regard style to be something like one of Sibley's a-qualities, an intrinsic and
observable quality in a work.
In this Section, I have not begun to demonstrate that all or even most aesthetic
concepts in the wider meaning of the word can be assimilated into the class of Sibley's a-
concepts. What I have demonstrated is that, prior to an exhaustive enquiry into the
matter, it would be premature to suppose that Sibley's restricted use of the term
'aesthetic' serves to exclude too much of what we understand to be 'aesthetic' to be of
much theoretical use.
Ill
There is a familiar set of examples customarily wheeled out in an attempt to refute
Sibley's claim that a-terms function as descriptive rather than evaluative terms. Thus, it
has sometimes been pointed out that whilst a person may be identified in terms of his
height, weight, hair colouring and distinguishing marks, no court of law would permit
reference to the 'sullen' expression of the suspect as a means of identification. Other
examples apparently demonstrate that a-terms do not appear to serve as terms of
classification, sorting items into categories or classes. I cannot follow the instruction to
pick out the only 'clumsy' painting in the gallery as I might follow the instruction to pick
out the only man wearing a pink carnation and a brown coat. Whilst a museum director
may return a Rothko on the grounds that it fails to meet the size and colour specifications
provided by the dealer, she would not be permitted to return the painting on the grounds
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that it lacks the dynamic visual tensions some critics discover therein.28 At the very least,
such examples suggest that, to the extent that a-terms do function descriptively, these do
not serve to describe things after the fashion of na-terms. Awareness of such examples
has led to the suggestion that a-terms function as 'value-tending' terms, terms which
describe objects in a necessarily value-tending way.29 That is to say, every a-term names
either an aesthetically good-making or an aesthetically bad-making feature. For instance,
'grace' names an aesthetically good-making feature, and 'garishness' an aesthetically
bad-making feature. Although a-ascriptions do not constitute verdicts, they typically act
as reasons in judgements of aesthetic value. Because they imply certain value-
judgements, a-terms are more evaluative than descriptive in nature. Ruby Meager, who
offers a neo-Kantian account of aesthetic judgement, demonstrates the special logic of
aesthetic judgements, the fact that these carry little or no descriptive content, by
suggesting that a non-English speaker might grasp the meaning of "What a marvellous
light!" if it were uttered in a suitable tone of voice in a suitable circumstance. By contrast,
there is no context and no tone of voice which could equally convey to someone ignorant
of the English language the meaning of "If the train does not arrive punctually at five
o'clock he'll miss the connexion."30
While the proposal that a-terms constitute terms of evaluation would deny a primarily
descriptive role for Sibley's a-ascriptions, the proposal that a-terms constitute terms of
affect would reduce Sibley's a-descriptions to a special species of perceptual judgements,
statements that at best report directly upon the subject and only indirectly upon the object
perceived. For the proposal that a-terms constitute affective terms implies that, when a
speaker makes an a-attribution, she intends to tell us about the object perceived, yet only
succeeds in telling us about the effect the object has upon her. If I call the music 'insipid',
I say something about the perceptual character of the music. If instead I say that the music
is 'irritating', I tell you how the music affects me. At most 'irritating' attributes to the
28 These and other examples may be found in Isabel Creed Himgerland, "Once Again, Aesthetic and
Nonaesthetic", JAAC, 26 (1968), 285-295, pp.287-288; and Marcia P.Freedman, "The Myth of the
Aesthetic Predicate", JAAC, 27 (1968), 49-55, p.51.
29 Freedman, p.54.
30 Ruby Meager, "Aesthetic Concepts", BJA, 10 (1970), 303-322, pp.303-304.
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music a dispositional tendency to irritate those who listen to it, but fails to identify the
features of the music responsible for this irritation. Beardsley defines an 'affective term1
as "any adjective that, as applied to a work of art, contains as at least part of its meaning
some reference to the effect of the work upon the percipient".31 Here 'irritating' would
function as an affective term, 'insipid' would not. The proposal I am now considering
suggests that many if not most a-terms function affectively, containing some reference to
an effect upon the perceiver as either a part or the whole of their meaning.
The two proposals under consideration here - the proposal that a-terms function
evaluatively, the proposal that a-terms are terms of affect - apparently come together in an
emotivist account of aesthetic judgement. Goran Hermeren has managed to demonstrate
something of the variety extant among definitions of emotive meaning.32 The common
thread running through these definitions is the idea that terms with emotive meaning serve
either or both of the following functions: (a) they may be used to express the feelings and
attitudes of the speaker; (b) they may be used to arouse feelings and attitudes in listeners.
Clearly, an account of the affective use of language will go a long way toward
demonstrating how emotive language fulfils function (a), whilst an account of value-
tending terms would help to explain how emotive language fulfils function (b). Since the
claim that a-terms function emotively adds no new consideration to the two proposals
already under consideration, I will not discuss this proposal separately.
I shall now show that neither of the proposals under consideration forces the
conclusion that a-attributions fail to ascribe phenomenological features. The first proposal
suggests that a-attributions are not descriptions but potential value-judgements. Defeating
this proposal would require arguing either that (i) a-terms don't carry any significant
value-tendency; or else that (ii) any value-tendency attaching to a particular a-term
represents at most a potential to appear in value-judgements, a potential that remains
distinct from the meaning of the term. I do not believe strategy (i) can be adopted, since
most a-terms clearly do possess a tendency towards positive or negative evaluation. To
attribute an a-quality such as gracefulness to an object provides potential grounds for a
3 1 Aesthetics, p.42.
3 2 Goran Hermeren, "Aesthetic Qualities, Value and Emotive Meaning", Theoria, 39 (1973), 71-100.
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positive evaluative judgement in a way in which attributing redness would not do. As
Peter Kivy suggests, since grace is an aesthetically good-making feature and garishness
an aesthetically bad-making feature, it seems prima facie absurd to state, without further
elaboration, "the vase is aesthetically bad because it is graceful" or "the garish colours
make the vase aesthetically good."33 So instead, I shall adopt strategy (ii) and claim that
the particular value-tendency associated with a given a-term reflects a potential to appear
in a certain type of value-judgement, a potential which may not be realized in the
individual case. The following example serves to illustrate this point. In most instances, a
work of art described as 'formless' may be said to lack one potential source of aesthetic
excellence. However, when Wolfflin charts a progressive descent into formlessness in
the late paintings of Michaelangelo, Wolfflin does not offer the 'formlessness' of these
works as grounds for a negative evaluation. Instead, Wolfflin uses the term to describe,
in a value-neutral way, a particular representational effect which was sought by the aging
artist, who aimed to realize great visual masses in his work. In creating these visual
masses, the artist was creating compositions which overwhelm the senses of the
spectator; or else he was giving artistic form to objects which by their very nature or size
appeared to lack form. Thus, Wolfflin notes that unlike Michaelangelo's early attempts at
a sculptured Pieta, where the body of Christ was disposed diagonally in a beautiful line
across his mother's knees, the artist's final attempt at such a grouping leaves the dead
Christ "partly upright and collapsing at the knees, making a beautiful line quite
impossible - but Michelangelo did not want a beautiful line. The last thought to which his
chisel gave expression was to be the formless collapse of a heavy mass."34 If we believe
that creating great visual masses which overwhelm the spectator, or else that depicting a
human body as a dead weight on the point of collapse, constitute representational
achievements on Michaelangelo's part, then to the extent that Wolfflin intends to provide
any evaluation when he ascribes formlessness to these works, his descriptions suggest
33 Peter Kivy, "What Makes 'Aesthetic' Terms Aesthetic?", PPR, 36 (1975), 197-211; p.200.
34 Heinrich Wolfflin, Classic Art: An Introduction to the Italian Rnaissance, fifth ed. (London:
Phaidon, 1994), pp. 199, 196.
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grounds for a positive rather than a negative aesthetic evaluation. Here is one clear case
where the negative value-tendency attaching to a particular term has failed to be realized.
How would we demonstrate that the value-tendency attaching to particular a-terms
remains distinct from their descriptive function? Beardsley offers the example of making
someone's mouth water by reading out the recipe for a cake, to illustrate and support his
contention that there is a difference between what 'unified' and 'graceful' mean as
predicates of objects and what their application suggests in the way of potential value-
judgments.35 The fact that Sally infers that the cake is good whilst I am describing the
recipe does not convert my description into a value-judgment, and in a similar way, "this
is unified" and "this is good" remain descriptions regardless of what they may be taken to
suggest in the way of evaluations. However, Beardsley's analogy between reacting to a
cake recipe and reacting to an a-description fails to acknowledge the obvious disanalogy
between the two cases. If I read out the recipe in a cold and factual way for the purposes
of a cookery demonstration, we can attribute Sally's reaction to her suggestibility, or to
the fact that she is feeling hungry. If on the other hand I dwell upon the delectable nature
of the ingredients because I wish to tempt Sally into making the cake herself, then Sally's
response owes less to her suggestibility and more to the intentions underlying my
demonstration. Ascribing a-qualities to objects resembles this second scenario more
closely than it does the first. This is because the activity of art criticism formalizes that
which we all do whenever we recommend an object for aesthetic appreciation. In
recommending an object for aesthetic appreciation, the art critic presents those qualities
she describes as reasons which will make us want to perceive or otherwise experience the
object for ourselves. For this reason, the audience at which she directs her comments
typically comes to see the qualities described as qualities grounding aesthetically valuable
experiences.
Given the intentions underlying the descriptions of the art critic, it is no wonder that
those terms characteristically employed in the course of art criticism seem to carry a
particular value-tendency. Nor is it surprising to find that a term which lacks any
35 Monroe C. Beardsley, "What is an Aesthetic Quality?", Theoria, 39 (1973), 50-70; pp.63-64.
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particular value-tendency when used in non-aesthetic contexts may come to acquire a
determinate value-tendency when it is employed as a term of aesthetic appreciation.
Consider in this respect the notion of unity. The unity of an object only becomes a good-
making characteristic when that object is being offered as a candidate for aesthetic
appreciation. To the extent it makes any sort of sense to say that my car is 'unified',
unity would not necessarily constitute a good-making characteristic in motor vehicles.
For this reason, I would consider the claim that my car is unified as a trivially true
observation that in no way formed the basis for an evaluative judgment. If, however, my
companion began to point out the superior modelling of the chassis, the simplicity of the
curving, aerodynamic lines, and generally indicated that she was recommending my car
as an object of aesthetic appreciation, then the unity of my car might offer grounds for a
positive aesthetic evaluation. What this example demonstrates is that it is not the fact that
a-terms possess a value-tendency as part of their meaning which allows us to use these in
judgements of aesthetic value. Instead, it is the established practice of offering a-qualities
as grounds of aesthetically valuable experiences which endows a particular a-term with its
perceived value-tendency. In short, a-terms do carry value-tendencies, but these value-
tendencies reflect the evaluative nature of critical discourse, rather than any component of
evaluative meaning they may carry outside the realm of critical discourse. The notion that
a-terms function primarily as descriptive terms remains intact.
IV
The second proposal under consideration, which claims that a-terms function as
affective terms, gains an air of plausibility from the fact that a very large subset of all a-
terms are expression words - words characterizing the moods, feelings, emotions and
intentions of human beings, but which also function to describe certain aspects of works
of art. However, not every term which functions affectively in its primary domain of use
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also ascribes an emotional effect when used to describe a work of art. To see that this is
so, consider a representative list of those terms typically employed in psychological
studies of musical cognition. The list given here was taken from a much larger list of
terms presented to subjects in a study,36 and represents those terms more frequently
selected by subjects to characterize works written in the minor mode than they were
























I would tentatively suggest the following intuitive classification of the terms
appearing on this list. One subset of these terms ('depressing', 'awe-inspiring',
'sensational') most typically function as affective terms when used to describe music,
since these place the described emotion firmly in the listener. To describe music as
'depressing' is to ascribe an attitude of response to the listener. A piece of music has a
depressing character if it is depressing in the listening, or creates a feeling of depression
in the listener. This is partly a grammatical observation, and partly a matter of established
practice. In point of grammar, if I wished to ascribe the feeling quality to the music rather
3 6 See Kate Hevner, "The Affective Character of the Major and Minor Modes in Music", American
Journal ofPsychology, 47 (1935), 103-108, pp. 110-111. Hevner utilizes the same list of terms in
"Experimental Studies of the Elements of Expression in Music", American Journal ofPsychology, 48
(1936), 246-268. For a similar study with a shorter list, see Paul Heinlein, 'The Affective Characters of
the Major and Minor Modes in Music", Journal ofComparative Psychology, 8 (1928), 101-142, p. 124.
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than to myself, I might describe the music as 'depressed' rather than 'depressing'. In
point of practice, typically I would not describe as 'depressing' music which had not
caused me to feel depressed on at least some occasion. However the following
counterexample presents itself. Speaking personally, I find the art songs of Tchaikovsky,
Rachmaninov and Moussorgsky anything but depressing and take enormous pleasure in
listening to these. Nonetheless, I am forced to concede that these may count as
depressing, on the grounds that most other people I consult on the matter report that they
feel depressed in listening to these songs. The persons concerned take steps to avoid
listening to the music in question, a fact which gives me reason to trust their testimony.
Thinking on the matter, I can recognize a lugubrious quality in this type of song which
could create feelings of depression in the listener. What this example shows is that some
music is depressing because it has a dispositional tendency to depress those who listen to
it, whether or not that disposition is realized in the individual case. Placing a dispositional
quality in the music is a roundabout way of referring to potential experiences of listeners.
So even on a dispositional analysis, 'depressing' functions as an affective term. By the
same reasoning, many other terms on the list ('pathetic', 'gloomy', 'sentimental') which
ascribe a dispositional emotional effect to the music also count as affective terms.
By contrast with this first group of terms, some terms ('yearning', 'yielding',
'longing', 'plaintive') never, or almost never, function affectively in describing music,
since these serve to qualify the perceptual appearance of the music. To describe the music
of Tristan and Isolde as 'yearning' is to locate the yearning quality in the music itself,
rather than the perceiver. Music which is said to be 'longing' wears a longing aspect, it
does not create a feeling of longing in the listener. On an alternative analysis, this same
group of terms ('yielding', 'longing', 'plaintive') along with such terms as 'pleading',
'mournful','gloomy' and 'agitated', might describe music appropriate to someone in a
state of longing, mourning, agitation or gloom; music which is characteristic of someone
making a complaint, pleading a case or yielding to some external force. That is to say,
'longing' music is music of longing. On both analyses of 'yearning' or 'yielding', it
makes no sense to say that 'yielding music' is music which makes me yield before it, or
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that 'yearning music' is music that makes me yearn for something. For this reason,
neither 'yearning' nor 'yielding' appear to function as affective terms.
In denying an affective meaning to terms such as 'yearning' or 'plaintive', I am not
denying that listening to music which wears a particular emotional character might
engender in me an emotion or feeling of a similar character. Indeed, the perceived
emotional character of some things may be infectious: being around good-humoured
people may lift my feeling of depression. 'Yearning' music in particular is likely be
infectious in just this way, creating feelings of yearning in us. However, because the
connection between the emotional character of the music and the feeling created in me as I
listen to that music is purely contingent, it remains true to say that music is not 'yearning'
in virtue of the experiences it causes in listeners. The music would not cease to have a
yearning character if people ceased to experience feelings of yearning in the listening, any
more than the art songs of the Russian romantic composers cease to be depressing owing
to their failure to depress me, a fact which demonstrates that the emotional affect in us is
not part of the meaning of 'yearning' as it applies to music
Casting an eye down this list reveals further variations in use. Terms such as
'mysterious', 'weird', 'vague', or 'fantastic' might qualify as affective because these
tell us less about the music and more about the response, or failure of response, of the
perceiver. That is to say, a listener who characterizes a piece of music as 'vague' or
'weird' she is not attributing a particular perceptual character to the piece. Instead, she is
reporting a failure on her part to determine the perceptual character of the piece. As far as
the passage in question has a particular dispositional character, it is the dispositional
character of something evading the listener's understanding. Music that is 'vague' is
music that in some sense 'resists' the listener's scrutiny, its perceptual character remains
opaque. One final group of terms ('mystical', 'tragic', 'sentimental', 'grotesque') would
most typically function as programmatic terms, terms ascribing a particular
representational content to a piece of music. That is to say, the music is being judged
suitable to represent a given subject matter, it has a perceptual appearance in keeping with
a particular subject matter. Terms which describe the representational qualities of music
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are not functioning as affective terms. This is coherent with the analysis treating
'yielding', 'longing', 'plaintive', 'pleading', 'mournful', 'gloomy', and 'agitated' as
terms characteristic of persons in certain emotional states. To say that music described in
these terms is characteristic of persons in particular emotional states would be to say
either, that the music in question is suitable to represent persons in that particular
emotional state, or else that the music provides a suitable accompaniment to artistic
representations of persons in such emotional states.
This brief survey of the original list suggests that not every term serving to ascribe
an emotional effect in its primary domain of use will attribute an emotional effect when
that term is applied to works of music. And if expression words are thought to be the best
candidates for a-terms that are also terms of effect, then the fact that not all of these
function affectively would make it appear unlikely that a-terms which are not expression
terms ('unified', 'graceful') will function as affective terms. However, to argue in this
fashion is to assume that the proposal that all a-terms are affective terms amounts to the
claim that every a-term serves to ascribe some emotional effect to the perceiver. Should
the proposal allow an interpretation which doesn't make this assumption, then the
considerations adduced thus far will appear irrelevant.
I believe that treating a-terms as statements of emotional effect is not the most
plausible way to capture the idea that a-terms function affectively, and that something
along the lines of the following suggestion provides a more plausible interpretation of the
claim that all a-ascriptions function as statements of effect. Whatever account of
perception we choose to accept at the physiological or psychological level, the following
would appear to hold true. When someone perceives an object, the stimulus is
experienced both as a sign of the object perceived, and also as a sensation taking place in
the organism. Very occasionally the stimulus will create in the organism a feeling of
discomfort or of actual bodily pain, as when the flame is hot, the sound is loud, or the
light is very bright indeed. However, for most episodes of stimulation, the subject will
experience sensations of a neutral or of a mildly pleasant character. We may call the
element of pleasant or unpleasant sensation experienced by the subject in the act of
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perception the affective tone of the experience. Whenever the act of perceiving creates a
sensation of discomfort or pain, we shall say that the experience carries a negative
affective tone. In those cases where the subject experiences pleasant sensations or where
she is unaware of any feeling of discomfort as she perceives, the experience carries with
it a positive affective tone. To say that every a-description functions as a statement of
effect amounts to the claim that every a-description serves to report the positive or the
negative affective tone accompanying a perceptual experience, that feeling of comfort or
discomfort experienced by the subject as she perceives.
Some circumstantial evidence for the notion that there exists an element of affective
tone accompanying many acts of perception may be found in the so-called 'startle' effect
in music. There is no doubt that in some cases of musical audition sound may have a
direct effect upon the nervous system, resulting in an experience of tension:
When the pitch of a sound is progressively increased within a fairly wide
frequency band, the increase is accompanied by a sensed rise in tension.
Conversely, when the pitch is decreased, an accompanying decrease in tension
is sensed. The magnitude of the effect can be correlated (within limits) to the
magnitude and rate of the modulation. Similar effects can be noticed with the
modulation of loudness and tempo. The reader can test these propositions at a
keyboard. While repeating a single note, allow its loudness to steadily increase
(holding all other variables constant); a rising tension will be sensed.
Conversely, a relaxation will be sensed when the loudness is steadily
decreased. The same phenomenon will be noticed for rising and falling pitch
and for increasing or decreasing tempo. The sense of rising tension can of
course be amplified by increasing all tension-raising variables simultaneously,
roughly what occurs in a crescendo.37
Jenefer Robinson appeals to the 'startle' effect when she suggests that music can
make us feel tense or relaxed, can disturb, unsettle or soothe. She suggests that it this
direct effect upon the perceiver, the element of pleasant or unpleasant sensation
accompanying acts of musical audition, which accounts for at least some of the
expressive attributions made to works of music. Thus, music that disturbs and unsettles
us is disturbing, unsettling music; and melodies that soothe us are soothing.38
37 Stanley Speck, '"Arousal Theory' Reconsidered", BJA, 28 (1988), 40-47; p.42.
38 Jenefer Robinson, "The Expression and Arousal of Emotion in Music", JAAC, 52 (1994), 13-22;
p. 18-19.
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The revised version of the proposal that a-terms constitute affective terms suggests
that an aesthetic description simultaneously describes the object perceived and serves to
report whatever affective tone accompanies the experience of perceiving that object.
When expressed in this form, the proposal displays some affinities with the Empathy
theory of artistic expression popular at the turn of the century. Empathy theories claim
that when we perceive dynamic or expressive traits in inanimate objects such as buildings
or works of art, this is owing to some mechanism whereby the perceiving subject
unconsciously treats a phenomenally subjective accompaniment of the act of perceiving as
though this were a quality in the thing perceived. In its more plausible manifestations, the
Empathy theory identified the subjective component projected into the object with the
physical effort expended by the subject as she perceives. The discussion of Empathy
theories in Chapter Four will examine the proposal that the physical effort expended by
the organism in the act of perception might sometimes enter the content of an act of
perception as a quality of the thing perceived.
The proposal that every perceptual act contains an affective tone apparently
contradicts the fact that a majority of perceptual experiences will cause nothing like a
'startle' effect, nothing like a determinate sensation of pleasure or of pain in the
perceiving subject. It might be thought that the proposal would more closely reflect the
situation as it obtains if we assigned a positive affective tone to those perceptual
experiences accompanied by feelings of pleasure, whilst assigning a negative affective
tone only to those experiences where the subject experiences sensations of discomfort or
of actual bodily pain; and if we agreed to say that a great number of our perceptual
experiences carried no affective tone whatever. After all, this would remove the
awkwardness of saying that any perceptual act where the perceiving subject experiences
no feelings of pain or discomfort while she perceives must count as an experience with a
positive affective tone. However, applying the notion of a positive affective tone in this
liberal fashion seems no more odd or contrived than it would be to say that Sally is happy
on all those occasions when she is not consciously experiencing any feelings of unease or
unhappiness. Although Sally may not be experiencing feelings of euphoria, the fact that
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she can identify no obvious sources of unhappiness in her life at this moment in time
probably would lead her to affirm that she is happy now. The proposal that every
perceptual experience carries an affective tone might seem less odd or contrived if we
recall that popular theory of the emotions whereby every emotion constitutes a thought
experienced with pleasure or with pain.39
Proposing to limit the scope of the notion of affective tone overlooks the fact that
while it is true to say that an average person probably experiences no identifiable affective
tone accompanying most of her perceptions, the same might not hold true for an
aesthetically sensitive perceiver. In illustration of this point, consider an example
engineered to reveal the element of truth in the Kantian claim that, in judging an object to
be beautiful, I both refer the representation to my own feeling of pleasure or pain, and I
demand that others will find the object as I do. Suppose that a friend whose superior
aesthetic judgments you have learned to trust announces that the vase you have called
'ugly' is more than ugly, it is 'hideous'. To the extent that this difference of opinion
amounts to a disagreement over the character of the vase, what is the ground of your
disagreement with your friend? Either it is the case that you and your friend are using
'ugly' and 'hideous' to designate separate phenomenally objective aesthetic qualities, in
which case your friend is claiming that you have misidentified the true perceptual
character of the vase; or alternatively she is suggesting that you have failed to capture the
degree of negative affective tone associated with this particular perceptual experience.
Since your friend is an aesthetically sensitive perceiver, someone possessing 'taste', the
second would appear to be the more likely option. After all, possessing a capacity to be
pleased by many of the things that count as aesthetically valuable, and to be pained in
experiencing things deemed to be lacking in aesthetic value, surely constitutes part of
what it means to be an aesthetically sensitive perceiver. The claim being promoted here is
that many aesthetic disagreements more closely resemble the disagreement between
yourself and your friend than they resemble whatever disagreement is involved when you
3 9 For a brief outline of the theory, see Malcolm Budd, Music and the Emotions: The Philosophical
Theories (London and New York: Routledge, 1985), ch. 1, pp. 1-15.
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say the vase is red and I say it is blue. This is because many, perhaps most a-ascriptions
record some element of affective response.
Clearly, this second form of the proposal that all a-terms function as terms of effect
does nothing to undermine the perceptual status of a-attributions.On the contrary,
insisting upon the element of subjective response accompanying an a-attribution brings
into focus the perceptual nature of such descriptions. However, treating a-attributions as
disguised subjective reports does raise questions concerning the objective status of a-
judgements, a matter I will turn to in Chapter Five.
I will end this section on a speculative note. Throughout this section, and for purely
rhetorical purposes, I have been enquiring whether a-attributions most typically describe
phenomenally objective properties, whether they typically characterize phenomenally
subjective components of perceptual experiences, or whether they supply reasons
grounding aesthetic evaluations. Of course, posing the question in this way gives the
misleading impression that most a-terms must conform to a single pattern of use. A more
accurate view of the matter would realize that different a-attributions typically fulfil
different functions at different times; and that different descriptions of the same
perceptual event may be crafted to highlight each of these functions in turn. For example,
I may call a piece of music 'loud' and thereby characterize the music as a source of
intense aural stimulation. In describing the same music as 'ear-splitting', I both describe
it as loud and at the same time draw attention to the negative affective tone associated with
the experience of listening to it, the fact that the music represents a source of unpleasant
aural stimulation. Designating the same music 'a terrific noise', serves to describe the
loudness of the music in a way which emphasizes my belief that the music possesses no
aesthetic value. Examples of this kind suggest that the phenomenally objective, the
phenomenally subjective and the evaluative might be viewed as different elements present
in a single perceptual act. I have already suggested a story whereby every perceptual act
might be thought to contain both a phenomenally objective and a phenomenally subjective
component. The idea that every act of perception carries an element of evaluation might
be developed by showing that the organism processes as she perceives, comparing the
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current percept with previous episodes of stimulation in an effort to determine both the
character of the cause of the stimulation, and some strategy of response to that cause.
Could this picture of the overall content of perception be sustained,40 there would be no
reason to suppose that a-terms fail to attribute phenomenally objective qualities simply
because the same descriptions also appear in affective and evaluative statements. That is
to say, there is some reason to suppose that one could defend an empiricist account of
aesthetic judgement, in the form of a version of the theory of aesthetic perception, as a
viable alternative to the Kantian view of aesthetic judgement.
V
Many of the comments Sibley makes lead to the conclusion that Sibley operates with
a perceptual model of aesthetic judgement. This perceptual model assimilates taste to a
form of perceptivity in the individual, something like the possession of a sense or a
sensory capacity. In Chapter One, we encountered the person of the aesthetic clod,
someone who, knowing that he lacks aesthetic sensitivity, studies without success to
infer the presence of a-qualities from the presence of na-qualities. Sibley claimed that
whatever judgements the clod might make in forming his inferences would not amount to
a-judgements, and that whatever successes the clod might enjoy would not constitute
aesthetic successes. Given the fact that Sibley uses 'aesthetic judgement' in a restricted,
40 A piece of evidence compatible with this interpretation may be found in Lage Wedin, "A
Multidimensional Study of Perceptual-Emotional Qualities in Music", Scandinavian Journalof
Psychology, 13 (1972), 241-257, another psychological study in music cognition requiring subjects to
match words with musical extracts. In applying multidimensional scaling techniques to the results of
this experiment, Wedin decided that the data obtained could be fitted along just three bi-polar dimensions
which Wedin labelled respectively Intensity-Softness, Pleasantness-Unpleasantness, and Solemnity-
Triviality. If there is any truth in the picture I have presented of the content of perception, then it is no
accident that Wedin settled upon these particular dimensions. Treating the stimulus as an indicator of the
nature of the object perceived would correspond with what I have called the phenomenally objective
component of the perceptual experience. Registering the pleasantness/unpleasantness of the stimulation
corresponds with what I have designated the phenomenally subjective component of the experience, its
affective tone. The dimension labelled Solemnity-Triviality captures an element of evaluation
accompanying perceptual experiences, a tendency on the part of the perceiver to assign some significance
to that which she perceive even as she perceives it.
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quasi-technical sense, the claim that the judgements of the clod are not a-judgements does
not amount to a form of abuse, since Sibley is not suggesting that nothing that the clod
does when he forms his judgements would be of interest to philosophical aesthetics.
Rather, Sibley's purpose in constructing the aesthetic clod example was to illustrate the
notion that the ability to form an a-judgement constitutes something like a perceptual
capacity: either we see that a particular a-quality is present or we do not, and no amount
of studious application or reasoning will make up for our shortcomings if we do not.
The aesthetic clod example illustrates one of the consequences of the perceptual model of
aesthetic sensitivity, the idea that someone lacking taste is like someone lacking a sense or
a basic perceptual capacity.
The fact that Sibley operates with a perceptual model of aesthetic sensitivity has led
many of his commentators to believe that Sibley regards taste to be a special faculty, the
aesthetic analogue of the faculty of moral intuition, the person of taste as it were judging
matters with the inner eye. In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that the notion that
taste constitutes a special faculty sits uncomfortably with Sibley's more extended
pronouncements on the subject. For Sibley's wider discussion of taste treats aesthetic
sensitivity as a special deployment of the ordinary faculties, and at times, as something
more than a narrowly perceptual capacity. If Sibley does give the reader the misleading
impression that he treats taste as a special faculty, this reflects one of the ways in which a
perceptual model of aesthetic judgement can distort our understanding of the nature of
aesthetic judgement.
The perceptual model of aesthetic judgement models our understanding of the
relative distribution of taste upon our understanding of the relative distribution of
perceptual sensitivity in the wider population. This becomes apparent when Sibley seeks
to establish parallels between the objectivity of a-judgements, and the objectivity of
colour judgements. Just as the objectivity of colour-terms relies upon the existence of a
core of persons agreeing in their colour judgements, so Sibley wishes to argue that it is
the existence of a nucleus of persons agreeing in their a-attributions that guarantees some
stability of reference for our a-terms, giving these the status of property terms. Sibley
107
acknowledges that whereas the core of those agreeing in their colour attributions includes
a majority of humankind, when it comes to aesthetic competence only a relatively small
number of the population will demonstrate the relevant sensitivity. Around this small
'nucleus' of those more or less agreeing in their a-attributions we find a "large and
variable penumbra consisting of groups exhibiting partial and merging areas of agreement
corresponding to what we ordinarily call areas of limited sensibility and levels of
sophistication".38 But however tiny this nucleus may prove to be, Sibley believes that the
mere existence of a group of persons capable of perceiving aesthetically suffices to
guarantee the objectivity of aesthetic judgements.
Sibley's perceptual account of aesthetic sensitivity predicts a population divided
between the following groups: an aesthetic 'elite' of individuals demonstrating unusual
abilities to detect a-qualities; persons averagely competent in applying a-terms; and those
resembling the 'aesthetic clod' who display little or no competence in identifying a-
qualities or applying a-terms. This picture of the relative distribution of aesthetic
competence may be thought to reflect the 'commonsense' view of the matter, which
conceives the competent, the modestly competent and the incompetent as somehow
existing along a hierarchical scale of aesthetic performance, with the aesthetically
incompetent ranging at the bottom end of the scale, those displaying true taste at the top,
and Everyman, representing a majority of the population, sitting somewhere between the
two. This commonsense view receives an apparent confirmation from our knowledge of
the relative distribution of ordinary perceptual competence, especially as this arises within
an aesthetic context. A few examples serve to illustrate this point. The realm of wine-
tasting reveals persons who apparently lack any sort of palate for wine, persons for
whom any two wines would be almost indistinguishable in flavour. Whereas the majority
of persons will display a moderately developed palate, being able to detect a difference in
taste character between different grape varieties, distinguishing a Gerwurtztramminer
from a Chardonnay, a minority of accomplished wine tasters will apparently distinguish a
number of taste sensations corresponding with a single wine, and will be able to name the
38 Frank Sibley, "Objectivity and Aesthetics", PAS, Supp. Vol. 42 (1968), 31-72, p.47.
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characters they detect. Similar differences in perceptual competence are revealed in the
realm of musical listening, where we acknowledge the existence of a relatively small
number of tone-deaf persons, persons who in some way fail to distinguish the notes of
the musical scale. Ordinary musical competence lies with that majority of the population
capable of distinguishing the notes of the scale as a series of relative pitches, determining
whether a series of notes is 'rising' or 'falling' in pitch, and noticing whether the pitch of
a violin string becomes sharper or flatter in tone as it is being tuned. A quite remarkable
and relatively rare level of accomplishment is displayed by the listener said to possess
'perfect pitch': someone with the ability to hear the chroma or 'colour' of a tone. Whereas
someone with relative pitch will manage to detect some change in pitch moving from an A
to a Bb, the person with perfect pitch will recognize the move as one from A to Bb. This
accomplishment is extraordinary in its rarity. It is a curious fact concerning our perceptual
experience that, whilst the ability to perceive colour or 'chroma' represents the rule rather
than the exception in the case of vision, in the auditory realm a capacity for colour
perception proves to be the exception to the rule.39 Whether this near-universal capacity
for coloured-vision but not coloured-hearing reflects an evolved tendency, on the part of
the human animal, to rely upon visual information to the exclusion of the other senses; or
whether it is the case that the human animal's superior capacity for coloured-perception in
the case of sight rather than sound accounts for the fact that we rely upon visual input to
the extent that we do, is a question well beyond the scope of a philosophical enquiry such
as this. Here I simply note the anomaly.
It will be difficult to form any accurate assessment of this commonsense
understanding of the relative distribution of taste in the absence of a theory of aesthetic
judgement giving a better understanding of the nature of aesthetic sensitivity. As I shall
be providing that theory and that better understanding in Chapter Five, I shall save until
then my assessment of Sibley's understanding of the relative distribution of taste, and of
3 9 One curious disanalogy between the senses of sight and sound lies in the fact that, whereas someone
born with only relative pitch may be trained to identify tone chroma, colour blindness is a birth defect
which no amount of training might correct. A documented attempt to acquire perfect pitch through
training may be found among the studies in Peter Howell, Ian Cross, and Robert West (eds), Musical
Structure and Cognition (London: Academic Press, 1985).
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the commonsense understanding upon which it is based. For the time being, we can
concede to Sibley and to the man in the street the fact that a capacity for ordinary
perceptual discrimination must underpin any capacity for aesthetic sensitivity. We do
expect to discover some positive correlation between those persons making fine
perceptual discriminations, and those persons thought to display aesthetic sensitivity. It is
a truism that persons lacking a capacity for rich sensory experience do not become art
critics or actively pursue aesthetic experiences. However, whilst conceding this much it is
important to note that the mere possession of perceptual discrimination is no guarantee of
aesthetic sensitivity in the individual. This is because many highly discriminating
judgements made in the aesthetic realm, such as the judgement that a note is sharp or flat,
do not constitute examples of Sibley's a-judgements.
When Sibley describes taste as the ability to notice or discern things,40 he conflates
what are in reality two distinct perceptual capacities. The ability to notice things is nothing
more than the ability to register the presence of stimuli or the ability to register a
succession of stimuli. Discernment is the ability to register either variations across stimuli
or changes in stimulation. Someone who (merely) notices things is an acute perceiver.
Like the unusually observant police witness, the acute perceiver registers the existence of
persons, objects and events surrounding him. By contrast, someone with great powers
of discernment is a discriminating perceiver, a perceiver who makes an unusually large
number of distinctions within a single parameter of sensory experience. This is the
person who discriminates between different shades or tones of a single colour, or
someone detecting a number of fruit flavours in a single glass of wine.
Although the merely acute or merely discriminating perceiver would be capable of
forming many judgements that are of interest to the art critic or art historian, the same
judgements would, for the aesthetician, lack the interest of Sibley's a-judgements. For
instance, someone with fine powers of discrimination might acquire the knowledge that
the method of fresco painting at the time of the Renaissance involved applying pigment to
an area of fresh wet plaster prepared the same day, a fact artists tended to take into
40 "Symposium on Taste", BJA, 6 (1966), 68-69; 68.
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account in planning their design. This person might then apply her capacity for
discriminating subtle variations in colour tone to the skyline of Raphael's Galatea, and
thereby come to determine portions of the fresco corresponding with the start and end of
a day's work.41 Here is a sensitive judgement, an aesthetic judgement in the wider
meaning of the word but not, pace Sibley, an a-judgement. Quite clearly, aesthetic
sensitivity amounts to something more than, or something other than, a capacity for fine
perceptual discrimination.
One problem with a perceptual model of aesthetic judgement is that such a model
apparently reduces aesthetic sensitivity to nothing more than an ability to register the
aesthetic features of things, a form of "hyper-sensitive discrimination, an almost extra¬
sensory ability to notice, see or tell ungainliness from grace, vitality from vulgarity,
etc."42 Sibley never offers anything like an analysis of the nature of aesthetic perception.
The tenor of his discussion suggests that for Sibley, perception takes the form of a
neutral confrontration with qualities of different sorts, some of them na-qualities, and
some a-qualities. That is to say, the difference between the aesthetically sensitive
perceiver and the aesthetic clod consists not in the quality or texture of their experiences,
but in the number and type of qualities each manages to perceive. To identify the
aesthetically sensitive perceiver with an acute perceiver, as Sibley docs, is to suggest that
the aesthetically sensitive perceiver does whatever the aesthetically insensitive perceiver
does, only more of the same, noticing those qualities that the aesthetically insensitive
perceiver overlooks. Thus, whereas the clod notices a ball that is red, irregularly
spheroid, and heavy, the aesthetically sensitive perceiver detects a ball that is red,
irregularly spheroid, heavy, and possesses an irridescent surface. To treat the
aesthetically sensitive perceiver as a merely discriminating perceiver is to say that the
aesthetically sensitive pcrceiver makes finer perceptual discriminations than the average
person, perhaps noticing irregularities in the shading on the surface of the ball.
41 The example derives from Roger Jones and Nicholas Perry, Raphael (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1983), p.96.
42 Ruby Meager, "Aesthetic Concepts", BJA, 10 (1970), 303-322; p.315.
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To treat taste as nothing more than a species of acute perception is to ignore the
perceptually elusive nature of aesthetic characterizations, the fact that aesthetic qualities
may be opaque to thorough acts of perception;43 and to undermine the notion that
aesthetic sensitivity constitutes an awareness of emergent qualities. It could be argued that
recognizing an emergent aspect involves more than noticing an additional feature of an
object, for it involves bringing the object under a whole new perceptual organization.
The same object enters into perception in different ways depending upon the qualities we
attribute to it. In much the same way that the change from seeing Jastrow's duck-rabbit
drawing as a duck to seeing it as a rabbit involves giving the same figure a different
structural cast, so too an object that is seen as delicate has a different perceptual character
to an object that is (merely) pink and fragile.
The notion that perception involves a neutral confrontation with qualities of different
character leaves no room for the possibility that the experiences of certain aesthetically
gifted individuals may be qualitatively or texturally different to the experiences of the
average person. Consider for instance how the artist Kandinsky describes the character
of perceived colour. According to Kandinsky, the warmth or coolness of a colour is
perceived as "a horizontal movement, the warm colours approaching the spectator, the
cool ones retreating from him." Kandinsky notes a difference in movement between
yellow and blue. Yellow displays an 'eccentric' movement, both straining towards the
spectator and overrunning its boundaries, whilst blue displays a 'concentric' movement,
retreating from the spectator and turning in upon its centre. The "unbounded warmth of
red....glows in itself, maturely, and does not distribute its vigor aimlessly", whilst the
blend of red and yellow to be found in orange "brings red almost to the point of
spreading out towards the spectator".44 These observations demonstrate that in the
experience of Kandinsky, colours do not possess the neutral character of something
there to be noticed. Nor is it true to say that Kandinsky merely notices things which the
43 See Chapter One, p. above.
44 W.Kandinsky, Concerning the Spiritual in Art (New York: Wittenhorn Art Books, 1947), pp.57, 58,
61,63.
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rest of us overlook. For a Kandinsky, colours possess a dynamic character, a life of
their own.
K.Mitchells takes up this idea that qualities enter the experience of the aesthetically
sensitive perceiver and the experience of an ordinary person in different ways when he
describes aesthetic perception as nothing short of "the total transformation of the whole
object as perceived non-aesthetically".45 Mitchell's treats aesthetic sensitivity as an ability
to appreciate the aesthetic character belonging to the most ordinary things. Kandinsky's
observations on the character of perceived colour give a good indication of what Mitchells
has in mind when he suggests that even Sibley's na-qualities may take on an aesthetic
character when viewed by an appropriately sensitive perceiver. Mitchells suggests that it
is only those na-qualities that are perceived to possess a certain aesthetic character which
will count for the presence of Sibley's a-qualities. Thus, it is not the blueness of its
surface, but the 'cool' and 'whispering' quality of that blue, which makes an object
appear 'delicate'. On this account of the nature of aesthetic sensitivity, the difference
between the aesthetically sensitive perceiver and the aesthetic clod consists not in the
number or the type of qualities they each perceive, but in the type of perception they train
upon things. The former trains an aesthetic mode of perception upon the objects he
perceives, the latter does not. If this captures the true nature of aesthetic sensitivity, it
would appear to follow that the distinction Sibley ought to be pursuing is one between
types of perception and not one between the types of quality we perceive.46
Mitchells goes much further than Sibley in identifying the sensitivity required for
making a-judgements with a definite mode of perception. According to Mitchells,
awareness of the aesthetic character of things and awareness of their nonaesthetic
character amount to distinct but nonexclusive modes of perception that are aimed at
different targets 47 Virgil C.Aldrich has argued for an even stronger conclusion,
distinguishing an aesthetic mode of perception, which he calls prehension, from a non-
aesthetic mode of perception known as observation, and claiming that I cannot realize the
45 K.Mitchells, "Aesthetic Perception and Aesthetic Qualities", PAS 67 (1967), 53-72; pp.53-54.
46 Ruby Meager, p.314.
47 Mitchells, pp.55, 57.
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same object under both modes of perception simultaneously. Aldrich's theory of
prehensive perception is both interesting and complicated, comprising among other things
a theory of representational perception, a theory of expressive perception and, if that were
not enough, an account of the ontology of works of art. In providing these things,
Aldrich at the same time manages to develop considerable insight into the nature of
aesthetic description, drawing attention to the existence of logically distinctive categories
of aesthetic attribution. Aldrich's proposal certainly deserves better than the caricature it
has received at the hands of George Dickie.48 That the view could lend itself to such
caricature is perhaps unsurprising, given the fact that Aldrich spends more time
presupposing the truth of his metaphysically dense suppositions than he does articulating
or defending them; and his exposition does little to clarify what is a difficult and
theoretically packed view. It is only after excavating some rather cryptic comments
scattered across several articles and a book49 that the true ingenuity of the view emerges,
along with some unwelcome and perhaps surprising consequences. Uncovering the
various implications of Aldrich's theory will occupy the better part of the next two
chapters. The aim of this enquiry will be twofold: to uncover some of the logical insights
into the nature of aesthetic attributions contained in Aldrich's account; but also to use the
assessment of Aldrich's view as a piece of theoretical ground-clearing en route to
developing my own account of aesthetic judgement in Chapter Five.
48 See George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis (Ithaca and London: Cornell
niversity Press, 1974), eh.6, pp. 135-v46.
49 Aldrich's articulates his view in "Picture Space", PR, 67 (1958), 342-352; Philosophy ofArt
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963); "Back to Aesthetic Experience", JAAC, 24 (1966),
365-371; "Pictures and Persons - An Analogy", Review of Metaphysics, 28 (1975), 599-610;
"'Expresses' and 'Expressive'", JAAC, 37 (1978), 203-217. Distressing to say, the book was produced an
an introductory text in aesthetics!
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CHAPTER THREE
Throughout this chapter, I shall be analysing Aldrich's theory of aesthetic perception
with two aims in view: to assess some of the stengths and weaknesses of Aldrich's
theory of representational perception; but also, to see whether Aldrich is able to provide
any evidence in favour of his assertion that observing and prehending amount to
perceptually making over the same material thing in perceptually and metaphysically
exclusive ways. To this end, Section I outlines the basic terms of Aldrich's theory,
drawing special attention to the way in which Aldrich calls upon the notion of a special
aesthetic mode of perception to provide an answer to the question, "What is a work of
art?" The next section outlines some of the successes of Aldrich's theory, and in
particular, the light it sheds upon the logic of aesthetic attributions. Section III assesses
Aldrich's theory of prehension as an account of the phenomenology of pictorial
representation, using Richard Wollheim's theory of representational perception as a foil
to bring out some of the strengths and weaknesses of Aldrich's account. Here I pose the
question whether we require the notion of mutually exclusive ways of looking to capture
the phenomenology of pictorial perception; or whether instead the assumption of mutually
exclusive perceptual modes serves to undermine our understanding of the phen¬
omenology of pictorial perception. One way in which it might harm our under-standing
of representational perception would be if it led to an illusionist account of pictorial
perception. Section IV produces some circumstantial evidence against the view that
adopting the aesthetic viewpoint necessarily precludes an ordinary perceptual relationship
with the object of attention, by suggesting ways in which this claim apparently offends
against commonsense. Given the strongly metaphysical nature of Aldrich's account of
aesthetic perception, Section V examines whether Aldrich is able to produce any
arguments of a metaphysical turn favouring the radical separation of the nonaesthetic and
aesthetic modes of perception. I conclude that Aldrich is able to provide no evidence
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supporting his claim that we cannot simulaneously perceive both the aesthetic and
nonaesthetic aspects of a thing.
I
Anyone attempting to appreciate Aldrich's account of aesthetic perception must pay
at least passing attention to the notion of representational seeing. This is because, like
many philosophers before and since, Aldrich is intrigued by the perceptual achievement
involved in seeing a flat canvas on the wall as a representational depiction. So intrigued is
he with this achievement that seeing a canvas as a depiction becomes for Aldrich the
paradigmatic example of aesthetic perception. By appreciating how Aldrich understands
this single example, we will come to see why Aldrich believes that observing an object
and prehending it constitute mutually incompatible achievements.
According to Aldrich, the word 'picture' indifferently designates both the canvas
(physical object) and what is depicted therein (aesthetic object). Yet seeing the picture as a
canvas and seeing it as a depiction involve two very different species of perceptual
achievement, becoming acquainted with objects presenting very different surfaces. That
surface which a physical object presents to vision is one we look at or through,
obstructing the line of sight in the case of an opaque object such as a canvas; or allowing
the line of sight to continue uninterrupted, where the object is a transparent sheet of glass.
By contrast, the surface of an aesthetic object such as a pictorial depiction is something
we look into, in some mysterious way that is unlike peering into a box.1 The one surface
resists my scrutiny, whilst the other opens out to it. When we switch from seeing the
canvas to seeing the depiction, the surface of the 'picture' changes, or rather we cease to
be aware of one type of surface while the object takes on characteristics belonging to
another type of surface.
1 "'Expresses' and 'Expressive'", JAAC, 37 (1978), 203-217; p.208.
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In formulating his account of aesthetic perception, Aldrich claims to have been
influenced in his thinking by those gestalt-switches whereby the eye resolves the same
visual design into distinct visual objects. Like the switch between observing the canvas
and prehending the depiction, gestalt-switches involve exclusive ways of visually
realizing the same object -1 cannot see Jastrow's duck-rabbit figure both as duck and as
rabbit at the same time.2 However, here ends the resemblance between the two examples.
Experiencing a gestalt-switch does not involve a change in perceptual mode, since I do
not experience a change in the type of surface perceived when I switch from seeing the
duck-rabbit drawing as a duck to seeing it as a rabbit. However, there is a change in the
surface perceived when I switch from noticing the drawing as a physical object
comprising ink impressions on white paper, to noticing its representational aspects,
comprising a rabbit-figure or a duck-figure standing out against a white background.
Whereas gestalt-switches involve changes in visual aspect, observing and prehending
involve a change in the categorialaspects under which I realize the picture. That is to say,
observation and prehension subsume the same entity under distinct metaphysical
categories where logically different types of discourse apply. When I see Frith's Derby
Day as a canvas covered with patches of cracked pigment, I am seeing it as a physical
object, and a physical object description applies. When I see the same picture as an
expressive depiction of the crowd at the Derby I see it as an aesthetic object, and certain
expressive and representational attributions now apply.
We have now introduced the main elements in Aldrich's account. Aldrich invites us
to think of a metaphysically neutral, determinable somewhat - what Aldrich calls the
material thing - as aspecting under different metaphysical categories when realized under
different modes of perception.3 To adopt the tortured terminology Aldrich introduces,
when the material thing undergoes categorial aspection as a physical object, its
characteristics are realized as qualities which the object possesses. When the same
material thing undergoes categorial aspection in the direction of an aesthetic object (sic) its
2 Virgil C.Aldrich, Philosophy ofArt, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 20;
"Picture Space", PR, 67 (1958), 342-352, p.345.
3 "Picture Space", p.346; Philosophy ofArt, p. 21.
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characteristics are realized as 'aspects' which 'animate' it.4 Aldrich also introduces the
notion of holophrastic perception, a form of noticing where the picture may be located,
encountered, and talked about,5 without thereby committing ourselves to the view that
what we are looking at constitutes either a physical thing or an aesthetic object.
At many points in his writings, Aldrich favours an analogy between persons and
works of art;6 an analogy that both sustains and elaborates his views on the nature of
pictorial perception. For Aldrich, the way in which we may be acquainted with a work of
art as both canvas and depiction parallels our acquaintance with a human being as both a
physical body and as a person. In particular, there are two different ways in which the
notion of a person's body functioning as a 'point of view' illustrates the exclusive nature
of the achievements that are involved in realizing the same picture as a canvas and as a
work of art.7 Firstly, in the third-person case, Sally's body functions as my point of
view upon Sally the person; something I look into to discover the 'person' or 'soul'
within. It is the person I see when I look into the body who is the proper bearer of those
expressive and emotional predicates attributable to 'Sally'. In a similar way, I look into
the picture (canvas) to see the 'work of art': the bearer of whatever representational and
expressive qualities belong to the 'picture'. Under both scenarios, the bearer of the
properties being attributed is not that which I look into (the body, the canvas), but that
which is seen therein (the person, the picture). Secondly, in the first person case, my
body functions as my point of view upon the world.8 That is to say, my body becomes
an extension of my perceptual apparatus, defining or generating the space in which I see,
facilitating perception without itself becoming an object of perception. Aldrich invites us
to think of a picture as functioning in a similar way as a 'point of view', a framing device
that acts as a window upon its represented subject matter without itself becoming the
4 '"Expresses' and 'Expressive'", pp.210, 211.
5 Philosophy of Art, pp.22-23, 33; "'Expresses' and 'Expressive'", p.210.
6 The analogy achieves fullest expression in "Pictures and Persons - An Analogy", Review of
Metaphysics, 28 (1975), 599-610. But see also "'Expresses' and 'Expressive'", esp.p.209; Philosophy of
Art, p.32.
7 This paragraph uses the analogy which Aldrich develops between persons and works of art in "pictures
and Persons - An Analogy", to explicate the meaning of the claim, in "'Expresses' and 'Expressive'",
esp.211, that a picture functions as a 'point of view'.
8 "Pictures and Persons - An Analogy", pp.601ff; "'Expresses' and 'Expressive'", p.209.
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target of attention. As long as it functions as a point of view upon its subject-matter, the
picture (physical canvas) drops out of sight, effacing itself in favour of the aesthetic
object with its representational and expressive aspects. These two ways of utilizing the
notion of a 'point of view' illustrate respectively the mutually exclusive nature of the
logical and the perceptual achievements involved in realizing the picture now as a canvas,
now as a work of art.
Drawing upon his analogy between persons and works of art allows Aldrich to give
an apparently simple and natural metaphysical analysis of the notion of a work of art.
Treating a picture as a (mere) physical object raises the puzzle how a brute physical thing
comes to be the possessor of aesthetic qualities, particularly expressive qualities.
Treating a work of art as nothing more than what Dickie identifies with the 'aesthetic
object', the set of characteristics in the object which capture the educated art appreciator's
attention, creates a mysterious relationship between the work of art and its physical basis,
reducing the work of art to a set of detached phenomenal qualities supervening upon the
physical object.9 Clearly, we wish to say that a work of art is both a physical object yet
something more than a physical object, and Aldrich gives us an opportunity to do
precisely that. The key lies in realizing that the work of art is related to its physical basis
in the same way that the person is related to a particular physical body. In much the same
way that my body cum perceptual apparatus functions as my point of view upon the
world, so Aldrich invites us to think of a work of art as a physical object which functions
as a 'point of view' upon its subject-matter, whilst itself remaining a thing not in view.
That is to say, when the material thing is transformed into a work of art by the
prehending eye, its physical object aspects are effaced as the object becomes animated
with representational and expressive aspects. In the same way that it takes a certain
perceptual organization to switch from seeing the duck-rabbit drawing as a duck to seeing
it as a rabbit, so too it takes a certain perceptual organization of a canvas to see it as the
bearer of aesthetic qualities; and Aldrich suggests that what we understand to be a work
of art is nothing more or less than the object viewed under this perceptual organization.
9 "Back to Aesthetic Experience", JAAC, 24 (1966), 365-371, p.370; Philosophy ofArt, pp.34-35;
'"Expresses' and 'Expressive'", pp.212-213.
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In short, Aldrich identifies the work of art as a physical object that has been transformed
into the bearer of aesthetic qualities for as long as it is subjected to a certain perceptual
regard.10 Any physical object subjected to this type of regard, such as a piece of art
trouve, has the potential to be transformed into an aesthetic object, but not necessarily
into a work of art. This is because, unlike a piece of art trouve, a work of art is a physical
thing that has been designed for prehension as an aesthetic object.11
The notion of aspect-animation is theoretically the most difficult and the least
articulated aspect of Aldrich's account of aesthetic perception. For this reason, I shall
baldly state what Aldrich says before attempting to interpret what it means. Briefly,
Aldrich suggests two respects in which a work of art may be 'animated' by 'aspects'.
The first form of aspect-animation describes what takes place when we prehensively
realize the material thing as a work of art, and forms the substance of Aldrich's theory of
expressive perception. In the prehensive view of things, we are not aware of the materials
of the work of art - the colours of a painting, the musical sounds - qua physical entities.
Instead, we become aware of the 'medium of the materials' - the timbres or characters of
the colours and sounds. We become aware too of the "aesthetic space-values of the thing
as structured by colour and sound", with the perceived tonal relationships between the
colours or sounds animating the object as the aesthetic space of the composition. The
second form of aspect-animation is a feature of representational seeing and involves
"seeing the thing as something it is not thought really to be" - for instance, seeing the set
of ink marks before me as animated by the image of a lampshade. The representational
aspects that emerge in the aesthetic space of the composition constitute the pictorial
content 'animating' the medium.12
To throw light upon these claims, imagine the artist at work hovering over the
canvas, his brush primed with paint. The pigment on his brush may be viewed as a
physical blob of paint (physical object); or we may be aware of the timbre or character of
the colour of that pigment - its warmth, the way it comes to life - in which case we are
10 "Back to Aesthetic Experience", p.368.
11 Philosophy ofArt, p. 88.
12 Philosophy ofArt, pp.22, 48.
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already prehending the artist's medium in the materials of the work of art. For Aldrich,
the painter's medium is not the physical materials with which he works, but the 'medium
of the materials': the timbres or characters which particular colours and lines possess for
the prehensive eye. To say that the artist works in his medium is to say that he is aware of
the aesthetic character of those elements he selects as he paints. According to Aldrich, "in
the artist's experience as he composes, each material is featured as a little, elementary
aesthetic object".13 The artist works in the medium of the materials by sculpting with
colour, positioning coloured pigments upon the canvas and allowing the tonal
relationships that arise when we view the combination of the timbres of colours and lines
to generate the representational and expressive effects of the picture. Such expressive and
representational effects constitute what Aldrich calls qualities ofcomposition in the work.
These qualities are 'compositional', both in the sense that these are qualities brought
about through acts of composition; but also 'compositional' in the sense of being
composite, or regional, qualities of the work.14 The mechanism generating these effects
is, I would suggest, the type of colour phenomena invoked by Kandinsky, the fact that
colours dynamically align themselves at different distances from the eye when perceived
aesthetically. The manner in which some colours apparently advance whilst others
apparently recede from the picture plane creates the illusion of pictorial depth, generating
the effect of a three dimensional space, and encouraging the eye to see the resulting
configuration as the three-dimensional representationalspace of the picture. Throughout
the process described here, it is the viewer's gaze which transforms the canvas covered in
paint into the bearer of representational and expressive qualities. The viewer becomes
13 Philosophy ofArt, p.39.
14 '"Expresses' and 'Expressive'", p.212. The term 'regional quality' derives from Monroe C.Beardsley,
Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 2nd ed. (Indiannapolis: Hackett, 1981), pp.83-88.
In "What is an Aesthetic Quality?", Theoria, 39 (1973), 50-70, p.51, Beardsley accepts the correction to
his own discussion of regional qualities contained in Robert Mathers and George Dickie, "The Definition
of 'Regional Quality'", JP, 60 (1963), 465-467. Mathers and Dickie, pp.467,465, offer two different
definitions of a regional quality: (1) a regional quality is a quality that a complex has as a result of the
relation between its parts; and (2) a regional quality is a quality of a complex that, if it belongs to one of
its parts, is a regional quality of that part. Although Aldrich does not take up the matter, it is safe to
assume that Aldrich would accept definition (1). Aldrich might also accept (2). This is because Aldrich
would accept that the same term might describe both the expressive quality belonging to the picture as a
whole, the character or 'timbre' belonging to the various colours viewed in combination, but also describe
the timbres of the parts. For Aldrich, both the parts of a picture may be characterized as 'warm', and the
picture overall may be expressive of warmth.
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enabled to see the representational and expressive compositional qualities that emerge in
the picture, but only once she has sensitized herself to the ground-level aesthetic qualities
of the work; both to the aesthetic character of each of the elements employed, and to the
aesthetic character belonging to the elements when organized by the eye into groups.
The distinction Aldrich creates between two types of aspect-animation no doubt
reflects the fact that the representational and expressive qualities of a work of art are
qualities of logically different types. As Richard Wollheim has pointed out,15 describing
the representational content of a picture involves attributing qualities of a physical object
kind. Although the qualities attributed do not happen to belong to that particular physical
object standing in front of me now (the canvas), they are of the same metaphysical order
as the qualities which do belong to the canvas. In Aldrich's terms, in seeing
representationally, I see the physical object as "something it is not thought really to be", a
different physical-object configuration to the physical-object configuration I know to be
there. By contrast, to attribute expressive qualities to a human body or to a canvas is to
attribute properties belonging to a metaphysically different category of thing to whatever
qualities apply to the canvas or body viewed as physical object. Under one species of
aspect-animation, I see the canvas as if it were a physical thing of a different type. Under
the other type of aspect-animation, I subsume the same object under a new metaphysical
category.
Such, in outline, is Aldrich's account of aesthetic perception and of the manner in
which different ways of looking may reveal different aspects of a single work of art.
Aldrich's account may be summarized as follows. Aldrich agrees with Mitchells that there
is a ground-level aesthetic character attaching to the most ordinary objects, and that
blindness to this character will prevent our experiencing Sibley's emergent a-qualities.
For Aldrich, this character takes the form of the timbres and tonal values of the materials
used in the composition, which taken singly or in combination constitute what Aldrich
calls the 'medium of the materials'. It is the perceived timbres of the elements of a picture
- the timbres belonging to the contours, and the colours of the pigments - that make these
15 Art aild Its Objects, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), sec.10-12, pp.11-16.
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elements appear to express such ground-level expressive qualities as 'warmth' or
'delicacy'.16 Unless we can recognize the expressive character of these materials, we will
remain indifferent to those higher order expressive qualities bodied forth by the timbres
or tonalities viewed in combination. These higher order expressive qualities, or 'qualities
of composition', may be designated by non-psychological terms ('solid', 'ponderous',
'luminous', 'delicate'), or by psychological terms ('pensive', 'gay').17 It is only once the
material thing has been transformed into the medium of the materials by the prehending
eye or ear that it becomes the proper subject of aesthetic predication. Thus, the medium of
the materials corresponds with what Aldrich calls the surface of the aesthetic object,
something generated by a prehensive view of the work of art, and that part of the material
thing to which aesthetic predications apply. The notion that observation and prehension
represent utterly distinct modes of perception reduces to the claim that I cannot
simultaneously be aware of the aesthetic character of the materials of a work of art, and of
the physical object presence of these same materials. To see one or other set of these
aspects is to make over a bit of the world in perceptually different ways. Applied to the
work of art overall, the notion that observation and prehension exclude one another
amounts to the claim that I cannot simultaneously realize the material thing (canvas) qua
canvas and qua representational picture. It is the claim that I cannot simultaneously
observe and prehend the same material thing which I shall be scrutinizing for the
remainder of this chapter.
II
One of the more obvious successes of Aldrich's theory of aesthetic perception is the
manner in which the theory brings to light the complex nature of aesthetic attribution.
Aldrich draws attention to the fact that aesthetic attributions do not form a logically
16'"Expresses' and 'Expressive'", p.211.
17 "'Expresses' and 'Expressive'", p.212.
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homogeneous class of expressions when he demonstrates, firstly, the plurality of ways in
which a variety of aesthetic predicates may apply to a single work of art in the course of a
single description; and secondly, the fact that a single predicate may be used to qualify
the same work of art in more than one way at the same time. Imagine that the picture
before me depicts 'a scene of wooded tranquility'. To say that 'the picture contains large
expanses of green' is to give a physical object description of the colour palate of the
painting; or else it is to partly qualify the representational content of the picture, the fact
that the picture depicts rolling expanses of green countryside. Talk of the coolness of the
picture qualifies either the perceived characters of the individual elements of the picture,
or the perceived character belonging to regions of the picture; the latter being one of the
compositional expressive qualities of the work. The physical surface of the canvas may
be 'flat' rather than warped; and the picture may be pictorially 'flat' in the sense that the
relatively limited palate deployed by the artist in the painting serves to thwart the illusion
of pictorial depth. This second species of flatness describes the sculptured composite
quality presented by the elements of the pigments. The tranquility of the painting may be
a compositional expressive quality, or else a representational effect, denoting the fact that
nothing is seen to be in motion in the picture-space of the composition. In the case under
consideration, the colour tones used by the artist and the colours depicted happen to
coincide, although they might not have done so, as when Poussin employs dabs of ochre
and umber paint rather than gold leaf to depict the golden idol in Worship of the Golden
Calf.18
Aldrich's theory of aesthetic perception manages to account for many features of our
experience of pictorial representation. For instance, Aldrich's distinction between two
species of aspect animation invites the notion that there are two separate but interrelated
aesthetic spaces corresponding with each pictorial composition - the colour space
animating the picture in the depth dimension, and the representational space of the
18 Michael Podro, "Depiction and the Golden Calf", in Philosophy and the Visual Arts: Seeing and
Abstracting, ed. Andrew Harrison, Royal Institute of Philosophy (Dordrecht: D.Reidel, 1987), pp.3-22,
p.5.
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composition.19 We can think of the representational space of the picture as that which is
seen in the picture, a group of objects and the relationships obtaining between them.
Although our ability to see the picture as its depicted subject-matter depends in some way
upon what I choose to call the colour space of the picture, the representational space
animating the picture is not entirely isomorphic with the three-dimensional tonal colour
effect arising from the interanimation of the timbres of the colours. This fact becomes
apparent when we consider how the pictorial illusion of depth comes about, and how the
represented depth of a picture may differ from the apparent colour depth. A picture is
judged to be 'flat' if it has a rather shallow projection of colours in the third dimension,
especially if the shallowness of this projection conflicts with our awareness that the
pictorial objects to which these different pigments belong are represented as standing at a
great distance from one other another.20
Distinguishing the colour space, defined by our awareness of the medium of the
materials, from the representational space emerging in that medium, allows us to
characterize the type of visual interest to be found in nonfigurational art. A picture will be
said to be nonrepresentational when it explores the properties of aesthetic (colour) space
without presenting an explicit image.21 Thus, according to Aldrich's account of pictorial
seeing, a Rothko possesses two different types of aesthetic quality: ground-level aesthetic
qualities, or the timbres of the colours employed; and those composite expressive
qualities arising when we view these timbres in combination. Distinguishing between the
colour space and the representational space also allows us to account for the defective
nature of some representations. Richard Wollheim has noted that as well as seeing a
drawing of a square or other diagram as a mere configuration, we can also see a drawing
of this type as "the representation of whatever it is of which the lines that constitute it are
19 The distinction I create here between the colourspace and the representationalspace of' a picture
reflects my own attempt to give a sharper focus to some insights contained in Aldrich's discussion of the
types of aspect-animation to be found in pictures. Aldrich never makes this distinction as such.
20 For an example of this phenomenon, see Aldrich's discussion of Kokoschka looking at an Alpine
landscape, in "Picture Space", pp.347-348.
21 Philosophy ofArt, pp.48-49.
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the projection on to a plane surface."22 Distinguishing between the colour space and
representational space of a picture explains why we might agree with Wollheim whilst
feeling that such geometrical figures are nonetheless representationally deficient. Such
diagrams are at best weakly representational because they fail to create an illusion of
depth. In the language of Aldrich, there is little or no expressive character attaching to
such a configuration as a whole when viewed prehensively.
The distinction between the colour space and the representational space
corresponding with a particular picture enables us to notice the fact that a colour may
seem to occupy one position within the colour-space of a visual composition, a position
determined by the intrinsic position which that colour would ordinarily take up relative to
the eye, whilst apparently occupying another position when it is seen as belonging to one
of the objects represented in the picture. For instance, a bright motif seen on its own may
tend to protrude, yet will tend to be recessed if seen as a sunlit wheat field in the
background of the composition. Likewise, although a gray-bluish green tends to be seen
as occupying a position further back in the space of the picture than the position occupied
by a bright tan, Aldrich describes the reversal of this relationship in a Derain still life,
where the turquoise sits ahead of the tan because it is seen representationally as a jug in
front of a table.23 Aldrich is right to suggest that our awareness of such dynamic tensions
adds to the aesthetic enjoyment a picture may provide. However, his insistence that I
cannot simultaneously perceive the picture as both canvas and work of art means that my
awareness of the aesthetic space values of the composition will inevitably cancel out my
awareness of the physical space values of the picture viewed as canvas. This rules out the
possibility that we could be aware of further dynamic tensions which may arise between
the position that a pictorial element is seen to occupy within either of the aesthetic spaces
Aldrich describes, and the position that element occupies in the flat, two-dimensional
picture plane coinciding with the space of the canvas. At the very minimum, Aldrich is
committed to denying that awareness of such tensions could figure in the aesthetic
22 Richard Wollheim, "On Drawing an Object", in On Art and the Mind (London: Allen Lane, 1973),
pp.3-30, pp.28-29. See also Art and Its Objects, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1980), sec. 12, 13, pp.15, 17.
23 Philosophy of Art, pp.44, 65.
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experience of looking at a picture. That is to say, Aldrich leaves no room for an aesthetic
noticing of the way in which the painter uses the two-dimensional space of the canvas.
Yet we lose the whole point of Breughel the Elder's Landscape with the Fall of Icarus if
we fail to realize the tension created when Breughel relegates his represention of the
putative subject of the composition to the margins of the two-dimensional picture space.
Aldrich falsifies our aesthetic experience when he assumes that noticing where a pictorial
element is placed on the canvas, noticing how full or empty the canvas looks to the eye,
excludes a simultaneous recognition of the sensuous presentation of the surface and
whatever images may animate this presentation.
Although Aldrich manages to provide some penetrating insights into the nature of
our perceptual involvement with works of art, there are crucial respects in which
Aldrich's account of aesthetic perception does little to illuminate the concept of pictorial
representation. Aldrich claims that the representational field of a picture is generated by
our taking the aesthetic point of view, prehending the timbres and tonalities of the colours
and lines and in so doing, allowing the represented image to form as it takes on properties
of aesthetic space.24 I have explicated this as the claim that we become aware of the
representational space of the picture when we become aware of the dynamic, three-
dimensional relationship between the colours. Of course, the three-dimensional colour
effect of the picture is only one of the devices the an artist might use to create the illusion
of pictorial depth. Other devices at the artist's disposal include the overlapping of images
in the picture plane, so that one part of the picture gives the appearance of being 'in front
of the other, obscuring part of the latter from view. Hand-waving references to a
prehensive awareness of the timbres of lines does nothing to explain the fact that where
we see two contiguous shapes on a page, one of them 'complete' and the other not, we
tend to see the configuration in such a way that the complete figure stands out three-
dimensionally in front of the incomplete figure. The gestalt psychologists explain this
phenomenon by pointing to two principles which underlie all acts of perception: the
notion that all perception involves the seeing of 'figure on ground'; and the principle that
24 Philosophy ofArt, p.33.
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perceivers always seek out the simplest interpretation possible for a set of perceptual data.
To see even a simple line or an outline figure on a page involves seeing that line or figure
as standing on top of an uninterrupted background. That particular figure-on-ground
resolution that we make when we see a configuration of lines as a circle standing in front
of a square reflects a simpler resolution of the visual data than one which treats the same
configuration as a single irregular figure lying in a single plane.25 Of course, once you
start to account for three-dimensional representational effects by appealing to the
principles underlying all acts of perception, talk of a prehensive awareness of the timbres
of lines becomes surplus to theoretical requirements.
Ill
One way in which Aldrich might demonstrate that observation and prehension
amount to distinct and mutually exclusive modes of perception would be to show that the
radical separation he proposes between these two modes of perception leads to a superior
account of the phenomenology of pictorial perception. Prima facie, this is not a promising
line of enquiry. The notion that I can't simultaneously observe and prehend a picture
poses the threat of an illusionist account of representational perception. To see how a
separation between the aesthetic and nonaesthetic modes of perception runs the risk of an
illusionist account of pictorial perception, I shall contrast Aldrich's account of the
phenomenology of representational perception with Richard Wollheim's well-known
account of representational seeing.26
25 See Rudolf Arnheim, Art and Visual Perception: A Psychology of the Creative Eye (London: Faber
and Faber, 1967), pp.168, 214, 241-243.
26 The following discussion draws upon Richard Wollheim, Art and Its Objects, sec. 12, pp.15-16; "On
Drawing an Object", pp.3-30; "Seeing-as, Seeing-in and Pictorial Representation", in Art and Its
Objects, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp.205-226; Painting as an Art
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1987), pp.46ff; "Imagination and Pictorial Understanding:, DAS', Supp.
Vol.60 (1986), 45-60; "A Note on Mimesis as Make-Believe", PPR, 51 (1991), 401-406.
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It could be argued that any account of the phenomenology of representational
perception must show willing to account for the following set of data:
(i) The experience of seeing a pictorial representation of a lion more closely
resembles the experience of seeing a lion than it resembles the experience of
reading a description of a lion.
(ii) The experience of seeing a pictorial representation of a lion more closely
resembles the experience of seeing a lion than it resembles the experience of
seeing a zebra.
(iii) In certain crucial respects, the experience of seeing a pictorial representation
of a lion more closely resembles the experience of seeing a zebra-picture than it
resembles the experience of seeing a lion in the flesh.
Whilst (i) captures the idea that a picture, unlike a denoting term in a language, acts as a
natural sign of its object, (ii) stresses the recognitional aspect of pictorial perception.
Taken together, (i) and (ii) suggest the visual component to the experience of looking at a
pictorial representation. That is to say, pictorial interpretation draws upon ordinary
perceptual skills, and in particular, our ordinary capacity for perceptually recognizing
objects, in a way in which the interpretation of sentences in a language does not. As
such, (i) and (ii) act as a constraint upon anyone who, like Nelson Goodman, opts for a
conventionalist account of pictorial representation. Formula (iii) recognizes the
conventional or configurational aspect to the experience of looking at a picture, (iii) acts
as a constraint upon an illusionist account of pictorial representation. Different accounts
of representational perception have tended to emphasize one or other of these aspects at
the expense of the rest. Thus a conventionalist account of depiction tends to emphasize
(iii) at the expense of (i), whilst an illusionist account of pictorial perception, like the one
offered by E.H.Gombrich in Art and Illusion, pays attention to (i) at the expense of
(ill).27
One way to summarizing the constraints which (i) through (iii) place upon an
account of representational perception would be to say that to have an experience of x as a
picture of y is to have a non-illusory experience of some pictorial appearance of y. In
27 Criteria (i), (ii), and (iii) are loosely based upon Richard Wollheim's discussion of conventional and
illusionist accounts of representation in "On Drawing an Object", pp.25-26.
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looking at a picture of y I have a visual experience that resembles or recalls in some ways
the experience of seeing y. However, the experience is not an illusional one to the extent
that I do not hold the belief that I am looking at y rather than x, a picture of y. It is an
interest in the non-illusional aspect of a pictorial experience of x which leads Wollheim to
place a twofold requirement upon acts of representational seeing. According to Wollheim,
in looking at a picture of y, I have a single visual experience with two theoretically
distinguishable but phenomenally inseparable aspects to it:28 I have a visual experience
that is both the experience of seeing a surface and the experience of seeing y. When I
look at a picture x of y as a picture of y - as opposed to seeing x as a flat surface marked
with paint, or believing that I am looking at y - the twofold visual awareness that I bring
to the task is a species of a widely occuring perceptual genus which Wollheim dubs
'seeing-in' ,29 Wollheim believes that I exercise my capacity for seeing-in whenever I see
figures in clouds or images in damp stains on walls, and whenever I see a canvas covered
with paint as the picture of a woman. The practice of pictorial representation presupposes
and exploits this basic human capacity for seeing-in things. That is to say, it is the
existence of this basic perceptual capacity which allows artists to mark surfaces in such a
way that spectators exercising their capacity for seeing-in will have certain recognitional
experiences. What distinguishes pictorial representation from standard cases of seeing-in
is the fact that in the former case but not the latter a standard of correctness applies to that
which is seen in the surface, a standard of correctness determined by the fulfilled
intentions of the artist.30 Wollheim believes the twofoldness he attributes to
representational perception both captures the phenomenological feature distinctive to the
experience of seeing-in, and serves to guarantee that the experience I have in looking at a
representation is not an illusional one.31 In seeing a picture of a woman, I have a visual
experience as of looking at a woman, and my attention simultaneously is drawn to a
configuration of elements on the page. It is because my experience possesses what
28 Painting as an Art, 46.
29 "Sccmg-as, Seeing-in, and Pictorial Representation", p.209.
3 0 Painting as an Art, p.47-48; "Imagination and Pictorial Understanding", p.46.
31 "Imagination and Pictorial Understanding", pp.46-47.
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Wollheim calls both recognitional and configuratioml aspects32 that I never lose sight of
the fact that what I am looking at is a picture of a woman rather than a woman in the
flesh.
I have described the distinction, implicit in Aldrich's discussion of pictorial
representation, between the colour space and the representational space of a picture. This
distinction, coupled with Aldrich's claim that different properties belong to an object
under the observational and prehensional modes of perception, suggests that Aldrich
anticipates the existence of three types of property which may feature in the experience of
a picture: (1) physical object properties belonging to the picture surface; (2) pictorial
properties of colour, whereby one colour may be pictorially in front of or behind another
colour; (3) representational properties attaching to whatever is visually recognized in the
picture. Wollheim's discussion of pictorial representation also demonstrates an aware¬
ness of these three property kinds. Wollheim distinguishes between the physical and the
pictorial dimension of my experience of looking at a patch of black paint that has been
applied to a white canvas.33 To say that the black is on the white in the physical
dimension is to say that I see the black paint as concealing a patch of white canvas which
would be revealed again to sight if the paint were rubbed off. To say that the black is on
the white in the pictorial dimension is to see the black as standing in front of the white.
Whereas in the first case, the black and white are seen as occupying a position in space
that is materially speaking equidistant from the eye, in the second case the black appears
to be closer to the eye than the white. No fact concerning the physical relationship in
which the black paint stands to the white canvas - the fact that the paint might have been
applied to the canvas, or the fact that the canvas may have been cut away to reveal the
black lying underneath - could serve to confirm or disconfirm the fact that the black is
pictorially on the white, an observation confirming that the two facts described occupy
separate dimensions. Wollheim acknowledges the representational properties of a picture
when he stresses the recognitional aspect of my experience of seeing-in. Because
Wollheim acknowledges the existence of three and not just two classes of property
3 2 "Imagination and Pictorial Understanding", p.47.
33 "On Drawing an Object", pp.26-27.
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entering pictorial experience, this raises the question what sorts of properties belong to
each of the aspects of the twofold visual experience of seeing-in.
Wollheim does not provide us with any obvious answer to this question, his
description of the twofold nature of pictorial perception apparently changing with each
new account he gives of the matter. In the earliest formulation of his theory, Wollheim
invites us to think of our ability to see a representation on analogy with the way in which
we can see black paint on a white canvas as standing out (pictorially) against the white.
He also suggests that an awareness of the pictorial fact of black on white does not
preclude an awareness of the physical fact of black on white.34 This suggests Wollheim
believes that the twofoldness of pictorial perception amounts to a simultaneous attention
to facts in the physical and pictorial dimensions of experience, my awareness of explicitly
representational properties presumably falling into the latter category. This would cohere
with the account given in Painting as an Art, where twofoldness amounts to the notion
that I am visually aware of the surface, and I discern something standing out in front of
(or perhaps receding behind) something else.35 But it is to ignore the fact, brought to our
attention by Aldrich, that the pictorial and representational properties in a given picture
may not coincide, as when the pictorial fact of turquoise-behind-tan is contradicted by the
representational fact of turquoise-before-tan in the Derain still life. Elsewhere, Wollheim
describes the twofoldness of pictorial experience as an attending to the recognitional and
configurational aspects of the visual experience. In looking at a picture of a woman, I
recognize a woman, and I have a visual awareness of a marked surface.36 In this
account, it is uncertain where the experience of pictorial properties would come into the
equation. Is my twofold attention to, on the one hand, the representational properties of
the picture, on the other hand, both pictorial and physical properties of the marked
surface? Elsewhere again,37 Wollheim suggests that in seeing y in x, I have a
simultaneous awareness of y and of features of x sustaining the experience of seeing y.
3 4 "On Drawing an Object", p.27-28; Art and Its Objects, Sec. 12, pp. 15-16.
3 5 Painting as an Art, p.46. This is also the view given in "A Note on Mimesis as Make-Believe",
PPR, 51 (1991), 401-406, p.403.
36 "Imagination and Pictorial Understanding", p.46.
37 "Seeing-as, Seeing-in, and Pictorial Representation", pp.212-213.
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Awareness of sustaining features is here equated with awareness of the medium of the
work of art, where it is indeterminate whether attention to the medium amounts to
awareness of a set of facts in the physical dimension, a set of facts in the pictorial
dimension, or both.
Michael Podro has made the complaint that Wollheim's account of pictorial
perception demonstrates an indifference to the material substrate of the painting which
distorts the phenomenology of pictorial perception. According to Podro, Wollheim treats
the act of looking at a picture as one of looking at a surface in which we catch likenesses,
rather than as one of seeing a depiction we resolve. Wollheim ignores the fact that when
we see say a Raphael drawing of a Madonna, not only do we see the figure in the pen
marks, but we also see the marks, the intervals of shadow and light, in the figure. In
looking at a drawing, we are aware of a drawing procedure that could have other
realizations. The sense of the depicted thing does not saturate the 'look' of the drawing
for us, any more than a particular prospect of an object saturates our sense of the
object.38 Aldrich's own very clear account of what is involved in perceiving the medium
of a work of art makes it possible to clarify the nature of the dispute between Wollheim
and Podro. According to Aldrich, I may attend to the surface of a picture as a physical
object surface. Alternatively, I can see the same surface as the drawing procedure that
Podro draws to our attention: the 'medium of the materials' in which certain expressive
and representational properties emerge. Podro believes that Wollheim ignores the second
of these ways of attending to the surface of the picture, and in so doing, falsifies the
phenomenology of our pictorial experience. Because Wollheim is noncommittal on the
question whether that half of my twofold pictorial attention directed to the medium is an
attending to the surface qua physical object suface or an attending to the surface qua
drawing procedure, it is very difficult to assess the justice of Podro's objection. The fact
that Wollheim does apparently change his description of the nature of twofoldness over
time might reflect an attempt on his part to meet objections of this type as he was made
aware of them.
38 Michael Podro, "Depiction and the Golden Calf', pp. 18,9, 10, 15.
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Whatever points of indeterminacy may be found in Wollheim's description of the
medium of a work of art, Podro's interpretation of Wollheim is correct to this extent:
Wollheim does not believe that my twofold attention to a picture involves an indifference
to the physical object properties belonging to the picture surface. Twofoldness amounts
to awareness of representational or pictorial properties or both, without losing sight of the
physical properties belonging to the marked surface. And since Aldrich explicitly denies
that I can be aware of physical object properties whilst attending aesthetically, it follows
that Aldrich is committed to denying the twofoldness of pictorial experience, at least as
Wollheim understands the term.39 Whereas Wollheim treats my awareness of a picture as
a single visual experience possessing two inseparable aspects, Aldrich treats my
awareness of a picture as an alternation between two different sorts of visual experience.
Aldrich claims that having an experience of a picture may take the form of an aesthetic
object experience of seeing the represented subject-matter appearing in the medium of the
materials; or else it may take the form of a physical object experience of seeing a piece of
canvas occupying a certain portion of the surface area of a wall. I can attend to the
physical fact that the black paint is on the white canvas, or I can attend to the fact that the
black is pictorially upon the white, but I cannot attend to both. Wollheim by contrast
believes that where my perceptual awareness takes the form of seeing-in, I not only can
but must be attending simultaneously to the two aspects of the situation. Although my
attention need not be divided evenly between recognitional and configurational aspects at
each point of the experience, I must continue to pay some attention to each of type of
aspect if my current act of looking is to count as an instance of seeing-in rather than an
instance of seeing-as or just plain seeing.40 Losing sight of the configurational aspects of
my experience of seeing y in the painting would turn the experience into one of seeing-as
rather than seeing-in. Losing sight of the recognitional aspects of the experience would
reduce the experience to one of looking at x.
39 I.e. Aldrich is not committed to denying that I can have a 'twofold' awareness of both the pictorial and
representational properties of the picture.
40 Painting as an Art, p.47; "Seeing-as, Seeing-in and Pictorial Representation", p.213.
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If Wollheim is correct when he claims that twofoldness is the phenomenological
feature distinctive to seeing representationally, and if he is correct in claiming that some
twofoldness requirement is necessary to avoid an illusionist account of representational
perception, then it would follow that in denying twofoldness, Aldrich manages to provide
both an inadequate account of the phenomenology of representational perception, and an
illusionist account at that. With Wollheim's own superior account of representational
perception to hand, we would have two reasons to reject Aldrich's account of pictorial
perception. On the other hand, if it could be demonstrated that appealing to twofoldness
does not lead to a superior understanding of the nature of pictorial perception, and if it
could also be demonstrated that our experience of pictorial representation is essentially
illusional in nature, then these reasons for rejecting Aldrich's account would evaporate
and Aldrich would live to fight another day.
As it happens, I am not persuaded that the appeal to twofoldness does lead to a
superior account of pictorial representation. Flint Schier points out that the twofoldness
requirement would be met in a case where I was seeing a diaphanous image of you
superimposed upon a portrait of you, whilst experiencing your portrait not as a portrait of
you, but as a dark object appearing behind the diaphanous image of you.41 Schier
devises this example to demonstrate that twofoldness is not sufficient for pictorial
perception. However, the same example could also be taken to demonstrate that
twofoldness does not capture what is phenomenally distinctive to our experiences of
looking at pictures. At a minimum the example demonstrates that, if there is something
like a feature distinctive to acts of pictorial perception, then Wollheim requires a more
sensitive description of twofoldness to capture this feature. In light of this observation, I
can imagine someone who claimed to be unimpressed with Wollheim's account of
pictorial perception arguing as follows. Wollheim's account of pictorial perception was
originally crafted to avoid the pitfalls of an illusionist account of pictorial representation,
and all too clearly shows the traces of that origin. Far from providing a rich and
interesting description of the phenomenology of pictorial perception, twofoldness
41 Flint Schier, Deeper Into Pictures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp.200, 203.
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functions as the barren stipulation that illusion shall not be entered into during the course
of pictorial perception. For twofoldness specifies a minimum requirement upon a non-
illusionist account of picturing: that in looking at a picture of y, I am having a non-
illusional experience, and my experience is of a (pictorial) appearance of y. In using the
notion of twofoldness to lay out the conditions for a non-illusory perceptual experience of
a picture, Wollheim has not thereby described what is phenomenologically distinctive to
the class of representational perceptions. If Wollheim believes that laying out the
conditions for a non-illusory experience of a picture is to specify what is distinctive of
pictorial perception, then this only goes to demonstrate the slippery way in which
Wollheim uses the phrase "seeing appropriate to representations."42 For this phrase
coincides in Wollheim's thinking both with the notion 'a way of seeing appropriately
representational', i.e. a way of looking which allows me to see pictures of y as
representations rather than taking them for the real appearances of y; but also with 'a way
of seeing appropriate to, or unique to, representations'. It is a tendency to slide in his
thinking between the two notions of 'seeing appropriate to representations' which leads
Wollheim to suppose both that twofoldness holds the key to an non-illusionist account of
pictorial representation, and that twofoldness serves to characterize the phenomenology
of pictorial perception. Realizing that the phrase "seeing appropriate to representation"
carries these two meanings leads one to see that in describing the seeing appropriate to
representations, Wollheim is not making a rich and interesting point concerning the
character of our visual experiences of pictures, but simply laying out the conditions
which must be met if those experiences are not to be illusional ones.
Wollheim's account of pictorial perception claims that (1) recognizing the subject of
a pictorial representation amounts to a visual experience; and that (2) there is a
phenomenological feature distinctive to those visual experiences corresponding with acts
of representational seeing, namely twofoldness. As (i) through (iii) above demonstrate,
identifying the subject of a pictorial representation amounts to a perceptual operation.
However, some might believe that it is by no means obvious that we will find a
42 For Wollheim's use of this phrase, see "Seeing-as, Seeing-in and Representational Perception", esp.
p.205.
136
phenomenological feature distinctive to all acts of looking at representations, and that it
requires something of a leap in thinking to go from the notion that recognizing the subject
of a representation requires an act of perception, to the claim that there is a feature
phenomenologically distinctive to all those acts of perception whereby we come to
recognize the subject of a pictorial representation. Wollheim makes the move from (1) to
(2) via the claim that (3) acts of perception involved in seeing representationally form a
species of a wider genus of phenomenally distinctive acts of perception called seeing-in.
The opponent unsympathetic to Wollheim's views on representational perception might
suggest that there is no class of phenomenally distinctive perceptual acts corresponding
with the notion of seeing-in, although he believes he can see why Wollheim might have
been misled into supposing there was. This is because, in earlier versions of his account
of pictorial perception, Wollheim sought to assimilate representational seeing within the
wider genus of seeing known as 'seeing-as,'43 but later came to think that the type of
visual experience involved in seeing a pictorial representation qua representation could be
better elucidated through the notion of seeing-in rather than seeing-as.44 Wollheim's
professed reasons for the shift in view were because he came to believe firstly, that
seeing-as draws upon no special perceptual capacity over and above straightforward
perception; and secondly, that seeing-as and seeing representationally amount to very
different visual projects.45 In twentieth-century philosophy, the notion of seeing-as has
come to be associated with the Wittgensteinian notion of 'seeing an aspect'. That the
notion of seeing-as or aspect perception is anything but an experientially well-defined
phenomenon can be demonstrated by pointing to the diversity of phenomena which
Wittgenstein chose to discuss under the topic of "the dawning of an aspect".46
Nevertheless, the sheer familiarity of the concept of seeing an aspect would for many
philosophers lend the notion of seeing-as the air of a clearly-defined phenomenon; and
this is no doubt why Wollheim originally persuaded himself that seeing-as amounted to a
43 Art and Its Objects, sec. 12, p. 16.
44 The reasons for this theoretical shift form the subject of the essay "Seeing-as, Seeing-in, and Pictorial
Representation". See in particular pp.209.
45 "Seeing-as, Seeing-in, and Pictorial Representation", pp.219-224.
46 Malcolm Budd demonstrates something of the range of phenomena Wittgenstein covered under this
heading in "Wittgenstein on Seeing Aspects," Mind, 96 (1987), 1-17.
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phenomenologically distinctive form of perception. Having begun with a theory which
identified pictorial perception as a species of what he mistakenly thought to be a
phenomenologically distinctive perceptual genus, Wollheim persisted in the error of
believing that the form of visual project he was attempting to characterize formed a
distinctive perceptual genus when he made the shift from talk of seeing-as to talk of
seeing-in.
Wollheim's opponent might go on to suggest that, far from enabling Wollheim to
locate acts of pictorial perception within a wider class of phenomenologically distinctive
perceptual acts, Wollheim's attempt to explicate the notion of representational perception
in terms of seeing-in rather than seeing-as only serves to weaken his original theory. For
as Hint Schier demonstrates, treating the experience of seeing a picture as the experience
of seeing y in x reduces our pictorial experience to a double-decker experience as of
seeing y and seeing x, and does nothing to explain the structure or articulation of pictorial
experience. By contrast, the seeing-as model of pictorial perception at least gestures in the
direction of articulating that structure, to the extent that it analyses seeing x as a picture of
y via the notion of seeing x as bearing various resemblance-relations to y. If I see a
Matisse as a group of dancers, I have more than a double-decker experience (of paint and
dancers); I also see the work as having dancer-like features.47
If Wollheim's opponent is correct in his line of argumentation, then twofoldness
does not describe the phenomenological feature distinctive to acts of looking at pictures.
Instead, the twofoldness requirement recommends a way of focusing attention upon
pictures that will avert an illusory experience. It follows that Aldrich cannot be accused of
failing to do justice to the phenomenology of pictorial perception for no other reason than
the fact he denies that my experience of a picture involves a form of dual attention.
However, if as Wollheim's opponent concedes, twofoldness describes a basic
requirement that any non-illusionist account of pictorial perception must meet, then
Aldrich would still stand accused of proposing an illusionist account of pictorial
perception. Or would he? At this point, Wollheim's opponent might deny that
47 Deeper Into Pictures, pp.203-204.
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twofoldness does represent a requirement that any non-illusionist account of pictorial
representation must respect. The opponent might point out that Wollheim's account of
pictorial representation is less a non-illusionist account than it is an anti-illusionist
account. In building twofoldness into the visual basis of our experience of a picture,
Wollheim takes excessive precautions against the possibility of illusion; resembling in
this respect the man who feels the need to prick himself at regular intervals to persuade
himself he is awake. In insisting upon the twofold nature of pictorial perception,
Wollheim apparently believes that to cease even for a second to attend visually to the
features of x sustaining the experience of seeing y, would result in succumbing to some
sort of illusion. Wollheim fails to do justice to the phenomenology of looking at pictures
when he suggests that my experience of the picture changes from one of seeing
representationally to seeing-as the moment I lose concentration upon the material basis of
the picture. On a more generous interpretation of the matter, the person who has an
illusory experience of a picture is not the man momentarily losing sight of the fact that he
is looking at a mere configuration; but the man whose overall experience of the picture
displays the correct belief-structure, namely, the belief-structure of one who knows he is
looking at a picture of y rather than y. I am not having an illusory experience of a picture
if I momentarily allow my visual attention to run over the subject matter to the exclusion
of all else. I would be having an illusory experience of a picture if I were to try to shake
the hand of the subject in the portrait. On this more generous interpretation of an illusory
pictorial experience, Aldrich does not provide an illusionist account of pictorial
representation merely because he allows me to switch attention between the canvas or
configuration on the one hand and the representational content on the other.
As a final consideration, Wollheim's opponent might point out that Wollheim's anti-
illusionist instincts have led him to characterize the experience of looking at a picture in a
way that rules out the illusionist mistake of supposing that in looking at a picture x of y, I
am looking at y not x. In gearing his own account of the phenomenology of pictorial
perception to ruling out this mistake, Wollheim perhaps loses sight of the fact there is a
sense in which the experience of a pictorial representation is necessarily an illusional
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experience, to the extent that it is constitutes the experience of looking at one of the
appearances of y rather than the experience of looking at y itself. Any adequate theory of
the phenomenology of pictorial representation should try to characterize in a sensitive
way the form of illusion involved in looking at the pictorial appearance of y.48 This
suggests that rather than criticizing any account of pictorial representation which, like
Aldrich's, carries the hint of a possibility that there is an illusion involved in looking at a
picture, we should look to see whether what is on offer amounts to a benignly illusionist
account, one that does justice to whatever element of illusion legitimately attaches to our
experience of pictures.
The arguments aired in this section suggest that it is not immediately obvious that
Aldrich provides an inferior account of the phenomenology of pictorial perception to that
offered by Wollheim. They also suggest that it would not be fair to hold up to ridicule
Aldrich's account of representational perception simply because his theory fails to display
the anti-illusionist instincts built into Wollheim's account of pictorial representation. I
conclude that the evidence for or against Aldrich's characterization of the phenomenology
of pictorial perception is inconclusive. If we do decide to reject Aldrich's account of
pictorial representation, we require better reasons than the fact that Aldrich's theory lacks
some of the anti-illusionist features built into Wollheim's account.
IV
Prima facie, the claim that I cannot simultaneously observe and prehend the same
material thing is intuitively implausible. Taking this claim seriously makes the most
innocent-sounding remark seem problematical. Section II introduced the Breughel
example to demonstrate the fact that we run the risk of losing many important aspects of
the artist's performance when we treat the medium of a work of art as something
48 Alastair Hannay, "Wollheim on Seeing Black on White as a Picture", BJA, 10 (1970), 107-118,
pp. 113-114, offers some suggestions as to the form that such a benignly illusionist account might take.
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available only to a special mode of perception. As another example of the problems
Aldrich inadvertently causes for himself, consider how the belief that we can only
prehend and never observe the medium of the materials trips Aldrich up when he comes
to describe the nature of pictorial representation. Aldrich believes that a work of art will
count as representational in virtue of some perceived resemblance between properties of
the materials arranged in the design and the properties of the depicted subject-matter.
However, he insists that "this resemblance itself is not seen or noticed in the aesthetic
experience; it is not part of the object of prehension".49 Those assuming that this is a
piece of stipulation on Aldrich's part, an attempt to maintain the purity of the aesthetic
experience by refusing to treat an interest in visual resemblances as a properly aesthetic
interest in a representational work of art, would be mistaken.50 For it follows from the
way in which Aldrich divides our perceptual competence that I cannot prehend the
resemblance between the subject of a portrait and the disposition of the materials of the
painting in virtue of which I see the subject in the picture. That is to say, Aldrich rules out
the possibility that there could be an aesthetic noticing of the representational fidelity of a
work of art. Here Aldrich is not denying that I can simultaneously observe the subject x
and prehend the portrait y. But he is committed to denying that I can prehend any
resemblance that obtains between x as observed and y as prehended, since the only way
in which I could prehend the similarity between x and y would be to have x as well as y
enter my experience as an object of prehension. By a similar line of reasoning, I cannot
observe the resemblance between an observed x and a prehended y, since in order to
observe this similarity I must simultaneously observe and prehend y. Thus on Aldrich's
account, I cannot enjoy an aesthetic awareness of the likeness between portrait and sitter.
In effect, Aldrich admits that there exist visual resemblances grounding my experience of
pictorial representation, that these resemblances cross whatever operational boundaries
are imposed by his distinction between two modes of perception, and that I will remain
oblivious to these resemblances as long as I am operating within the constraints of these
49 Philosophy ofArt, pp.52-53.
50 No doubt it is comments such as this one that have led George Dickie to classify Aldrich's theory as
an aesthetic attitude theory. See Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1974), p. 135.
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boundaries. I can think of two reasons for dissatisfaction with this observation. In the
first place, the notion that there are unobservable resemblances grounding my experience
of pictorial representation would appear to make the whole notion of pictorial
resemblance somewhat mysterious. In the second place, the existence of brute perceptual
resemblances crossing the boundaries of Aldrich's distinction tends to make this
distinction look somewhat contrived. That is to say, the fact that Aldrich is able to appeal
to the notion of visual resemblance to explain the phenomenon of representational seeing
suggests that seeing is a more unified phenomenon than Aldrich's distinction suggests.
The fact that we cannot do justice to these overriding perceptual similarities when we
accept Aldrich's view operates as a powerful disincentive to anyone tempted to adopt the
view in the first place.
The claim that I cannot simultaneously observe and prehend the same material thing
creates further problems for Aldrich when he makes the seemingly innocent-looking
suggestion that prehension constitutes an 'impressionistic' way of looking, and one
which remains "fairer than usual to the integrity of experience as a whole".51 The notion
that aesthetic perception is both impressionistic and unusually whole captures what we
might call the 'commonsense' view of the phenomenology of perception. From the
common-sense point of view, it is easy enough to understand what it means to refer to an
impressionistic way of looking. Beardsley presupposes this commonsense view when
he characterizes aesthetic perception as a form of seeing that surrenders itself to what is
given, rather than forcing the perceptual field to disgorge a predicted datum. To illustrate
the impressionistic and holistic nature of aesthetic perception, Beardsley offers the
example of someone who ceases to scan the openings between trees for the sight of
someone she expects to appear, amd applies a more diffuse attention allowing her to take
in the 'regional' qualities of the woods as a whole, its bunchiness, bushiness, heaviness,
stateliness or ominousness.52 Unfortunately, once Aldrich establishes observation and
prehension as utterly distinct modes of perception, he leaves no room for any sensible
51 Philosophy ofArt, pp.17, 18, 22, 25.
52 "What is an Aesthetic Quality?", pp.58, 57,
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interpretation of the commonsense claim that prehension involves an 'impressionistic'
way of looking.
Intuitively, to look at something impressionistically involves taking in some of the
properties belonging to the object experienced whilst ignoring or failing to do justice to
the rest. When I look impressionistically, I fail to see all that there is to see. This suggests
that when Aldrich describes prehension as an 'impressionistic' way of looking, he means
to suggest that prehension involves a selective way of attending to the thing perceived.
Aldrich, who treats the notion of aspect-perception as central to his account of aesthetic
perception, offers two examples of what are ostensibly gestalt-switches purporting to
illustrate the 'impressionistic' character of prehensive seeing. One case involves seeing
snowflakes as comet-shaped with tails extending upwards. Here the change of aspect is
brought about by failing to attend to the flakes themselves and focusing instead upon a
point in the dark beyond the snowflakes.The second example involves looking at "a dark
city and a pale western sky at dusk, meeting at the sky line" in a way which alters
ordinary perceptual relationships, so that "the light sky area just above the jagged sky line
protrudes toward the point of view. The sky is closer to the viewer than the dark areas of
the buildings."53 These examples suggest that one possible model for the type of
selective attention involved in prehensively realizing an object might be that change of
attention required to bring about a gestalt-switch. For it might be thought that achieving a
gestalt-switch involves altering the character of what I see by selecting different features
of the design to act as figure and ground for each new interpretation, with those features
demoted to the background within a given perceptual interpretation having no determinate
character for the purposes of that interpretation. One simple example of this change in
foregrounding would be the 'double cross' introduced by Wittgenstein at Philosophical
Investigations, II.xi. However, if prehension resembles the sort of selective attention
required to bring about a change in gestalt, the question then arises, to what do I
selectively attend when I prehend? Aldrich cannot claim that prehension works by
selecting the aesthetic characteristics of the object and ignoring the nonaesthetic ones,
53 "Back to Aesthetic Experience", pp.368-369; Philosophy ofArt, p.22.
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because he takes it as given that I cannot perceive both aesthetic and nonaesthetic
characteristics at the same time. This is why Dickie is mistaken when he supposes that
prehension reveals "which aspects of a work of art or nature are aesthetic (that is, are
proper parts of an aesthetic object) and which are not".54 For Aldrich, it is not the case
that an object simultaneously possesses both aesthetic and nonaesthetic aspects in a way
that allows me to attend to one set of aspects but not the other. Rather, the aspects an
object possesses are generated by the way in which I look at that object. That is to say,
prehension does not isolate the aesthetic object out of what is already given to perception,
it realizes the aesthetic object by bringing the material thing under a new mode of
perception, or a new perceptual organization. For as long as I am perceiving
prehensively, I endow the object with one type of structural cast, whilst remaining
temporarily oblivious to a quite different structural cast which would be realized for the
object were I perceiving in the physical object mode.
The type of perceptual reorganization that takes place when I switch from observing
to prehending the same material thing is far more drastic than any perceptual
reorganization taking place under a gestalt-switch. For this reason, prehension cannot
amount to the sort of selective attention involved in a change of gestalt. However, Aldrich
might preserve the claim that prehension constitutes an impressionistic form of perception
by claiming that prehending involves selectively attending to whatever characteristics
belong to the object viewed holophrastically. The notion of holophrastic perception is
problematic, partly because Aldrich devotes relatively little space to the notion in his
overall discussion; but also because what little he says on the topic changes as the theory
matures. The cynical reader could be forgiven for thinking that the notion of holophrastic
perception functions for Aldrich as a theoretical convenience,55 allowing Aldrich to
explain away the fact that for most of the time, the act of perceiving carries none of the
metaphysical commitments implied in the notions of observation and prehension. That is
to say, because Aldrich asserts that our ways of perceiving are metaphysically loaded, he
requires some notion of the sort of perceiving we do when we are not committing
54 Art and the Aesthetic, pp. 135-136.
55 See for instance Philosophy ofArt, pp.33, 23.
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ourselves to specific metaphysical categories. I can refer to Sally without making explicit
reference to Sally as a person or as a human body, and there must be a way of looking
which underpins this sort of case. Of course, introducing a form of perception that is
divorced of metaphysical presuppositions raises the question why we require
metaphysically charged ways of seeing in the first place. This is presumably why, in the
earliest formulation of his view, Aldrich blocks the possibility that any of our perceiving
could be totally divorced of metaphysical presuppositions when he identifies holophrastic
perception as a confused sort of attending to both the physical and aesthetic aspects of an
object simultaneously, with the different aspects tending to cancel each other out.56 In the
late account of the theory contained in '"Expresses' and 'Expressive'", Aldrich replaces
talk of 'holophrastic perception' with talk of perceiving in the primary perceptual field.
By this stage in the development of the theory, a neutral description of the 'material thing'
(painting) resembles nothing so much as a physical object description. Thus, to describe
the surface of the painting in this neutral vein is to describe the canvas that has had paint
applied to it - a surface that can be too absorbent, too rough, too smooth, for the paint to
apply - or it is to describe the surface of the paint itself - the fact it is dull red, rough,
cracked, beginning to peel in places.57 This enriched notion of a metaphysically neutral
way of looking apparently leaves no room for the notion of a physical object way of
looking, a fact which fails to worry Aldrich, who at this late stage in his thinking appears
to believe that realizing something as a physical object is not really a matter of perception
after all. Whereas in the earlier account, realizing something as a physical object involved
an awareness of "end-to-end coincidences of rigid units of measure structuring the field
and thus determining distance intervals and volumes,"58 we are now given to understand
that "appearances are irrelevant to anything qua physical object. A physical object
description of a thing is concerned with what the thing is 'in itself - an object of
conception, not of perception." Physical object properties are now the sorts of properties
ascertained by measuring things or performing scientific tests rather than pure acts of
56 "Picture Space", p.346.
57 '"Expresses' and 'Expressive'", p.210.
58 "Picture Space", p.347.
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perception. Realizing a material thing as a physical object involves dislodging it from its
logical place in the primary perceptual field, and making its perceptible features less and
less relevant to the account of it.59 Given the very different things Aldrich says about
holophrastic perception over the course of time, the reader is left wondering whether the
later pronouncements on the topic represent a shift in Aldrich's thinking, or only an
elaboration of the full implications of a view that remains invariant over time.
Let us sidestep some of the problems of interpretation raised by Aldrich's differing
pronouncements on the topic of holophrastic perception by concentrating upon the view
given in the paper "Picture Space," whereby holophrastic perception amounts to a
confused attending to both physical and aesthetic aspects at the same time. Under this
interpretation of holophrastic perception, prehension could count as a form of selective
attention to what is given holophrastically. However, there are two serious problems with
this proposal. In the first place, if holophrastic perception allows me to attend to both
physical object qualities and aesthetic object aspects simultaneously, albeit in a confused
fashion, this would appear to contradict Aldrich's claim that I cannot realize both sorts of
property for the object simultaneously. Since cognitive processing of what is given to
perception in a confused way may reveal for me the physical properties and aesthetic
aspects of things, I do not require additional modes of perception to realize the two; and
the notion of mutually exclusive ways of perceiving becomes surplus to theoretical
requirements. In the second place, if prehension counts as impressionistic because it
involves a selective attention to what is given in holophrastic perception, observation
would count as impressionistic for precisely the same reason. It follows that calling
prehension 'impressionistic' does not serve to characterize the phenomenology of
aesthetic as opposed to nonaesthetic perception.
In treating prehension and observation as distinct perceptual modes, Aldrich rejects
the prevailing view whereby physical object perception constitutes perception in the
default mode, with aesthetic perception representing a deviant or unusual way of looking
at things. Aldrich insists that observing something should be regarded as an
59 '"Expresses' and 'Expressive'", pp.209-210,216.
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'achievement' under a categorial requirement every bit as much as prehending the
representational content of a depiction. What we have are "two modes of perception, each
of which has its own standard of objectivity and its own sort of rapport with things that
accommodate both", and neither way of realizing objects asserts ontological priority over
the other.60 However, Aldrich puts this view at risk when he suggests that prehension is
an 'impressionistic' way of looking compared with observation. Describing prehension
as 'impressionistic' suggests that the structural cast of the material thing as prehended
either fails to agree with the 'true' structure of the object, or agrees less well, than does
the structural cast of the material thing as observed; perhaps because the aesthetic object
interpretation assigns fewer characteri si tics to the material thing than does the physical
object interpretation. However, if observation and prehension reflect autonomous ways
of perceiving the world, then it doesn't matter whether the physical object interpretation
assigns a million properties whilst the aesthetic object interpretation assigns a single
aspect. It is impossible to compare these descriptions because the material thing
possesses no particular structure unless or until it is being realized under a given mode of
perception. Suppose however that holophrastic perception does assign some sort of
structural cast to the material thing and that this structural cast resembles the structural
cast of the material thing as observed, but not the material thing as prehended. Then
prehension would count as an impressionistic way of perceiving when compared with
observation, but only because we have decided to treat holophrastic perception, or
observation, or both, as somehow constituting the default mode of perception.
The foregoing discussion suggests that we will only make sense of the claim that
prehension reflects an impressionistic way of seeing by stepping beyond the framework
imposed by Aldrich's perceptual distinction. The assumption must be that when Aldrich
calls prehension 'impressionistic', he is speaking for rhetorical effect, rather than
characterizing the phenomenology of aesthetic perception. That is to say, Aldrich realizes
that most people identify perception with physical object perception. In light of what most
people ordinarily, mistakenly, take perception to be, Aldrich concedes that aesthetic
60 "Picture Space", pp.345, 346; Philosophy ofArt, p.26.
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perception counts as an 'impressionistic' way of looking. Here I have devoted so much
attention to what appears to be a stray comment in order to draw attention to the fact that
establishing the existence of mutually exclusive ways of perceiving conflicts with
ordinary ways of thinking about and talking about aesthetic perception, ways into which
Aldrich himself is prone to lapse in his less guarded moments.
V
In Section I, I demonstrated the metaphysically demanding nature of Aldrich's
account of aesthetic perception. Aldrich makes such metaphysical demands upon his
reader in the belief that it is only by giving some attention to the logical and metaphysical
distinctions underlying our aesthetic descriptions, distinctions which commonsense
thinking tends to overlook, that we can hope to progress in understanding the nature of
art, and the nature of representation and expression in art. To this end, Aldrich offers the
analogy between persons and works of art as a means of demystifying the ontology of
art. Aldrich exploits the analogy between persons and works of art in order to alert us to
the fact that a satisfactory account of expressive attribution must give some attention to
those metaphysical issues that arise in understanding the expressive nature of persons. I
shall say more about this analogy, and the use to which it is put, in the next chapter.
In the previous section, I demonstrated how the claim that observation and
prehension amount to mutually exclusive modes of perception might be thought to
conflict with the commonsense claim that aesthetic perception is an 'impressionistic' way
of looking. The fact that Aldrich's views are in conflict with commonsense might make
many hesitate to adopt Aldrich's views. However, Aldrich himself probably would not
be distressed to learn that his views were an affront to commonsense. The analysis of
holophrastic perception contained in "Picture Space" suggests that Aldrich believes that
commonsense thinking is by its very nature confused. That is to say, Aldrich believes
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that people are prone to confuse important metaphysical distinctions both when they
perceive and when they describe the things they perceive. Aldrich devotes considerable
space in the paper '"Expresses' and 'Expressive'" to explicating the logic of the
preposition "in" as it applies to pictorial perception and contrasts with the "in" of physical
inclusion,61 with a view to demonstrating some of the important distinctions that
philosophers 'fudge' in their unthinking use of this humble preposition. Aldrich would
probably believe that, in cases where the views of commonsense were found to conflict
with theory, commonsense should give way before metaphysically enlightened theory.
Given the strongly metaphysical nature of Aldrich's account of aesthetic perception,
and the considerable metaphysical machinery which underpins that account, it is natural
to wonder whether Aldrich might be able to provide some sort of metaphysical argument
in favour of treating observation and prehension as mutually exclusive modes of
perception. Aldrich apparently offers such a metaphysical argument for his view when he
insists that we will struggle to make sense of the various logical and metaphysical
categories that we use unless we realize that these logical differences are grounded in
metaphysical differences which are grounded in turn in distinctive ways of looking at
things. Our logical, metaphysical and perceptual categories act to reinforce one another in
a symbiotic relationship which the notion of categorial aspection is intended to capture.
Thus, it is Aldrich's contention that an aesthetic use of terms presupposes an aesthetic
way of looking at the things thus articulated,62 whilst our physical-object language
presupposes a way of visually realizing things as physial objects. It is only through
realizing that our words apply in virtue of different ways of looking at things that we can
hope to avoid certain category mistakes. To illustrate the point, consider Sibley's
suggestion thata-terms lack governing conditions. Aldrich would agree with Sibley that
no set of na-descriptions ever entails an a-description, on the grounds that such an
entailment involves a category mistake, one which can be avoided by realizing that na-
descriptions and a-descriptions apply to the same object in virtue of metaphysically
distinctive ways of looking. Even in those cases where the same term does double duty,
61 "'Expresses' and 'Expressive'", p.206-207.
62 Philosophy ofArt, p.35.
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applying to the same object both as na-term and as a-term, there can be no valid inference
between the aesthetic and nonaesthetic uses of the term. The solidity belonging to an
apple-depiction by Cezanne relies in no way upon the solidity of those physical materials
Cezanne employs in his composition. To describe the solidity of the canvas, the pigments
used or the apple depicted, reflects a physical-object awareness of items located in a
physical space, an awareness of "end-to-end coincidences of rigid units of measure
structuring the field and thus determining distance intervals and volumes". By contrast,
the solidity of the apple-as-depicted is a structural quality of the aesthetic composition as
prehended in an aesthetic space defined by colour relationships; involving an awareness
of, amongst other things, what protrudes and what recesses in the colour arrangement.63
These examples serve to demonstrate Aldrich's belief that aesthetic discourse conceals a
variety of logical and metaphysical distinctions grounded in distinctive ways of looking at
things.
Aldrich's opponent might respond to what he perceives to be Aldrich's metaphysical
agenda in one of two ways. In the first place, the opponent might treat Aldrich's
argument here as a piece of metaphysical grandstanding which he can match. Thus, the
opponent who lacks Aldrich's metaphysical convictions might agree that if our ways of
perceiving are metaphysically charged in the manner that Aldrich describes, then our
perceptual, metaphysical and logical distinctions will serve to reinforce each other; yet he
might insist that the onus falls upon Aldrich to provide some evidence for the existence of
these metaphysically charged ways of perceiving. Aldrich cannot use the notion that ways
of perceiving generate metaphysical categories to support his claim that there exists a
special form of aesthetic perception that is utterly distinct from ordinary perception, for
the reason that the former claim is as much in dispute as the latter. The opponent might
further contend that far from using the notion of distinctive ways of seeing to explain
those category-mistakes which are already in existence, Aldrich manages to generate a
whole raft of new category mistakes when he introduces his perceptual distinction. This
is because, for someone who refuses to countenance the existence of metaphysically
63 "Picture Space", p.347; '"Expresses'and'Expressive'", p.212; Philosophy ofArt, p.86.
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charged ways of looking, the claim that na-descriptions entail a-descriptions might count
as a false claim, but it would not count as a category mistake. In effect, Aldrich's
opponent would be pointing out that Aldrich is describing the understanding that comes
with a certain type of metaphysical conviction; but that simply laying out the nature of that
understanding - as Aldrich has done here - does not provide any evidence in favour of the
underlying conviction.
Alternatively, Aldrich's opponent might be willing to embrace some part of Aldrich's
metaphysical agenda. That is to say, he might be willing to take seriously the suggestion
that there exists some distinction at the level of perception corresponding with each
significant metaphysical distinction that we make. For the possibility that there might
exist metaphysically distinctive ways of looking at things grounding our metaphysical
distinctions carries with it the appealing notion that there is nothing arbitrary about the
number and type of metaphysical categories we happen to operate with. The fact we
happen to have precisely these metaphysical categories and no others reflects the fact that
our metaphysical categories are generated by the different sorts of bodily, especially
perceptual, encounter we have with the world. Let us assume therefore that Aldrich's
opponent is willing to go along with the proposal that the distinction we make in language
between the painting qua physical object and painting qua work of art requires a
corresponding distinction at the level of perception. Has the opponent thereby conceded
the notion that I cannot simultaneously view a painting in an aesthetic and a nonaesthetic
way? Clearly not. For all that Aldrich has succeeded in showing is that we have a
metaphysical difference in categories (painting qua canvas, painting qua work of art) that
requires a perceptual difference to bring it about. He has not demonstrated that the
metaphysical difference in question requires a perceptual incompatibility to bring it
about.64 The fact that a painting is metaphysically different viewed as a canvas or a work
of art does not entail that I cannot simultaneously perceive the object under both
categories. Thus, what at first bears the appearance of a piece of elegant metaphysical
64 As Richard Wollheim points out in "Reflections on Art and Illusion", in On Art and the Mind
(London: Allen Lane, 1973), p.280, the fact that two interpretations are (metaphysically) different does
not entail that these must be (metaphysically) incompatible.
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economy on Aldrich's part, an attempt to account for the groundedness of our
metaphysical categories, proves on examination to be a piece of metaphysical
extravagance. For Aldrich is here making greater metaphysical demands upon his reader
than Aldrich's own agenda requires. It follows that Aldrich has given us no metaphysical
reasons for supposing that observation and prehension operate to the exclusion of one
another. I conclude that Aldrich's metaphysical argument for the exclusivity of operation
of his two modes of perception fails.
Having humoured Aldrich this far in the argument, the opponent might then retrace
his steps, by wondering whether Aldrich really wishes to assert that we will find a
distinction in modes of perception underlying each significant metaphysical distinction
that we make. To give Aldrich credit, Aldrich is willing to assert just that in the case of
that other metaphysical distinction which interests him, the distinction between the human
being as the subject of moral judgement and the human body as the subject of medical
research. Aldrich claims that detecting the hidden sadness of another human being
involves "a kind of (Ur)-prehension, since it involves looking at something to see what is
"in" it, isomorphic with perception in the aesthetic case, but reports of which have no
special aesthetic significance on the ground level of primary perception." In much the
same way that observation and prehension involve mutually exclusive perceptual
achievements, so too observing a human body and (Ur)-prehending it involve mutually
exclusive achievements, with John's body disappearing from view as long as it functions
as a point of view upon John the person. Aldrich even goes so far as stating that where
there is a meeting of minds, the bodies involved are not primarily in view but only
"shadow" the encounter as objets manques.65
At this point, Aldrich's opponent might be forgiven for supposing that it is the sheer
momentum of that two-way analogy Aldrich draws between persons and works of art
which leads Aldrich to suppose that whatever might be found to be a feature of the
aesthetic case will also feature in the personal case. Thus, if the work of art as something
animated by representational aspects can be realized only in a special act of perception,
65 '"Expresses' and 'Expressive'", pp.215,209.
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then so too the person as a body animated by a mind must require some analogue of
prehension for its realization. Unfortunately for Aldrich, the analogy between prehension
and Ur-prehension is less than perfect, since it is difficult to see how Ur-prehension and
observation could represent mutually exclusive modes of perception after the manner of
observation and prehension. It might be true to say that our ability to perceive the work
of art presupposes that we have left certain physical object determinations far behind.
For instance, the heaviness of a piece of sculpture depends upon the bulky look of the
thing rather than its physical weight, so that a papier mache Epstein could be heavier,
aesthetically speaking, than a bronze statuette of the same dimensions. However, a large
part of our talk concerning persons only makes sense if we keep both the person and her
physical body determinations simultaneously in view. This is because the bodily states of
a person are often partly constitutive of her emotional states. Behaviour signifying
embarrassment - blushing, awkward shifts in posture, restlessness - is not just something
we look through to see the embarrassment underneath, but itself constitutes part of what
we attribute to the person when we say she is embarrassed. To adopt the terminology
preferred by Aldrich, when we perceive someone else's embarrassment, her bodily
disposition both functions as a point of view upon her underlying affective states, and
itself remains very much a thing in view. It would seem therefore that the distinction
between a person and her body does not and cannot require the existence of special ways
of perceptually realizing the two. Having admitted one metaphysical distinction which
carries no particular perceptual implications, the notion that every metaphysically charged
way of speaking is grounded in a metaphysically charged way of looking would appear
to be false. The onus then falls upon Aldrich to explain why the particular metaphysical
distinction which interests him, the distinction between the canvas and the depiction, can
only be realized by exercising distinct modes of perception.
If Aldrich allows himself to be carried away by the momentum of his own analogy
on this point, Aldrich is also capable of making selective use of that analogy when it
suits his purposes to do so. The reader will recall that Aldrich describes two different
ways in which a human body functions as a 'point of view'. A person's own body may
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function as her point of view upon the world; and others may use her body as a point of
view upon the owner-occupier.66 In the first case, to the extent that the person's own
body acts as an extension of the perceptual apparatus, it functions as nothing more than a
framing device, and ceases to be a thing in view. In the second case, the body appears as
one item amongst others in the perceptual field and to this extent remains very much a
thing in view. Following through the consequences of this analogy in the aesthetic case
suggests the existence of two different ways in which a work of art might function as a
point of view. Parallelling the case where my own body functions as my point of view
upon the world, to say that a picture functions as a point of view is to say that I cease to
regard the picture as one item among many in my perceptual field and choose instead to
treat the picture as the sole object of my attention, allowing the boundaries of the picture
to define the boundaries of my perceptual field as I look into the picture and its content.
Parallelling the way in which the body functions for others as a point of view upon the
moral subject, I see the canvas as the image of its pictured content, with the canvas itself
occupying only a portion of my perceptual field. In allowing this one portion of my
perceptual field to present a pictorial content, I do not lose sight of the fact that what I am
looking at is just a picture, and the picture remains one item among many in view.
Aldrich of course chooses to overlook the second of these possibilities when he suggests
that a picture qua physical object (canvas) functions as a point of view upon the work of
art within, and in doing so, overlooks that part of his analogy between persons and
works of art which might be used to demonstrate that I can simultaneously be aware of a
picture as both canvas and as work of art. That is to say, Aldrich rejects the possibility
that a picture may both become animated by representational aspects and sit squarely as a
flat canvas in my perceptual field. Aldrich chooses instead to think of the canvas
functioning as some sort of perceptual framing device. Now it is true to say that some
sort of visual transformation takes place when I allow the picture to become the lone
occupant of my visual field. If you like, there is a shift in the way I look at the picture.
However, this visual transformation is adequately described as a shift of focus within a
66 "'Pictures and Persons - An Analogy", p.602; '"Expresses' and 'Expressive'", p.209.
154
single mode of perception; it does not constitute a shift from one mode of perception to
another. Thus, careful analysis of the analogy Aldrich develops between persons and
works of art demonstrates that whilst Aldrich uses that analogy to support his contention
that a work of art cannot simultaneously be seen as picture and as physical object, Aldrich
might have used the same analogy to yield a very different conclusion.
The notion that a work of art qua physical object functions as a 'point of view' upon
the expressive and representational properties attributed to the work represents an attempt
upon Aldrich's part to capture the fact that the properties attributed to an object in the
course of perception are not always identical with the properties thought to belong to that
object materially speaking. There is a real distinction to be made here between the object
ofperception, the object towards which the act of perception is directed; and the
perceptual object, the notion of the same object that is generated in the course of
perception. One cannot help thinking that Aldrich would be able to do away altogether
with his original distinction between two modes of perception, and with the notion of a
work of art functioning as a point of view upon its representational and expressive
properties, if he were willing to countenance some simple distinction along these lines.
By the latest version of his theory, it does appear that Aldrich's original distinction
between two distinct modes of perception incompatible in their operation has sifted to a
distinction between a way of experiencing objects that is primarily perceptual, and a way
of experiencing objects that is in part perceptual, part conceptual. For at this point,
Aldrich tells us that "appearances are irrelevant to anything qua physical object." That is
to say, "a physical object description is concerned with what the thing is 'in itself - an
object of conception, not of perception." Realizing a material thing as a physical object
involves dislodging it from its logical place in the primary perceptual field, and making its
perceptible features less and less relevant to the account of it.67
67 "'Expresses' and 'Expressive'", pp.209-210,216.
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In summary, Aldrich believes we may perceptually realize the world in two different
ways which go hand in hand with certain metaphysical and logical distinctions. The
example which influences his distinction is one of seeing a canvas qua physical object
and qua work of art. Here I have outlined the metaphysical assumptions underlying
Aldrich's proposal, and looked for any evidence Aldrich might be able to offer in support
of his theory. I made some concession to Aldrich's proposal when I pointed out that,
viewed as an account of representational perception, his theory is not as counterintuitive
as anyone superficially acquainted with Wollheim's theory of representational perception
might think. At the end of the day, we can grant Aldrich's point that there is a real
metaphysical separation to be made between the picture viewed as a physical object and
the picture viewed as a work of art, whilst denying that these different metaphysical
realizations represent perceptual as opposed to conceptual realizations. This view of the
matter is supported by the fact that, in the late version of his theory, Aldrich apparently
modifies his original distinction between ways of perceiving into a distinction between an
acquaintance with objects that is purely perceptual, and an acquaintance that is in part
conceptual. Given the fact that Aldrich's views are so much at odds with commonsense, I
shall take the liberty of rejecting his suggestion that we cannot simultaneously perceive
the aesthetic and nonaesthetic character of things, and accept the commonsense opinion




This chapter focuses upon one distinctive class of aesthetic attributions: expressive
attributions, the class of (c) category attributions identified in Chapter One. The
commonplace practice of borrowing the language of human affective and emotional life to
describe works of art and natural phenomena raises a number of philosophical questions.
What do we mean when we call a work of art 'sad'? How is the practice of using
anthropomorphic predicates to describe works of art related to human emotional life? Do
anthromorphic predicates apply to parts of the natural world for much the same reasons
they apply to works of art, or do the reasons underlying the attributions differ between
the two cases? Is a melancholy landscape more like a melancholy person, or a melancholy
work of art?
Because my immediate goal in this chapter and the next will be to develop a theory of
aesthetic perception, I shall focus my discussion of expressive attribution around the
notion of expressive perception. This means that I shall be assessing theories of
expression in art purporting to give some insight into the nature of expressive perception.
In particular, I shall be looking to characterize the concept of physiognomic perception, a
form of expressive perception which we train upon works of art and inanimate objects
alike. I am aware that this focus upon the topic of artistic expression represents
something of a departure from the way in which philosophers tend to discuss the issue,
and for this reason, I use Section I to outline something which I call the New Theory of
expression in art, a theory which I believe has tended to set the agenda for current
philosophical discussions of expression. I also discuss two interesting lines of objection
to this theory developed by Guy Sircello and Virgil Aldrich. Aldrich's critique of the
New Theory draws heavily upon the rather elaborate metaphysical machinery
underpinning his account of prehensive perception. In the previous chapter, I gave
reasons for doubting whether that mode of aesthetic perception Aldrich dubs 'prehension'
provides any particular insight into the nature of pictorial representation. Aldrich does not
explain why I interpret a set of ink marks upon a canvas as the pictorial appearance of
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something else, he merely asserts that I do so; and he spends more time answering the
question why I don't take what I see for a mere canvas. The reader who has patiently
endured the discussion of Aldrich's views in the last chapter will no doubt be wondering
why I have chosen to devote so much attention and space to what I believe to be a
patently false view. That patience will now be rewarded as I demonstrate how Aldrich
puts his metaphysical machinery to use in his attack upon the New Theory.
Section II begins the discussion of expressive perception by assessing Richard
Wollheim's theory of expression in art, demonstrating those affinities which Wollheim
strives to create between his theory of artistic expression and his theory of representation
in art. Our discussion of the lattter in the previous chapter serves to provide some
background for this critique. Section III introduces the concept of physiognomic
perception, distinguishing a wide and a narrow use of the term. Here I demonstrate how
Stephen Davies presumes a narrow understanding of the concept in his theory of musical
expression. Sections IV and V respectively examine two theories based in psychology
attempting to account for the range of phenomena incorporated under the wider notion of
physiognomic perception: the Empathy theory, and Rudolf Arnheim's version of the
Gestalt theory of expression. I close the chapter by suggesting reasons why we might
prefer Arnheim's broadly-based approach to physiognomic perception to the narrower
concept implied in Stephen Davies work on musical expression.
I
It would be true to say that, for the last half century or so, theorizing about the nature
of expression in art has been much under the influence of what, for want of a better title,
I shall call the New Theory of expression.1 This is an unfortunate name in view of the
1 Proponents of the New Theory include Monroe C.Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy
of Criticism, 2nd ed. (Indiannapolis, Cambridge: Hackett, 1981), pp.331-332; O.K.Bouswma, 'The
Expression Theory of Art", in Philosophical Analysis, ed. Max Black (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1950), pp.75-101; John Hospers, "Art as Expression", in Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy,
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fact that the theory is no longer new. However, I have christened it the "New Theory" to
reflect the fact that, at the time of its inception, the theory marked a major departure from
more traditional discussions of expression in art such as those offered by Tolstoy, Croce
and Collingwood. The New Theory is less a theory than it is a proposal for realigning the
interface between the concepts of 'expression' and 'art' in a manner designed to bring
about the destruction of "that hopeless theory that works of art are the exudates of the
soul."2 The New Theorists detected two false assumptions underlying traditional
discussions of expression in art. The first of these was the assumption that "expression"
and all its cognate forms must display the same logical behaviour in every context of use.
Because "express' is a transitive verb directing attention to an expresser and expressan-
dum, traditional discussions of expression in art tended to assume that the existence of
expressive qualities in works of art implied a prior act of expression,3 and some reference
to an emotion expressed. In the second place, the fact that "expression" is one of those
terms that can refer both to a process and to the product resulting from that process4
tempted traditional theories of expression into what Haig Khatchadourian called the
'Genetic fallacy',5 the false assumption that the product of a given activity possesses
properties belonging to the activity generating that product, and that therefore, features
belonging to the process of artistic creation must also belong to the product issuing from
that process. In light of these two false assumptions, traditional discussions of
expression became sidetracked into speculations concerning the relationship between the
work of art and the emotional history of the artist; issues irrelevant to answering the
question, "what is a work of art expressive ofT',(' The New Theorists suggested that
statements attributing expressive properties to works of art should be construed as
statements concerning the works themselves rather than statements concerning the
ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1967), Vol.1,46-48; Alan Tormey, The Concept of
Expression: A Study in Philosophical Psychology and Aesthetics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1971).
2 Arthur C.Danto, "Introduction" to Alan Tormey, The Concept ofExpression, p.xii.
3 Alan Tormey, The Concept ofExpression, p. 104.
4 John Hospers, "Art as Expression", p.46;




relationship between the work of art and the artist.7 They supported this suggestion by
pointing to a commonplace use of "expression" which makes no inference to emotion, as
when we speak of the "sad expression" on the face of a beagle.8 Whereas an expression
of sadness cannot occur without an accompanying episode of sadness, sad expressions
may occur in the absence of particular episodes of felt sadness. The grammatical
construction "o-expression" displays a very different logical behaviour to that transitive
use of "express" displayed in the construction "expression of o," functioning as an
unbreakable one-place predicate and in this respect, mimicing the logical behaviour of
such simple property attributions as "The rose is red". Like "The rose is red", talk of a o-
expression is talk of certain observable features of a situation.9 In light of this use of
"expression," the New Theorists proposed that expressive attributions should be
analysed as statements concerning the properties perceptibly present in a work of art. In
the words of Beardsley,
When we say the rose is red, we have only one thing, namely the rose, and we
describe its quality; in exactly the same way when we say the music is joyous,
we have only one thing, namely the music, and we describe its quality. There is
no need for the term "express".10
For the New Theorists, all the interesting questions regarding expression in art become
questions of expressive attribution. "It is no longer necessary to say that the work of art
is expressive of feeling qualities; it is only necessary to say that it has them - that it is sad
or embodies sadness as a property."11 Likewise, '"The music is joyous' is plain and can
be defended. 'The music expresses joy' adds nothing except unnecessary and
unanswerable questions."12
The New Theory replaces the notion that a work of art is the product of an act of
expression, thereby coming to display the expressive character of the artist's action, with
7 Tormey, p. 106.
8 Tormey, p.39.
9 Tormey, p.40.
10 Monroe C.Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, pp.331 -332.
11 Hospers, "Art as Expression", pp.47-48.
12 Beardsley, p.331.
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the notion that a work of art is an expressive object: an object possessing 'human' or
'feeling' qualities that are explicable in terms of what Beardsley calls the 'local' and
'subregional' qualities of the work. According to the New Theory, qua expressive
objects, works of art are no different to those parts of nature we anthropomorphise. Just
as a hill may be 'austere' in virtue of its colour, its contours, or its lack of vegetation, so
too a painting may be 'austere' in virtue of visual features of its design, features
belonging to its subject-matter, or features belonging to both the design and subject-
matter viewed overall.
In brief, what I have called the New Theory of expression may be identified with the
following four recommendations:
(1) To treat the problem of expression in art as one concerning the properties
works of art possess, rather than the relationship between works of art and
human emotional states.
(2) To analyse "express" and its cognates along the model of "o-expression"
rather than "expression of o", treating this as a logically complete expression,
an unbreakable one-place predicate. Thus, "The music is sad" more closely
resembles "The rose is red" than it resembles "John is sad".
(3) To understand the relationship between a work of art and what it expresses
on the model of a thing and the properties it possesses, rather than on the model
of a person and her emotional states.
(4) To treat the expressiveness of works of art as of the same order as the
expressiveness of natural phenomena rather than the expressiveness of
persons. Thus, a work of art or a part of nature possesses expressive qualities
in virtue of the other characteristics it possesses; and we can point to those
other characteristics in justifying a particular expressive predication.
Writing in 1973, Guy Sircello dubbed the New Theory the "Canonical Position" on
the grounds that the theory had been 'canonized' by its inclusion in the Encyclopedia of
Philosophy.13 The intervening years have lent this tongue-in-cheek christening an air of
prophecy. The New Theory has become the Canonical Position, and looks set to
determine the agenda for discussions of artistic expression for the foreseeable future.
13 Guy Sircello, Mind and Art: An Essay on the Varieties ofExpression (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1973), p.
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Thus, in what has proved to be the most influential theory of musical expression in recent
decades,14 Peter Kivy follows the New Theorists' recommendation that the phrase "sad
music" should be analysed on the model of the phrase "the music is a sad expression"
rather than "the music is an expression of sadness",15 and for this reason, he compares
our ability to recognize emotional qualities in music with our ability to recognize the
sadness in the face of a St Bernard dog. Kivy claims that the sadness of a perceptual
object is as immediately perceived a quality as is its colour or shape;16 that music
'contains' emotions in the sense of possessing them as perceptual properties the way
objects possess (say) colours.17 At the centre of Kivy's theory of musical expression is
a 'contour' model of musical expressiveness, enabling Kivy to explain the
expressiveness of music by the congruence of musical 'contour' with the structure of
expressive features and behaviour in human beings. Our experience of sad music is of a
heard resemblance between the structure of the musical sound and the characteristic
features of human emotional behaviour. According to Kivy, we hear a musical line as a
musical resemblance of the gesture and carriage appropriate to the expression of our
sadness, constituting a 'sound map' of the human body under the influence of emotion.18
It would be almost impossible to overestimate the influence Kivy's theory has exerted
upon contemporary discussions of expression in music.
Despite the undoubted success of the New Theory in shaping the current agenda for
discussions of expression in art, the view has not been greeted with universal jubilation.
Here I shall concentrate upon two interesting lines of criticism developed against the view
by Guy Sircello and Virgil Aldrich. Sircello argues that, whilst there are some
anthropomorphic or expressive descriptions of works of art amenable to the New
theorist's analysis, there are ways in which works of art are deemed to be expressive that
14 Kivy, Peter, The Corded Shell (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980). Reprinted
in Sound Sentiment: An Essay on the Musical Emotions (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1989).
15 Sound Sentiment, p. 12.
16 Sound Sentiment, p. 168.
17 Peter Kivy, "What was Hanslick Denying?", Journal ofMusicology, 8 (1990), 3-18; p.5.
18 Sound Sentiment, pp.50, 77, 53.
162
the New theorist cannot cope with.19 To illustrate his thesis that there are descriptions of
expressiveness in art which remain untouched by the New Theorist's analyses, Sircello
draws attention to descriptions of the following kind:
Poussin's The Rape of the Sabine Women is calm and aloof.
Breughel's Wedding Dance in the Open Air is an ironic painting.
Rembrandt's Self-Portrait of 1660 is an unflinching depiction of the descent
into old age.
John Cage's VariationsII is impersonal and detached.
Sircello points out that, contrary to what the New Theorist would have us believe, it is
not possible to analyse the expressive characteristics contained in these descriptions into
statements concerning the subject-matter of the work in question, or statements regarding
the formal properties of the work, or statements concerning both the formal properties
and subject-matter viewed overall. Cage's work possesses no subject-matter. What is
more, we feel that the 'anthropomorphic qualities' of Cage's music depend upon the fact
that the sounds presented are completely lacking in human properties. Sircello analyses
the statement that Cage's music is impersonal and detached as amounting to the claim that
Cage offers a set ofnoise-like sounds in a totally uninvolved, detached, impersonal way.
Arguing along similar lines, Sircello points out that the qualities of calm and aloofness
found in Poussin's painting owe nothing to the depicted subject-matter, for what Poussin
depicts is a scene of violence. Nor could it be said that there is a calm and aloof spectator
depicted in the scene, or that the compositional properties of the visual design amounted
to a 'calm' and 'aloof painting. To say that Poussin's painting is calm and aloof is to say
that Poussin calmly observes the scene and paints it in an aloof detached way.
Likewise, Breughel's painting is superficially happy and light-hearted to the extent that it
depicts a happy occasion. The irony of the painting lies in the fact that the painter
'observes' or depicts the happy scene in an ironic way, and he does so by depicting
peasants with bland, stupid, brutal-looking faces. And in a similar fashion to the other
19 Guy Sircello, "Perceptual Acts and Pictorial Art: A Defence of the Expression Theory", JP, 62
(1965), 669-677, p.669; Mind and Art, p.23.
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cases discussed here, Sircello recommends that we make best sense of the statement that
Rembrandt's self-portrait is an unflinching depiction of the descent into old age when we
analyse this as the claim that the artist scrutinizes in an unflinching way the effects of
aging in the face ofa man .20
Examples such as these lead Sircello to believe that sometimes, anthropomorphic
predicates apply to a work of art in virtue of something the artist has done in the work.21
Sircello dubs the acts described in the phrases italicized here 'artistic acts'. Although
Sircello claim that he does not want the notion of an 'artistic act' to carry any
metaphysical import,22 nonetheless he insists that these are truly acts of artists, things
artists have done. The New Theorist cannot say that talk of artistic acts describes the artist
and not the work of art, for the fact of the matter is that these describe both in a single
breath. Artistic acts are peculiar to the extent that descriptions of these at once and
necessarily describe the artworks themselves.23 Descriptions of artistic acts exploit the
fact that the same adjective used to describe the work of art may be applied adverbially to
the activity undertaken by the artist in bringing that work of art about. When we say that
The Rape of the Sabine Women is calm and aloof we have in the same breath ascribed to
the artist a calm and aloof manner of acting in the production of this depiction. Sircello
sees a parallel here with the way in which we can say, either that Sally has a sad smile, or
that Sally is smiling sadly, a grammatical shift made possible owing to the fact that,
where human gestures are concerned, the act is inseparable from the thing brought about
by that action.24 If Sally is smiling, then necessarily, she has a smile upon her face; and
if there is a frown upon her face, then necessarily, she is frowning. That is to say,
'smile' and 'smiling' constitute two grammatically different ways of referring to a single
action. Sircello uses the grammatical parallels he thinks he finds between smile-smiling,
pout-pouting, portrayal-portraying, view-viewing, etc. to argue that artistic acts are
20 Mind and Art, pp.20, 23; "Perceptual Acts and Pictorial Art", p.673.
21 Mind and Art, p. 26.
22 Mind and Art, p.26. In the earlier account in "Perceptual Acts and Pictorial Art: A Defence of the
Expression Theory", Sircello describes these as 'virtual acts' rather than acts of the artist carrying no
metaphysical import.
23 Mind and Art, p. 28.
24 Mind and Art, pp.28, 30.
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remarkably like common facial, vocal, and gestural expressions,25 and therefore
expressive in much the same way as these. In Sircello's reckoning, the work of art is
expressive because it functions in much the same way as the artist's 'grimace'.
The New Theorists' most obvious line of defence against Sircello's attack would be
to demonstrate that statements incorporating Sircello's so-called artistic acts can be
reduced to statements concerning the two other types of expressiveness which The New
Theorist allows. That is to say, the New Theorist could attempt to show that those
descriptions Sircello employs to qualify both artist and work of art can be analysed as
statements concerning either features belonging to the subject matter of the work, features
belonging to its formal qualities, or features belonging to both subject-matter and formal
design viewed as a whole. Jenefer Robinson attempts to do just that.26 In line with her
professed intention, Robinson contends that Breughel's Wedding Dance is one of those
cases where the artist 'borrows' the expressiveness of nature rather than 'creating' the
expressive qualities of his work by means of artistic acts. The Wedding Dance is ironic,
not because Breughel portrayed the scene in an ironic way, but because he has accurately
recorded an ironic scene. Breughel has recorded a scene that would be seen as ironic by a
distinterested observer because it would be seen to have ironic features. These features
include the fact that the peasants are brutal-looking, the dance is heavy, and the other
wedding accoutrements are innocent-looking and joyful. The painting is ironic because it
depicts a scene which, were it to exist in real life, would be seen as ironic.27
Robinson picks a most unfortunate example to illustrate her thesis when she attempts
to explain away the irony of Breughel's creation in terms of the ironic nature of the
depicted subject-matter. Typically, there are two ways in which we speak of irony: irony
of statement, and dramatic irony, exploiting irony of situation. The person who speaks
ironically intends his interlocutor to search for an utterance-meaning that diverges from
the surface meaning of his statement.28 Treating Breughel's painting as an ironic visual
25 Mind and Art, p.35.
26 "The Eliminability of Artistic Acts."JAAC, 36 (1977), 81-89.
27 "The Eliminability of Artistic Acts", pp.83-84
28 For an account of irony as a figure of speech, see Robert J. Fogelin, Figuratively Speaking (New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 13ff.
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'statement' brings us back to talk of artistic acts, and for this reason, Robinson considers
the notion that the painting depicts an ironical situation. I would dispute Robinson's
suggestion that a situation is ironic because it possesses ironical features. The features of
a situation only become ironical when there is a perceived incongruence between these
features and some human expectation. In this case, the perceived incongruity arises from
the fact that the features belonging to the depicted scene - brutal-faced peasants engaged
in a heavy dance - are incongruous with the expectation aroused by the title of the picture
that this is a happy and light-hearted occasion. That is to say, the only way to make sense
of the statement that Wedding Dance in the Open Air is ironic is to treat the act of
producing a picture with that title and those features as an expressive act on the part of the
artist, the making of an ironic statement.
Robinson admits that in the case of Poussin's Rape, the 'aloofness' in question
cannot be analysed away by appealing to the aloofness of the scene depicted. For this
reason, Robinson appeals to the notion that the feature of aloofness attributable to the
painting consists in the aloof point of view from which it is portrayed. Realizing that this
comes dangerously close to talk of an artistic act, and after much struggling on her part to
make sense of the notion that a work of art contains an aloof point of view not attributable
to the artist, Robinson finally hits upon the formulation that Poussin's painting is aloof
because it represents the rape scene as if it were being viewed in an aloof manner. Putting
the same point another way, Poussin represents the Sabine rape as seen through the eyes
of an aloof observer. If anyone were to view the scene of the Sabine rape in the way
Poussin represents it, he or she would be viewing it in an aloof way. Robinson is now
able to comfort herself that she has analysed the "somewhat mysterious" notion of
representing something from an aloof point of view in terms of the perhaps slightly less
mysterious notion of seeing something from the standpoint of a particular psychological
attitude. "What Poussin gives us is a view of the Sabine rape by someone who ignores
the violence and cruelty, the frenzied movement, the anguish of the victims and the
brutality of the attackers. Instead this hypothetical observer has seen the rape as a study
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in form, in which the figures are merely graceful constituents of a harmonious
composition.,r29
Robinson's paper, "The Eliminability of Artistic Acts", might with equal justice have
been titled "The Ineliminability of Artistic Acts", since Robinson's long-winded and
convoluted analyses do nothing to persuade that the art critic can do without descriptions
employing artistic acts. If nothing else, Robinson manages to demonstrate the economy
of Sircello's talk of artistic acts, the fact that artistic acts provide a succinct and elegant
way of articulating what might otherwise only be indicated at rather tedious length.
Although Robinson concedes that explanations of expressive characteristics in terms of
artistic acts are not impossible, it is her professed intention to show that such
explanations could be replaced with something simpler.30 If the length of her analyses is
anything to go by, the only simplicity Robinson could have in mind is the metaphysical
simplification that comes with eliminating 'artistic acts' from our ontology. I doubt that
Robinson's analyses do represent a greater metaphysical economy than Sircello's, since
her analysis of the Rape replaces one metaphysically mysterious entity, a virtual act
attributed to the artist, with another mysterious entity, the hypothetical observer or
hypothetical viewpoint.
The very fact that Robinson attempts to explain away descriptions containing artistic
acts demonstrates, I believe, that she neither comprehends the nature of an 'artistic act',
nor does she understand precisely what motivated Sircello to draw attention to these in
the first place. To understand the nature of artistic acts, it is important to note that talk of
artistic acts underlying some of our anthropomorphic descriptions of works of art does
not constitute a return to the bad old days of the traditional expression theories. This is
because artistic acts are known to be true, regardless of how much or how little we know
about the creator of a work of art.31 Descriptions employing artistic acts are descriptions
of the work of art which cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed by biographical facts
concerning the artist himself. Thus, were we to learn that one of Poussin's nearest and
29 "The Eliminability of Artistic Acts", p.85-86.
30 "The Eliminability of Artistic Acts", p.83.
31 Mind and Art, p. 26.
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dearest had been the victim of an indecent assault prior to the composition of Poussin's
picture, this might lead us to believe that Poussin produced his picture with a view to
exposing the horrors of rape. In light of this information, we might come to see the act of
publicly displaying the work as a piece of anti-rape propaganda on Poussin's part; and
we would be totally justified in believing that the historical artist regarded the subject of
the picture in anything but a calm and aloof fashion. Nevertheless, this piece of
information and this assumption would not remove the truth of the claim that, in saying
that the painting is calm and aloof, we are saying that Poussin observes and depicts his
subject-matter in a calm and aloof fashion.
To explain why Sircello's 'artistic acts' cannot be disconfirmed by historical
knowledge concerning the artist, consider Richard Wollheim's discussion of two
different ways in which we might be tempted to infer between the trace left behind by the
artist, and the artist's action in bringing that trace about.32 Wollheim considers the view
which says that inferences from the trace to the activity bringing it about are more
securely grounded than any inferences running in the opposite direction from the artist's
activity to the trace. According to this view, whilst the mark left by a confident attack
upon a canvas might not itself be expressive of confidence, if a certain grey mark left on
the canvas is expressive of gloom, then it cannot be doubted that the activity of setting
that mark down is expressive of gloom. Wollheim notes:
The acceptability of thinking of the activity as derivatively expressive, i.e. as
having an expressiveness that derives from its trace, is simply a reflection of
the fact that the activity has been described in a way that is itself derivative: for
the activity has been described, it will be observed, by reference to the trace in
which it issues. For the activity merits the description "setting a grey mark on
the canvas," solely in so far as on its completion there is a grey mark on the
canvas. It is, we might say, only because nothing of the activity is caught or
fixed by the description except its outcome, that we can safely concede that
expressiveness passes from the outcome to the activity so described.
Wollheim brings out the difference between the two descriptions by suggesting that, in a
situation where the the canvas was totally porous, causing the paint to vanish as it was
applied, whilst it would still make sense to talk of someone "attacking the canvas with
3 2 Richard Wollheim, "On Expression and Expressionism", Revue Internationale de Philosophie, XVII,
67-70 (1964), 270-289.
168
great panache", it would never be true to describe the activity as one of "setting a grey
mark on the canvas." Wollheim continues:
Once we know what marks are set by the painter on the canvas, we are likely to
describe his activity in what might be called a transparent way: that is to say, in
a way which permits us to see straight through the gesture and focus solely on
its trace....When, however, we are as yet uncertain what the trace will be...we
have no alternative but to describe the activity in terms that are logically
independent of its outcome: that is to say, in a way that makes explicit reference
to the painter's behaviour.
Wollheim concludes that it is the existence of these two ways of describing the artist's
activity and their different conditions of appropriateness, which misleads us into
supposing that there is an asymmetrical relationship between the inferences we can make
from the gesture to the mark and from the mark to the gesture.33
In light of Wollheim's observations, it is now possible to formulate in a more
precise way the notion of an artistic act. Sircello's 'artistic acts' are ways of referring to
the activity of the artist which transparently focus upon the product of that activity. This
is why, as Sircello admits, artistic acts are not describable or even identifiable
independently of the works in which they are done.34 Artistic acts can only be
individuated by appealing to the particular objects in which they issue. Poussin's activity
in producing The Rape of the Sabine Women constitutes a calm and aloof manner of
depicting rather than a passionate and frenzied portrayal because the product of that
activity was a calm and aloof picture; and we can confirm or disconfirm the claim that The
Rape of the Sabine Women exemplifies an aloof manner of depicting simply by looking
to the nature of the painting itself. Of course, the fact that artistic acts can only be
individuated by appealing to the particular objects in which they issue, raises the question
whether we require the notion of an artistic act in the first place. After all, if the
expressive character of an artistic act is something we only discover by looking to the
expressive character of the painting produced, then we can look directly to the painting
and its character and bypass talk of artistic acts altogether. I believe that Sircello would
answer this objection as follows. The New Theorist treats the expressiveness of works of
33 "On Expression and Expressionisn", pp.281-282.
34 Mind and Art, p. 28.
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art as on a par with the expressiveness of natural objects. That is to say, the New
Theorist treats a work of art as a brute physical object which happens to possess certain
anthropomorphic characteristics. Sircello believes that to view Poussin's painting in these
terms, as an object possessing the properties of calmness and aloofness, is to fail to view
the painting with understanding. In his attitude to works of art, the New Theorist
resembles the man who sees a smile as nothing more than a configuration of the human
face. To view a smile as a facial configuration is not to view it with understanding. For to
view a human gesture with understanding is to view it as a facial expression; and we only
view this as an expression when we see the lie of the face as the product of an activity,
the activity of bringing about a particular facial configuration.35 In a similar way, to see
the expressive character of the work of art with understanding is to see it as the product
of a manner of acting.
We can now see that, when Sircello introduces the notion of an artistic act, he has a
much more important point to make than to show that there are ways of describing works
of art which resist the New Theorist's analyses. Sircello believes that the New Theorist
demonstrates a defective metaphysical understanding when she treats the expressiveness
of works of art as of the same order as the expressiveness of natural objects. The New
Theorist overlooks the fact that a work of art is, metaphysically speaking, a very different
entity to a natural feature of the environment.36 A work of art is not simply a brute
physical thing, it is an artifact, a physical object that is the product of human intentional
activity. To view it with understanding is to view it as an artifact, rather than as a piece
torn out of the natural environment. And viewing it as an artifact means that we cannot
help but interpret it, qua product, as something carrying the expressive traces of the
activity which brought it into being.
The second set of objections to the New Theory that I would like to consider here
are those presented by Aldrich in the paper '"Expresses' and 'Expressive'" . As the title
suggests, the paper constitutes an extended polemic against the New Theory of
35 Richard Wollheim, "Expression", in On Art and the Mind (London: Allen Lane, 1973), pp.80-100,
appeals in a similar way to llie notion of activity in order to bring out the difference between seeing a
gesture as a facial configuration and seeing it as an expression. See in particular pp.97ff.
3 6 Guy Sircello, Mind and Art, pp. 18-19.
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expression, a polemic drawing upon the considerable metaphysical machinery described
in the previous chapter. Aldrich finds more than Sircello did to argue with in the theory,
although like Sircello, his interests are largely metaphysical ones. Aldrich agrees with
Sircello that the New Theorist is wrong to compare works of art qua expressive objects
with such natural objects as hills, trees, and rivers. Aldrich believes that it is this
tendency, on the part of the New Theorist, to treat works of art as metaphysically
speaking on a par with natural phenomena, which leads her to to misdescribe the problem
of expression in art. The New Theorist identifies the problem of expression in art as a
problem peculiar to aesthetics, the problem of explaining away the commonplace human
practice of ascribing 'human' or 'feeling' qualities' to works of art. As Peter Kivy
formulates it, the problem of expression in music becomes "the 'special' metaphysical
difficulty (if I may so call it) of how a certain kind of object, musical sound, can possess
a certain kind of property, the garden-variety emotions, that can belong only to a very
different kind of object, namely a sentient being."37 There is some explaining to be done
because ordinarily, things which are sad feel sad; and no one seriously believes that
works of art are the sorts things to experience sadness.38 Aldrich believes that the New
Theorist defines the problem of expression in these narrow terms because she applies her
metaphysical instincts in an inconsistent fashion. The New Theorist applies a physicalist-
reductionist analysis to the concept of a work of art, then wonders how a brute physical
thing can function as the subject of expressive predication. Aldrich implies that, were she
being entirely consistent in her reductionistic instincts, the New Theorist might choose to
apply the same reductionist analysis to the notion of a human being; and she might then
come to question how a human being comes to be the subject of aesthetic predication.39
The problem, as Aldrich sees it, is that the New Theorist allows herself to be puzzled by
the expressiveness of works of art because she does not allow herself to be puzzled
sufficiently by the expressiveness of persons. For once she allowed herself to be puzzled
by the expressiveness of persons, the New Theorist would come to see that the problem
37 Sound Sentiment, p. 180.
38 Stephen Davies, "The Expression of Emotion in Music", Mind,, 89 (1980), 67-86; p.67.
39 Virgil C.Aldrich, Philosophy of Art (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962), pp.45-46.
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of expression in art is not a uniquely aesthetic problem, but part of a general metaphysical
problem of expressive predication.
Aldrich believes that the New Theorist brings a defective metaphysical understanding
to her task when she identifies the problem of expression in art as a matter of properties
which human beings may, and works of art may not, possess. Not only does Aldrich
disagree with the New Theorist's assumption that expressive predicates applied to works
of art function as simple property attributions, but he argues that expressive attributions
never designate expressive 'qualities', whether applied to persons or to works of art.
Sadness is not an expressive quality, it has no reality as a nature-in-itself in the way in
which an ordinary quality such as redness constitutes a nature-in-itself. I do not see
sadness as a property present in a sad thing in the way in which I see the redness of a red
object. The very notion of psychological predicates being denoting terms, with which one
can refer to various qualities and describe things having them, is suspect. Sadness
represents a 'state' of the person or the work of art that is expressed by the set of
elements that are in that state.What is realized in the expressans (person, work of art) has
no reality as a nature-in-itself. Rather, the expression entifies it.40
Aldrich points out that neither works of art nor human beings qua physical objects
'possess' the attributes they express, for the simple reason that psychological predicates
have no direct application to bodies at all, whether living or not.41 For Aldrich, the notion
of expression is necessarily tied up with the notion of a body functioning in a certain
way.42 It is only the physical object (human being, work of art) that has been subjected
to a special form of perceptual organization, the physical object regarded under a special
mode of perception (Ur-prehension, prehension) which becomes the proper subject of
expressive predication. In the terminology familiar from the previous chapter, it is the
physical body categorially aspecting as a human being or a work of art that functions as
expressans, expressively revealing the state it is in.
40 "'Expresses' and 'Expressive'", pp. 213-215, passim.
41 "'Expresses' and 'Expressive'", p.213.
42 "'Expresses' and 'Expressive'", p.208.
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Aldrich's proposal for a general theory of expressive predication applying to both
works of art and persons faces two serious difficulties. At the end of the previous
chapter, I threw doubt upon the notion that the difference between a human being qua
subject of moral argument and human being qua subject of medical experimentation could
be attributed to the operation of distinctive modes of perception.43 If anything, the
suggestion that there exist two modes of perception allowing us to metaphysically make
over the human person in different ways seemed even more unlikely than the suggestion
that there exist two modes of perception allowing us to contemplate the work of art in
metaphysically different ways. In raising doubts concerning the utility of the notion of
Ur-prehension, I hinted that it was Aldrich's desire to maintain his analogy between
persons and works of art, rather than the innate plausibility of the suggestion that we see
human beings under different modes of perception, which led Aldrich to propose the
existence of Ur-prehension. If I am right in claiming that it is the momentum of his
analogy which leads Aldrich to propose the existence of a form of perception (Ur-
prehension) paralleling prehension, then this raises a serious difficulty for Aldrich's
account of expression, given the fact that Aldrich is trying to ground an understanding of
the expressiveness of art upon our prior understanding of the expressiveness of persons,
and not vice versa.
Any theory of expression in art resembling that on offer from Aldrich, a theory
stressing the similarities that obtain between the expressiveness of persons and the
expressiveness of works of art, inevitably fails to do justice to whatever parallels might
exist between the expressiveness of art and nature. Whilst Aldrich does not rule out the
possibility that we can prehend aspects of nature, he does rule out the possibility of
extending the notion of prehension to explain the anthropomorphic characteristics found
in nature. Aldrich claims that natural objects function as aesthetic objects when we
prehend the 'medium of the materials' in them. Natural objects which function as
aesthetic objects 'express' their lower-order aesthetic qualities of timbre or character,
such qualities as tempo, crescendo, contour, pitch and brightness.44 However, Aldrich
43 See above, pp. 153-154.
44'"Expresses' and 'Expressive'", pp.211-212.
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apparently rules out the possibility that natural objects qua aesthetic objects 'express' the
sorts of higher-order aesthetic qualities generally designated by psychological predicates,
on the grounds no doubt that natural objects qua aesthetic objects do not 'categorially
aspect' either as persons or as works of art. If Aldrich believes that psychological
predicates do not apply to natural objects qua aesthetic objects, it follows that Aldrich's
theory of aesthetic perception rules out the possibility of finding parallels between the
expressiveness of nature and of art; a fact which inevitably limits the usefulness of his
account of expression.
II
Sircello's criticisms of the New Theory are valuable for bringing to attention a form
of expressiveness in art which the New Theorist overlooks. This having been said,
Sircello does not deny that the New Theorist identifies one of the ways in which art is
expressive when she treats the expressiveness of art as of the same order as the
expressiveness of nature. The fact that there are forms of expressiveness common to both
nature and works of art raises the possibility that there exists a form of expressive
perception that we train upon things, and that it is the exercise of our capacity for
expressive perception which grounds the emotion ascriptions we make, to persons in the
first instance, and to works of art and natural features in the second. Richard Wollheim
offers a theory of expression in art which exploits this very possibility.45 Wollheim's
theory introduces two technical terms: projection and correspondence,461 shall begin my
discussion of Wollheim's theory by explicating these.
45 Richard Wollheim, Painting as an Art (London: Thames and Hudson, 1984), pp.80-89; "Corres¬
pondence, Projective Properties, and Expression in the Arts", in The Language ofArt History, ed. Saliin
Kemal and Ivan Gaskell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.51-66. Hereafter CPPE.
The essay, which constitutes an elaboration of the account given in Painting as an Art, is reprinted in
Richard Wollheim, The Mind and its Depths (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993),
pp.144-158. See also The Thread ofLife (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp.154, 214-
215.
46 Wollheim introduces 'correspondence' as a technical term in two earlier discussions of expression.
See Art and Its Objects, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), sec. 18, p.31;
"Expression", in Art and the Mind (London: Allen Lane, 1973), pp.84-100, p.95.
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Projection describes a process in which emotions or feelings flow from us to what
we perceive.47 Wollheim gives the notion a more technical meaning when he identifies
projection as a psychological mechanism whereby the subject learns to cope with his
feelings, moods and emotions by projecting these upon his surroundings and then
emotionally reacting to his altered environment. A psychological subject will tend to
project his emotion onto a part of his environment both in cases where he wishes to rid
himself of an emotion, and in cases where he values the emotion he is experiencing and
wishes to preserve it.48 Wollheim distinguishes between a simple and a complex form of
the mechanism. Simple projection describes that form of projection characteristic of the
immature or psychotic mind. In cases of simple projection, the subject relieves himself of
an emotion that is causing him anxiety by projecting his emotion onto another figure or
some other part of his environment. Through the act of projecting his emotion, the
subject comes to believe firstly, that he no longer experiences the emotion; and secondly,
that the emotion belongs to the figure or part of the world onto which it was projected.
An individual who is melancholy may project his melancholy onto the world, thereby
coming to believe that it is the world, not himself, that is melancholy.49 Similarly, a
young man may project his hatred of a rival in love onto that rival, and in his projective
fantasy come to believe that it is his rival, not himself, who feels the hatred. In cases of
complex projection, the subject projects his own feeling of sadness upon the world. As
well as coming to believe that he is no longer sad, the subject also comes to experience
the world as of a piece with his sadness.50 Whereas in cases of simple projection, the
subject merely acquires a belief concerning the figure onto which he projects his emotion,
complex projection gives the subject a way of experiencing the external world.51 In cases
of simple projection, the subject treats the figure or part of the environment onto which he
projects his emotion as the possessor of a psychology, and experiences that figure or part
47 Painting as an Art, p.82.
48 Painting as an Art, p.84; CPPE, p.57.
49 Of course, in cases where the emotion projected is a desirable one, projection leads not to the purging
of the emotion, but to the emotion living on in a form outside of the subject. See Painting as an Art,
p.82.
50 Painting as an Art, p.82; CPPE, p.58; The Thread ofLife , pp. 154, 214.
51 Painting as an Art, p.83; CPPE, p.58.
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of the environment as possessing the property which he himself began by experiencing.
By contrast, because complex projection is more responsive to features of the
environment, the property which the subject experiences the world as having is not the
same as the property the subject originally projected. The man who was sad does not
think of the world as something possessing a psychology, the sort of thing that could be
sad or on the brink of tears. Instead, he experiences the world as being of a piece with his
sadness or as in some way corresponding with sadness. Wollheim calls the property the
individual experiences the world as possessing a projective property.52
Wollheim draws attention to the developmental nature of projection, to the way in
which the maturing mind moves from acts of simple projection to acts of complex
projection. In the early stages of development projection is a haphazard affair. Because
the subject pays no attention to the nature of the object he projects his emotion upon, his
acts of projection are not rewarded by an ability to sustain his projective fantasies for
long. As the subject matures, he begins to take account of his surroundings in his acts of
projection. Through a process of trial and error, the subject discovers that some but not
other parts of his environment will be more suited to the projection of a particular
emotion. As projection matures, the subject learns to adjust his moods and emotions in
harmony with that environment, so that projective properties start to owe something to
the features upon which they are overlaid.53 It is in this process of constant adjustment
that correspondences are born.Wollheim treats the human capacity for expressive
perception, the capacity to see the sad or melancholy character of a landscape, as an
extension of the human capacity to project emotion.
To gain further insight into Wollheim's claim that in acts of complex projection, a
sad scene is thought to correspond with, but not possess, the garden-variety emotion of
sadness, consider J.M.Howarth's account of anthropomorphic descriptions of nature.
Howarth suggests that many of the emotion ascriptions made to nature are mood
ascriptions: the sky is 'angry', the seasons 'melancholy' or 'joyful', the brook
52 CITE. p.56.
53 CPPE, pp.59-60; Painting as an Art, p.83.
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'cheerful'.54 Howarth characterizes moods as affective states that tend to colour
everything we think, do and perceive. The person experiencing a mood seeks out and
focuses upon features of her environment which form an appropriate backdrop or
atmosphere for the mood, the appropriate atmosphere being one which 'feeds' and helps
to prolong her mood.55 A change of atmosphere may be enough to dispel a mood, so that
bright sunny skies and balmy breezes might put one's depression at bay. According to
Howarth, when we apply labels such as 'gloomy', 'sombre', 'dismal', 'serene',
'tranquil', to skies, hills, countryside, lakes, rivers and forest glades, we are describing
these as the appropriate atmospheres for the corresponding human moods. A 'gloomy'
sky is thus a sky appropriate to prolong feelings of gloom. The fact that we use the same
word to designate the mood and its atmosphere reflects the way in which moods spread
to colour one's environment.56 For Howarth, to describe a scene as 'melancholy' is to
identify it as a scene forming the appropriate backdrop for a melancholy mood. To make
the same point in the language of Wollheim, a melancholy scene is a scene that
corresponds with the human emotion of melancholy.
Wollheim's theory of pictorial expression enjoys a similar structure and articulation
to his account of pictorial representation. The reader will recall from the previous chapter
how Wollheim relates the practice of pictorial representation to a basic human capacity for
seeing-in, that capacity we exercise in catching likenesses in clouds, in damp stains on
walls, and whenever we see a three-dimensional pictorial image in a two-dimensional
surface. In the words of Wollheim, seeing-in precedes representation, both logically and
historically. Seeing-in is logically prior, because there are many cases of seeing-in which
do not count as instances of pictorial representation, as when I see horsemen in the
clouds. Seeing-in precedes representation historically, because the practice of pictorial
representation arises out of and exploits this natural human capacity to see images in a
54 J.M.Howarth, "Nature's Moods", BJA, 35 (1995), 108-120, p. 113.
55 Ronald Hepburn describes how one might nurture and prolong a mood: "In my compartment I make
into one unity-of-feeling the trainwheels drumming, the lugubrious view from the window (steam and
industrial fog), and the thought of meeting so-and-so, whom I dislike, at the end of my journey. My
depression is highly particularized." See "Emotions and Emotional Qualities: Some Attempts at
Analysis", in 'Wonder' and OtherEssays (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1984), pp.75-87;
p.82.
56 "Nature's Moods", pp. 113-114.
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variety of surfaces. What distinguishes garden-variety cases of seeing-in from cases of
representational perception is that not everything that we can see in a work of art has been
represented in that work. The artist's intention imposes a standard of correctness upon
what the spectator recognizes in the work, so that what a picture is thought to represent is
determined by the intentions of the artist insofar as these have been fulfilled.57
In much the same way that the practice of artistic representation arises out of a
fundamental visual capacity, so too Wollheim suggests that the practice of artistic
expression arises out of the basic human capacity for expressive perception, a capacity
for experiencing correspondences between parts of our environment and human
emotional states. Wollheim further suggests that the capacity for expressive perception
precedes the practice of artistic representation, both logically and historically. Wollheim
further maintains the parallels with his account of pictorial representation when he claims
that there is a standard of correctness imposed upon that which we see in cases of artistic
expression, but that there is no one correct expressive way to see a stretch of
landscape.58 Against the background of these two human perceptual capacities, the
capacity for seeing-in and the capacity for expressive perception, the artist marks a
surface in such a way that others will see therein certain representational and expressive
effects. As Wollheim sees it, expressive perception differs from representational
perception only to the extent that the latter does, and the former does not, constitute a
narrowly visual capacity. The reason why our capacity for expressive perception is not a
narrowly visual capacity is, of course, because it is based in part upon a psychological
mechanism, the mechanism of projection.59
In Section III of Chapter III, I rehearsed some arguments which might be used by
someone unimpressed with Wollheim's account of representational perception. For those
persuaded of the merits of Wollheim's account of pictorial representation, the formal
similarities which Wollheim creates between that theory and his theory of pictorial
expression will no doubt lend an immediate air of plausibility to the latter. Perhaps it
57 Painting as an Art, pp.46-48.
58 Painting as an Art, pp.85-86.
59 Painting as an Art, p. 80.
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would be unfair to suggest that Wollheim uses the similarities between the two theories to
give his account of expression in art a greater plausibility than it deserves. However, it
would be fair to say that the similarity in exposition between the two accounts serves to
disguise some important points of dissimilarity between the two theories, and that a
failure to appreciate the differences in detail between the two theories could lead us to
miscomprehend the nature of the account of pictorial expression which Wollheim offers.
One crucial dissimilarity between the theory of pictorial representation and the theory
of artistic expression concerns the explanatory role played by the underlying perceptual
capacity within the context of each theory. In the theory of representational perception,
the existence of a human visual capacity for seeing-in serves to underpin the practice of
pictorial representation in a general way. At the same time, it would be true to say that in
a majority of those cases where I identify the subject of a representational picture, my act
of pictorial recognition itself constitutes an instance of seeing-in. By contrast, whilst the
practice of pictorial expression is underpinned in a general way by a prior capacity for
expressive perception, itself a refinement and development of the emotional mechanism
of projection, it is not the case that all expressive perception takes place in the immediate
aftermath of projection.60 Wollheim is not postulating an occurrent emotion in the
perceiver that is being projected into the object perceived. Rather, in cases where I
experience a part of the world as being sad this is owing to the fact that I experience a
correspondence between that portion of nature, and a form of emotional response familiar
to me. The experience of the felt correspondence between the two is the experience of a
projective property. Projective properties are unlike the properties encountered in
ordinary acts of perception to the extent that the former but not the latter are properties of
a kind that intimate a particular sort of history. My experience of the projective property
of sadness intimates to me, not how the occurent perceptual experience came about, but
how experiences of its kind come about in general.61 The experience intimates to me that
the sadness I perceive in a landscape is not an occurent emotion of sadness, but the
projective property of sadness.
60 CPPE, p. 60.
61 CPPE, pp.57, 60.
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Another point of difference between Wollheim's theory of pictorial representation
and his theory of pictorial expression concerns Wollheim's claim that what a picture is
seen to represent or to express is determined by the fulfilled intentions of the artist.
Maintaining the symmetries with his account of pictorial representation, Wollheim states
that, whereas there is no one correct expressive way in which to see a landscape, there is
a right and a wrong expressive way to look at a landscape painting; the right way
ensuring an experience that concurs with the fulfilled intentions of the artist.62 In making
this claim, Wollheim is not denying what happens to be the case, that people will tend to
concur in identifying the expressive character of a piece of scenery. Instead, he is making
the point that there is no one stipulated way of seeing the piece of scenery; whereas there
is a way of seeing the painting that is required of me if I am to perceive its expressive
character with any accuracy - the way which happens to concur with the artist's intention.
However, in allowing the fulfilled intention of the artist to set the standard for what must
be expressively seen in the painting, Wollheim overlooks the fact that artists are obliged
to respect the human capacity for expressive seeing in a way in which they need not
respect the human capacity for seeing-in. Artists are free to exercise a certain amount of
innovation when it comes to pictorial representation, pushing forward the boundaries of
their art by challenging the boundaries of what can be seen in a painting. This means that
at times, as happened with the early Cubist painters, artists will present to the public
supposedly representational works of art where no one (else) yet can see what is in them.
However, it would be a total nonsense to suggest that artists are free to push forward the
boundaries of what can be expressively seen in a work of art. If an artist manages to see-
in his art what almost no one else can see, this may be because, like the early Cubists, he
has discovered a way of seeing-in surfaces that his public must be educated to appreciate.
By contrast, if an artist expressively sees in his work what few others can see, this is
owing to the fact that he lacks skill as an artist. It is he, not his public, who stands in
need of education. The limits upon what an artist might expressively convey in his work
reflect the inbuilt limitations of the human capacity for perceiving correspondences.
62 Painting as an Art, pp.85-86.
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Sircello's objections to the New Theory described in Section I above suggest a
distinction between two different ways in which works of art qualify as being expressive.
In the first place, as the New Theory suggests, works of art may be expressive after the
manner of natural objects. Wollheim's talk of projective properties serves to capture this
notion of expressiveness. To say that a landscape or a work of art corresponds with
melancholy is to assign a particular expressive character to it. In the second place,
Sircello taught us to see that works of art may be expressive after the fashion of human
expressive gestures. Wollheim demonstrates some awareness of the distinction between
these two notions of expressiveness in an earlier account of artistic expression,63 when
he distinguishes between the artist's relationship to the work of art, and the spectator's.
However, Wollheim's late theory of artistic expression demonstrates a confusion
between these two different notion of expressiveness. For whilst Wollheim operates with
the second of these notions of expressiveness when he allows the intention of the artist to
determine what a work of art expresses, he operates with the first notion when he
suggests that the artist's relationship to the work of art is that of the first perceiver. It is
because he fails to distinguish adequately between these two forms of expression that
Wollheim's theory allows the intention of the artist to be both decisive and nondecisive in
determining the expressive character of the work of art.
Although Wollheim offers a projectivist account of expressive perception, there are
two reasons why Wollheim's brand of projectivism does not amount to a form of naive
projectivism. In the first place, the projective mechanism Wollheim describes is a
relatively sophisticated one, constituting in its complex form nothing short of an ongoing
process of emotional adjustment to the world. In the second place, Wollheim avoids the
pitfalls of the sort of naive projectivism that postulates, corresponding with each and
every aesthetic quality that we perceive, an act of perception on the part of the perceiver
projecting that quality into the object perceived. Wollheim is not suggesting that on each
and every occasion where I perceive sadness in a portion of nature or a work of art, I am
guilty of unconsciously projecting my occurent sadness onto the object I perceive. As
63 Art audits Objects, sec. 18, pp.31-32.
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Wollheim points out, we can and do perceive nature as of a piece with our feelings in
cases either where we can no longer recall having projected those feelings onto it, or
where we have not done so. To say we perceive expressively in such cases is to say we
recognize parts of nature as those into which we might have projected this or that kind of
feeling.64 Likewise, in identifying the activity of the artist as an expressive activity,
Wollheim is not saying that the artist creates his art under the influence of an occurrent
episode of emotion that will be reflected in some way in his work. Rather, the expressive
activity of the artist occurs within and reflects a pattern established by a career or a form
of life.65 The emotion the work of art expresses is not something felt by the artist or
spectator, but "something that the artist or spectator has in mind, or (perhaps better) it is
something with which they are put in touch, or (perhaps best) it is something upon
which, or upon memory of which, they can draw."66 However, the very feature which
prevents the theory from looking naive deprives it of the richness of explanation to be
found in Wollheim's account of representation. To the extent that Wollheim's account of
representational perception possesses genuine explanatory power, this is for the reason
that Wollheim is able to posit an act of seeing-in corresponding with each and every act of
representational perception. When it comes to cases of expressive perception, all that
Wollheim can tell us is that it is the habit of a lifetime, of emotionally interacting with the
world, which encourages human beings to see certain parts of nature but not others as
being of a piece with melancholy. Michael Podro has made the complaint that Wollheim's
account of pictorial representation is more concerned with the question, "what is the
origin of painting?" than it is with the question, "how do we look at paintings?"67 A
similar complaint could be made here concerning Wollheim's account of expressive
perception. For Wollheim displays more interest in the question, "what is the origin in
human psychological development of our capacity for expressive perception?" than he
64 CPPE, p. 60.
65 Painting as an Art, p.87.
66 CPPE, p.64.
67 Michael Podro, "Depiction and the Golden Calf", in Philosophy and the Visual Art: Seeing and
Abstracting, ed. Andrew Harrison, Royal Institute of Philosophy (Dordrecht: D.Reidel, 1987), pp.3-22,
p.18.
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does in the question "what causes human beings to assign expressive characteristics to
the things they see?"
I would suggest that there is a vacuousness at the heart of Wollheim's account of
expressive perception that the appeal to correspondences tends to conceal. For talk of
correspondences carries an explanatory air about it, hinting at the existence of formal
similarities between human emotions and parts of the environment which human beings
take into account in projecting their emotional states. However, to see that the notion of
correspondence does not trade upon the notion of formal resemblances between our
emotions and features of the world, let us re-examine Wollheim's description of the
developmental nature of projection. In the early stages of projection, the subject
haphazardly projects his emotions, only later coming to project in a way that respects the
features of his environment. To say that the individual comes to respect features of his
environment as he projects is not to say that late acts of projection exploit natural
similarities between human emotions and parts of nature. If that were the case, then
Wollheim could appeal to the existence of these similarities to explain our acts of
expressive perception, and the notion of projection could be dispensed with altogether.68
Instead, Wollheim must have something like the following in mind. The immature subject
will consider his acts of projection to be a success in the event that he is able to maintain
the illusion that his emotion belongs to the thing it was projected upon rather than
himself. When he retraces his steps and comes to interrrogate nature in the wake of his
early, haphazard acts of projection, the subject discovers that the illusion has taken in
some places rather than others. As he develops the maturity to modify his behaviour in
the face of experience, the subject attempts to repeat earlier successes by seeking out
those parts of nature resembling the scenes of his earlier triumphs. This is the limited
sense in which the notion of resemblance has a role to play in the account. It is important
to remember that whatever similarities might exist between the emotional states of the
individual and parts of the environment are not ones he discovers but ones he imposes.
68 A point which Wollheim himself acknowledges. See CPPE, p.60.
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As Wollheim puts it, correspondences are forged69 in acts of projection. They are not
discovered there.
The vacuousness at the heart of Wollheim's account of expressive perception
amounts to this. In saying that we see nature as corresponding with, or being of a piece
with sadness, Wollheim has hit upon an elaborate way of saying that when we apply
emotion predicates to works of art or to nature, we believe that it is appropriate to do so.
This is less to provide an account of expressive perception, than to redescribe the thing
we wanted to explain in the first place. Far from providing insight into the nature of our
projective experiences, the notion of correspondences functions as a label, a place-holder
for the thing we wish to explain: the fact that human beings see nature as being of a piece
with their emotions. From the earliest writings where he introduces the term, Wollheim
treats the human experience of such correspondences as a brute fact from which all
theorizing must begin. Perhaps, at the end of the day, this is all we can say about the
phenomenon of expressive perception: that people do perceive expressively, and there's
an end on't. However, I believe it is too early into an enquiry into the nature of
expressive perception to succumb to such a pessimistic conclusion.
Ill
To say that there exists a form of expressive perception underpinning an awareness
of the anthropomorphic characters of nature and of art suggests that the expressive
perception in question is a form of 'physiognomic' perception: a form of perception
detecting a 'human' face in inanimate things. Although there is no doubting the fact that
human beings perceive physiognomically, the notion of physiognomic perception is
difficult to fix precisely. From the point of view of the psychologist, physiognomic
perception represents an atavistic tendency, a throw-back to a more primitive form of
69 Painting as an Art, p. 83.
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perceptual response. The idea is that, just as everything in the world of the infant
revolves around the smiles and frowns of the mother, so too in the world of the
'primitive', everything is interrogated to reveal a friendly or a hostile face. Under this
primitive form of perception, every object encountered is classified according to the facial
type it presents: whether it is friendly or hostile, promotes the well-being of the organism
or not. As the mind matures, this initial primitive response is overlaid by the practical or
scientific attitude which brings with it a more sophisticated set of perceptual categories. It
follows that those who would join the artist in seeing the physiognomic characters of
things must learn to throw off the practical or scientific attitude.70 Gombrich assigns a
certain limited value to a form of 'physiognomic intuition' we bring to bear in assessing
the dispositions of other persons. The gloomy look of a person's face allows us to form a
first estimate of his emotional state or character, an opinion which may be confirmed or
refuted as we see his smile, hear his voice, or generally come to know more about him.
According to Gombrich, this physiognomic response is valuable for providing a
perceptual hypothesis which we can subsequently modify and adjust to the evidence
provided by life or by history.71 It is, of course, this physiognomic intuition which leads
stage directors to classify or 'type-cast' actors according to facial type, and operatic
voices according to vocal type. Whatever the age of the singer, the baritone or bass is
more likely to play a king or a father-figure than he is the young lover, and this is simply
because physiognomically speaking, he has a 'mature' sounding voice. Gombrich's
'physiognomic intuition' points us in the direction of one feature of physiognomic
characters: the fact that the physiognomy or facial-type a person presents and the emotion
his face expresses may diverge. Because the physiognomic character of a face may
depend in large part upon one's biological inheritance, a man naturally inclined to sagging
of the facial muscles may have a sad-looking face. Such an individual would continue to
70 E.H.Gombrich, "On Physiognomic Perception", in Meditations on a Hobby Horse and Other Essays
on the Theory ofArt, 4th ed. (London: Phaidon, 1985), pp.45-55; p.47-48; K.Koffa, Principles of
Gestalt Psychology (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1936), pp.359-360; Rudolf
Arnheim, Art and Visual Perception: A Psychology of the Creative Eye (London: Faber and Faber,
1967), p.430.
71 "On Physiognomic Perception", p.50.
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possess a sad physiognomy, even on those occasions where he was smiling in a way that
others interpreted to be an expression of happiness.
At this point, it will prove useful to distinguish two ways in which the concept of
physiognomic perception might be employed. Physiognomic perception in the first and
narrower use of the concept 'anthropomorphizes' the object perceived. The human being,
the St Bernard dog, and the weeping willow are 'sad' because they are in some way
reminiscent of the emotional appearance of a human being. To assign the St Bernard and
the weeping willow a physiognomic sadness is to assign these a human, rather than an
arboreal or a doggie sadness. Speaking in this narrow sense, an object physiognomically
perceived is thought to present a 'face' or a form of behaviour to the perceiver, and the
anthropomorphic adjectives applied to the object describe the nature of this facial type or
form of behaviour. In the second and wider use of the concept, physionomic perception
serves to assign a certain 'character' to the object perceived, a character which may or
may not be described using emotion terms. Whereas too close attention to the human
cases might tempt the belief that all physiognomic perception involves assigning an
expressive or emotional character to the object perceived, this conclusion should be
avoided. Although generally speaking, a description of the 'character' belonging to a
human face will employ emotion terms, it might not have done so; and in a similar way,
the physiognomic 'character' of an insentient thing may or may not be described using
emotion terms. In general, whilst only objects enjoying a certain structural complexity
will possess the sort of physiognomic character inviting emotion ascriptions, relatively
simple objects of perception such as lines and geometrical figures may possess a
physiognomic character describable in non-emotional terms. A curved line becomes
'limp' or 'graceful' when physiognomically perceived,7 an angular geometrical figure
looks 'abrupt', the same tone played on different musical instruments announces a
'warm' or 'cool' timbre. To describe the physiognomic characters assigned to simple
lines, shapes and sounds, is to describe what Aldrich calls the 'ground-level' aesthetic
qualities 'expressed' by the 'medium of the materials', the 'aesthetic surface' of the
72 Helge Lundholm, "The Affective Tone of Lines: Experimental Researches", Psychological Review,
28 (1921). 43-60, offers a psychological study of the link between physiognomic character and line.
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aesthetic object.73 Even words may possess a physiognomic character for the language-
user, a fact which becomes apparent in those cases where repeating a word in a monotone
serves to reduce the phoneme to a meaningless noise. The 'meaning' lost in such cases is
not the semantic function of the word, the external relationship between the word and its
object of reference; but instead whatever physiognomic character the language-user
customarily assigns to the word as a result of the habit of associating the word with its
referent.74
Sections IV and V are given over to examining two different theories looking at the
wider notion of physiognomic perception. For the time being, I would like to look at the
way in which a well-known theory of musical expression exploits the first notion of
physiognomic perception described here.75 Stephen Davies' theory of musical expression
is very much in the mould of the New Theory. Davies points out that sometimes, we
apply emotion predicates to persons in a way which happens to describe, not an episode
of felt emotion on the part of the person concerned, but simply the appearance of that
person. In such cases, to say that John is sad is to say that John is sad-looking, in a no-
reference-to-feelings use of 'sad'. In this no-reference-to-feelings use, emotion words
refer solely to what Davies calls 'emotion characteristics in appearances' (hereafter
e.c.i.a's). According to Davies, music is expressive by presenting e.c.i.a's. These
e.c.i.a's are emergent properties belonging to the music itself. In hearing the emotions
expressed in music we are hearing emotion-characteristics in sounds in much the same
way that we see emotion-characteristics in human appearances. Thus for Davies, the
expressiveness of music depends mainly on a perceived resemblance between the
dynamic character of music on the one hand, and human movement, gait, bearing, or
carriage on the other 76 Davies' theory hints at the existence of two separate sets of
e.c.i.a's - emotion characteristics as these appear in human behavioural appearances, and
73 '"Expresses' and 'Expressive'", p.212.
74 Heinz Werner and Bernard Kaplan, Symbol Formation: An Organismic-Developmental Approach to
Language and the Expression of Thought (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), esp. p.31.
75 S. Davies, "The Expression of Emotion in Music". The view is reprised in a slightly expanded form
in Stephen Davies, Musical Meaning and Expression (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
1994), pp.221-240.
75 The Expression of Emotion in Music", pp.69, 77; Musical Meaning and Expression, pp.229, 239.
187
emotion characteristics as these appear in musical sounds - and thus promises to provide
some insight into the physiognomic characters we perceive in persons and in art. Rather
than offering a general assessment of Davies' theory of musical expression, here I shall
look at the extent to which Davies' discussion of e.c.i.a's determines the nature of the
physiognomic characters that can be ascribed to works of music.
Davies points to several pieces of evidence suggesting that talk of emotion
characteristics in human appearances is not talk of feelings or experiences. Whereas
episodes of felt emotion may be experienced internally without any external
manifestations, e.c.i.a's may be worn by a person 'on the outside' without being
'experienced on the inside'. Whereas a person is less likely to be mistaken about the
emotions she feels than is an onlooker, a person who wears a sad look enjoys no
advantage over anyone else when it comes to identifying the emotion characteristics
displayed in her appearance. A person might deceive us as to her true feelings by
adopting a sad look, but in so doing, she could not deceive us concerning the sad
appearance given in her look. Davies further points out that, whereas a person who
changes or suppresses whatever made her appear to be sad-looking thereby ceases to
have a sad appearance; a person who changes or suppresses the expressions of her
occurent emotion does not thereby cease to feel that emotion. According to Davies,
emotion characterisitics are attributed to the appearances people present rather than the
persons themselves. That is to say, an e.c.i.a is something 'worn' by a face or piece of
behaviour, as opposed to something expressed by the face or behaviour. E.c.i.a's and
the criteria for e.c.i.a's are given solely in appearances.77
When Davies speaks of e.c.i.a's in the sphere of human emotional behaviour, what
he has in mind are the appearances of expressive human emotional behaviour detached
from episodes of felt emotion. It is with a view to distinguishing e.c.i.a.'s from episodes
of behaviour expressing felt emotion that Davies makes the following set of claims:
77 Musical Meaning and Expression, p.223; "The Expression of Emotion in Music", pp.68-70.
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Since e.c.i.a's do not involve the occurence of feelings and thoughts
accompanying an episode of felt emotion, those forms of behaviour which are
expressive of an emotion only to the extent that they reveal the emotional object
of the emotion, cannot give rise to a corresponding e.c.i.a.
E.c.i.a's are revealed in those actions which are directly expressive of the
feeling component, rather than the thought component, of an emotion.
Of behaviours naturally and characteristically expressing emotion, those most
likely to feature in a corresponding e.c.i.a. are ones a face, voice, gait or
deportment might fall into without conscious pretense or genuine feeling.78
In light of these and related considerations, Davies concludes that e.c.i.a's correspond
with those emotions which can be identified from a person's behaviour in the absence of
any knowledge of her intentional states or of the object those states are directed towards.
This means that e.c.i.a's correspond with the Tower emotions', such emotions as
sadness or joy, rather than the so-called 'higher emotions' or 'Platonic attitudes',
emotions such as embarrassment, hope, acceptance, despair, puzzlement, annoyance,
amusement, nervousness. In particular, e.c.i.a's correspond to happy and sad emotions
and moods.79 To see why Davies chooses to restrict in this way the range of emotions
giving rise to e.c.i.a's, consider the following example. Gary and Jane have both applied
for a job with the same firm. Today, Gary and Jane compare notes on the situation and
discover that whilst Gary has had no news concerning his application, Jane received
notification last week that she is on the shortlist for a job interview. Jane is now looking
forward to her interview, and hopeful of being offered a job. Gary is resigned to the fact
that he has no future with that firm. At this point, Tom walks by. Jane and Gary are
making no effort to hide how they feel; their behaviour is expressive, respectively, of
hope and resignation. However, their behaviour would only be seen as expressive of
hope and resignation to someone who was aware of their current intentional states and the
news they had just received. To someone like Tom, going on nothing but the appearances
78 Musical Meaning and Expression, p.225; "The Expression of Emotion in Music", pp.71-72.
79 Musical Meaning and Expression, p.226; "The Expression of Emotion in Music", p.71. The term
'Platonic attitudes' derives from J.M.E.Moravcsik, "Understanding the Emotions", Dialectica, 36 (1982),
207-224.
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given in their behaviour as he walks by, their behaviour could not be construed as
expressing anything more determinate than happiness and sadness, respectively.
It is a consequence of Davies' enquiry into the logic of e.c.i.a.'s in the human case
that the emotion words which designate the e.c.i.a's or physiognomic characters
discoverable in musical works and parts of nature will be confined to those words
designating emotional states that can be identified from a person's behaviour without any
knowledge of her intentional states or the objects those intentional states happen to be
directed towards. That is to say, the physiognomic characters we perceive in human
beings, musical works and non-human objects such as trees, dogs and cars, are
designated by words describing the lower rather than the higher emotions, words
describing sad and happy emotions and moods.80 Davies does not rule out altogether the
possibility that some of the higher emotions might be expressed in an indirect way in
musical works. However, what we physiognomically recognize in those cases where,
say, hope is expressed in a work, is not the aural appearance of hope, but rather the aural
appearance of a natural pattern or progression of feelings of which hope forms a
predicatable element. In such cases, provided the outline of the pattern of feelings was
sufficiently distinctive and complex, we might feel entitled to 'fill in' the missing element
in the series, and to this extent, hear the music as being expressive of hope. Davies notes
that since not all of the higher emotions would form an element in such a natural
progression of feelings, only some of the higher emotions could be expressed in this
indirect fashion.81
I must confess to feeling some qualms concerning the way in which Davies
identifies the physiognomic characters discoverable in nature and in music. My qualms
relate to the fact that, whilst Davies' discussion of e.c.i.a's issues in an account of the
physiognomic characters which may emerge in musical works, his account of e.c.i.a's
was not primarily devised with that end in view. To understand the purpose underlying
the discussion of e.c.i.a's, it is important to go back to the beginning of Davies' account
of expression in music. If Davies sees the problem of expression in music in the terms set
80 Musical Meaning and Expression, pp.226-227.
81 "The Expression of Emotion in Music", p.78; Musical Meaning and Expression, pp.262-263.
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out by the New Theory, a problem of explaining away a certain use of emotion
vocabulary, he believes an answer to that problem must address the concerns raised by
Scruton's ambiguity argument. Davies points out that, in the primary use of 'sad', things
which are sad feel sad. Since musical works are not thought to feel the emotions
attributed to them, it follows that the use of 'sad' in 'the music is sad' must constitute a
secondary use of the term, but not a uniquely aesthetic secondary use. For if it were a
uniquely aesthetic secondary use, then talk of the sadness of music would in no way
reflect upon the world of felt emotions; and we would be powerless to explain, either
why music moves and interests us as it does, but also the importance we attach to the
expressiveness of music. So emotion words ascribed to music must retain some link with
their primary use. Davies believes that we will maintain the link between emotions in
music and emotions in life, and the link between the primary use of 'sad' to indicate felt
emotion and the use of 'sad' to describe the expressiveness of musical features, in the
event that we can discover an ordinary secondary use of 'sad' that is both reliably related
to the primary use, and also applies to the musical case. For this reason, Davies sees the
problem of expression in music as the challenge of finding an established secondary use
of emotion words that will also apply in the musical case, a use in which emotions are
unfelt, necessarily publicly displayed, and lack emotional-objects.82 Davies discovers
that secondary use in the no-reference-to-feelings use of emotion words to refer to
emotion characteristics in appearances.lt follows that explaining the physiognomic
characters attaching to musical works is perhaps not the only or the primary reason why
Davies introduces the notion of e.c.i.a's; that his interest in e.c.i.a's is in part an interest
in explicating the logic of a special secondary use of emotion words.
Once we realize this fact, we see that throughout the discussion of e.c.i.a's, Davies
is holding two very different notions before his mind: the notion that (a) talk of e.c.i.a's
is talk of a no-reference-to-feelings use of emotion words; and the notion that (b) e.c.i.a's
are the appearances of emotional behaviour which may become detached from episodes
of felt emotion.We can dub this second notion the reference-to-appearances use of
82 "The Expression of Emotion in Music", p.67-68.
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emotion words. The fact that Davies thinks of e.c.i.a's in these two different ways
explains the very different criteria Davies produces in order to exclude the higher
emotions from the class of e.c.i.a's. It explains, for instance, why Davies makes the
rather curious claim that "to say that a person looks envious is always to refer, I think, to
how they feel, or are prone to feel, or could be feeling, and is not to refer to an emotion
characteristic paying no regard to feelings,"83 as part of his rationale for excluding the
higher emotions from the class of e.c.i.a's. This claim reflects Davies' interest in the
logic of the no-reference-to-feelings use of emotion words. It is a very puzzling claim if
you assume that e.c.i.a's constitute the appearances of emotional behaviour which may
be detached from episodes of felt emotion. For in the reference-to-appearances use of
emotion words, to say someone is sad-looking is to say that he presents the appearance
of someone who feels sadness. Why can we not then say, in the same reference-to-
appearances use, that somone looks envious, thereby meaning that he presents the
appearance of someone who feels envious? Although as Davies rightly points out, in
cases where we were ignorant of Jane's beliefs, there would be no logical justification in
inferring from Jane's appearance to the fact she is feeling hopeful, who is to say that we
always speak in this logically careful fashion? Often, we might surmise that Jane is
feeling hopeful based upon nothing but the appearance of hope in her behaviour; and it
might be thought that in a similar way, we could read the appearance of hope in inanimate
things. Davies strays onto much firmer ground when he excludes the higher emotions
such as hope or envy from the class of e.c.i.a's on the grounds that these lack
characteristic and easily recognizable emotional behaviours. That is to say, Davies might
agree with the observation that sometimes we may carelessly infer that Jane is hopeful
based on nothing but appearances. Nonetheless, he would point out that to the extent that
there is the appearance of hope which may be read from someone's behaviour, this
appearance would be visually indistinguishable from the appearance of happiness, and
83 Musical Meaning and Expression, p.226.
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this is why we do not detect the physiognomic character of hope in music in addition to
the physiognomic character of happiness.84
In raising these qualms concerning Davies' exposition, I am not suggesting that
Davies might be wrong when he claims that the higher emotions do not feature amongst
the physiognomic characters discoverable in music and nature. I leave it an open question
whether the physiognomic characters that we attribute to music and nature in the narrow
sense of the term are confined to the lower emotions. What I am suggesting here is that
the rather indirect way in which Davies goes about characterizing the human emotions
which may issue in characteristically behavioural responses, does little to inspire
confidence that Davies has managed to capture the class of physiognomic characteristics
attributable to musical works. I shall have something more to say concerning Davies'
narrow use of the concept of physiognomic perception when I come to discuss the
Gestalt theory of expression in Section V below.
IV
We say that mountains 'rise', hills 'roll', the facade of a baroque building 'heaves',
the spire of a gothic cathedral 'soars', lines 'move', 'spread out', 'flow', 'bend' and
'twist', when there is no material fact of the matter corresponding with these claims.
Mountains do not move,85 hills, buildings, spires and lines stay stubbornly put. The
doctrine of empathy sometimes has been enlisted to account for these and similar
descriptions. The term Einfuhlung, or empathy, which means "feel oneself into" derives
84 It is worth noting at this point that not all philosophers share Davies' pessimism that there exist
characteristic behavioural expressions of the higher emotions which may be reflected in and therefore
expressed by the structure of musical works. Thus Jerrold Levinson suggests that "Davies is unduly
pessimistic as to the existence of subtle behavioural/figural/postural manifestations that might
characterize one who is hopeful, particularly at peak moments, and thus contribute to a characteristically
hopeful appearance, which music might, in turn, reflect, independent of any light cast by the passage's
contextual situation." See "Hope in the Hebrides", in Music, Art and Metaphysics: Essays in
Philosophical Aesthetics (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp.336-375; p.357.
85 Ignoring such factors as plate techtonics, and planetary motion, of course!
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from the writings of Theodore Lipps.86 According to the doctrine of empathy, when we
say that mountains rise, spires soar and lines spread, we say that "they do...what we
should feel outselves doing if we were inside them."87 The intuition underlying the
doctrine of Empathy is that the subject somehow 'feels himself into the aesthetic object
in the course of aesthetic contemplation, so that sensations taking place in the perceiver
are attributed to the object as qualities perceived. According to the empathy theorists,
perceivers are inclined to merge the activities of the perceiving subject with the qualities
of the perceived object,88 a practice that could be used to account for the dynamic
properties attributed to inanimate things. Although highly popular at the turn of the
century in the writings of psychologists and particularly, philosophers and psychologists
of aesthetics, the theory is now little more than an historical curiosity attracting the
occasional philosophical mention in the context of musical aesthetics.89 Here I choose to
revive that historical curiosity for the light it might shed upon the notion of physiognomic
perception in the wide sense. As the texts of the original empathy theorists are no longer
in common circulation, I shall take the liberty of quoting generously from source, in an
attempt to convey something of the flavour of the theory.
At this point, it will be useful to distinguish the notion of empathy as it occurs within
general psychology from the notion as employed in aesthetic theory. As a doctrine of
general psychology, the notion of empathy was enlisted to explain a whole host of
perceptual qualities which could not be accounted for in the sensory dimensions of the
classical psychology which dominated the discipline at the turn of the century. A
psychology which confined the attributes of vision to hue, tint, saturation, protensity,
intensity, extensity, lacked the resources to explain how lines could be 'graceful' or
86English extracts from Lipps' writings may be found in Vernon Lee and Catherine Anstruther-
Thompson, Beauty and Ugliness and Other Studies in Psychological Aesthetics (London: John Lane,
1912), pp.36-43. See also Theodore Lipps, "Empathy, Inner Imitation, and Sense-Feelings", in Melvin
Rader(ed.), A Modern Book ofAesthetics, 4th ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973),
pp.374-382.
87 Vernon Lee, "Anthropomorphic Aesthetics", in Beauty and Ugliness, pp. 1-35; p. 19. Vernon Lee is
the pen name of Violet Paget.
88 Lipps, "Empathy, Inner Imitation, and Sense-Feeling", p.381; Vernon Lee, "The Beautiful", in
Melvin Rader (ed.), A Modern Book ofAesthetics, pp.370-374; p.372.
89 The view is briefly mentioned in Olga Meidner McDonald, "Motion and E-Motion in Music", B.IA,
25 (1985), 349-359, esp. pp.350-351. See also Roger Scruton, "Understanding Music", in The Aesthetic
Understanding (Manchester: Carcanet Press, 1983), pp.77-100, esp.pp.95-97.
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'awkward', and was helpless to explain in its own terms how buildings could be 'heavy'
or skies 'depressing'.90 It was therefore suggested that when we attribute dynamic
properties to inert matter, we unconsciously treat some of the movements that the
perceiver makes in the course of perception as qualities belonging to the object perceived.
Thus, a line is 'graceful' because the movements of the eyes in surveying it are smooth
and easy-flowing. Speaking at this elementary level, the notion of empathy was used to
explain the spatial and formal qualities which we attribute to shapes and lines. The
experience of extension in a line "must be our extension, for the inert cannot extend or
indeed tend in any literal sense, and the attribution of extension is therefore an attribution
of an item of our own active experience." In directing our attention successively to the
different parts belonging to a form made up of lines and planes, "we go through an
incident or a drama, and this incident is projected by us into the form on which our
energies are concentrated. 1
In the course of empathy, the perceiver commits the projective error of treating
processes taking place in himself as qualities of the object perceived. The empathy
theorists found a precedent for this projective error in the projective error whereby we
come to describe secondary qualities as genuine properties belonging to things. Just as
we say "The object is red" rather than "The object looks red"; so too, the formula of
perception is not "The line scans smoothly and easily" but "The line is graceful". Because
we remain unconscious of the physiological processes taking place in ourselves in the
course of perception, and because the actions of rising up, lifting, pressing down,
expanding, bulging out, attributed to two-dimensional and three-dimensional forms are
so complex, it does not occur to us that the movements in question are in the mind any
more than colours or musical tones are in our own organs of perception:
90 Carroll C.Pratt, "The Design of Music", JAAC, 12 (1954), 289-300; p.292-293.
91 Vernon Lee, "Anthropomorphic Aesthetics",p.22; "Aesthetic Empathy and its Organic Accompan¬
iments", in Beauty and Ugliness, pp.45-76, p.53.
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Instead of being conscious of changes of condition in our eye and ear, we are
incapable of knowing them otherwise than as objective qualities, colour or
pitch, of the non-ego; and to a lesser degree, our attention has become engaged
not with the change in ourselves productive of the sense of height, or
roundness, or symmetry, but with the objective external causes of these
changes. The formula of perception is not 'I feel x' but 'this object is x.'92
The simple form of the empathy theory described here was apparently undermined at
an early stage by photographic evidence demonstrating that the eyes move more or less in
the same way regardless of the content of the visual field.93 However, not all of those
treating empathy as a physiological process were equally impressed with or perturbed by
the counter-evidence from eye movement. Herbert Sidney Langfeld attributed the
phenomenon of empathy occurring in both aesthetic and nonaesthetic perception to the
fact that all our perceptions depend upon the motor atttitudes the perceiver unconsciously
assumes towards the object. According to Langfeld, during the course of the most
ordinary acts of perception physiological processes, in the form of kinaesthetic processes
and muscular adjustments taking place in the subject, are projected back into the object
perceived.94 Langfeld rejected the counter-evidence from eye movement, reasoning that,
in a majority of cases of empathy, no overt action could be detected on the part of the
perceiver because the 'movements' the perceiver projects into the object amount to
nothing more than a shifting of tensions in the muscles. Thus, argued Langfeld,
It is not necessary to empathize with the eyes, any more than it is necessary to
imagine ourselves walking in a spiral in order to appreciate the curves. A
tendency to move any part of the body that is capable of moving in the way
suggested is sufficient.
Thus, our visual awareness of the 'weight' or heaviness of an object may be due to strain
in all muscles of the body which would be used in lifting the object, or in only one small
muscle group, such as that which moves the finger.95 Langfeld extended his
physiological account of empathic projection to cases of aesthetic perception. According
92 Vernon Lee, "The Central Problem of Aesthetics", in Beauty and Ugliness, pp.77-151, p. 102;
"Beauty and Ugliness", in Beauty and Ugliness, pp. 156-239, p. 159. See also Herbert Sidney Langfeld,
The Aesthetic Attitude (Harcourt Brace: 1920. Reissued 1967 by Kennekat Press), p. 118.
93 Pratt, "The Design of Music", p.293.
94 Langfeld, pp. Ill, 109-110.
95 Langfeld, pp. 124-125.
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to Langfeld, aesthetic perception differs from ordinary acts of perception in virtue of the
special empathic adjustments that the subject makes toward the object perceived:
Two attitudes may be assumed toward the outstretched hand of a statue: either
one of grasping the hand, or of feeling the "outstretching" of the hand. It is
through this latter attitude, which gives us the feeling of tension and the weight
of the arm, the angle at which it is raised, and the bend at the elbow and wrist,
that we can get the true aesthetic effect.96
That is to say, in cases of aesthetic perception, the perceiving subject unconsciously
'mimics' in his own body the posture of the object perceived, and in so doing, projects
the physiological processes taking place inside his body as he perceives back into the
object as qualities of the object perceived.
In her early writings of the topic, Vernon Lee agrees with Langfeld in treating
empathy as a physiological process in the perceiver, and to this end, devotes a large
portion of her early work "Beauty and Ugliness" to answering the question,what portions
ofour organism participate in the process ofperceiving form? Like many psychologists
of the period in question, Lee was operating at this time under the influence of the Lange-
James hypothesis regarding emotion and for this reason, she specifically wonders
whether adjustments of balance and alterations in breathing take place in the course of
aesthetic perception. Of course, notes Lee,
it will always be difficult to obtain information about phenomena which, if they
exist, are normally subconscious and, by the very nature of aesthetic
perception, are translated into qualities attributed to the visible objects, qualities
thought of as existing outside ourselves, and for which we have as little the
habit of looking inside our bodies as we have the habit of looking for the colour
red in the eye, the middle h of the violin in our ear, or the smell of a flower in
our nose.97
This sobering reflection does not prevent Lee from calling upon her artist-friend,
Catherine Anstruther-Thompson, to test out the Lange-James hypothesis by introspecting
upon her own aesthetic experiences. Anstruther-Thompson obligingly delivers, reflecting
that
96 Langfeld, pp.211, 113.
97 "Beauty and Ugliness", p. 161; "The Central Problem of Aesthetics", pp. 128, 137.
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We are always balancing ourselves more or less...But as soon as we see
something else adjusting equilibrium, our own balance seems to swing on a
wider scale, and this wider balancing brings a sense of our limits being
enlarged in every direction, and of our life being spread over a far wider area.
According to Anstruther-Thompson, the horizontals in a great French cathedral
curve up very slightly, as if overcoming the force of gravitation, so that one
feels the horizontal movement as actually taking place. We feel out of step with
our surroundings unless we put our weight almost entirely upon one foot, and
when we have done so, we can fully perceive and, so to speak, feel
incorporated with our surroundings.
Perception of movement in a work of art calls for some fancy footwork on the part of the
perceiver:
When we feel movement in a work of art, it is not as the opposite of standing
still. We feel movement in art as the contrast between opposing movements,
which we are forced to initiate in the process of seeing. For instance, we
perceive a movement forward by balancing forward, and then moving back
again; the rapid movement forward contrasted with the rather passive swing
backwards gives us the sense of having gone forwards.
To give a particular example, "the movement of an arch consists of the balance of its two
half-arches, and this balance we follow by shifting our own weight from one foot to
another."98 Anstruther-Thompson also assigns a crucial role to the respiratory apparatus
in the course of aesthetic experience:
We realize bulk by breathing backwards and forwards in longer or shorter
breaths; breathing a short breath, for instance, up to where the object stands,
and a much longer succeeding breath immediately beyond the object as the eye
moves past it into the distance.
In looking at mountains, we do something which 'feels like' breathing in on the right side
and out on the left, although in a rare moment of diffidence, Vernon Lee leaves it up to
the physiologists to decide whether these adjustments really take place in the lungs or
only in the throat and nostrils. Anstruther-Thompson even goes so far as to say that we
seem to 'inhale' colour, and that "the scheme of colour of a picture has the power of, so
to speak, placing the respiration."99 On a facetious note, one cannot help wondering what
98 "Beauty and Ugliness", pp. 199, 200-201, 215, 216.
99 "Beauty and Ugliness", pp.214, 198 ftnote, 204, 206.
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other bodily adjustments Anstruther-Thompson would have discovered had she been
operating under a different initial set of instructions; or what respiratory difficulties she
might have encountered in following an operatic aria!
Vernon Lee's later work on empathy, which shows the influence of Theodore
Lipps, identifies empathy as a psychological rather than physiological process. Lee
rejects the naive projectivism inherent in her earlier view that empathy involves attributing
what goes on in us when we perceive a shape to the shape perceived. Lee now thinks that
when I see a mountain rising, my particular present act of raising my eyes to look at the
mountain acts as "the nucleus to which gravitates our remembrance of all similar acts of
raising, or rising which we have ever accomplished or seen accomplished", a nucleus
around which gathers the general idea of rising as such; and it is this idea embodying our
cumulative experience of acts of rising which we project into the mountain.100
For the modern reader, perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the theory of aesthetic
empathy is the assumption, built into the theory, that perceivers will adopt a particular
motor-set towards the object perceived by somehow mimicing the posture of the object in
their own posture. The puzzle dissolves once we realize that we are in the era of the
aesthetic attitude theory. That is to say, the prototypical empathy theorist is not describing
the way people actually perceive so much as recommending a mode of perception that is
peculiarly aesthetic. To perceive aesthetically is to give oneself over to the object in such a
way that one is thereby able to project one's own life forces into the object. Vernon Lee
regards aesthetic acts of form perception are 'thorough' acts of form perception.
Reflecting upon the nature of these 'thorough' acts of form perception leads her to
theorize on the nature of our judgements of beauty. According to Lee, the projection of
our experience into the forms of inanimate objects involves the more or less vivid revival
of that experience in ourselves. Those forms leading to the revival of pleasurable
experiences are deemed to be 'beautiful', whilst those forms leading to the revival of
dynamic experiences that are biologically unfavourable to ourselves will be avoided as
'ugly'.101 In light of some of the excesses contained in Anstruther-Thompson's
100 Vernon Lee, "The Beautiful", pp.371,372.
101 Vernon Lee, "Anthropomorphic Aesthetics", pp.17, 21.
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descriptions, many modern readers will no doubt feel that giving oneself over to the
object in the way that the empathy theorists were suggesting is too great a price to pay in
order to guarantee a properly aesthetic experience.
As the extracts from Catherine Anstruther-Thompson suggest, those looking for it
can have much fun with the Empathy theory. This fun arises in large measure from the
fact that many empathy theorists tend to confuse the bodily sensations accompanying acts
of aesthetic form perception with the sensations arising in the body as one imaginatively
empathizes with the representational content of a work of art. Vernon Lee makes just this
complaint with a passage from Bernard Berenson in mind,102 and the same accusation
might be levelled against a number of passages in which Langfeld illustrates his thesis
with examples drawn from the fine arts.103 To understand the concerns Langfeld
expresses in these passages, it is important to recall his belief that, necessarily, the
subject perceiving in a properly aesthetic way must be attending to the object rather than
the sensations taking place in his own body.104 In Langfeld's thinking, cases of aesthetic
perception where the mimicing posture of the perceiver leads to the arousal of violent
bodily sensations would tend to threaten the break-down of the aesthetic attitude, by
distracting the attention of the perceiver away from the object and onto the processes
taking place in his own body. Although Langfeld starts well in chapter six, noting that the
strength of the empathic response is not determined by the amount of movement
represented in a statue or picture, he is soon observing, in the spirit of Lessing's
Laocoon, how signs of physical effort in the faces and muscles of depicted human
figures might lead to an unpleasant empathic experience on the part of the spectator, with
a consequent lessening of the properly aesthetic response. Thus, the Greeks of the
classical period are praised for offering the spectator an empathic experience of the
102 "The Central Problem of Aesthetics", p. 115. The extract Lee has in mind occurs in Bernard
Berenson, The Italian Painters ofthe Renaissance (London: Phaidon, 1967), p.59, where Berenson
describes how visual artists create the pictorial illusion of represented motion by appealing to our "tactile
imagination": "I see...two men wrestling, but unless my retinal impressions are immediately translated
into images of strain and pressure in my muscles, of resistance to my weight, of touch all over my body,
it means nothing to me in terms of vivid experience - not more, perhaps, than if I heard someone say
'Two men are wrestling'."
103Langfeld, The Aesthetic Attitude, chp.6, pp. 143-159.
104Langfeld, p. 118.
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stretching of muscles, weight of limbs and body, and poise of the head, without
representing the muscles so realistically that the spectator feels an unpleasantly violent
mimicing response in his own body. Langfeld suggests that we can empathize without
pain in the posture of the Caryatides supporting the roof of the Erectheum because, whilst
there is sufficient evidence in the bodies of the women to suggest weight being
supported, the faces are without lines of effort. In these and other extracts, Langfeld is
guilty of confusing the spectator's emotional empathic identification in the plight of the
subject of a representational work of art, with the motor accompaniments of aesthetic
form perception. In what must be the crowning absurdity in that long list of absurdities
which constitutes the sixth chapter of Langfeld's book, Langfeld suggests that the artist
must himself experience the empathic response he wishes to convey to the spectator, and
that consequently "the physical strength of the artist is a condition of the amount of
empathy suggested". Not surprisingly, the statues of women sculptors come in for
particular dispraise. "One feels the listless droop of the arm, the lack of weight of the
body, and the relatively slight expression in the posture."105
In both the realm of general psychology and the realm of psychological aesthetics,
the notion of empathy has been called upon to explain a wide range of phenomena, of
which the following would be a representative sampling:
(1) Perception of process as unity, as when we attribute rhythm to a series of
musical sounds or poetic syllables.
(2) Perception of form and space in simple lines and shapes.
(3) The attribution of such 'aesthetic' qualities as grace and awkardness to
lines, shapes and objects.
(4) The visual perception of weight or mass in objects.
(5) Perceptions of movement in visual patterns and lines; the phenomenon
whereby lines move, spread out, flow, bend and twist.
(6) Perception of the representation of movement in two-dimensional visual
patterns.
(7) Perception of the emotional states of another sentient being.
105 Langfeld, p. 143, 145-146, 144.
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The sheer range of phenomena which the doctrine of empathy has been invoked to
explain constitutes both the strength and the weakness of the empathy theory. For those
looking to understand the nature of physiognomic perception, the range of items
incorporated under the theory might bear the appearance of a strength. This range is also
a weakness, since it points to the fact that there is no such thing as the empathy theory,
that instead there are as many empathy theories as you care to enumerate. What we find in
(1) through (7) is not a well-defined spectrum of cases which a single empathy theory
employing a single mechanism of explanation could account for, but instead a set of cases
that a patchwork of empathy theories utilizing different empathic mechanisms might be
brought to explain. In order to assume that (1) through (7) represent a spectrum of cases
permitting a single mechanism of explanation, one must conflate three very separate
concepts which empathy theorists like Langfeld do not always manage to disentangle in
their minds:
(a) Empathically perceiving such dynamic qualities as stresses and strains in a
pillar as one's eyes run over the pillar. That is to say, attributing qualities to the
pillar as a piece of form perception.
(b) 'Feeling oneself into' the same pillar by mimicing the 'posture' of the pillar
in one's body, then projecting the dynamic sensations arising in one's body
from this act of mimicry into the pillar itself;
(c) Imagining oneself into the body of a represented human being, by mimicing
their posture and imaginatively responding to the emotions that arise in one's
own body as a consequence.
As we examine (1) through (7) on a case-by-case basis, we discover that the cases
most plausibly explained by the empathy theory exist at the high and the low end of the
spectrum. This is hardly surprising since the cases at the opposing ends of the spectrum
are those cases corresponding with, respectively, the theory of empathy viewed as an
aesthetic hypothesis, and the theory of empathy functioning as an explanation of
perceived dynamic qualities in general psychology. It is a point often observed that
adopting the posture of another person arouses certain kinaesthetic sensations in my own
body which can go some way towards putting me in the same emotional state as the
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person I emulate. Understanding another person through imitation represents the limiting
case of the procedure recommended under the theory of aesthetic perception, whereby I
can come to have a 'properly' aesthetic experience by 'mimicing' the disposition of parts
in the object in my own bodily posture as I perceive. The cases at the lower end of
spectrum represent the simplest applications of the concept that perceivers treat their own
bodily movements in perceiving as qualities of the perceived object. Lipps' explanation of
the perception of rhythm must count as one of the minor successes of the empathy
theory. According to Lipps, the rhythm attributed to a piece of music or to a line of poetry
is the rhythm belonging to my act of perceiving the parts of the object projected into the
object perceived. More formally, the act of perceiving accented and unaccented items
grouped in a certain way forces upon the perceiver a certain manner of proceeding as his
attention moves between the items, and that manner of proceeding, or 'rhythm', becomes
the rhythm of the object.106 However, as the counter-evidence from eye movements
suggests, even some of the explanations occupying the lower end of this spectrum must
be taken with a pinch of salt. Consider in this regard one of the illusions arising from the
anisotropy of visual space, the fact that the top half of a line bisected horizontally looks
'longer' than the bottom half. Langfeld attempts to explain this illusion in empathic terms
by suggesting that there is an increasing strain in the eye muscles as we look towards the
top of the picture, an increase in effort that is experienced as an increase in distance
travelled by the eye.107 It goes without saying that the greater effort of eye movement
will occur only in those cases were the picture is centred at eye height, or where the lower
half of the picture is locatedat eye height. Place the divided line at such a distance from
the eye that the whole can be taken in at a glance, and Langfeld's explanation for the
illusion disappears, but not the illusion itself.
The answer to the question, what can the Empathy theory teach us regarding the
nature ofphysiognomic perception? is, not a lot. Despite some localized successes in
accounting for specific aesthetic attributions, the theory is too patchy and inconsistently
106 Theodore Lipps, quoted in Beauty and Ugliness, pp.38-39. Lipps' account of rhythm receives a brief




applied to provide anything like a unified account of the nature of perceived dynamic
character in inanimate things. Perhaps the greatest success of the theory lies in drawing
attention to the physical nature of the act of perception itself, the fact that the act of
perception amounts to something more than the passive reception of sensation in a single
organ of sense. For the empathy theory brings us to see that, even in those cases where a
person does not overtly move his own body in the act of perceiving, there may be
extensive adjustments taking place in the perceiver towards the object on a physiological
or kinaesthetic level, adjustments which might be reflected occasionally in the character
attributed to the object perceived. The notion that perception consitutes a less-than-
passive affair involving the whole body of the perceiver is a theme taken up in the Gestalt
theory of expressive perception, to which I now turn.
V
The final theory of expression in art that I shall examine here is the Gestalt theory of
expression as developed by Rudolf Arnheim.108 Arnheim treats expression as a more
pervasive phenomenon than the external manifestations of the human personality as these
appear in human behaviour in the first instance, and in natural objects and works of art in
the second. Expressive qualities include the 'aggressive' stroke of lightning, the
'soothing' rhythm of rain, the 'weariness' of slowly floating tar, the 'passive limpness'
of a telephone receiver.109 Thus, like the Empathy theory, Arnheim's Gestalt theory of
expression functions as a theory of physiognomic perception in the broad sense,
accounting for the dynamic perceptual character attributed to most of the things we
perceive. Arnheim follows Kurt Koffa in suggesting that the physiognomic character or
108 See in particular Rudolf Arnheim, 'The Gestalt Theory of Expression", in Towards a Psychology of
Art: Collected Essays (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), pp.51-73; "Perceptual Dynamics in Musical
Expression", in New Essays on the Psychology ofArt (Berkeley: University of California Press,1986),
pp.214-227; Art and Visual Perception: A Psychology of the Creative Eye, 2nd. ed. (London: Faber
and Faber, 1969), pp.396ff.
109 "The Gestalt Theory of Expression", pp.51, 52, 53, 65.
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expressive quality of an object is something given directly to perception, as much a
quality of the percept as its colour or shape:
The terrifying character of the thunder is its outstanding characteristic, its
description as a noise of a certain intensity and quality, quite secondary;
similarily, a snake is uncanny before it is brown or spotted, a human face
happy before it is of a certain hue and chroma. All these descriptions imply
something like a force, something that goes beyond the mere static thing and
affects ourselves. This force, which may have the character of a thing, is also a
property of things, or, otherwise expressed, thing and force, substance and
causality, are, as parts of our behavioural environment, often not two separate
objects but closely interrelated aspects of one and the same object. Discursive
thought has separated what to naive experience is in many cases a unity.110
Arnheim also follows Koffa in maintaining that the dynamic physiognomic qualities
found in percepts point to the existence of 'forces'. According to Arnheim, objects
possess dynamic physiognomic qualities in perception because we perceive objects as
animated by 'forces', or what he also sometimes calls 'directed tensions'. A tree or a
tower is seen as reaching upward, a wedge-shaped object like an axe advances in the
direction of its cutting edge. To the sensitive eye, a dark spot on a light ground presents
the spectacle of an object expanding from its centre, pushing outward, and being checked
by the counterforces of the environment. Not only are such physiognomic qualities
inseparable from shape, but they often create a more immediate impact than shape
itself.111
According to Arnheim, although neither a tree in a painting nor a human body in a
sculpture is driven by physical forces, their visual images are experienced as
configurations of forces.112 Arnheim accounts for the visual 'forces' or dynamic qualities
attributed to visual images by suggesting that these represent the psychological
counterpart of the physiological forces taking place in the perceiver in the organization
and interpretation of visual data. Like the Empathy theorists, Arnheim believes that
perception amounts to something more than the passive reception of stimuli in a single
110 Kurt Koffa, Principles ofGestalt Psychology, p. 72.
111 'The Gestalt Theory of Expression", p.53; Art and Visual Perception, p.400; "Perceptual Dynamics
in Musical Expression", pp.214-215.
112 Art and Visual Perception, pp.399-400; 'The Completeness of Physical and Artistic Form", BJA,
34 (1994), 109-113, p. 112.
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organ of sense; and for this reason he invites us, in somewhat dramatic language, to think
of stimulation, not as "stable patterns peacefully printed upon a passive medium" but
rather as "a hole being torn into a resistant tissue". Perception involves nothing short of
"an invasion of the organism by external forces, which upset the balance of the nervous
system." A battle ensues in which the invading forces try to maintain themselves against
the tendency of the physiological field forces to eliminate the intruder or at least to reduce
it to the simplest possible pattern. If the outcome of this struggle is reflected in the formal
properties attributed to the object perceived, the actual struggle, the play of physiological
forces, finds its correlate in the directed tension or dynamic qualities attributed to the
percept.113 To express Arnheim's thesis in less florid language, it is Arnheim's
suggestion that the projection of the perceptual stimulus on the brain, and particularly on
the visual cortex, creates a configuration of electrochemical forces in the cerebral field.
The stresses and strains taking place in the cerebral cortex whilst retinal stimulations are
subjected to organizational processes in the brain, represent the physiological correlate of
what is experienced as the expressive quality of the object; whilst the dynamic
physiognomic qualities attributed to the object perceived are the psychological correlate of
those dynamic physiological processes in the subject which result in the organization of
perceptual stimuli.114
It is a short step in Arnheim's thinking from the notion that a percept possesses
dynamics or directed tensions to the notion that the percept enjoys a certain expressive
character. Unlike the other components of the perceptual stimulus, such as the hue of a
colour or the size of a shape, the directed tensions are phenomenal forces, illustrating and
recalling the behaviour of forces elsewhere and in general. Thus, "by endowing the
object or event with a perceivable form of behaviour, these tensions give it 'character'
and recall the similar character of other objects or events. This is what is meant by saying
that these dynamic aspects of the percept 'express' its character."115 Arnheim defines
expression as "the capacity of a particular perceptual pattern to exemplify through its
113 Art and. Visual Perception, pp.399-400.
114 'The Gestalt Theory of Expression", pp.61-62.
115 "The Gestalt Theory of Expression", p.53.
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dynamics the structure of a type of behaviour that could manifest itself anywhere in
human experience."116
To help comprehend the nature of the theory on offer, it will be useful to compare
and contrast Arnheim's theory of expression with Stephen Davies' account of musical
expressiveness. Davies' approach to musical expression assumes the priority of human
expression over all other forms of expressiveness. That is to say, the ability to recognize
the physiognomic or expressive characters belonging to inanimate objects and works of
music assumes a prior thorough familiarity with the nature of human emotions, and with
the ways in which people manifest their emotions in behaviour. Physiognomic characters
will be assigned to the relatively small number of things that can bear a striking
resemblance to human emotional behaviours, the relatively few things that can, in the
words of Davies, "wear an expression or have a gait, carriage or bearing in the way in
which a person's behaviour may exhibit these things."117 Only given a familiarity with
emotional human beings can we begin to identify those parts of nature and of works of
art bearing a sufficient resemblance to human emotional behaviours to warrant extending
emotion predicates to them.
In contrast with the view expressed by Davies, Arnheim's account of expression
explicitly denies the priority of human expression in determining the expressiveness of
other objects. Arnheim denies that the expressive characters belonging to natural objects
and works of art are confined to the resemblances these objects bear to human emotional
behaviours, what Davies calls emotion characteristics in appearances (e.c.i.a's).
According to Arnheim, a work of music counts as 'expressive' because the aural percept
corresponding with that work embodies a dynamic structure that exemplifies and
therefore 'expresses' patterns of behaviour or dynamic processes that are familiar to us
both from our experience of human beings, but also from our experience of the
'behaviour' of natural objects and processes. Arnheim believes that only some of those
dynamic processes which the aural percept exemplifies in its structure correspond with
those dynamic processes identifiabl as the characteristic behaviours of human beings in
116 "Perceptual Dynamics in Musical Expression", p.222.
117 "The Expression of Emotion in Music", p.76.
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the grip of emotions. It follows that a work of music may be expressive of a whole range
of dynamic concepts besides those corresponding with the human emotions.118 Since
human emotional behaviour is one among many kinds of behaviour which the dynamics
of a perceptual pattern might express, Arnheim believes it would be a mistake to suppose
that inanimate things are expressive only and to the extent that these display dynamic
perceptual patterns exemplifying human emotional behaviour. So far, there would appear
to be little point of difference between Davies and Arnheim when it comes to the nature of
musical expression. For whilst Davies' own theory of expression in music is specifically
designed to explain the attribution of emotions to music, this is not to say that Davies is
committed to denying that music may express other things besides the emotions.
However, Arnheim's denial of the priority of human expression in fixing the expressive
qualities of works of art goes much further than pointing out that emotions are not the
only things that works of art express. For Arnheim wishes to argue that, where a percept
could be seen as exemplifying, both the dynamic pattern of a form of human emotional
behaviour, and the dynamic pattern of some other process, it is our awareness of the
latter which will dominate:
A weeping willow does not look sad because it looks like a sad person. It is
more adequate to state that since the shape, direction, and flexibility of willow
branches convey the expression of passive hanging, a comparison with the
structurally similar psychophysical pattern of sadness in humans may impose
itself secondarily.119
That is to say, in those cases where an object is 'physiognomized' in the narrow meaning
of the word, where it is seen as expressive of human behavioural characteristics, an
awareness of the resemblance the object bears to human beings in the grip of emotions is
secondary to our recognition of the direct expressive character of that behaviour.
It would appear to be a corollary of Arnheim's view of expression that the behaviour
of human beings may present in its perceptual dynamics both forms of behaviour that are
deemed to be emotional, and forms of 'behaviour' common to both human beings and
118 "Perceptual Dynamics in Musical Expression", p.226.
119 'The Gestalt Theory of Expression", p.64.
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natural processes. It is therefore not surprising that Arnheim should point out that the
way in which we visually organize the appearances of human behaviour does not always
give priority to the emotionally expressive character of that behaviour - that sometimes,
we give priority to the forms of behaviour which may be exemplified by human beings
and nonsentient things:
We perceive the slow, listless, 'droopy' movements of one person as against
the brisk, straight, vigorous movements of another, but do not necessarily go
beyond the meaning of such appearance by thinking explicitly of the psychical
weariness or alertness behind it. Weariness and alertness are already contained
in the physical behaviour itself. They are not distinguished in any essential way
from the weariness of slowly floating tar or the energtic ringing of the
telephone bell.120
In denying the priority of human expression in fixing the expressiveness of natural
objects, Arnheim rejects the explanatory mechanism underlying Davies's account of
musical expressiveness. Arnheim does not believe that the expressive character we
attribute to human behaviour is the result of an inference we habitually make from the
emotional states of individuals to the forms of behaviour characteristically associated with
those emotional states. Nor does he believe that we see inanimate, non-human objects as
expressive in virtue of any perceived similarities between the forms of human emotional
behaviour and the appearances of these objects. Instead, whether we are looking at a
human being or at some natural object, any similarities between the dynamic structure of
the percept and behaviour characteristic of emotional human beings is incidental to our
awareness of the expressive character directly given in the percept. For Arnheim,
expressive character is not something present by inference, but something directly given
in perception. As he sometimes puts it, expression is part of the 'primary content' of
perception, an integral part of the perceptual process.121 We can summarize Arnheim's
discussion of expression by saying that an object is expressive to the extent that it
exemplifies in its perceptual dynamics a form of behaviour. In Arnheim's thinking,
behaviour is not something belonging to human beings and extended by analogy to
120 'The Gestalt Theory of Expression", pp.64-65.
121 Art and Visual Perception, p.430; 'The Gestalt Theory of Expression", p.63.
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honorary human beings - that is to say, anything else capable of motion. The concepts we
form of behaviour are general concepts of dynamic processes that may be exemplified in
the actions of sentient beings and in other natural processes. We do not think of slowly
floating tar as 'weary' because it somehow resembles the behaviour of persons who are
feeling weary. It would be more accurate to say that the concept 'weariness' designates a
form of behaviour that is exemplified in people who feel tired, and in slowly moving tar.
The person who understands the concept of weariness is someone who can recognize a
certain perceptual dynamic both in human beings but also in viscous liquids.
It is not my intention to argue for the gestalt theory of expression here. Given the
types of claim Arnheim makes in his theory, the business of supporting or refuting the
gestalt theory of expression is best left in the hand of psychologists and physiologists
rather than philosophers. Thus, rather than arguing for the theory, I shall adopt the
strategy of sketching some of the beneficial consequences of adopting such a broadly-
based approach to the phenomenon of physiognomic perception, as opposed to the rather
narrow notion of physiognomic perception implicit in Stephen Davies' theory of musical
expression.
If we take seriously the narrow notion of physiognomic perception contained in
Stephen Davies' theory of musical expression, then we would expect to find that human
beings become acquainted with the expressiveness of persons before they become
acquainted with the physiognomic characters belonging to non-human objects. In point of
fact, this expectation does not reflect the manner in which we would go about teaching
emotion concepts to children. Here an analogy may be useful. You would not teach a
young child the concept 'airplane' by showing him a coloured photograph of a Boeing
747. Instead, you would begin by showing him the simplified, schematic icon of an
airplane appearing in a child's picture book, along with some cartoons depicting airplanes
and other objects in flight. At the same time, you would introduce him to things that fly,
such as birds, and teach him to imitate the motion of a plane in his own body. At the end
of all this, you would hope that when it came time to board a Boeing, he would grasp the
fact that the entire rigid object surrounding him, containing row upon row of seated
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persons, was airborne and travelling from point A to point B. In a very similar way, a
child cannot be taught overnight to recognize and react to the emotions of others and
relate these to his own internal states and feelings. The child understands the concept of
sadness when he can recognize it both from without and within, when he has learned to
identify the manifestations of sadness in the behaviour of others and to relate these forms
of behaviour to the internal feeling of sadness in himself. One of the ways in which you
would go about teaching the young child to experience an emotion both from without and
within involves teaching him to recognize non-human objects that are 'sad', such as
weeping willows; teaching him to mimic the drooping posture of these 'sad' objects in
his own body, and in this indirect way, teaching him to identify the feelings which he
experiences in his own body when he adopts this slumping posture with the feeling state
of sadness. If this is anything like an accurate picture of the way in which the very young
acquire emotion concepts, then it follows that our understanding of human emotional
behaviour does not predate our understanding of the expressive character of inanimate
things, that we acquire both types of understanding simultaneously. That is to say, the
expressiveness of natural objects is not derivative upon the expressiveness of persons, in
the way in which the narrow concept of physiognomic perception would tend to suggest.
There may be some truth in Arnheim's suggestion that our concepts of behaviour are
generalized concepts of dynamic processes which may be exemplified in the actions of
human beings and in natural processes. So the first benefit of adopting a broad rather
than a narrow understanding of the concept of physiognomic perception is that this
provides a more faithful picture of the human acquisition of emotion concepts.
The reader will recall that, way back in Chapter One, in the course of assessing
Scruton's ambiguity argument, we examined a scenario offensive to commonsense which
Scruton believed would be a natural consequence of Sibley's brand of aesthetic realism.
Under this scenario, an individual possessing the faculty of taste but lacking the concept
of sadness in persons would be capable of applying the concept of sadness to works of
art. The assumption implicit in the narrow notion of physiognomic perception, that our
understanding of the expressive character of non-human things is contingent upon a prior
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understanding of human emotional behaviour, suggests a variant upon Scruton's original
scenario. This companion scenario describes an individual who is fully competent in
identifying and discussing the emotional states of human beings, yet who possesses no
understanding of how the same words might be used to identify physiognomic
characteristics in nature and in works of art. Of course, if the story provided here of the
acquisition of emotion concepts is correct, then it is unlikely to say the least that someone
would have acquired the notion of sadness in persons without simultaneously acquiring a
competence in applying the same concept to inanimate objects. However, for the sake of
argument, let us accept the assumption implicit in the narrow use of the concept of
physiognomic perception, that our ability to apply emotion concepts to human beings
precedes an ability to apply these same concepts to non-human objects. What would we
wish to say concerning this variant of Scruton's original scenario? Although we would
not say that the individual described under the scenario fails to understand the human
emotions, we would wish to say that this individual displays an inferior understanding of
the emotions to the man who can apply the concept of sadness both to persons and to
inanimate things. Adopting the wide notion of physiognomic perception contained in
Arnheim's account of expressive perception allows us to say why we believe this
individual's understanding is defective: because he has not realized that the dynamic
pattern inherent in his percept of another persons's behaviour exemplifies a form of
behaviour (limp passivity) which may be detected visually in the behaviour of sad
persons, but also in the 'behaviour' of willow trees and telephone receivers. Thus,
Arnheim's account of expression respects our belief that the person who cannot identify
the physiognomic characters belonging to inanimate things possesses a poorer
understanding of the emotions than the person who is able to apply emotion concepts to
persons, to nature, and to works of art.
The third and final benefit to be derived from adopting the wide notion of
physiognomic perception contained in Arnheim's theory of expressive perception relates
to the concerns raised at the start of this chapter. The chapter began by examining the
New Theory of expression, a theory built on the premise that the practice of attributing
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category (c) emotion terms to works of art constitutes an idiosyncratic use of language
requiring a special philosophical explanation. Aldrich's criticism of the New Theory
amounted to the claim that we will never understand this use of language as long as we
treat the aesthetic use of (c) category terms in isolation from other uses of the same
vocabulary. Aldrich invited us to think of the 'problem' of category (c) emotion
attributions as a piece torn from a much wider philosophical problem, the metaphysical
difficulty of explaining how any 'mere' thing - be it a human body or a work of art -
functions as the subject of expressive predication. Arnheim also sees the attribution of
category (c) terms to works of art as part of a wider problem, albeit a different problem
to the one identified by Aldrich. According to Arnheim, the problem of emotion
attribution in art is part of the problem of accounting for the various dynamic properties
perceivers attribute to inanimate objects. Like most aesthetic attributions, category (c)
attributions reflect the fact that human beings 'animate' that which they perceive, by
treating the dynamic processes belonging to acts of perceptual interpretation as qualities in
the thing perceived. Whereas the narrow notion of physiognomic perception implied in
Stephen Davies' theory of musical expression invites us to see category (c) attributions as
atypical of the class of aesthetic attributions in general, the wide notion of physiognomic
perception which Arnheim employs provides a mechanism for treating most aesthetic
attributions in the same way, and teaches us to see category (c) attributions as natural
denizens of the class of aesthetic attributions. This reflection offers a convenient point to




The Plot So Far
This thesis began by examining Sibley's distinction between aesthetic concepts and
nonaesthetic concepts as a means of tackling the question whether there is an intuitive
distinction to be made within aesthetics between judgements which are, and judgements
which are not, narrowly aesthetic. This question amounted to the question whether some
judgements are more deserving of the curiosity of philosophical aestheticians than others.
We discovered that Sibley identified a narrowly aesthetic judgement as the report of a
sensitive perception. Pursuing the connection between aesthetic judgement and aesthetic
perception endorsed this notion of aesthetic judgement when it was revealed that those
aesthetic judgements that interested Sibley amount to strongly perceptual judgements -
that is to say, judgements formed in the course of perception, as opposed to reflective
judgements or pieces of reasoning taking the data of perception for their raw materials.
The realization that aesthetic judgements are both strongly perceptual and perceptually
elusive led to the question, firstly, whether the experiences of the aesthetically sensitive
might not prove to be qualitatively different to the experiences of the aesthetically
insensitive; and secondly, whether perceiving aesthetically and perceiving non-
aesthetically might not amount to incompatible ways of looking at things. As a method of
focusing upon this second question, we examined one account of aesthetic perception
which made the claim that I could not entertain simultaneously both the aesthetic aspects
and the nonaesthetic aspects of an object. Although Aldrich's account of aesthetic
perception provided substantial insight into the complex and diverse nature of aesthetic
predication, we could find no reasons supporting Aldrich's claim that an aesthetic
awareness of things simultaneously excludes a nonaesthetic awareness. I used the failure
of Aldrich's account to endorse the commonsense view that if aesthetic perception proves
to be a phenomenologically distinctive species of perception, this fact does not imply that
aesthetic perceiving cannot be carried out during the course of ordinary acts of
perception.
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We then proceeded to assess Aldrich's theory as an account of expressive
attribution. This enquiry provided an excuse to assess, and ultimately reject, a series of
familiar accounts of expressive attribution. Placing a discussion of expressive attribution
in Chapter Four was no accident for, as I now intend to show, far from viewing
expressive attributions as an idiosyncratic subclass of aesthetic attributions, one requiring
special analysis and explanation, we can think of expressive attributions as forming the
paradigm of aesthetic attributions in general. To the extent that there exists a
phenomenon of aesthetic perception remaining distinct from scientific perception or
ordinary perception, then aesthetic perception constitutes something very like
physiognomic perception, or an awareness of the perceptual character of things. The
notion that aesthetic perception constitutes a form of physiognomic perception records
one of the main findings of this thesis.
In light of issues raised in preceding chapters, it is now possible to make good my
promise to deliver a theory of aesthetic judgement. To this end, I use Section I to recast
the distinction between aesthetic perception and nonaesthetic perception in a new way, by
suggesting that aesthetic perception amounts to an awareness of the perceptual character
belonging to objects - that is to say, an awareness of the way in which objects present
themselves to perceivers. Here I suggest that the notion of physiognomic perception
introduced in Chapter Four and the notion of aesthetic perception may be used to
illuminate one another. The claim that aesthetic perception constitutes an awareness of the
way in which objects present themselves to the perceiver reduces aesthetic qualities to
qualities of appearance, and thereby raises in a particularly urgent way the question of the
objective status of aesthetic judgements. For this reason, Section II tackles the topic of
aesthetic realism and the claim, often made, that aesthetic judgements lack objectivity.
According to this line of thinking, aesthetic qualities form a proper subset of a much
wider class of qualities and judgements which are projected upon the world rather than
being embedded in the world's fabric. The focus of discussion is John McDowell's
critique of J.L.Mackie's claim that moral values are not part of the fabric of the world.
Here I argue that those seeking an understanding of aesthetic attribution will find little
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enlightenment in the type of projectivism which tars all secondary qualities, aesthetic
qualities, and moral values with the same metaphysical brush. Section III continues the
same theme from a different direction, examining the claim that aesthetic qualities qua
properties projected upon the world supervene upon a set of more fundamental, natural
properties. In reviewing the manner in which the doctrine of supervenience has been
employed by those writing in aesthetics, I find some just-ification for Marcia Muelder
Eaton's claim that the notion of supervenience does little theoretical work in the aesthetic
realm.
Finally, Section IV contains a reassessment of that perceptual model of aesthetic
sensitivity attributed to Sibley at the end of Chapter Two. In particular, I question the
picture of the relative distribution of taste contained in that model in light of the view of
aesthetic perception developed in Section I, a view which suggests that the ability to form
Sibley's so-called aesthetic judgements is not something confined to the gifted few, but
lies within the province of Everyman.
I
In the course of Chapters Three and Four, I hae devoted much time to considering
the faults of Aldrich's theory of aesthetic perception, and his theory of expressive
attribution. Despite the various weaknesses that I have attributed to Aldrich's views, I
would not wish to suggest that Aldrich has nothing of value to teach us concerning the
nature of aesthetic attribution and aesthetic judgement. In particular, I would suggest that
there are three features of his discussion of aesthetic perception which provide something
like a minimum requirement upon an adequate theory of aesthetic judgement. I shall
specify these, then discuss them in turn:
(i) Aesthetic perception involves a form of sensitivity to the ground-level
aesthetic features of things.
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(ii) Aesthetic perception should not be contrasted with perception simplicitur.
Rather, the contrast between aesthetic perception and nonaesthetic perception is
a contrast between different perceptual projects.
(iii) The so-called problem of expression in art identified in recent philosophy is
best tackled as part of a wider philosophical problem.
(i) In the course of this investigation, we have encountered a variety of opinions
concerning the nature of aesthetic descriptions and aesthetic attributions. At one end of
the spectrum of opinion we find Philip Petit's suggestion that aesthetic characterisations
are perceptually elusive. The claim that aesthetic characterisations are perceptually elusive
amounts to the claim that thorough acts of perception may fail to reveal the aesthetic
characteristics of things. The view that aesthetic characteristics are perceptually elusive
apparently chimes with Frank Sibley's assertion that it takes a certain perceptivity or
'taste' to detect a-qualities. Whether he intended to or not, Sibley demonstrated the
elusive nature of aesthetic characteristics when he introduced the person of the aesthetic
clod. The clod, it will be recalled, was an individual aware of his own deficiencies of
taste, and who studied to make up for inadequacies by employing rules and
generalizations in forming his aesthetic judgements. Sibley used the fact that such an
individual could never have great confidence in the results of his aesthetic inferences to
illustrate the contention that a-terms lack governing conditions. Although Sibley
engineered the example of the aesthetic clod with a view to illustrating his assertion that a-
terms lack governing conditions, the example of the clod equally might be used to
illustrate the perceptually elusive nature of aesthetic characteristics, or the fact that
someone could perceive thoroughly and intelligently and still fail to detect aesthetic
qualities. The notion that it takes taste or extraordinary powers of discrimination to locate
perceptually elusive aesthetic characters suggests that aesthetic qualities constitute occult
or hidden qualities lost in a sea of nonaesthetic qualities. Occupying the other end of the
spectrum of opinion is the view of the gestalt psychologists, who claim not only that
expressive aesthetic characteristics are given directly in perception, but that these qualities
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loudly proclaim their presence to the canny perceiver, being more overt characteristics of
a percept than such nonaesthetic characteristics as size, hue and shape.
Running like a leitmotif through the views of aesthetic perception we have
encountered thus far is the notion that aesthetic perception involves a sensitivity to what
K.Mitchells called the aesthetic character lurking in the most ordinary things, and what
Aldrich calls the medium of the materials of a work of art. In addition to these lower-
order aesthetic features, Aldrich thinks that works of art possess certain higher-order or
global aesthetic characteristics, features Aldrich designates as qualities of composition.
Aldrich believes that it is impossible to be sensitive to these qualities of composition
unless or until we are aware of the medium of the materials. That is to say, Aldrich agrees
with Sibley in regarding these higher-order aesthetic qualities as emergent qualities, but
departs from Sibley in believing that they emerge out of the lower-order aesthetic
qualities, rather than the nonaesthetic qualities, of works of art. Arnheim also commits
himself to the view that there exist certain higher-order aesthetic qualities, the qualities
which objects express in their perceptual dynamics. Like Aldrich, Arnheim believes that
these qualities emerge from a form of lower-level aesthetic quality. For Arnheim, the
various elements of a visual design must be dynamically animated by directed tensions if
I am to see the design overall as exemplifying and hence 'expressing' a form of
behaviour. The notion that the global aesthetic characteristics of works of art do not
emerge directly out of nonaesthetic characteristics suggests that Sibley provides a
misleading picture of aesthetic sensitivity when he treats acts of aesthetic perception as
unusually careful acts of perception in which we detect emergent qualities that the clod
overlooks. Instead, it would appear to be the case that it is the form of perceptual
organisation one brings to an object which makes an act of perception 'aesthetic' or not,
and that the same form of perceptual organization may be directed upon both works of art
but also what are seemingly the most trivial aspects of things.
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(ii) Talk of the perceptually elusive nature of aesthetic characteristics misleads us
into supposing that it is possible to perceive competently whilst failing to recognize the
aesthetic characteristics of things. That is to say, to suggest that aesthetic characteristics
elude the ordinary perceiver is to suppose that nonaesthetic perception, comprising an
awareness of all and only nonaesthetic characteristics, constitutes ordinary perceptual
competence; whilst an ability to recognize aesthetic features represents more than ordinary
perceptual competence. The result of this view is the opinion that the person displaying
aesthetic competence displays an extraordinary and admirable sensitivity that is in no way
necessary to the business of understanding language and the world. We do have the
notion of a type of perceiver who perceives competently and thoroughly whilst failing to
take account of aesthetic characteristics. That perceiver is the scientific observer. The
notion that the perceiver incapable of detecting aesthetic qualities may nonetheless display
ordinary perceptual competence - the notion, in other words, that nonaesthetic perception
corresponds with perception simplicitur - arises from the unreflecting commonsensical
view that the 'ordinary' perceiver does in a less formal way whatever it is that the
scientist does when he observes and measures things. The fact of the matter is that
scientific perception does not exhaust the nature of ordinary perceptual competence. For
as Rudolf Arnheim draws to our attention, the attitude of the scientific perceiver is an
artificial one.1 The scientific perceiver is a perceiver who consciously sets out to ignore
the aesthetic characteristics given to ordinary perception, someone who chooses to see a
fire as merely a set of hues and shapes in motion instead of noticing the exciting violence
of the flames; someone who ignores the expression of a face as he determines the shape
of the jawline and the space between the eyes. Aldrich introduced his distinction between
observation and prehension, contrasting these with ordinary or 'holophrastic' perception,
in part as a corrective to the notion that an exclusively 'scientific' world view, comprising
an awareness of physical objects located in physical space, represents our bedrock
rapport with things, the default mode of perception in terms of which we make sense of
1 Rudolf Arnheim, 'The Gestalt Theory of Perception", in Towards a Psychology ofArt: Collected
Essays (London: Faber and Faber, 196V), pp.51-73; p.63. See also Rudolf Arnheim, Art and Visual
Perception: A Psychology of the Creative Eye, 2nd. ed. (London: Faber and Faber, 1969), p.430.
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the world.2 Aldrich teaches us to see that, if whatever the aesthetic perceiver does
represents a departure from ordinary perception, the same point can be made concerning
the activity of the scientific observer. Aldrich lays down the idea that the scientific and the
aesthetic perceiver are not persons displaying different levels of perceptual competence,
but perceivers in pursuit of separate perceptual projects.
What we might call the scientific world view regards the capacity to detect aesthetic
qualities as something of little or no importance to our understanding of language and the
world. In his earlier accounts of aesthetic perception, Aldrich attempts to check the
prejudicial attitude to aesthetic perception implicit in the scientific world view by
identifying our sensitivity to aesthetic features with a distinctive and autonomous form of
perceptual competence, to be placed alongside the perceptual competence which allows us
to perceive physical objects existing in space. There are times when Aldrich apparently
expresses the view that prehensive perception amounts to something more than the ability
to perceptually make over a piece of canvas as the pictorial appearance of a three-
dimensional landscape, when he wishes to suggest that prehension vies with physical
object perception to provide an alternative comprehensive perceptual structuring of the
world. This is how I interpret the casual allusion which Aldrich makes to "the aesthetic
space and time in which things appear as aesthetic objects, a milieu in which they have a
history."3
It is a simple enough matter to demonstrate that there does not exist the form of
aesthetic space which Aldrich hints at here. The notion that there could exist a form of
aesthetic space in which different aesthetic objects appear takes a foothold from our
experience of listening to music. As mentioned several times previously, we experience
musical melodies as 'objects' travelling through a virtual, musical 'space'. For musical
compositions written in the Western tonic system, the diatonic scale describes a structure
for that space, making it possible to think of musical melodies as realizing different
possibilities inherent in a single musical 'space'. However, when it comes to the visual
2Philosophy ofArt (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p.24; "Picture Space", PR, 67
(1958), 342-352, pp.342-343.
3 Philosophy ofArt, p. 34.
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arts, it is impossible to maintain the notion that pictures constitute objects located relative
to one another in a structured pictorial space. Whenever Aldrich talks of the aesthetic
space of a picture, what he invariably has in mind is a structure unique to that picture
which happens to instantiate it. The problem is that, as Aldrich admits, the aesthetic space
of a pictorial composition emerges from our awareness of the timbres as well as the
tonalities of the elements employed, an awareness of the smoothness, harshness,
warmth, sharpness or delicacy of colours and lines.4 To put the same point in a slightly
different way, the tonality of visually perceived colour cannot be divorced from its timbre
in the way in which the tonality or 'colour' of perceived sound can be divorced from its
timbre. A musical tone, say a 'C', possesses the same colour and thus the same tonal
relationships with other notes of the diatonic scale, regardless of the octave range in
which it occurs and regardless of the timbre of the instrument upon which it is played. By
contrast, the tonal relationships generated by the combination of pigments used to create a
given pictorial composition are partly determined by the timbres belonging to the
pigments in question. Replacing a patch of blue pigment in a picture with a pigment of a
slightly redder shade of blue would alter the tonal relationships between the colours in the
picture, perhaps generating a different three-dimensional colour projection and thereby
altering the representational content of the picture. Attempting to extend the boundaries of
the aesthetic space of the picture by placing it edge to edge with another picture would
serve to alter the colour relationships within each picture, and create a new aesthetic space
assigning a new set of properties to each of the constitutent aesthetic spaces. What this
demonstrates is that the aesthetic space corresponding with a pictorial composition is a
one-off. The notion of an aesthetic space as an overarching structure or milieu in which
individual works of art appear as aesthetic objects and have a history gains no foothold
when it comes to the pictorial arts. And since the notion gains no foothold in the case of
the pictorial arts, we can discredit the notion for the arts in general.
Aldrich does not pick the best method of correcting the prejudicial view of aesthetic
perception implicit in the scientific world view when he treats the ability to perceive
4 Philosophy ofArt,, p.44.
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aesthetic qualities and the ability to view things scientifically as mutually exclusive modes
of perception. The problem with Aldrich's account of aesthetic perception is that
separating our awareness of aesthetic and nonaesthetic qualities into two mutually
exclusive modes of perception gives a misleading and at times paradoxical view of the
nature of perception. What is more, isolating our awareness of aesthetic aspects from our
awareness of physical properties may serve to accord aesthetic perception an equal status
with scientific perception, but it leaves intact the pretensions of the scientific view to
represent an exhaustive account of reality. A more satisfying answer to the scientific
world view would attempt to demonstrate that aesthetic perception and nonaesthetic
perception constitute different parts of a single perceptual competence. The person who
attempted to negotiate the world after the fashion of the scientific observer would struggle
to survive, being oblivious to such emergent features as the friendliness in one face and
the hostility in another. Assuming the scientific perceiver survived his experiences
unscathed, he would not be demonstrating what we understand to be ordinary perceptual
competence. Rather than conceiving the scientific perceiver to be the ordinary or baseline
perceiver against whose performance all forms of perceptual competence can be
measured, it would more adequately reflects our understanding of the nature of perceptual
competence to treat the perceiver aware of both aesthetic and nonaesthetic qualities as the
baseline perceiver against whose performance other acts of perception may be judged. To
this end, we should think of 'scientific' and 'aesthetic' perception, not as distinct modes
of perception generating alternative conceptions of reality, but as separate perceptual
tasks, tasks which may be performed in the course of a single act of perception.
Taken together, (i) and (ii) lead to the suggestion that what we call aesthetic
perception involves a special perceptual project, specifically the project of opening
oneself up to, or becoming aware of, the ground-level aesthetic character lurking in the
most ordinary things. Aldrich at one point in his thinking believed that the pursuit of this
special project involved adopting a special mode of perception which served to exclude an
awareness of the physical characteristics of things. The empathy theorists made the less-
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than-plausible suggestion that I open myself up to the aesthetic character of an object
through a form of sympathetic mimicry, adapting my own bodily posture to the
disposition of parts in the object perceived. The question we need to ask ourselves is this:
is there something special that we do when we perceive aesthetically, something which
puts us in touch with the aesthetic character belonging to the most ordinary things, but
which falls short either of adopting a special mode of perception that precludes an
awareness of nonaesthetic aspects, or of indulging in sympathetic mimicry of the object
perceived? I believe there is. The person perceiving aesthetically interrogates reality after
a different fashion to the nonaesthetic perceiver. The aesthetically sensitive perceiver
allows the object to tell her what it is like, rather than telling the object what it must yield
to her gaze. If the scientific perceiver poses the question, 'what are you like?', the
aesthetic perceiver poses the question, 'what are you like to perceive?'.
Understanding the nature of that character we are sensitive to when we perceive
aesthetically requires a distinction between what I shall call the perceptible character and
the perceptualcharacter of things. The distinction between perceptible and perceptual
character recalls and complements a distinction made at the end of Chapter Three. This
was the distinction between the object ofperception, the object towards which the act of
perception is directed, and the perceptual object, the set of properties generated for the
object in the act of perception. Perceptiblecharacter is that character or nature we discover
in an object through perception. The perceptible character of an object is a 'thing in
itself', something constituting the nature of the object, or deemed to be a property of the
object. By contrast, the perceptualcharacter of an object is the character that object
possesses for the act of perception itself. We can think of the aesthetic character of an
object as its perceptual rather than its perceptible character. Quite simply, my proposal is
that to perceive aesthetically is to look for the perceptual rather than the perceptible
character of things, by posing the question 'what is this object like to perceive?' When a
wine critic detects a number of fruit flavours in a single glass of wine, she is not
describing the perceptible character of the wine, the character of the fruit juices used in its
production. Instead, she is describing the perceptual character of the wine, the character
223
of the experience to be had in drinking the wine; and she does so by suggesting that the
experience of drinking the wine resembles the experience of these different flavours.
Speaking nonaesthetically, the unity of an object is its perceptible unity, and designates
some relationship of coherence between the parts of the object. By contrast, the aesthetic
unity of an object describes its perceptual unity, the fact that perceiving the object in
question generates experiences of a unified kind. Likewise, the visual balance of a
painting designates not its real balance, the struggle of a physical object to maintain its
position against the countervailing forces of gravitation, but instead its apparent balance,
the settled aspect a visual design possesses for the perceiving eye.
(iii) Aldrich criticised the New Theory of expression for the way in which it separated
the aesthetic from the nonaesthetic uses of category (c) terms, then identified the problem
of accounting for the former as a free-standing philosophical problem requiring a
localised solution. Aldrich believed that the question of expressive attribution in art
cannot be understood without considering what it means to attribute emotions to persons.
This is because, according to Aldrich, treating with understanding the problem of
expression in art involves viewing it as part of a wider metaphysical problem: the
problem of explaining the nature of an expressive object. For Aldrich, any answer to the
question, why do we attribute emotions to works ofart? must form part of the answer to
the question, why do we attribute emotions to persons? Rudolf Arnhcim also tackled the
issue of expressive attribution in art as part of a wider concern. Arnheim identified this
wider concern as the phenomenon of physiognomic perception. That is to say, Arnheim
treated the problem of expressive attribution in art as part of the problem of accounting
for the dynamic character attributed to most of the things we perceive. Arnheim's answer
to the question, why do we see expressive qualities in art? also functions as an answer to
the wider question, why do we see ordinary objects as animated by dynamic tensions?
Here I shall be taking on board Aldrich's suggestion that the problem of expressive
attribution in art forms part of a wider issue. I shall also be taking on board Arnheim's
suggestion that the wider problem concerned is one of physiognomic perception broadly
conceived. Discussing the notion of expression in art under the heading of physiognomic
224
perception respects the element of truth in Aldrich's suggestion that, qua expressive
objects, there exist important resemblances between works of art and persons, so that a
proper understanding of the expressiveness of works of art presupposes a proper
understanding of the ways in which persons might be deemed to be expressive.
If (i) and (ii) come together in the suggestion that aesthetic perception involves an
awareness of perceptual character, then (ii) and (iii) come together in the claim that
aesthetic perception is nothing more or less than what I identified in the previous chapter
as physiognomic perception in the wide sense or the term. At the end of Chapter Four, I
suggested some reasons why anyone interested in the phenomenon of expressive
attribution might wish to employ the broad notion of physiognomic perception contained
in Arnheim's theory of expression. Those 'physiognomic' properties that Arnheim
examined in the context of his theory of expression are, of course, aesthetic qualities
under another name. In tackling what I have called the issue of physiognomic perception
in the broad sense, Arnheim was doing nothing more or less than tackling the issue of
aesthetic perception. Arnheim informs us that the aesthetic perceiver, the perceiver aware
of the grassroots aesthetic character belonging to the most ordinary things, is the
perceiver who sees objects as animated by dynamic tensions. For the aesthetic perceiver,
simple shapes are animated by vectors of force, spreading laterally in a rectangle, resting
in balance in a circle or a square.5 Even a dark spot on a light ground becomes, for the
aesthetic perceiver, a living thing animated by 'forces', an object expanding from its
centre, pushing outward, and being checked by the counterforces of the environment.
Points (i), (ii) and (iii) come together in the reflection that the notion of
physiognomic perception, and the notion of aesthetic perception, where the latter is
viewed as an awareness of perceptual as opposed to perceptible character, serve to
illuminate one another. The reason why the notion of physiognomic perception
illuminates the notion of aesthetic perception is because the task we undertake in
physiognomically perceiving a human face provides a model for the task we perform
5 For more on the vectors of force contained in simple patterns and shapes, see Art and Visual
Perception, pp.401-402.
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when we attempt to determine the aesthetic or perceptual character of an object. To
perceive another human being physiognomically is to look with the eye of the casting
director, viewing the individual as someone presenting a certain physiognomy or facial
type. On analogy with the human case, when we move to cases of physiognomic
perception in the wider sense, we think of the object as presenting a physiognomy or
'face', and the job of the perceiver becomes one of determining the character or type of
that face. In a very similar fashion, to view an object aesthetically is to view it as
something with a physiognomy or 'face' of a type we must decipher. The aesthetic
perceiver treats an object as something presenting a physiognomy or face to the act of
perception itself. In forming an aesthetic assessment of the object, she attempts to
decipher the character or type of that face. Whether one is perceiving physiognomically or
perceiving aesthetically, the task in hand is the same: to identify and articulate the nature
of what we might call the object's 'face'.
It is important to distinguish three factors in the case where we view a human being
physiognomically: the facial expressions of the individual which allow us to infer to his
underlying emotional states; the personality or character of the individual; and the
character belonging to that person's face. It is only the third of these which is
physiognomically perceived. We think of these three things as coinciding in the ideal
case. Not only is the sunny disposition of an individual displayed both in his frequent
smiles, and the habitually relaxed muscles of his face; but we believe that we can infer
from his relaxed disposition and characteristically happy facial expressions to an
underlying happy disposition. In point of fact, the physiognomic character of a human
face may belie both whatever facial expression the individual happens to be wearing at a
given time, and his personality type. Arnheim's account of aesthetic perception
illuminates the concept of physiognomic perception in the human case, because it offers
an explanation for the fact that the character worn by a face might fail to coincide with the
true 'character' or personality belonging to the individual concerned. In the terms of
Arnheim's theory of expression, to perceive a face physiognomically is to look at it
aesthetically, so that the face becomes a study in animated form perception. The reason
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why a person of sunny disposition might be assigned a melancholy physiognomy is
because, viewed as a study in animated form perception, the parts of his face display a
dynamic pattern exemplifying and recalling the dynamic or behaviour of a person of
melancholy disposition.
In much the same way that the physiognomic character of a face may fail to concur
with both the facial expressions of the individual and the underlying personality, so too
the perceptual (aesthetic) character of an object and the perceptible character may come
apart. A person of sunny disposition might, physiognomically speaking, possess a
melancholy facial type. An object that is, materially speaking, light as a feather may look
'heavy', in the aesthetic sense. The notion of aesthetic perception serves to illuminate the
notion of physiognomic perception, because understanding the fact that aesthetic
perception involves an attention to the perceptual rather than the perceptible character of
an object helps us understand the difference between reading a human face
physiognomically, and reading a human face as an indicator of the person within. In the
aesthetic case, we look at an object, not in order to determine how things are with the
object, the material relationships between that object and other things; but in order to
discover how the object presents itself to the perceiver, the type of 'face' it wears. By
analogy, to view a human face physiognomically is not, in the language of Aldrich, to
treat the face as a 'point of view' upon the person or soul within, an indicator of the
underlying affective states of the individual. Rather, to view a face physiognomically is to
assess its perceptual character. Applied to the human case, the distinction between
perceptible and perceptual character becomes a distinction between the expressive
character of a face, and the physiognomic character. Just as the perceptible character of an
object refers us to its material condition, so too the expressive character of a face is a
'property' of the face allowing us to infer to the emotional states and personality traits of
the individual. The scare quotes are necessary because, as both Sircello and Aldrich have
taught us to believe, the emotions and the 'character' or personality I find when I examine
the expressive character of the face are strictly speaking properties belong to the person
rather than the face itself. According to Sircello, to say that John is smiling, to describe
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the expressive character of John's face as 'happy', is to say that John expresses his
happiness by gesturing (smiling) through the medium of his face. According to Aldrich,
the expressive character attributed to the face (happiness, melancholy, mirth) is a property
of the individual whose face it is, rather than a property of the face qua material thing.
Happiness, viewed as the expressive character of a face, is not a property belonging to
the face in the way in which redness is a quality of the apple.6 Whilst Aldrich is correct
about the expressive character of a face, we should like to say that the sad character
physiognomically attributed to the face is a property of the face, one serving to qualify the
face and not the person. Aldrich makes the mistake of supposing that the only way in
which emotion words might apply to material objects is if these serve to identify an
expressive character, applying to the metaphysical entity known as the person or the
work of art through the transparent medium of the material thing. Aldrich overlooks the
possibility that there is a way of using emotion terms physiognomically, to apply directly
to the appearance of a material thing.
The distinction between perceptual and perceptible character is not, of course, one
perceivers always consciously make, any more than they will always distinguish the
physiognomic character of a face from its expressive character . For much of the time,
awareness of the physiognomic character of human faces functions as Gombrich's
'physiognomic intuition,' the least reliable among a number of tools we may use as
indicators of the personality of individuals. The aesthetic or perceptual character of an
object can also be an unreliable tool in determining the way things are. Somtimes, we will
assume an object is 'heavy', going on nothing but the physical appearances, the fact it is
a large public sculpture apparently made of stone. It is only on discovering that the object
is made of papier mache that we realize it isn't heavy, after all, that the heaviness ascribed
is a purely visual heaviness that describes the way in which the object fills the field of
vision and relates to other objects in that field, rather than describing any fact concerning
the materials of its construction. However, in much the same way that the perceiver may
look past the expressive character of a human face, and adopt the perceptual attitude of
6 See Virgil C.Aldrich, '"Expresses' and 'Expressive'", JAAC, 37 (1978), 203-217; pp.213-215 passim.
See also p. 173 above.
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the casting director who seeks the visual type of the face; so too we may consciously set
about to discover the perceptual appearances of things, and thereby perceive aesthetically.
To say that aesthetic and nonaesthetic perception form parts of a single perceptual
competence is to say that an awareness of perceptual or physiognomic character is one of
the devices human beings use in interpreting their environment, a device that is
backgrounded during so-called acts of 'scientific' perception, but which will be brought
to the forefront of attention in the context of aesthetic judgement.
In short, it is my proposal that the man who judges aesthetically, in the non-
verdicative sense of judgement outlined by Sibley, is the man who consciously seeks out
and reports the aesthetic character of an object, the 'facial' type that object presents to the
act of perception. This is to replace Sibley's formula that an aesthetic judgement
constitutes the report of a sensitive perception, with the formula that an aesthetic
judgement is the determination of the perceptual character of an object. Treating the
aesthetic character of an object as its perceptual character captures the fact that aesthetic
appreciation is a form of discourse telling us what it is like to perceive things. Yet at the
same time, this proposal places aesthetic qualities squarely within the realm of qualities of
appearance. This raises the question whether aesthetic judgements, qua judgements
describing properties of appearance, are properly objective after the manner of primary or
secondary quality determinations. It is to the matter of assessing the objectivity of
aesthetic judgements that I now turn.
II
Aesthetic qualities are often classified as tertiary qualities. Tertiary qualities resemble
the so-called secondary qualities in being qualities of affect, ones standing in the same
relationship to secondary qualities as secondary qualities stand to primary qualities. The
intuition which underlies the distinction between secondary and tertiary qualities is that,
in much the same way that secondary qualities are conceived to be qualities of or
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emerging from configurations of primary qualities, so too tertiary qualities constitute
qualities of or emerging from patterns of secondary qualities.7 There would be no
secondary qualities in the absence of primary qualities, and in a similar way, removing
secondary qualities from the world removes at a stroke their dependent tertiary qualities.8
Given the fact that we already have a two-tier distinction in place between secondary
qualities, or qualities of appearance on the one hand, and primary qualities on the other, it
might seem something of a metaphysical extravagance to introduce a third tier to this
distinction, especially when that extra tier takes the form of a further class of qualities of
appearance. I would suggest three reasons why we might wish to distinguish aesthetic
qualities from the ordinary run of secondary qualities. In the first place, classing aesthetic
qualities as tertiary qualities fits nicely with Sibley's claim that aesthetic qualities are
qualities which emerge from the way things appear.9 In the second place, treating
aesthetic qualities as a distinctive class of quality to the ordinary secondary qualities
coheres with the claim made in the previous section, that aesthetic judgements amount to
judgements of perceptual character. Aesthetic descriptions tell us, not simply how the
object seems, but how it seems to perception. Aesthetic descriptions tell us what things
are like to perceive, describing the experience of perceiving the object in the same breath
that they describe the object perceived. Talk of tertiary aesthetic qualities emerging from
secondary qualities captures the notion that aesthetic qualities describe the appearances of
appearances. In the third place, incorporating aesthetic qualities within a wider set of
tertiary qualities allows the philosopher to class these with such entities as moral values,
providing an opportunity to apply to the aesthetic case arguments originally aired in
discussing the objective status of moral values. Here I shall follow the commonplace
7 Ruby Meager, "Aesthetic Concepts", BJA, 10 (1970), 303-322; pp.307-308. For more on the
nomenclature of tertiary qualities and its genesis, see Carroll C.Pratt, "The Design of Music", JAAC, 12
(1954), 289-300, pp.294ff.
8 Roger Scmton, "Understanding Music", in The Aesthetic Understanding (Manchester: Carcanet Press,
1983), footnote 16.
9 F.N.Sibley, "Objectivity and Aesthetics", PAS, Supp.Vol 42 (1968), 30-54, pp.35, 39. Prima facie,
there is no reason to suppose that aesthetic qualities could not emerge directly from the primary qualities
of an object. After all, could not delicacy arise from the shapes in a line drawing as well as from the
pastel shade of a watercolour? What this example shows is that whether or not tertiary qualities emerge
directly from primary qualities depends upon whether you treat the determinate shape of a particular object
as a primary quality, or whether you follow Ruby Meager in treating perceived shape as a secondary
quality. Reasons for adopting the latter course will perhaps emerge in what follows here.
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procedure of assessing arguments for the objectivity of aesthetic values and moral values
in the same breath, by considering J.L.Mackie's attempt to demonstrate that moral values
lack objectivity; and John McDowell's answer to Mackie's assessment of the nature of
value.10
Tertiary qualities will not count as objective qualities in the scientific realist's
conception of the world. J.L.Mackie adopts the scientific realist's stance when he asserts
that moral values and aesthetic values are not 'objective', equating this statement with the
claim that moral and aesthetic values are not embedded in the fabric of the world.11
Mackie reasons that, if moral values are to count as thoroughly objective, it would need
to be the case both that values present themselves as they do, as a form of subjective
concern, and that there was something embedded in the world's fabric which served to
back up and validate that subjective concern.12 That is to say, there would need to be
intrinsic features of the world corresponding with values as we experience them. And
since there are no such objective values answering to values as we experience them
embedded in the fabric of the world, Mackie concludes that moral qualities are not
objective.
Mackie admits that such objective values, were they to exist, would be 'queer'
entities.13 However, he treats the claim that such objective moral values exist to be
factually false rather than theoretically incoherent.14 According to Mackie, the person
who supposes that such objective values exist commits a form of projective error. Mackie
finds a precedent for this projective error in the commonsense understanding of the nature
of coloured perception, a projective error brought to philosophical awareness by Locke's
distinction between primary and secondary qualities.15 For commonsense thinking
identifies secondary qualities as being both qualities of appearances and qualities
10 J.L.Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (London: Penguin, 1977), esp.pp. 15-49; John
McDowell, "Values and Secondary Qualities", in Morality and Objectivity: A Tribute to J.L.Mackie, ed.
Ted Honderich (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), pp. 110-129; John McDowell, "Aesthetic
Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World", in Pleasure, PreferenceandValue, ed. Eva Schaper
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 1-16.
11 Ethics, p. 15.
12 Ethics, p.22.
13 Ethics, p.38.
14 John McDowell, "Values and Secondary Qualities", p. 113.
15 Ethics, pp. 19-20.
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revealing the genuine structures of things. That is to say, commonsense assumes that the
phenomenal aspect of colour, colour as it appears to us, is as much a property of the
object perceived as are such primary qualities as shape, size, and hardness. Locke's
distinction between primary and secondary qualities cautions against the commonsense
error of supposing that colour-as-we-see-it is embedded in the world in the same manner
as such primary qualities as size and shape. Mackie contends that in much the same way
that the claim that colour judgements are objective amounts to the naive projectivist view
that there exist "thoroughly objective features which resemble our ideas of secondary
qualities,"16 those making the claim that moral values are objective naively project
primary qualities like values-as-we-experience-them into the fabric of the world.
John McDowell responds to Mackie's argument by suggesting that those objective
values and colours which Mackie describes, primary qualities like values-as-we-
experience-them, colours-as-we-see-them, represent a theoretical as well as a practice
impossibility. Not only would it be false to claim that such items exist, but the very
notion of a "thoroughly objective" value of the kind which Mackie describes is
incoherent. According to McDowell, the invitation to think of a primary quality like
redness-as-we-perceive-it asks us to do that which we could never do: form an idea of a
colour which did not make essential reference to the idea of how its possessors would
look.17 The invitation is to construct a conception of a quality such as amusingness, a
conception which was fully intelligible otherwise than in terms of the characteristic
human responses to what is amusing, but which nevertheless contrived somehow to
retain the 'phenomenal' aspect of amusingness as we experience it in those responses.18
McDowell contends that to credit commonsense with the projective error which Mackie
describes is to accuse commonsense of possessing a "wildly problematical understanding
of itself."19 It is not necessary for commonsense to entangle itself in this projective error
in order to make sense of the fact that colours are objectively there to be experienced. For
16 J.L.Mackie, Problems From Locke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), pp. 18-19. The terminology of
colour-as-we-see-it, taste-as-we-taste-it, etc., derives from Mackie's discussion of the primary and
secondary quality distinction on p.22.
17 "Values and Secondary Qualities", p. 113.
18 "Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World", p.4.
19 "Values and Secondary Qualities", p. 113.
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we can make error-free sense of the thought that secondary qualities are authentic objects
of perceptual awareness without postulating the existence of primary qualities resembling
colour-as-we-see-it; and we do so by characterizing colours as essentially phenomenal
qualities. To use McDowell's own convoluted formula, we can think of a secondary
quality as a property the ascription of which to an object is not adequately understood
except as true, if it is true, in virtue of the object's disposition to present a cetain sort of
perceptual appearance: specifically, an appearance characterizable by using a word for the
property itself to say how the object perceptually appears. Thus an object's being red is
understood as obtaining in virtue of the object's being such as to look red.20 According
to McDowell, commonsense is not guilty of supposing that colours will only have
experiential reality for us if there is something in the world formally corresponding with
the experience of colour-in-us.
McDowell suggests that when Mackie reduces the claim that moral values are
objective to the claim that moral values are part of the fabric of the world, Mackie
succeeds in confounding two very different notions of objectivity.21 According to the
first of these notions, a quality is objectivei in the event that it can be adequately
conceived otherwise than in terms of dispositions to give rise to subjective states. In the
notion of subjectivity contrasting with objectivityi, a quality that is subjectivei is a quality
such that no adequate conception of what it is for a thing to possess it is available except
in terms of how the thing would, in suitable circumstances, effect a sentient being. An
object of awareness is objective2 in the event that it is there to be experienced, as opposed
to being a mere figment of that subjective state purporting to be an experience of it.
Corresponding with this second notion of objectivity, an object of awareness will be
subjective2 if it is a mere figment of the subjective state that purports to be an experience
of it.22 This second distinction between objectivity and subjectivity concerns the
20 "Values and Secondary Qualities", pp.111-112.
21 "Values and Secondary Qualities", pp. 113-114; "Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the
World", p.2.
22 A piece of evidence supporting McDowell's contention that Mackie's argument presumes a single
notion of objectivity can be found in the fact that at one point, Mackie rules out equating objectivity
with intersubjective agreement, thereby ruling out the existence of a further type of objectivity, according
to which a matter is objective in the event there exists widespread intersubjective agreement. See Mackie,
Ethics, p.22.
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distinction between veridical and illusory experiences. Mackie claims that our experience
of secondary qualities and aesthetic values will count as veridical only if it resembles
primary quality experience in one particular respect: that what it is for an object or
situation to possess a secondary quality or moral value is conceivable without any notion
of how that quality presents itself to a sentient being. As most people would view the
matter, the claim that value is in the world amounts to the claim that value is objective2,
there to be experienced by sentient beings, and not as Mackie suggests objective!, or
conceivable independently of its effect upon sentient beings.23 The fact that a matter is
subjective!, does not entail that it is also subjective2. Yet this is precisely what Mackie
assumes when he identifies the thesis that moral values are objective with the claim that
moral values are part of the fabric of the world. Although McDowell is not unkind
enough to say it, Mackie commits the rather elementary philosophical error of assuming
that anything tainted with subjectivity to the extent of reflecting the perceptual awareness
of a human being is thereby tainted with subjectivity in the sense that it is non-veridical.
Whilst I broadly support the method of argumentation which McDowell brings to
bear against Mackie, some of the detail of his argument should be questioned. As we
have seen, Mackie's argument concerning the objectivity of moral values relies heavily
upon an understanding of Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities.
The understanding which Mackie shows on this point deserves greater respect than
McDowell's argument tends to give it. For whilst it is no doubt true that McDowell
succeeds in demonstrating an understanding of secondary quality experience which is
free of projective error, he never succeeds in demonstrating that the error-free
understanding which he describes coincides with what we might call the commonsense
view of the matter, either in Locke's day or in our own. If the error-free understanding of
secondary quality perception that McDowell describes reflects the views of
commonsense, it is not a pre-philosophical commonsense he describes, but a
commonsense heavily indebted to a philosophical education. In its unreconstituted form,
commonsense is very much guilty of the error Mackie's own argument falls into, the
23 "Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World", p.2.
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error of confusing objectivityi with objectivity^, a fact which will be familiar to anyone
who has taught undergraduate philosophy. Thus, if it came to a showdown between
Mackie and McDowell as to whose view of secondary quality perception best champions
the views of commonsense, then Mackie would win hands down. On a purely historical
footnote, it is also worth pointing out that the projective error contained in the
commonsense understanding of secondary qualities which Locke's own discussion of
secondary quality perception was intended to correct, owed less to the views of
commonsense than it did to the Scholastic philosophy of the time.24 Once again, if the
view under attack reflects a form of commonsense, it is not a naive commonsense, but
one enlightened by philosophy.
McDowell strays onto much firmer ground when he argues that the brand of
scientific realism implicit in Mackie's argument craves a description of reality
corresponding with "a view from nowhere".25 For Mackie, a thoroughly objective
description of reality is one making reference only to those properties that can be
understood without essential reference to their effects on sentient beings.26 Mackie's
brand of scientific realism excludes any input from perceivers, and in this respect starkly
contrasts with that brand of scientific realism espoused by John Locke, the figure
commonly identified as the popularizer of the primary-secondary quality distinction.
Given the prominence accorded to Locke's primary-secondary quality distinction
within the context of Mackie's argument, I shall pause briefly here in order to clear up
some common misconceptions which have tended to taint discussions of the distinction.
These misconceptions concern Locke's intentions in making the distinction, and the
manner in which Locke is thought to have argued for his distinction. Locke's discussion
24 Edwin McCann describes how "the Aristotelian-Scholastic doctrine of qualities held that most, at
least, of the sensible qualities of objects are real qualities, that is, that they are real entities existing or
inhering in the objects, and that perception of them involves the mind taking on the form of these
qualities as they exist in the object. This is facilitated by the transmission through a medium - light, for
example, in the case of qualities perceived by means of vision - of an intentional species that becomes the
form of the relevant perception or act of mind; this intentional species is the form that exists in the
object, except that this form exists not in matter, as it does in the object, but in the mind. The idea in the
mind is thus qualitatively identical with the quality in the body that initiated the whole causal process,
since these two are the same in form of species; and so it can properly be said to resemble the quality as
it is in the body." ("Locke's Philosophy of Body", in The Cambridge Companion to Locke, ed. Vere
Chappell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp.56-88, p.64).
25 "Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World", p.6.
26 "Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World", p.2.
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at Essay Il.viii is all too often lifted out of its original context and treated as a weapon in
the arsenal of the would-be scientific realist whom Mackie describes, someone who
wishing to distinguish between those qualities which should and those which shouldn't
belong to a fundamental description of the world.27 Locke's original exposition of the
distinction is then taken for a philosophical argument in favour of the distinction,
employing examples of the invariability and freedom from illusion of our perceptions of
primary qualities, in contrast to our perceptions of secondary qualities.28 The now
orthodox interpretation of Locke's discussion of the primary-secondary quality
distinction is that Locke was not making the distinction at Essay Il.viii.6-21, but
attempting to popularize a scientific distinction that was familiar to him from his contact
with Robert Boyle. The examples of sensory illusion he produces in his text are offered
by way of illustrating the distinction rather than arguing for it, with Locke using the
distinction to explain how these illusions come about, rather than using the existence of
these illusions as evidence in favour of his distinction.29 The second point I would make
is that Locke was not objecting to the commonsense understanding of secondary qualities
from the perspective of any and every type of scientific realism. Instead, Locke was
attempting to familiarize his reader with one particular brand of scientific realism, the
corpuscular hypothesis or atomism of the day. What arguments Locke offers for his
distinction are not arguments from within perception, but conceptual arguments relying
upon the commonsense notion of what it is to be a body, and what is involved in the
causal efficacy of the notion of body.30 These arguments reflect his interest in the
corpuscular hypothesis. Thus at Essay Il.viii.9 Locke invites his reader to identify
primary qualities with those qualities belonging to bodies as we perceive them which
27 Mackie for instance suggests that some of the evidence for the distinction would point out that
secondary qualities are redundant to a scientific description of the world. See Problems From Locke,
pp. 17-20.
28 Thus making his view vulnerable to the Berkeleyan objection that primary qualities are as variable
under changing conditions of perception as are secondary qualities. It is no doubt the realization that
primary qualities are as viewer-dependent as secondary qyalities which leads Ruby Meager to declare that
the philosophy of secondary qualities is mistaken and incoherent. Meager does however concede that the
notion of a tertiary quality might not be as muddled as the notion of a secondary quality. See Ruby
Meager, "Aesthetic Concepts", BJA, 10 (1970), 303-322; pp.307-308.
29 See Peter Alexander, "Boyle and Locke on Primary and Secondary Qualities", in Locke on Human
Understanding: Selected Essays, ed. I.C.Tipton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp.62-76.
30 Edwin McCann, "Locke's Philosophy of Body", pp.60-67.
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must belong to any body, however imperceptibly small, if it is to maintain the character
of a body; and to identify secondary qualities with the set of qualities the object would
cease to possess as it underwent modifications. Thus, in the event that a grain of wheat
were to be subdivided until it became imperceptibly small, it would cease to have colour,
but still possess bulk and motion.
Given the background of Locke's interest in the corpuscular hypothesis, it might be
argued that when Locke cautions the common man to guard against the supposition that
secondary qualities really belong to the object perceived, Locke is not making a principled
objection to any and all perceptual representations which purport to make some essential
reference to the way things look to perceivers. Instead, Locke is objecting to that
particular set of perceptual representations we happen to make now. From the point of
view of the corpuscular hypothesis, the human perceptual apparatus is too coarsely-
grained in its operations to do justice to the true texture of the world. What the human eye
perceives to be a macroscopic-sized object of uniform colour, an opportunity for
undifferentiated sensation, the microscope of the seventeenth-century scientist revealed to
be an intricate arrangement of tiny bodies. A more powerful and more discriminating
organ of sense than the human eye would replace our current secondary quality ideas
with their inaccurate representations of the textures of things, with secondary quality
ideas more closely resembling the microscopic structure of the world.
To illustrate my point, consider the following extract:
Had we senses acute enough to discern the minute particles of bodies and the
real constitution on which their sensible qualities depend, I doubt not but they
would produce quite different ideas in us; and that which is now the yellow
colour of gold would then disappear, and instead of it we should see an
admirable texture of parts, of a certain size and figure. This microscopes plainly
discover to us; for what to our naked eyes produces a certain colour is, by thus
augmenting the acuteness of our senses, discovered to be quite a different thing;
and the thus altering, as it were, the proportion of the bulk of the minute parts
of a coloured object to our usual sight produces different ideas from what it did
before... Blood to the naked eye appears all red, but by a good microscope,
wherein its lesser parts appear, shows only some few globules of red,
swimming in a pellucid liquor; and how these red globules would appear, if
glasses could be found that yet could magnify them a thousand or ten thousand
times more, is uncertain. (Essay, Il.xxiii. II).31
3 1 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. John W.Yolton; 2nd ed. (London:
J.M.Dent and Sons, 1976).
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There are two distinct interpretations which might be placed upon a passage such as this
one. In the first place, it might be assumed that Locke's intention in this passage was to
point out that the secondary qualities assigned to an object are relative to the perceptual
apparatus being used to determine them; and that consequently, this passage constitutes
an argument from the relative nature of secondary quality judgements to the fact that
secondary qualities are not objective features of reality. An alternative reading of the same
passage would stress the fact that Locke apparently leaves it an open question whether
seeing the object under even greater magnification would continue to raise secondary
quality ideas in us, albeit secondary quality ideas more closely resembling the true
microscopical textures of things than those secondary quality ideas we entertain now; or
whether, under even more powerful magnification than the microscopes of Locke's time,
properties such as colour might disappear altogether, so that what are now secondary
quality ideas would become primary quality ideas, and a true reflection of the particulate
nature of reality. That is to say, Locke leaves it an indeterminate question whether the
secondary quality ideas aroused in human perceivers may be explained away as a form of
'noise' accompanying any perceptual message received by the organs of sense; or
whether this perceptual 'noise' could be eliminated if we were operating with suitably
refined senses. On the first of these interpretations, Locke is making a principled
objection to any use of the perceptual organs, on the grounds that these will always create
secondary quality representations distorting the true nature of reality. Under the second
interpretation, Locke is only objecting to those secondary quality representations we
make now, given the fact that the human perceptual apparatus is woefully inadequate to
do justice to the corpuscular nature of reality. Whereas on the first interpretation, Locke is
keen to demonstrate that any use whatsoever of the perceptual organs inevitably leads to
some projective error on the part of the perceiver, on the second interpretation, Locke
objects only to that particular projective error we happen to be guilty of now. In short, I
would suggest that not all would-be scientific realists are committed to the claim that all
perceptual representations making reference to how things look to perceivers must be
eliminated from a properly scientific description of the world. For this claim is not an
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immediate consequence of the primary-secondary quality distinction; and it is something
alien to the thinking of Locke, the figure popularly associated with the introduction of this
distinction.
According to McDowell, Mackie's conception of the thoroughly objective constitutes
a "thin conception of genuine reality" and a "metaphysically disparaging attitude to
values.32 That variety of projectivism which Mackie attributes to the commonsense point
of view, one which treats primary qualities as somehow embedded in the fabric of the
world, with all other qualities representing human projections upon this basic matter, is
by its very nature uninformative, partly because it excludes so much from the fabric of
the world that it results in a thin characterization of the world's fabric; but also because it
fails to do justice to any differences in texture which might obtain between the different
classes of entity excluded from the world's fabric. Many of those wishing to argue that
aesthetic qualities lack objectivity being from the conviction that aesthetic qualities lack
objectivity in some different way to the manner in which secondary qualities might be
thought to lack it. They would argue, in other words, that whatever degree of objectivity
ordinary secondary qualities might be thought to lack vis-a-vis the so-called viewer-
independent primary qualities, tertiary qualities such as aesthetic qualities are pathological
in some further respect. For instance, the argument has been made that whereas the
existence of intersubjective agreement regarding colour judgements makes room for a
distinction between objects which are red because they create sensations of redness in
ordinary perceivers under ordinary conditions of perception, and objects which merely
seem red to the extent of causing sensations of redness in individual perceivers under
nonstandard conditions of perception; because aesthetic qualities are by their very nature
qualities of appearance, properties characterized in terms of how they present themselves
to individual perceivers, they allow no similar distinction between merely seeming F and
actually being F.33
32 "Values and Secondary Qualities", p.121, "Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World",
p.5.
33 Isabel Creed Hungerland, "Once Again, Aesthetic and Non-Aesthetic", JAAC, 26 (1968), 285-295,
pp.288-289. Joseph Margolis also expresses doubts that an is/seems distinction can be made for aesthetic
qualities. See "Robust Relativism", JAAC, 35 (1976), 37-46, p.40, and "Sibley on Aesthetic
Perception", JAAC, 35 (1976), 155-158, p. 158.
239
I can think of three different ways in which we might interpret the claim that aesthetic
qualities are "qualities of appearance," each one of them yielding a different interpretation
for the argument. I shall work through them in turn. In the first place, the idea that
aesthetic qualities are qualities of appearance might amount to the claim that these are
essentially phenomenal properties and therefore subjective!. In which case, since
secondary qualities are also both phenomenal properties and subjective!, either the
argument contradicts itself, or there is no argument here at all. For the argument makes
the false claim that anything that is subjective! is thereby excluded from being objective2,
whilst at the same time permitting secondary qualities to be both subjective! and
objective. Alternatively, the reference to a form of intersubjective agreement grounding
the objectivity of colour-descriptions might point to another type of objectivity being
appealed to here, objectivity3, whereby a matter is objective if it allows the possibility of
intersubjective agreement. In which case, the argument claims that the fact that aesthetic
qualities are subjective! disqualifies these from being objectives. Once again, the
argument contrives to go nowhere, telling us as it does that, on the one hand, secondary
qualities are both subjective! and objectives (or possibly subjective! and both objective2
and objectives), and on the other hand, that the mere fact that aesthetic qualities are
subjective! is sufficient to exclude them from being objective2 or objective3. In addition
to displaying a lack of conceptual clarity on the part of those framing it, this argument
demonstrates that it is impossible to claim that there exists intersubjective agreement
regarding colour-judgements and deny the same for aesthetic judgements without
assuming the truth of the thing you set to prove in the first place, namely, that aesthetic
judgements are hopelessly relative.
Clearly, those wishing to argue that aesthetic qualities qua qualities of appearance
lack the objectivity enjoyed by secondary qualities must believe that aesthetic qualities are
not just phenomenal qualities after the fashion of secondary qualities, these are
'flagrantly' phenomenal qualities. Someone arguing along these lines might seize upon
my own characterization of aesthetic judgements to make her point. For treating aesthetic
judgements as judgements characterizing the way things look to the act of perception
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itself involves treating these as phenomenal characterizations of what already possesses a
phenomenal presentation. However, this line of argument might be turned upon its head.
For rather than taking the fact that we can enjoy another perceptual 'take' upon the object
subjected to an aesthetic description to show that aesthetic descriptions are somehow
lacking in objectivity; the same fact might be taken to demonstrate the fact that aesthetic
characterizations enjoy a species of objectivity lacking to colour-judgements. This is
because the fact that I can have another perceptual take upon the object viewed
aesthetically opens up the possibility of reason-giving in aesthetics. When a dispute arises
concerning coloured perception, there is no opportunity to appeal to criteria of a
perceptible nature to solve that dispute. By contrast, where a dispute arises concerning
the aesthetic character of an object, the disputants enjoy the option of justifying their
aesthetic claims by appealing to the perceptible nonaesthetic facts of the matter.
Margolis provides yet another gloss upon the notion that aesthetic qualities are
qualities of appearance in a way in which secondary qualities are not, when he provides
what he believes to be a factual description of the nature of aesthetic dispute. Margolis
observes that two persons may agree when it comes to describing all the nonaesthetic
features of an object, yet disagree regarding the aesthetic character of the object
concerned. Here, Margolis is not simply alluding to what was earlier described as the
"perceptually elusive" nature of aesthetic characterizations, the fact that thorough acts of
perception may fail to reveal the aesthetic qualities of an object. For the type of dispute
Margolis has in mind here is not one between an aesthetic sophisticate and an aesthetic
clod, between someone who perceives the gracefulness of a dance and someone who
fails to assign any aesthetic character at all to the dance. Rather, Margolis envisages a
dispute between two aesthetically sensitive perceivers who assign conflicting aesthetic
characterizations to the same object, as happens when one person judges a painting to be
garish where the other sees a composition that is vibrant, lively and full of vitality.
Margolis believes that aesthetic discourse tolerates and allows participants to defend
incompatible aesthetic characterizations, and the reason why he believes this is because he
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believes that the 'reasons' backing aesthetic judgements function as personal reasons,
binding only upon the speaker:
You may be prepared to say that you quite understand why, given my reasons,
I say (or 'see') the dance is (or 'as') graceful; but you do not find yourself
logically bound in any sense, having admitted the nonaesthetic qualities (which
I am advancing as reasons), to support or share my claim or judgment. In a
word, you insist that you appreciate things differently. You see why I say it is
graceful all right, but the qualities mentioned do not count as decisively for
grace for you as they do for me.34 [italics in text]
In line with Margolis' description of the nature of aesthetic dispute, someone might argue
that aesthetic judgements are judgements of appearance to the extent that these draw upon
what we might call 'personal' reasons, a form of reason-giving alien to the making of
colour-j udgements.
It might be suggested that the notion of a personal reason introduced here is
thoroughly unintelligible. A private reason of the sort Margolis envisages might serve as
some sort of psychological reassurance to the reason-giver, giving him the comforting
reflection "I have my reasons;" but this would not function as a reason in any intelligible
meaning of the word. Prima facie, to say that my reasons are private ones, reasons I
could never expect to apply to somone finding themselves in a specifiably similar
situation to the one I find myself in now, is to say that I have no reasons at all. Unless we
can make sense of the notion of a personal reason, we will be unable to make any sense
of Margolis' proposal.
To throw some light upon the notion of a personal reason as it operates in Margolis'
argument, consider how, in a very similar description of the nature of aesthetic dispute to
the one offered by Margolis, Jeffrey Olen characterises aesthetic descriptions as 'theories'
or 'interpretations' of works of art. Olen notes that whereas some of the terms employed
in aesthetic descriptions, terms such as 'red', 'large', 'straight', 'dark', and 'triangular',
would be agreed to by anyone who looks at the work, other terms occurring in aesthetic
descriptions, terms such as 'graceful', 'gay', 'powerful', 'sombre' and 'dainty', are
34 "Sibley on Aesthetic Perception", p. 157.
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'theory-laden' to the extent that people will only agree to these if they agree in their
interpretation of a work of art. To someone who views the Bridgewater Madonna as a
calm and serene work, the hands of the Madonna are expressive of tenderness. An
opponent might see the Madonna's hands as 'languid' and 'lifeless' because he views the
painting as a 'flat' and 'insipid' work. Olen uses examples of this type to suggest that
aesthetic terms do not apply to works of art independently of our interpretations of works
of art.35 In the unusually broad sense in which Olen uses the notion,36 an interpretation
of a work of art includes those all statements concerning the work that are intended to
form a coherent description of the work and intended to unify the work according to
aesthetic principles. Thus, statements regarding the 'meaning' or 'significance' of the
work, about the representational or suggestive functioning of the work form part of the
interpretation. In fact, almost anything intelligible we choose to say regarding a work of
art would, to Olen's way of thinking, constitute an interpretation. In another piece of
loose nomenclature, Olen dubs these interpretations of works of art 'theories'. In its role
as a theory, an interpretation of a work of art explains why a work has the qualities it
does, serves to unify the non-theory laden qualities of the work, and serves to
demonstrate that the theory-laden qualities 'posited' by the theory are suitably connected
to each other and to the non-theory laden qualities.37
Olen is happy to point out an obvious disanalogy obtaining between the notion of a
theory as it operates in science, and the aesthetic theories he describes. Olen suggests
that, unlike the theories of science which must meet standards of internal consistency and
explanatory coherence, no aesthetic theory counts as false simply because it contradicts
another aesthetic theory. Where two scientific theories are seen to be in conflict, we
preserve explanatory coherence in our total world view by judging one of those theories
to be false. In the aesthetic realm, we do not feel similarly constrained, in the interests of
preserving explanatory coherence, to decide upon the truth or falsity of conflicting
3 5 Jeffrey Olen, "Theories, Interpretations, and Aesthetic Qualities", JAAC, 35 (1977), 425-431; pp.427-
428.
36 See Olen, footnote 6, p.431.
37 Olen, p.428.
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aesthetic theories or interpretations.38 The explanatory coherence of our total world view
does not stand or fall according to whether two people agree that the hands of the
BridgewaterMadonna are 'tender' or 'insipid'. Olen's discussion of the nature of
aesthetic theories provides the following gloss upon the notion of a 'personal' reason.
To say that the reason underlying my aesthetic judgement is a personal one is to say that I
do not feel compelled, in the interests of preserving explanatory coherence, to defend my
reasons or to decide between my reasons and those of another person. The reasons
supporting my aesthetic judgements are personal reasons because, in aesthetic matters,
we agree to disagree. To adopt the manner of discussion that Margolis suggests, I might
listen as you describe the Bridgewater Madonna as 'flat' and 'insipid'. I might feel
moved to observe that for someone who views the work in those terms, the hands will
look 'languid' and 'lifeless'. I might even agree that describing the painting overall as
'flat' and 'insipid' is perfectly coherent with all the non-theory laden properties the work
possesses. And there I allow the matter to rest, resisting the urge to demonstrate to you
why treating the work as a timeless statement of serenity would lead to an even more
cogent explanation of the properties you describe, an explanation that might be utilized
with success in describing other works. For in matters of aesthetic opinion, we operate a
gentlemen's club agreement that there will be no entangling in messy aesthetic disputes
which can have no bearing upon those laws of mechanical explanation that dictate
whether or not I will be able to catch the bus on time tomorrow morning.
If this description carries an air of parody about it, I make no apology for the fact.
For what Margolis and Olen provide is not argument in favour of the relativity of
aesthetic description, but assertion of the conviction that all aesthetic judgement is
hopelessly relative in nature, and assertion of the accompanying conviction that the
participants to an aesthetic discussion will recognize the fact that no opinion is defensible,
and will adapt their rhetoric accordingly. Whilst it is no doubt true to say that the
explanatory coherence of our total world view does not stand or fall according to any
decision we make or fail to make concerning the hands of the Madonna, almost
38 Olen, p.429.
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everything else we might choose to say in the realm of aesthetic discussion does. Unless
we are willing to examine reasons, to consider whether those features of the work in
virtue of which I find the Madonna serene could function as serenity-making features in
other works of art, the very possibility of aesthetic discussion evaporates. What remains
in the place of discussion is the mere outward form of discussion, the diffident exchange
of observations, the sterile opportunity to talk at or past one another in a polite fashion,
that I have attributed to Margolis' account. To suppose that nothing else we say in the
realm of aesthetic discourse could possibly depend upon what you or I say concerning
the Bridgewater Madonna, is to assert without proof the hopelessly relative nature of
aesthetic dispute. The problem with Olen's proposal is that simply giving various
aesthetic attributions the grand-sounding name of'theories' or 'interpretations' of works
of art does not make them so. Far from being embarrassed by the obvious disanalogy that
obtains between the theories of science and the theories he describes, Olen uses the fact
that aesthetic theories are not subject to the constraints of explanatory coherence to
illustrate the relative nature of aesthetic judgement. It goes almost without saying that
those not already persuaded of the relative nature of aesthetic judgement would probably
use the same fact to demonstrate that the aesthetic 'interpretations' which Olen describes
do not function as 'theories' in any meaningful use of the word.
Another way of expressing dissatisfaction with the proposal put forward by
Margolis and Olen would be to point out that the assertion, that a determinate set of
nonaesthetic qualities counts for gracefulness for me but not for you, apparently violates
the intuition underlying the doctrine of aesthetic supervenience. Although the doctrine of
supervenience will be discussed in detail in the following section, it will be useful to
anticipate some findings here. The doctrine of aesthetic supervenience tells us that things
cannot vary aesthetically without varying nonaesthetically. It is a conceptual impossibility
that two things should be identical in every conceivable respect yet one be F and the other
not-F. In the event that Sally and Jane are indistinguishable in every way, then it is
impossible that Sally should be beautiful if Jane is not. Applying the same doctrine to a
situation where one object is viewed by different persons, then it is impossible that an
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object should change aesthetically between two perceivers unless the aesthetic change
happens to be accompanied by some nonaesthetic change in the situation. Although much
thought has been given in recent years to specifying the type of nonaesthetic change
which would accompany a change in aesthetic qualities, few if any writers would share
Margolis' belief that it requires nothing more than a change of perceiver to alter the
aesthetic characteristics of an object. One person who does make this claim is Marcia
Muelder Eaton. Eaton asserts "I do not have to believe that someone must differ
'sensibly' from me to grant that he or she may apply different, even contradictory
aesthetic terms to the same object or event. Even I myself may, staying sensibly the
same, come to apply different or contradictory terms myself to an object whose non-
aesthetic properties are stable."39 It is significant to note that Muelder Eaton actively
argues against the usefulness of the doctrine of supervenience. As I shall argue in the
next section, supervenience is best viewed, not as a doctrine concerning the dependency
of classes of qualities upon other classes of qualities, but as a doctrine describing some
minimum consistency requirement upon emergent or dependent properties. To treat
dependent qualities as qualities which may vary in their application from speaker to
speaker is to deprive these of the status of properties. I conclude that the aesthetic realist
will not rush to endorse that description of the nature of aesthetic discourse on offer from
Margolis or Olen or Eaton.
In summary, the fact that aesthetic qualities constitute qualities of appearance, and in
fact, the appearances of more fundamental qualities of appearance, drove us to question
the objective status of aesthetic judgements. I have not been able to find any good or
persuasive arguments supporting the contention that aesthetic judgements lack objectivity.
Those objecting to the claim that aesthetic qualities are 'objective' do so, either out of the
metaphysical conviction that these qualities are less 'real' than, say, primary qualities,
because unlike primary qualities, tertiary aesthetic qualities are not deemed an essential
ingredient in the scientific realist's description of the world; or because they tend to
confound two very different notions of objectivity. Here I have attempted to demonstrate
39 Marcia Muelder Eaton, "The Intrinsic, Non-Supervenient Nature of Aesthetic Qualities", JAAC, 52
(1994), 383-397, p.387.
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that disentangling the two species of objectivity and subjectivity which McDowell places
before us reveals the confusions underlying these objections. It is true to say that, qua
qualities of appearance, aesthetic qualities are not objective in the sense that these can be
adequately conceived without making reference to the way they present themselves to
perceivers. Nonetheless, the fact that an understanding of the nature of aesthetic qualities
makes essential reference to the representations of perceivers does nothing to demonstrate
that these are subjective in the sense of being nothing more than figments of perceivers'
perceptual representations. Nor does the fact that aesthetic qualities make essential
reference to the representations of perceivers undermine the possibility of achieving some
form of intersubjective agreement concerning the nature of these perceptual presentations.
That is to say, there is every reason to suppose that aesthetic qualities enjoy whatever
objectivity attaches to those other qualities of appearance with which we are familiar, the
so-called secondary qualities. Those claiming that aesthetic qualities lack the level of
objectivity attaching to secondary qualities do so for one of two reasons: because they
confuse in their own minds the two species of objectivity which McDowell has helped to
separate; or else because they believe that factually speaking, aesthetic descriptions do not
attract the same high level of intersubjective agreement afforded to secondary quality
descriptions. As we discovered in considering the proposals of Margolis and Olen, those
who adopt the second position do not offer arguments for their claim that aesthetic
judgements fail to attract intersubjective agreement, but instead assume the hopelessly
relative nature of aesthetic judgement, and adjust their own descriptions of the nature of
aesthetic discussion accordingly. In light of the inadequacies of these various lines of
argumentation, I conclude that there is every reason to suppose that aesthetic judgements
are no more, and no less, objective than secondary quality judgements.
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Ill
Where Sibley and his contemporaries tend to speak of aesthetic qualities depending
upon or emerging from the nonaesthetic qualities of an object, the current generation of
articles devoted to the topic of aesthetic attribution speak of aesthetic qualities
'supervening' upon a base of nonaesthetic qualities.40 Judging by the recent literature
devoted to the topic, no discussion adopting a realist stance upon the question of aesthetic
judgement would be complete which failed to pay some attention to the concept of
aesthetic supervenience. What is aesthetic supervenience, and why are aestheticians
determined to expend so much paper and breath on this topic? Does talk of supervenience
help to throw light upon the relationship of dependency between aesthetic qualities and
the nonaesthetic qualities these emerge from?
The doctrine of aesthetic supervenience states that two objects possessing precisely
the same nonaesthetic attributes will be indistinguishable with respect to their aesthetic
attributes. If we assume the nature of human sensibilities to be relatively fixed, it follows
that it in order to change the aesthetic attributes of a work of art it is necessary to change
at least some of the nonaesthetic attributes belonging to that work. The doctrine of
supervenience takes one of two forms. According to weak supervenience, if we assume a
complete, base description of a thing, B*, telling us everything that could be relevant to
determining its A-state, then necessarily if there is a thing which is B* and A, then
anything resembling it in being B* is like it in being A as well. Strong supervenience
40 Recent discussions include Jerrold Levinson, "Aesthetic Supervenience", reprinted in Music, Art and
Metaphysics: Essays on Philosophical Aesthetics (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990),
pp. 134-158; John Bender, "Supervenience and the Justification of Aesthetic Judgments", JAAC, 46
(1987), 31-40; Gregory Currie, "Supervenience, Essentialism and Aesthetic Properties", Philosophical
Studies, 58 (1990), 243-257; Marcia Mulder Eaton, "The Intrinsic, Non-Supervenient Nature of
Aesthetic Properties". These articles variously derive an understanding of the nature of supervenience from
the work of Simon Blackburn and Jaegwon Kim, including: Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Word:
Groundings in the Philosophy ofLanguage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), esp.pp. 181-189;
Simon Blackburn, "Supervenience Revisited", in Essays on Moral Realism, ed. G.Sayre-McCord (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1988), PP.59-75; Jaegwon Kim, "Supervenience and Nomological
Incommensurables", APQ, 15 (1978), 149-156; Jaegwon Kim, "Concepts of Supervenience", PPR, 45
(1984), 153-176. The account of supervenience developed in this section is derived almost entirely from
Simon Blackburn's discussion in Spreading the Word.
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states that necessarily, if a thing is B*, it is A.41 Strong supervenience differs from weak
in ruling out the possibility that there are things which are B* and not -A. For weak
supervenience recognizes the possibility that, whilst the world as we know it is such that
human beings regard things which are B* as being A, things might have been so
constituted that human beings reacted to things that are B* as if they were not-A. That is
to say, whereas strong supervenience functions as a ban upon possible worlds in which
things are B* and not-A, weak supervenience permits the existence of worlds differing
from our own in this respect. What weak supervenience bans is the existence of 'mixed'
worlds, worlds in which there are both things which are B* and A, and things which are
B* and not-A.42 Weak supervenience simply points out that, as the facts now obtain for
use, once we have discovered one thing that is B* and A, we can expect to find that
anything else that is B* will also be A.
The following intuition suggests that it is appropriate to adopt the weak rather than
the strong form of the supervenience relationship in the aesthetic case. Whilst it seems
conceptually or logically necessary that two things sharing a total basis of natural
properties should possess the same aesthetic properties, it does not seem to be a matter of
conceptual or logical necessity that any given total natural state of a thing should give it
some particular aesthetic property rather than another.43 As John Bender points out, if
our cognitive, sensory, and emotive faculties were significantly different from what they
are, then facts about the aesthetic properties of objects would be altered. Bender
illustrates this point by suggesting that, if human colour vision were very much more
sensitive to greens than to yellows, the interplay of colours in a Cezanne still life would
no longer be subtle.44 Weak supervenience is coherent with the fact that which aesthetic
qualities happen to be matched with which total natural states would appear to be a matter
for empirical rather than conceptual investigation. Accepting weak over strong
supervenience also allows us to articulate the nature of that form of objectivity enjoyed by
aesthetic qualities. As demonstrated in the previous section of this chapter, to say that an
41 Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Word, p. 183.
42 Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Word, pp. 183-184.
43 Blackburn, p. 184.
44 John Bender, "Supervenience and the Justification of Aesthetic Judgments", p.37.
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aesthetic quality A is objective is not to say that things which are B* would continue to be
A in the absence of all sentient beings. Nor is it to say, as strong supervenience suggests,
that things which are B* would be A for all sentient beings in all possible worlds.
Rather, to say that aesthetic qualities are objective is to say that they are there to be
perceived as opposed to being figments of the subjective states of which they purport to
be experiences. It is to say that aesthetic qualities are qualities of appearance which are
qualities of stable appearance, presenting themselves to all or most similarly constituted
perceivers in the same way. Talk of weak supervenience captures the objectivist claim
that once we know that things which are B* seem A to reliable perceivers, we can stably
predict the same correlation between B* and A for other reliable perceivers within a
possible world.
The question naturally arises, what attributes belong to the supervenience base for an
aesthetic attribute? Jerrold Levinson divides the potential candidates for the supervenience
base for a given aesthetic attribute between three categories: the structural, the
substructural, and the contextual. Levinson defines a structural attribute as a perceivable
attribute, and a substructural attribute as any physical attribute that is not perceivable, in
the sense that it is not discernible from an alternative at the same level of of specificity.
Thus, if the copy of an original painting contains a line 6 centimetres in length where
there is a 5 centimeter line in the original, this would amount to a structural difference
between the pictures. If on the other hand, the line in the copy was precisely 5.0005
centimetres in length, then this would amount to a substructural difference, and 'having a
line exactly 5.0005 centimetres long in the upper right corner' would count as a
substructural attribution. Contextual attributes include any "appreciatively important
relation of the object to the artistic context in which it occurs,"45 and would include such
attributes as being painted by Mondrian, being in a certain genre, being influenced by the
Mona Lisa.
Intuitively, one would expect to operate with the notion of weak supervenience as
follows. You specify B* by specifying a set of attributes in a given object responsible for
45 "Aesthetic Supervenience", p. 135. See also "Aesthetic Uniqueness", also reprinted in Music, Art and
Metaphysics, pp. 113-115.
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the A-ness of the object. You project that anything else discovered to be B* must also
count as A, accepting at the same time that counterfactually speaking, had things been
different, you might have been matching some other A with B*. The most likely-looking
candidates for base properties underlying those A qualities which do not vary between the
perceivers within a possible world are structural attributes.The assumption would
therefore be that, in the terminology provided by Levinson, aesthetic properties are
'centrally supervenient' upon structural rather than substructural or contextual
attributes.46 The claim that aesthetic attributes are centrally supervenient upon structural
attributes reflects the fact that we are more likely to discriminate aesthetically between two
works of art in the event that the works were perceptibly, rather than imperceptibly,
different. It further reflects the fact that that two works of art might differ substructurally
- say, by differing in their chemical composition - without differing either structurally or
aesthetically.
The problem with claiming that the aesthetic attributes of a work of art are centrally
supervenient upon the structural attributes is that, whilst it is true to say that substructural
differences failing to issue in structural differences will probably not influence the
aesthetic attributes of works, it is far from obvious that contextual factors play little or no
role in determining aesthetic character. Kendall Walton demonstrates the contextually
sensitive nature of aesthetic qualities when he argues that those aesthetic properties we
perceive to be present in a work of art will be determined in part by the category to which
the work belongs. This is because the category under which a work of art is subsumed
determines which features belonging to the work are seen as standard and which are seen
as variable for that kind. Those features taken to be variable for an artwork of that kind
will be judged to be the noteworthy or expressive features of the work, those contributing
to its perceived aesthetic character. Walton illustrates this point by imagining a society
lacking the established medium of painting but which produces guernicas, an artform
consisting of versions of Picasso's "Guernica" done in various bas-relief dimensions.47
Whereas the flatness of "Guernica" is a feature we judge to be standard to paintings and
46 Levinson, "Aesthetic Supervenience", p. 136.
47 Kendall L. Walton, "Categories of Art", PR, 79 (1970), 334-367, p.347.
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therefore tend to overlook in determining the aesthetic character of Picasso's painting, the
same feature becomes the most noteworthy and expressive characteristic in a society
familiar only with bas-relief guernicas. Whereas we see "Guernica" as violent, dynamic,
vital, disturbing; to those seeing it as a guernica, Picasso's picture will appear to be cold,
serene, bland and lifeless.
Some have wished to argue that it is not only the nonaesthetic structural properties
that a thing possesses which determine its aesthetic qualities; but that the situation in
which an object is viewed, as well as the nature of those doing the viewing, could play
some part in determining aesthetic character. For Walton, the categories to which we
assign works of art are not interpretations or theories in the attenuated sense employed by
Jeffrey Olen, but reflect the cumulative art experiences of specific social groups. That is
to say, Walton's suggestion that the aesthetic qualities of a work depend upon the
category under which the work is seen reflects the fact that both the art-historical context
of a work, as well as the art-historical experiences of different perceivers, may influence
the aesthetic qualities thought to belong to a work of art. Gregory Currie takes up
Walton's theme when he suggests that aesthetic properties depend upon 'historical'
properties which might include relations to individuals, the community, and to other
works of art. In some cases, the aesthetic impact of a work will partially depend upon the
originality assigned to the work, where being original is a matter of being significantly
different from other works available at the time.48 Arguing in a similar vein to Currie, one
might observe that a perceiver with a wide and varied experience of art objects is less
likely to assign properties of originality to each new work of art that comes along, than is
a naive perceiver who has witnessed far fewer works and artistic genres. Currie
demonstrates the falsity of the claim that aesthetic qualities are centrally supervenient
upon structural properties by pointing out that even those A-properties most plausibly
thought to be dependent upon structure alone - such properties as beauty, dynamism,
vibrancy - are partially dependent upon historical properties. A work which strikes us as
'vibrant' or 'dynamic' would not so strike us if we saw it as merely repeating a formula
48 Gregory Currie, "Supervenience, Essentialism, and Aesthetic Properties", p.248.
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exemplified by countless other works with which we were already familiar.49 The
dispute between those believing that more than the structural properties of works
determine their aesthetic character, and those who believe that aesthetic properties are
centrally supervenient upon structural properties, amounts to the dispute between those
adopting the wide notion of the term 'aesthetic', and those adopting Sibley's narrower
use of the term.
John Bender draws attention to the fact that, once you set about specifying the
supervenience base for a given A, it is difficult to know where to stop. Bender argues
that, however we decide to specify the supervenience base for an aesthetic attribute A in a
work of art s , we cannot reduce the notion of aesthetic supervenience to one of aesthetic
determination. This is because the supervenience base for A inevitably includes more than
those properties of v thought to determine its A-ness. Bender reasons that an
interpretation of the supervenience base which leaves outside of the base properties any
which could defeat the A-ness of 5 while being compatible with those properties
mentioned in the base "will violate the logical claim which supervenience makes, namely,
that indiscernibility in regard to the base insures indiscernibility in regard to supervenient
properties."50 For this reason, the supervenience base for A must include not only all the
positive, A-making properties belonging to 5, but the complements of whatever A-
defeating properties 5 lacks. Bender points out that the metal version of Brancusi's
sculpture Bird in Space has a 'rarified calm and elegance' deriving from its seamless,
polished surface, its tapered and flowing form, its ratio of height to base, the purity and
coolness of its materials. The base description for the elegance of Brancusi's sculpture
must include these elegance-making properties, but also such properties as the fact that
the sculpture is not smeared with blood after the manner of the works of Soutine.
Bender is right to suggest that the notion of aesthetic supervenience does not capture
the notion of aesthetic determination. To argue that the supervenience base for A should
include only those properties of 5 directly responsible for A is to project or predict laws
of correspondence between aesthetic and nonaesthetic qualities. This moves in the
49 Gregory Currie, pp.255-256.
50 "Supervenience and the Justification of Aesthetic Judgments", p.34.
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direction of the formula of strong supervenience, towards the notion that there exist
essential connections between sets of nonaesthetic properties and particular aesthetic
properties in all possible worlds. Weak supervenience makes the more modest claim that
whatever else besides s happens to meet the situation before me now, the situation
bringing about the A-ness of s, must also count as A. Yet clearly, the more accurately and
clearly I specify the conditions which must stay the same to bring about A, the less likely
it will be that anything besides s can fulfil those conditions. If the supervenience base for
A must include every conceivable factor in the current situation contributing to the A-ness
of s, it follows that the supervenience base must list historical as well as structural
properties. As Currie points out, this means that at the end of the day, the works being
compared for A-ness will be works which originated in the same community from the
hand of the same artist, displaying the same relations of precedence and influence to other
works. That is to say, the works being compared will be numerically identical with one
another. Because weak supervenience collapses into the tautology that identical things
have identical properties, Currie concludes that weak supervenience is an uninformative
and uninteresting claim.51
MarciaMuelder Eaton has suggested that the notion of supervenience is of dubious
value to aesthetics. This is because, according to Muelder Eaton, epistemological
questions concerning the justification of aesthetic attributions receive little illumination
from introducing what is a primarily metaphysical notion describing how certain
properties depend for their existence upon others.52 As it happens, a large part of
Mueldcr Eaton's hostility to the concept of aesthetic supervenience can be attributed to the
fact that Muelder Eaton believes that there is no intuitive distinction to be made between
aesthetic qualities and those nonaesthetic qualities upon which they supervene. Muelder
Eaton replaces the notion of an aesthetic quality as Sibley uses the term with the notion of
a quality that has been appreciated aesthetically. That is to say, for Muelder Eaton, an
aesthetic quality is any quality that has been elevated into an object of aesthetic
appreciation by a perceiver. Even a supposedly nonaesthetic quality such as a colour has
51 Gregory Currie, pp.248-249.
52 Marcia Muelder Eaton, "The Intrinsic, Non-Supervenient Nature of Aesthetic Properties", p.39I.
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the potential to be elevated into an object of aesthetic appreciation in a suitable context and
thereby function as an aesthetic quality.53 That having been said, John Bender's
demonstration that aesthetic determination does not coincide with the notion of aesthetic
supervenience, apparently endorses Marcia Muelder Eaton's suggestion that
supervenience captures a metaphysical rather than an epistemological notion of
dependency. I would suggest that the doctrine of weak supervenience does function as a
metaphysical notion, one serving to lay out the consequences of a certain form of
metaphysical understanding. That is to say, talk of aesthetic supervenience lays out the
scientific realist's view of how aesthetic qualities should relate to his base description of
the world. The scientific realist regards aesthetic qualities as queer entities unnecessary to
his own world view. In laying out a supervenience requirement placing a ban upon mixed
worlds, the scientific realist specifies those conditions under which he would tolerate talk
of aesthetic qualities as an addendum to his base description of the world. The scientific
realist does not pretend to explain or predict whatever matches might obtain between
these queer entities and the properties in his base description. He simply demands that, if
and where and when a match has been established between some B* and some A, the
match should be carried through consistently if A is to be accorded the status of a
property-concept. Talk of supervenience does lay down a type of minimum property
behaviour for aesthetic attributions, no doubt making it attractive to those aesthetic realists
looking to accord our aesthetic attributions the status of property terms. However, if the
doctrine of supervenience is nothing more than a statement of grudging tolerance on the
part of the scientific realist for those properties which he has chosen to exclude from his
base-level description of the world, then talk of supervenience in the aesthetic realm
becomes an empty intellectual exercise, an attempt on the part of the aesthetic realist to
court the approval of the scientific realist by adopting the rhetoric of the latter. I concur
with Marcia Muelder Eaton's assertion that the notion of supervenience has no real role to
play in the area of aesthetics, that this notion can tell us very little concerning the
53 See "The Intrinsic, Non-Supervenient Nature of Aesthetic Properties", esp. p.390.
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relationship between aesthetic properties and the nonaesthetic properties from which they
emerge.
IV
At the end of the second chapter,54 I described how Sibley's belief that aesthetic
sensitivity constitutes something like a perceptual capacity led him to endorse a version of
the commonsense understanding of the relative distribution of aesthetic competence. This
commonsense model, it will be recalled, describes a population ranged along a scale of
aesthetic competence, with those incapable of forming any aesthetic judgements at all -
the so-called 'aesthetic clods' - occupying the lower end of the scale, the aesthetic experts
or those possessing 'taste' occupying the top end, and Everyman ranging somewhere
between the two. Everyman would represent that majority of the population who, though
not excluded in principle from forming aesthetic judgements, would display their
aesthetic competence on a less frequent basis than those judged to be aesthetically adept. I
made the suggestion that this commonsense understanding of the relative distribution of
taste reflects and parallels our understanding of the relative distribution of ordinary
perceptual competence. That is to say, operating within a given parameter of sensory
experience, we understand the concept of a person incapable of producing adequate
perceptual judgements within that parameter; the concept of an averagely competent
perceptual performance; and the concept of an extraordinarily sensitive performance.
How closely Sibley follows this commonsense model of the distribution of taste is
difficult to say. Certainly, Sibley admits the existence of persons occupying either end of
the scale, clods and persons of taste. The confusion arises over whether Sibley believes
that the possession of taste is an all-or-nothing affair. If taste is something you either
have or you don't, then the population must be divided between the sensitive and the
54 See above, pp. 107-109.
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clodish, with nothing in between. However, if persons may possess different degrees of
taste, then we would expect to discover persons existing between the two extremes of the
scale, persons capable of demonstrating aesthetic sensitivity only some of the time. That
Sibley assumes the latter is suggested by the contrast Sibley draws between the
agreement that exists within the population over coloured judgements, and the agreement
that exists over aesthetic determinations. Sibley acknowledges that whereas the majority
of humankind agree in their colour judgements, when it comes to aesthetic dispute we
find a small 'nucleus' of those more or less agreeing in their aesthetic attributions,
surrounded by a "large and variable penumbra consisting of groups exhibiting partial and
merging areas of agreement corresponding to what we ordinarily call areas of limited
sensibility and levels of sophistication".55 I shall therefore assume that Sibley does
endorse a version of the commonsense view. In light of the theory of aesthetic judgement
developed in the first section of this chapter, it is now possible to assess the accuracy of
Sibley's picture of the relative distribution of taste.
However closely Sibley follows the commonsense model of the relative distribution
of taste, what is beyond dispute is that Sibley broadly distinguishes between those who
possess and those who lack taste. If his description of the relative distribution of coloured
perception reflects his understanding of the relative distribution of aesthetic competence,
then Sibley believes that those who possess taste represent a minority of all perceivers.
The notion that aesthetic sensitivity is confined to a gifted elite is premised upon the
perceptually elusive nature of aesthetic characteristics. As argued in the first section of
this chapter, the perceptually elusive nature of aesthetic characteristics is something of a
myth. Aesthetic characteristics only elude us during the course of ordinary acts of
perception if we choose to adopt an artificial perceptual attitude which consciously
excludes them. The perceiver who perceives and perceives thoroughly without noticing
aesthetic characteristics is not the ordinary perceiver who lacks 'taste', but someone who
adopts the artificial perceptual perspective of the scientifically detached observer, a
perspective that encourages her to ignore the aesthetic aspects given directly to ordinary
55 Frank Sibley, "Objectivity and Aesthetics", PAS, Supp. Vol. 42 (1968), 31-72, p.47.
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acts of perception. If what I have argued is correct, what Sibley characterizes as 'taste'
amounts in a large part to a sensitivity to the perceptual character of the things we
perceive, a form of awareness which might enter the content of any and every act of
perception. It follows that anyone capable of perceiving not only possesses the capacity
to form aesthetic judgements, but necessarily entertains ideas concerning the aesthetic or
perceptual characters of objects in the course of ordinary acts of perception. We should
expect to find a majority of persons capable, in principle if not always in practice, both of
determining the perceptual character of the objects they perceive, and of using an aesthetic
vocabulary with some success. That is to say, any attempt to treat taste as a broadly
perceptual capacity should place the capacity for aesthetic judgement within the province
of Everyman, rather than the province of a few gifted individuals.
To reject the perceptually elusive nature of aesthetic characteristics is to reject the
notion that there could be 'ordinary' perceivers who lack altogether the capacity to form
aesthetic judgements. It follows that the greatest problem with Sibley's reworking of the
commonsense view of the distribution of taste rests in the person of the aesthetic clod.
The notion of the clod is, of course, premised upon the perceptually elusive nature of
aesthetic characteristics. Sibley conceives the aesthetic clod as a person who demonstrates
considerable competence when it comes to detecting nonaesthetic qualities, yet little or no
competence in detecting aesthetic features. Conceived in these terms, the notion of the
clod is incoherent. We can make sense of a person whose 'clodishness' was confined to
some areas of her aesthetic experience; and we would attribute her insensitivity in those
areas to some underlying perceptual deficiency. The element of truth contained in the
commonsense view that the relative distribution of aesthetic competence reflects the
relative distribution of ordinary perceptual sensitivity amounts to this: that those
individuals displaying an incapacity in some basic parameter of sensory experience are
thereby excluded from forming whatever aesthetic judgements might rely upon the
exercise of that capacity. Thus, the aesthetic character of colours would elude someone
who was colour-blind, who could not identify the 'face' that a colour possesses for the
perceiver, could not experience the warm liveliness of one colour, the cold passivity of
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another. Admittedly, this basic incapacity would have a knock-on effect in preventing the
individual concerned from recognizing whatever compositional aesthetic qualities
emerged from an awareness of the aesthetic character of perceived colour. However,
colour-blindness in itself would not be sufficient to render somone an aesthetic clod
across all areas of aesthetic experience. Colour-blindness would not prevent the afflicted
individual from forming visual aesthetic judgements which did not rely upon the ability to
detect colour. Nor would it deprive her of the ability to form ideas concerning the
aesthetic character of musical sound - unless, of course, she had the misfortune to be
tone-deaf as well as colour-blind. Thus, whilst it is possible to make sense of the notion
that someone could be an aesthetic 'clod' across some part of her sensory experience, it is
not possible to imagine that someone could function as an aesthetic clod in all areas of her
experience. We may lay it down as a law: the person who cannot perceive any aesthetic
characteristics whatsoever is the person who lacks the ability to perceive.
Sibley conceives the clod, not as someone displaying a deficiency in ordinary
perceptual competence, but as someone displaying a form of aspect-blindness. The
question arises whether the clod's aspect-blindness is a general aspect blindness,
extending to all emergent or gestalt qualities; or whether her aspect-blindness is confined
to those aspects amounting to aesthetic characteristics. Neither of these options bears up
under scrutiny. Arguably, someone who was blind to all perceptual gestalt qualities
would have experiences that were chaotic and quite unlike our own. Such an individual
would be confined to experiencing the world as a series of sense data, and would never
form recognizable perceptual judgements. She might experience a piece of music as a
sequence of sounds, but not as a melody moving through space, rising and falling,
posessing rhythmic qualities. Being blind to all emergent qualities, the clod would fail to
recognize those things most crucial to her survival in the world - the friendliness in one
face, the menace in another. On the other hand, to suggest that the clod's aspect-
blindness is confined to a failure to detect all and only aesthetic qualities is to paint a
picture of perceptual and linguisitic schizophrenia. It seems improbable, to say the least,
that the clod would be capable of noticing the soaring quality of a bird in flight, but that
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no amount of training could bring her to see that a gothic spire or a soprano vocal line
possess a perceptual character suitably described as 'soaring'. Nor does it seem
reasonable to suppose that the clod could recognize the menace in the face of an assailant,
but that no amount of introspecting upon the character of her experiences could bring her
to hear the menace in the music accompanying the Sacristan's entrance in Act One of
Tosca. As the discussion of Arnheim's theory of physiognomic perception brought to
light, we would be suspicious of anyone who, whilst laying claim to competence in
applying emotion terms to persons, showed no ability to apply the same terms to works
of art or parts of nature. I suggested that part of the reason we would be baffled to
discover someone who lacked this wider competence is because part of the process of
acquiring an emotion concept involves recognizing how the same concept applies to the
appearances of inanimate things. I also suggested that an ability to recognize the latter
might well predate the ability to recognize the former in the developing individual. Very
similar observations might be made concerning those aesthetic attributions failing to
employ emotion terms. It seems unlikely that someone could have acquired the concept of
'soaring' in the flight of a bird without being able simultaneously to recognize a 'soaring'
character in a cathedral spire or a musical line. It is doubtful we would be willing to say
that the individual who lacked the ability to apply the term 'soaring' to all three cases truly
possessed the concept of soaringness. We would certainly question Sibley's claim that
such an individual was displaying a form of ordinary (nonaesthetic) perceptual or
linguistic competence.
I recommend that we think of Sibley's aesthetic clod less as a creature of flesh and
blood and more as a theoretical construct. That is to say, talk of aesthetic clods does not
serve to describe a type of aesthetic perceiver we might meet up with in the flesh. Instead,
the notion of the aesthetic clod functions as a pedagogical device, one allowing Sibley to
highlight, by its absence in certain perceivers, that part of our perceptual and language-
using competence that is of most interest to the philosophical aesthetician. If the aesthetic
clod looks to be someone we might meet in the flesh, this is owing to an unfortunate
tendency on the part of most people to assume that what I have called 'scientific'
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perception, a perceptual sensitivity to the world which strives to eliminate our awareness
of the perceptual character of thing, represents our bedrock perceptual rapport with the
world. In the event that full-blooded perception amounted to the ability to register all and
only nonaesthetic qualities, then not only would we find in existence persons displaying
no sensitivity to the perceptual character of things, but these creatures would count as
ordinary perceivers. At the same time, anyone displaying a sensitivity to what I have
called perceptual character would be deemed to display more than ordinary competence as
a perceiver.
At this point, the reader might well question whether, in opening up the ability to
perceive aesthetically to every perceiver, I haven't succeeded in obliterating the natural
distinction that exists between those who are and those who are not aesthetically adept. I
would argue that, far from obliterating this distinction, I have managed to demonstrate
where the true nature of the distinction lies. The aesthetically competent individual is not,
as Sibley suggests, someone displaying hyper-sensitive powers of sensory
discrimination who manages to notice things that others overlook. The aesthetically adept
perceiver is someone alive to perceptual character, someone who is aware at all times of
what it is like to perceptually engage with things. The difference between the aesthetically
adept and the less adept reflects the extent to which different individuals bring the
aesthetic character of things to the forefront of their consciousness during ordinary acts of
perception. Where we do discover differences in aesthetic competence between
individuals, these amount to differences in linguistic competence as much as differences
in experiential sensitivity. The aesthetically competent are the linguistically competent,
those who display their competence as much in the language that they use, the ability to
re-employ the language of perceptible character to describe perceptual character, as they
do in the number and the type of experiences they enjoy. A very large part of the
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